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Abstract 
A study of transgender embodiment provides a unique vantage point from which to 
examine how people take up, and are constituted by, ideas about sex and gender. 
Discontinuities between the anatomical bodies and social identities of transgendered 
people trouble conventional understandings about bodies and selves. At the same 
time people who use gender reassignment technologies attach considerable authority 
to normalising discourses about bodies and identities, masculinity and femininity. 
This thesis explores subjectivity, agency, citizenship and community through 
analyses of conversations with 'transgendered' people in Australia and New Zealand. 
The thesis consists of distinct but interrelated essays that explore the relationship 
between global technologies and the local achievement of identities. It illustrates how 
conversations about identity in transgendered social spaces are also discussions about 
the medicalisation of sex and gender and the social/institutional expectations 
associated with particular gender identities. Attention to the situated dimensions of 
social interaction suggests that it is not just discourses, but also corporeality and 
spaces, that make certain subject positions available to actors. Holding 'public stories' 
and the particularistic features of personal narratives in play, I argue that both 
stories and identities emerge from interaction - shifting and changing according to 
the spaces and times in which they are embedded. 
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Mutable bodies constructed genders: 
An introduction 
Gender, not religion, is the opiate of the masses. 
Erving Goffman (1997 [1977]: 203)1 
Of all forms of "hidden persuasion", the most implacable is the one exerted, 
quite simply, by the order of things. 
Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wac quant, 1992, 168 italics in 
the origina1)2 
On sex and gender 
How are sociologists to make sense of sex and gender? At the turn of the 
millennium, understandings of sexual difference are the subject of considerable 
historical, medical, cultural, linguistic and academic uncertainty. Historical and cross-
cultural diversity (Bullough, 1976; Kessler and McKenna, 1978; Laqueur, 1987, 1990; 
Martin, 1987; Herdt, 1993; Lorber, 1994; Nicholson, 1995; Connell, 1995; Hood-
Williams, 1996; Lindemann, 1997) in the configuration of gender categories and 
identities has significantly challenged the notion that Western binary categories 
associated with sexual difference are natural and not subject to change. Public 
narratives3 and common-sense understandings of sexual difference frequently confuse 
and disrupt academic and scientific distinctions between sex and gender (Pringle, 
1992: 89; Nicholson, 1995: 39; Haraway, 1991: 130; Scott, 1999, 71). Attention to 
hormones and genetics within medicine has blurred the categories and boundaries of 
physiological gender determination so that there appears to be as much variation 
1 From 'The Arrangement Between the Sexes'. 
2 From 'An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology'. 
3 Public narratives transcend the individual; they are the cultural stereotypes that exist in the wider 
communities of interpretation through which stories circulate (Somers, 1992, 1994; Plummer, 1995). 
Public narratives are discussed further in Chapter Two. 
1 
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within the categories of male and female as there are differences between them 
(Esptein, 1990; Fausto-Sterling, 1993; Garber, 1992: 106; Lorber, 1994; Cream, 1995; 
Hood-Williams, 1996; Connell, 1999). Confusion in the use of sex and gender (Scott, 
1999: 71- 72), and the multiplication of biological categories of sexual difference 
within medicine (Butler, 1990; Fausto-Sterling, 1993), parallels changes in academic 
thinking about sex and gender as the post-structuralist turn in the humanities calls into 
question old certainties associated with biology and identity. 
Post-structuralist theory posits that the categories of sex and gender are discursively 
produced and legitimated through the oppositional relationship that is constructed by 
the respective alignments of sex and gender with nature and culture.4 Sex, or 
biological differences between women and men, is a product of scientific and cultural 
understandings about the relationship between anatomy and social gender. Donna 
Haraway (1991: 134), for example, argues that 'biology has tended to denote the body 
itself rather than a social discourse that is open to intervention'. Haraway (1991: 134) 
argues that feminist scholarship needs to critically interrogate 'how bodies, including 
sexualised and racialised bodies, appear as objects of knowledge and sites of 
intervention in 'biology". Judith Butler also argues that sets of understandings about 
sexual difference are constructed through a complex set of circular relationships 
between the body, sex, gender, heterosexual hegemony and language. Following 
Foucault, Butler (1990: viii) explores the way that sex, like gender, is culturally 
constructed through the 'effects of institutions, practices and discourses'. For Butler the 
cultural construction of sexual difference means that the representation of biological 
sex as foundational, natural and inevitable is no longer tenable. Moreover, Butler 
(1990: 7) argues that 'the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no 
distinction at all'. More recently, in the contemporary Western world, transsexual and 
transgender bodies and identities further complicate linguistic, medical, cultural and 
4 Historically feminists have understood sex to be foundational, while gender is said to be culturally 
produced (Lindemann, 1997: 73). Simone de Beauvoir (1953: 19), for example, argued that the division 
of the sexes is explained as a biological fact because it did not occur as the result of a known historical 
event. According to this view, sex refers to biology, anatomy, hormones and genetics. Biological sex 
forms the basis for differences between males and females. Genderrefers to social and cultural 
distinctions between men and women (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 172; Nicholson, 1995: 39-41; 
Hood-Williams, 1996; Hawkesworth, 1997: 650; Aalten, 1997: 45; Witz, 2000: 2-4). These differences 
mark bodies in terms of body shape, appearance, dress and ways of moving about in the world (Bourdieu, 
1977; Bartley, 1988; Bordo, 1993a, 1993c). Biological sex is understood as a base on which gender is 
constructed. The location of sexual difference in biology, which is understood as linear, universal and 
transhistorical, enables an explanation of social differences between the sexes in terms of 'natural' and 
therefore unchangeable human behaviour (Game, 1991: 33; Vance, 1992: 132). 
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academic meamngs and categories associated with sexual difference. Despite these 
challenges, the durability of sex and gender categories is apparent in contemporary 
Western societies which continue to privilege two sexes and two genders. 
Epistemological challenges to the meanings and categories associated with sexual 
difference provided the context for this project. In 1995, when I began work on 
aspects of transgender embodiment, I was interested in how the lines of connection 
between anatomy, social gender and (hetero)sexuality are challenged and maintained. 
The politics of transgendered lives provided an ideal site for an analysis of those 
connections. As a previously lesbian-identified female-to-male transgender friend 
commented recently: "Forget homophobia! Gender discrimination is something else'. 
My friend's exasperated comments refer to his experience of the assumed naturalness 
of binary gender categories in everyday locations which obliges transgendered people 
to 'pass' as normatively gendered in order to avoid verbal and physical harassment 
(Namaste, 1996a: 226). Why are identities that do not take the biological body as their 
ontological basis so threatening to so many people? How was I to understand and 
represent the experiences of transgendered people who participated in the research? In 
what ways are the narratives of people who identify as transsexual or transgendered 
consistent with contemporary feminist theories about sexual difference? This thesis 
presents a partial response to these questions. 
A study of transgender embodiment provides a unique vantage point from which to 
examine why gender categories have proved enduring and persuasive despite the 
challenges outlined above. This thesis examines how gender is crafted in the day-to-
day practices of those with transgendered bodies. It explores how conversations about 
identity, in transgendered social spaces, are also discussions about the medicalisation of 
sex and gender and the sociallinstitutional expectations associated with particular 
gender identities. Discontinuities between the anatomical bodies and social identities of 
transgendered people call into question conventional understandings about bodies and 
selves. At the same time, people who use gender reassignment technologies attach 
considerable authority to normalising discourses about bodies and identities, 
masculinity and femininity. Individuals whose experiences embody these contradictions 
provide an opportunity for the analyses of subjectivity, agency, citizenship and 
community offered in the thesis. 
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A central theme within the thesis is the way personal narratives about transgender 
embodiment may be brought into conversation with both sociological and feminist 
post-structuralist theories about agency, corporeality and subjectivity. Stories, contexts 
and bodies are important to the representation of a gendered self. Holding 'public 
stories' and the particularistic features of narratives in play, I argue that both stories 
and identities emerge from interaction - shifting and changing according to the spaces 
and times in which they are embedded. Attention to the situated dimensions of social 
interaction suggests that it is not just discourses, but also corporeality and spaces that 
make certain subject positions available to actors. The liminality (Urry, 1990; Turner, 
1979; Bowie, 2000)5 of people who identify as transsexual or transgendered allows 
them to reflect on the social construction of gender identity. Rather than being an 
exception to binary notions of gender, transgender narratives are able to illuminate the 
complex interaction between bodies and gendered conventions. It is therefore possible 
to see transgender bodies and identities, not as peripheral to binary notions of gender, 
but as examples of how gender identities come to be codified, constructed and crafted 
through the everyday practices of individuals. 
At the core of the thesis are conversations with twenty-four people who craft sexed 
identities6 while occupying bodies that disrupt conventional expectations about 
anatomy and social gender. 7 My interest is in exploring the tacit social agreements 
involved in common-sense understandings of sexual difference that are articulated by 
people for whom sex and gender categories are problematic. This research has focused 
on what Howard Becker (1998: 214) refers to as "looking for exceptions" and "looking 
5 Bowie (2000: 168) defines liminality as 'the middle stage of a rite of passage; anti-structural, 
ambiguous, creative'. Turner (1979: 234-235) identifies the following characteristics as typical of 
liminality - a blurring of the boundaries between male and female; the use of ordeals and humiliations 
that symbolize the 'process' of 'transformation' that is marked by a transition between opposing states -
the having been and the becoming. These characteristics may also be applied to people who transition 
across binalY gender categories. 
G Sexed identities refers to sets of understandings about lines of connection between anatomy and social 
gender. 
7 The thesis draws on the stories of twenty-four transgendered research participants living in 
Christchurch, New Zealand and three Aush'alian cities during 1996 and 1997. Interview material from 
these different research sites is included in most of the thesis chapters. Chapters Eight and Nine are based 
solely on interviews with people living in New South Wales, Aush'alia. New Zealand participants were 
obtained through personal contacts. Australian participants were recruited through email, advertising, 
leaving copies of the information sheet at the Gender Centre, and attending social gatherings and 
conferences. Contacts with potential participants were also made through research participants who 
arranged inh'oductions to other people who agreed to participate in the research. The research process is 
discussed in detail in Chapter Three. 
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for things that don't fit". In this regard, the thesis is not meant to 'represent' the 
experiences, discourses and practices of people who identify as transsexual or 
transgendered. Instead of generalising from my interview material, I use specific pieces 
of interview text to think through theoretical and cultural understandings about sex, 
gender and transsexualism that are manifest in feminist analyses (Raymond, 1980; 
Butler, 1993; Hausman, 1992; 1995), medical discourses (DSM-IV, 1994; McConaghy, 
1993) and common-sense understandings about sexual difference. This approach to 
investigating the complexity of sexual differences involved pursuing a qualitative, 
interview-based research project. 
Stories are specific to a particular time and place. My immersion in particular social 
and geographical contexts provided access to the insights relating to sex/gender, 
agency, selves and community that are presented in this thesis. Three events framed the 
narratives of the Australian people who participated in this study. The first of these 
events was the passing of the Transgender Anti-Discrimination legislation in June 1996. 
This legislation allowed post-operative transsexuals born in New South Wales to change 
the sex designation on their birth certificates. It also gave all people living in New South 
Wales who transition across binary gender categories legal redress against 
discrimination in important areas such as employment and housing. Second; on-going 
political debates in the 'transgender community' were also a significant feature of 
context that I encountered in Sydney in 1996/97. Differences of opinion over the use 
of state-funded resources for transgendered people, criticism of the medical model of 
transsexual ism, political divisions between those who identified as transsexual and 
those who claimed identities as transgendered, and critiques of the construction of sex 
and gender as natural and ahistorical were a feature of these debates. Third, the month 
long Sydney Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras in February was also important to the way 
that the people I interviewed defined themselves in relation to other people who 
transgressed binary gender categories and to the gay and lesbian community more 
generally. The outcome of my observation and experience of this context is represented 
in Chapters Eight and Nine of the thesis. 
6 
Getting started 
From 1993-94 I carried out research for a Masters thesis on cosmetic surgery. 
During an interview with a plastic surgeon in 1993, he talked at length about gender 
reassignment surgery. At the time I was astonished by the way in which cultural 
understandings about gender were imported into the 'scientific' narrative of this 
medical professional and I thought that this could be a possible topic for a doctoral 
thesis. An extract from this narrative is reproduced below: 
I'm the one who does that (sex reassignment) surgery. In fact, we have a team 
of people, and a very strict protocol. A patient who is transsexual does not 
choose to be transsexual. In order to be a straight female or male you have to 
have about five things lined up properly, genetic sex you have to have right. In 
other words, you have to have XX or XY chromosomes, and you can have all 
sorts of permutations and combinations of those axons - you can have XX, XXV, 
XYV and all these sorts of things. So you have to have genetic sex lined up 
properly. The next one is anatomic sex, which has to be lined up. In other 
words you have to have the gonads and you have to have either ovaries or 
testicles, then you have to have hormonal sex lined up, the gonads that you have 
need to start working and producing the female hormones and the male 
hormones. The next one is sex of up-bringing, a woman can have five boys for 
example and she has always wanted a girl, and the sixth boy she brings into the 
world she determines to dress him as a girl and she gives him dolls to play with 
and brings him up as a girl. Sometimes anatomic sex is not very determined and 
you can have a tiny little penis for example and a big bulbous scrotum, which 
looks like a labia. So the obstetrician/gynaecologist as the baby is being born, 
oh it is a girl, and in fact it can be a tiny penis and the scrotum sacks that look 
like the labia and here you are it is actually a genetic male brought up as a girl 
because they actually make a mistake when they glance at it quicldy. So sex of 
up bringing can either be a woman's desire or a proper mistake. Then you have 
to have psychological sex. So a person can actually have the external habits of a 
male but actually feel that he is female, so you can have a male body and 
actually mentally feel that you are a female locked in a male body. All these 
things have to be lined up in order to be straight. So you can see why we have 
all these grey areas can't you. 
Plastic Surgeon, 1993 
In another part of the interview the plastic surgeon outlined the criteria for 
acceptance by the 'gender dysphoria' team with which he works. The criteria indicate 
that the clinical team follows the guidelines for diagnosis and management of 
transsexualism outlined in standard psychiatric and medical textbooks on 
transsexualism (see Money and Walker, 1977; Stone, 1991; DSM-IV, 1994; 
McConaghy, 1993; Lewins, 1995). In the plastic surgeon's narrative medicine and 
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psychology operate as regulatory practices that construct transsexual identity as 
pathological and in need of medical and/or psychological intervention. Instead of 
defining and specifying the relationship between sex and gender, this narrative blurs 
the categories and boundaries of physiological gender determination (Garber, 1992, 
106; 1993: 332). As biological markers of sex fragment, gender identity as a 
psychological concept replaces physiology as the basis for determining gender. 
Clinicians with an interest in the sex determination of infants or in transsexualism have 
to attend to genital morphology, gonadal/hormonal, chromosomal and social markers 
of 'sex'. The medical discourse of this plastic surgeon draws on contradictory 
understandings of gender as based both in corporeality (endocrinology and physiology) 
and in the way identities are learned through socialisation and signalled through 
gender-marked behaviours and appearances. 
A literature review quickly ascertained that a range of people were already involved 
in critically interrogating understandings about sex and gender in scientific texts and 
medical practices relating to transsexualism (Raymond, 1980, 1994; Billings and 
Urban, 1982; King, 1987; Epstein, 1990; Stone, 1991; Garber, 1992, 1993; Hausman, 
1992, 1995; Cream, 1995; Hale, 1998).8 According to this literature, the production of 
surgical technologies and the psychological discourses associated with gender 
reassignment technologies are not independent of the cultural processes through which 
understandings about sex and gender are embedded. Both transsexual identity and 
gender reassignment technologies have their origins in medicine's 'discovery' or 
'invention' of transsexualism.9 Dave King (1987: 356-358), for example, argues that 
the medical concept of transsexualism is based on patriarchal definitions of masculinity 
and femininity. It involves the individualisation of a social problem that deflects 
attention away from the political origins of transsexualism as an extension of the 
commodification and rectification of the body within late capitalism. Within this 
analysis any person who identifies as transsexual and/or pursues sex reassignment 
surgery IS conforming to the hegemonic relations of medicine, capitalism and 
patriarchy. 
8 For a comprehensive history of the medicalisation of hermaphrodism and intersexed individuals see 
Julia Epstein (1990) 'Either/Or-Neither/Both: Sexual Ambiguity and the Ideology of Gender'. 
9 The term transsexualism was first used by Harry Benjamin at a lecture to the New York Academy of 
Medicine in 1953 (Raymond, 1980: 4; King, 1987: 353). 
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Bernice Hausman (1995) and Marjorie Garber (1992) trace the importance of 
surgical technologies and psychological discourses to the construction of contemporary 
understandings of transsexualism. They argue that plastic surgery introduced a specific 
medical culture that is central to the emergence of transsexualism in the twentieth 
century. Cosmetic surgery defines the body as a plastic and malleable commodity 
through offering elective surgical solutions to specific problems of body shape and 
form. Hausman (1992: 285) suggests, for example, that the development of cosmetic 
surgery sets a precedent for 'the establishment of surgical "therapy" for psychological 
problems focused on the body'. At the same time, the medical/psychological discourses 
and practices associated with transsexualism involve seeing the preoperative 
transsexual body as problematic - as an 'abnormal' body with the 'wrong genitals' 
which must be brought into tune with the mind, SUbjectivity and social identity of the 
transsexual subject. For both Hausman and Garber (1992: 106; 1992: 332), 
understandings of transsexualism as a surgically rectifiable problem are a product of 
cultural, social and psychological processes. 
The cultural basis of transsexuality is also indicated in the medical discourses 
surrounding gender reassignment technologies which tend to be based on 
heterosexual-sociality (Smith, 1990: 191).10 One reading of transsexuality is that it is 
embedded in the sex/gender system 11 which is the product of intersections between 
technologies of the body and ideological systems. The medical discourses and practices 
attached to gender reassignment technologies may be seen as a discipline of the body 
and a form of knowledge/power based on the reconstruction of vaginas and penises to 
fit heterosexual expectations about gender and sexuality (Hausman, 1992: 297). 
Within this analysis the emergence of transsexualism lies in specific material practices 
and technological possibilities of physical transformation associated with sex 
reassignment (Hausman, 1992: 274). These practices and possibilities are developed 
through medical techniques of surveillance and examination, while surgical 
technologies may be interpreted as 'mechanisms' for the transformation and sculpting 
of bodies and identities. Like cosmetic surgery clients, transsexuals are often 
constructed as victims of the sex/gender system and as 'cultural dupes' who collude 
10 According to Smith, heterosexual-sociality refers to the way many of the discursive practices of 
femininity 'interpret women as producing themselves for men as extensions of men's consciousness and 
as objects of men's desire' (Smith, 1990: 191-192). 
11 Drawing on Teresa de Lauretis' notion of gender technologies, Hausman (1992: 273) defines the 
sex/gender system as 'the sum of practices through which sex and gender are produced as biological and 
social! psychological counterparts within the subject, in the context of the subordination of women and 
the hegemony of heterosexuality'. 
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with doctors in the medicalisation of the body, in general, and transsexualism, in 
particular (Hausman, 1992: 273-274; Cream, 1995; Lienert, 1998). This analysis of 
transsexualism is unable to account for the active agency of transsexual subjects who 
may be critical of these technologies and/ or perceive them as simultaneously 
constraining and enabling. 
A review of the literature indicated that feminist, sociological and transgender 
critiques of the medicalisation of transsexualism 12 were already well established and 
that, in pursuing this line of inquiry, it would be difficult to make an original 
contribution to the existing literature. I needed to find another way to engage with this 
topic. My attention was drawn to the construction of transsexual subjects in the 
academic literature. I noticed some interesting parallels between this literature and 
feminists' constructions of women using cosmetic surgery (Morgan, 1991; Davis, 1991; 
Bordo, 1993a, 1993c; Wolf, 1990). I began to think about a thesis that looked at 
connections and differences between cosmetic surgery and gender reassignment 
technologies. When I began the thesis I was interested in issues associated with the 
knowing subject, agency and corporeality. I was also intrigued by the deployment of 
oppositions between natural and 'artificial' bodies in feminist analyses of the elective 
surgical/hormonal alteration of the (female) body (Wolf, 1991; Morgan, 1991; Coney, 
1991). Ideas for the citizenship and community chapters emerged out of material 
gathered throughout the research process itself. During the course of my research I 
came to understand that it is not the meanings of sex and gender that are at stake, but 
the way in which the construction of such definitions involves the mobilisation of 
particular resources, actors and networks. All of these ideas eventually found their way 
into the thesis in its final form. 
12 For critiques of the medicalisation of intersexuality see Epstein, 1990; Butler, 1990; Fausto-Sterling, 
1993; Chase, 1998; Dreger, 1998; Hird and German, 2001. Intersexuality is discussed further in 
Chapter FoUl'. For discussions of h'anssexualism see Raymond, 1980; Billings and Urban, 1982; Stone, 
1991; Garber, 1992, 1993; Butler, 1993; Hausman, 1992, 1995; Nataf, 1996; Namaste, 1996b; Devor, 
1997; the 'Transgender Issue' of the Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies (GLQ) 1998, vol. 4,2; 
Halberstram, 1998; Hale, 1998. The medicalisation of transsexualisl11 is discussed further in Chapter 
Seven. 
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Retracing the analytic agendas 
My conversations with people who identified as transgendered or transsexual were 
informed by a desire to take seriously the knowledges and agency of people who engage 
with the possibility of using medical technologies such as hormones, breast implants, 
mastectomy or genital surgery to craft gendered bodies. This involved exploring how 
research stories are co-produced through interactions between the researcher and the 
people who participated in the study. The talk of research informants, and my 
responses to it, introduces some of the methodological issues that I was interested in 
addressing in the thesis. They concern not only the way informants may be viewed as 
both theorists and experts in their own lives and realms of experience, but also how this 
orientation to research reworks who is knower and who is known in research contexts, 
and the questions of agency that such an orientation to research invariably produces. 
The thesis is set in the context of an on-going discussion about the often complex 
relationship(s) between the actual processes involved in doing sociological research and 
how we as sociologists write about, interpret and understand the groups of people we 
choose to study (Bourdieu and Wac quant, 1992; Becker, 1998; Goffman, 1997 [19771; 
Bloom, 1998). 
I was increasingly dissatisfied with the way that I had used 'agency' uncritically in 
my earlier work on cosmetic surgery. To counter understandings of women as cultural 
dupes, I had emphasised the agency and knowledgeability of women who chose to 
engage in cosmetic surgery (Phibbs, 1994). Following Davis (1991), agency was thus 
deployed as a critique of feminist analyses of cosmetic surgery that implicitly 
constructed women as 'victims' or 'cultural dupes' of the cosmetic surgery 
establishment. In my doctoral thesis I wanted to situate a similar construction of 
agency within recent theoretical debates in sociology (Granovetter, 1985; Emirbayer 
and Mische, 1998) and feminist philosophy (Davies, 1991, 1997) about the meaning of 
the term, and to explore the implications of these different interpretations of agency for 
understandings about embodied social action. This involves recognising agency as a 
theoretical construct which is contestable. These concerns are developed in Chapter Six 
of the thesis. 
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My work on cosmetic surgery focused on the way femininity is understood, 
reproduced and transformed by people who engage in these practices of 
transformation. Minimal attention was paid to the way that corporeality may inform 
choices and shape action. In the intervening years I had become increasingly 
dissatisfied with the way that individual experience of the messy materiality of bodies 
was sometime neglected in social constructionist approaches to agency and 
subjectivity.1s Alison Jones (1997), for example suggests that identities are shaped 
through and by the culturally specific meanings associated with the particular 
structural categories (gender, class, sexuality, race, and occupation) that a person 
happens to occupy. As a result, '(t)he real embodied individual is largely irrelevant to 
the performance' (Jones, 1997:268). Drawing on the work of Arthur Frank (1995, 
1996), and other people writing within and from the experience of disability and/or 
illness (see Williams and Bendelow, 1998), I wanted to look at the way physical bodies 
impinge on action and shape identities. I was unsure about how I was actually going to 
address these issues, but I hoped that conversations with transgendered people would 
provide some insight into the way bodies impact on action and therefore provide some 
way forward in this debate. I was fortunate to interview two people who explicitly 
talked about how their bodies had forced them to attend to gender identity issues, and 
one person who used their14 ambiguous body in order to challenge binary 
understandings of gender. While I acknowledge that these are exceptional stories, their 
very existence illuminates how bodies and selves are co-implicated in the construction 
of gender identities. Conventional or unproblematic bodies are less likely to facilitate 
thought about this relationship. Our attention may be drawn to the body as 'other' in 
times of illness or pregnancy (Frank, 1995, 1996; Young, 1990; Balsamo, 1996; 
Longhurst and Johnston, 1998), but this is seen as an exception rather than an 
indication of this very close yet silenced relationship. 
I was interested in the way that ideas about 'natural' and 'artificial', 'normal' and 
'abnormal', bodies are articulated in medical discourses, feminist analyses and the talk 
of research participants. Medical discourses surrounding transsexualism construct an 
individual's original gender identity as 'unnatural', their intermediate sUbjectivities as 
'abnormal' and surgical intervention as necessary to restore them to the normality of 
13 See Witz (2000), Williams and Bendelow (1998), Davis (1997), Frank (1996) who also share aspects of 
these concerns about 'the body' in social theory. 
14 I acknowledge that the combination of the singular 'person' and plural 'their' in this sentence is 
unusual. Third person plural is often used in this way by transgendered individuals who do not wish to 
identify as male or as female. See Norrie May Welby's discussion of personal pronouns in Chapter Five. 
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their 'natural' selves (Money, 1977; DSM-IV, 1994; McConaghy, 1993; Lewins, 
1995) 15. These ideas are shared by many people who identify as transgendered. Some 
feminist and sociological analyses also strategically deploy natural! artificial oppositions 
to critique the artificial (and unnatural) construction of bodies through surgical 
alteration (Morgan, 1991; Garber, 1992; Hausman, 1995; Connell, 1995). According 
to this view, scientific discourses and medical technologies subjugate, exploit and 
oppress the 'natural' and 'normal' body (Morgan, 1991: 41). I argue that it is too 
simplistic to assume that debates surrounding medical technologies for crafting gender, 
and their construction of the body as a plastic and malleable commodity, may be 
resolved by privileging the 'natural' culturally constructed body over the artificial 
surgically altered body (Garber, 1992). The deeply embodied nature of transgender 
stories suggests that post-structuralist theories about how identity categories may be 
deconstructed (Davies, 1991; Davies and Harre, 1990) must be held in tension with the 
ways in which essentialist understandings of identity are used by individual actors. I 
argue in Chapter Six for a more complex analysis of agency and subjectivity that 
explores how embodiment as well as discourses and practices are co-implicated in the 
construction of identity. 
The individual stories presented in this thesis connect to debates in transgendered 
communities and to the more general project of exploring the broader analytic agendas 
of the thesis. Personal stories provide constructed accounts of how particular 
individuals pursue their own construction of identity through fields of 
knowledgeability. The narratives of transgender people provide a site in which to 
explore issues associated with embodiment, identities, post-structuralist and 
essentialist/modernist theories and conceptualisations of persons. Chapters in the thesis 
separate out what is occurring simultaneously in local and national settings. Sociology 
entails an analysis of multi -dimensional networks where all of these things are in play. 
Attention to these particular narratives and forms of embodiment allows me to explore 
existing theories - and to set up an analysis of sex and gender through its embodied, 
physical, state and institutional forms. 
15 Also see the edited collection by Walters and Ross (1986). 
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Thesis overview 
The thesis is presented as a series of inter-related essays which may be read as stand-
alone pieces. These essays engage with key substantive areas within sociology -
narrativity, methodology, biography, performativity, agency, corporeality, citizenship 
and community. The analysis progresses from consideration of the micro politics of 
situated lives to the macro politics of state and national contexts. In each of these 
chapters the relationship between the local achievement of transgender identities and 
the substantive theme of the chapter is developed. The thesis draws on the work of two 
or three theorists in each chapter; it does not attempt a comprehensive review of the 
literature in each of these areas, but illustrates themes at work in this field through 
extracts from conversations with, or the narratives of, people who are identified by 
themselves or others as transgendered. 
The thesis has a logic that moves from detailed attention to one life story to analysing 
a variety of stories, conversations and political actions in a regional and community 
context. The analysis of the interview material begins in Chapter Two with a 
consideration of the micro politics of interpersonal social interaction at the hairdresser 
and in a beauty salon. This chapter draws on Margaret Somers' (199Z; 1994) 
arguments about the narrative construction of identity, Bronwyn Davies and Rom 
Harre's (1990) discussion of 'positioning' and Ken Plummer's (1995: ZZ) assertion that 
stories emerge from interaction, shifting and changing according to the contexts in 
which stories are told and heard. I argue that the unstable identities Somers discusses 
are predicated on relatively stable, but sometimes problematic, narratives. I incorporate 
into Somers' concept of narrative identity an analysis of the destabilising, temporal, 
spatial and relational aspects of narratives. Transgender narratives about gender 
identity are shaped by the particular characteristics of the contexts in which they 
present themselves. I argue that it is not just discourses, but also corporeality and 
spaces that make certain subject positions available to actors. It is the particularistic, 
socially and spatially situated narratives that are the subject of discussion in this 
chapter. Ideas about 'narrativity' and 'positioning' outlined m Chapter Two are 
continued in Chapters Three and Four where I explore the politics of knowledge 
production through attention to the contexts in which research narratives are co-
produced, reproduced and consumed. 
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Chapter Three combines key methodological themes with a discussion of the 
research on which the thesis is based. I explore the way research stories are co-
produced through interaction between the researcher and the people who participated 
in this study. I consider methodological debates that privilege women and/or gender as 
the subject of feminist research and reflect on these debates in relation to my position as 
a woman interviewing people who have been and are both male and female. 
Methodological themes are continued in Chapter Four where issues associated with 
doing and presenting life stories are discussed. 
Chapter Four also introduces a wider temporal and spatial frame. Robyn tells an 
incredible story about how her body 'changed gender' following an accident. Robyn's 
story was told to me in private and with the condition that I ensure Robyn's anonymity 
in the thesis. In this chapter several of the major threads in the thesis are introduced-
issues associated with language, subjectivity, agency, embodiment, gender, biography, 
and methodology. Robyn's life history provides the context through which an argument 
is made about the relationships between biography and public narratives of medicine, 
sex and gender. Robyn defines herself as someone who, and inhabits a social world in 
which s/he, constantly moves from one gender to another; physically, psychologically, 
linguistically, socially and symbolically. As a result, Robyn's narrative is a destabilising 
one that constructs an identity that is shifting and contingent. Robyn's story goes to the 
heart of the issues that I am interested in exploring in the thesis. It highlights how 
identities are both socially constructed and rooted in essentialism. A core focus is on 
the way medical technologies, discourses and practices powerfully influence sets of 
understandings about the relationship between anatomical sex and social gender. This 
chapter also examines how the stories of people who have experienced discontinuities 
between their anatomy and social gender both conform to, and disrupt, sets of 
understandings about the relationship between anatomical sex and social gender. 
Rather than being an exception to binary notions of gender, Robyn's narrative clearly 
illustrates how gender identities come to be codified, constructed and crafted in the 
everyday practices of individuals. 
The fifth chapter of the thesis is based on an interview with a transgender 
performance artist. Norrie May Welby is out and proud as a transgender activist. 
Welby's real name is used throughout the thesis at his/her request. Welby's narrative 
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articulates a social model of transgenderism that provides an opportunity to engage 
with the sociological concepts of habitus (Bourdieu, 1990) and field (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992) and post-structuralist theories about the performativity of gender 
(Butler, 1990) . Welby appears again in Chapter Nine where his/her political activism 
is the focus of attention. Detailed attention to a conversation with Norrie May Welby 
provides an opportunity to explore the transformative potential of unauthorised and 
challenging gender performances. I argue that the subversive meanings associated with 
Norrie May's gender performances are dependent upon differences that are defined in 
relation to the conventional and the ordinary. In this regard, transgender performances 
simultaneously embody traces of the unruly associated with incoherent gender 
identities and the normative associated with conventional gender identities. I analyse 
the subversive and conventional elements in the talk of research informants on 
performing and 'doing' gender. Norrie May's post-structuralist account of gender as 
multiple, fluid, shifting, contingent and contradictory also rests on a notion of an 
embodied choosing (Enlightenment) subject. 
Attention to choosing involves engaging with agency. The 'problem' of individual 
agency informs the analysis of agency and constraint in Chapter Six and the 
comparative analysis of gender reassignment technologies and cosmetic surgery 
advanced in Chapter Seven of the thesis. These chapters explore the need for a more 
complex analysis of agency and sUbjectivity that explores how bodies, technologies, 
discourses/narratives and practices are co-implicated in the construction of identity by 
research informants. Chapter Six considers the relationship between agency, 
corporeality, narrativity, selves and technologies through the local achievement of 
identities. Connections and differences between liberal humanist and post-structuralist 
theories of agency are explored. I am interested in how people who transition across 
binary gender categories draw on and utilise ideas about action that may be identified 
with these contemporary social theories of agency and identity. How embodiment 
impacts on the discursive positioning of subjects, and the constitution of subjectivity, is 
also explored in this chapter. Most people do not consciously think of themselves as 
'doing agency' nor do they recognise the way that their identity is constructed through 
interaction, discourse or via biology. Some of the people who participated in this 
research did talk about agency in language that may be identified with a theoretical 
positioning, and/ or talked about their conscious location in discourses and practices 
surrounding masculinity/femininity. These people were actively engaged in crafting 
their identities and, at the same time, recognised the constructedness of gender in their 
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own practices and in the practices of non-transgendered others. It is the active and 
embodied constitution and reconstitution of identities that are simultaneously historical, 
relational and corporeal that is of interest in this chapter. 
Chapter Seven considers similarities and differences in the use of medical 
technologies between women who engage in cosmetic surgery and people who use 
gender reassignment technologies. The marginality of transgender people, their 
experience of maintaining a particular gender identity while occupying a body that is 
differently sexed, and the attractions of a body in which gender and anatomy are 
consistent, contributes to narratives that are a rich site for an exploration of agency. 
Another theme that is developed in Chapter Seven, and runs through the thesis more 
generally, is a consideration of the way that corporeality is important to the 
representation of a gendered self. Identities are the deeply embodied outcome of a 
complex interaction between narrativity, corporeality, culture and sUbjectivity. 
Transgender identities are managed in the context of occupying bodies that confound 
conventional discourses associated with sexual difference. This lack of fit between 
embodiment, subjectivity and 'ordinary' discourses about sexual difference as 
immutable suggests that identities are not simply a product of discourses and social 
practices. In short, bodies matter and they matter most when they are experienced or 
defined as problematic in some way. I argue that it is not just discourse, but also 
corporeality and spaces that make subject positions available to actors. 
Chapters Eight and Nine explore the collective agency of social groups. The 
achievement of the New South Wales Anti-discrimination legislation, discussed in 
Chapter Eight, is an example of the outcome of collective agency. Political action within 
the gay, lesbian and transgender community is also the subject matter of Chapter Nine. 
Discussions of controversies over the construction of sexed identities in these chapters 
link to analytic agendas associated with the construction of identity, sex and gender in 
the academy. Chapter Eight begins with a mundane artifact - a piece of paper on which 
the perfunctory details of a person's birthlidentity are recorded - and traces the 
complex network of relations that go into its production. The birth certificate is 
embedded in multiple overlapping networks. This chapter focuses on the Births, Deaths 
and Marriages register, the legislation governing this register for recording a change of 
sex in New South Wales, and the birth certificate itself. I argue that the Births, Deaths 
and Marriages register acts as a bridging device (Latour, 1995) between the birth 
certificate, the individual and the state. In Australia, state citizenship determines the 
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rules for recording sex at birth and for recognising subsequent gender identities. In 
New South Wales, surgery and reproductive non-functioning are important to the way 
that the state regulates or authorises transgendered bodies and identities. I argue that 
variations in 'change of sex' policies and practices within and between Australian states 
mean that administrative distinctions between male and female bodies are complicated 
by the corporeal diversity and personal histories of transgendered individuals. The 
legislation governing the Births Deaths and Marriages register, that allows the sex 
designation on the birth certificate to be changed, is a new instrument of bio-power 
(Foucault, 1978: 139-143; Sawicki, 1991: 67-68) and potential source of division and 
differentiation among transgendered people. 
Division and differentiation among transgendered people is also the focus of Chapter 
Nine. This chapter provides an analysis of the way that unity, connection and 
boundaries within communities are actively constructed. It also explores how the 
groups established through these actions are simultaneously problematised and 
deconstructed through forms of political activism and identity politics in the Sydney 
transgender community. It outlines debates over the utilization of institutional 
resources that the transgender community have created. I problematise ideas about 
bounded communities by looking at the way identities are constructed in relation to 
broader social configurations that are not tied to place. Tensions surrounding the 
politicisation of identities within the inner city Sydney transgender community also 
point to the way social bonds, tacit understandings and political mechanisms operating 
within communities are open, contested and contradictory. At the same time, 
communities are 'imagined' (Anderson, [1983] 1991) through newspapers, posters, 
jokes, spatial symbols, public narratives, collective social rituals and shared times and 
experiences. The examination of these political processes leads to conclusions about the 
construction of imagined communities through difference, schism and unity. This final 
substantive chapter brings together, through an analysis of the construction of 
relational identities on different local and national scales, many of the themes discussed 
in previous chapters - narrativity, identity, corporeality, space and time. 
The analyses presented in the thesis do not apply only to people who have 
transgendered bodies. They make a contribution to the literature on embodiment more 
generally. Arguments presented in the thesis about the way that subjectivity is 
constituted through a complex inter-relationship between language and embodiment 
also connect to current debates around theorising experience in the areas of illness and 
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disability (Frank, 1995, 1996; Williams and Bendelow, 1998; Parr and Butler, 1999). 
Throughout the thesis, I argue that it is not just discourse, but also times, spaces and 
bodies that make subject positions available to actors. Ideas about the narrative 
construction of identity are extended through consideration of the way that individuals 
negotiate everyday encounters, take up particular subject positions and resist others. 
This requires a critical engagement with the construction of agency and the agentic 
subject in social theory through attention to how people present themselves as knowing 
subjects in research conversations. If storied social action is the key to the production of 
identity, then the narrative identities of people who participated in this research were 
also shaped by their location in a particular temporal and spatial field where complex 
social and political redefinitions of sex and gender were in play. Transgender identities 
are produced and reproduced in the everyday actions of individuals as life stories, 
contingent circumstances, public narratives, community politics and state forms 
interact. The thesis is therefore a story about how identities are constructed through an 
exploration of cultural and political processes that are simultaneously personal, local, 
national and global. 
Constructing identities 
Narrativity, positioning, spaces 
I began the process by telling a close friend at work. 
He - a young gay man. 
"Had he heard of transgender people?" 
His assumptions were logical. 
In trying to assure me of his friendship - he drew attention to the butch dykes seen around his area and 
mistaken for men. Eager words of continued support followed with examples of lesbian friends. 
My frustration grew. The closet was stifling. 
"But I'm not a lesbian" - I said as evenly as I could. 
"Oh". 
I wave I never felt. 
A breath. 
"I see". 
He pressed on with the conversation, struggling with my answers. 
I admired his determination. 
He - a cautious stumble of care and self-corrections. Still walking forward in such an unfamiliar 
landscape. 
Apologies. 
Starting and stopping. 
Hesitant now. Both of us. 
I told him how I felt ashamed of coming out and of my own self. 
I was afraid of losing his friendship. 
He said that any young boy coming out feels the same. 
He talked about how he hated living a lie. 
His stories of feeling separated and hidden - examples from his old jobs, family, friends and experiences. 
Our paths merging again - common ground now. 
We both relaxed. 
"Any young gay boy coming out ... " 
In that space, I took a second breath. 
And another. 
Just like any young gay guy. 
Craig Andrews1 
I've arranged to meet Craig for lunch at Craig's favourite restaurant. Craig was one of 
the first people that I interviewed for this research project and we have since become 
good friends. I listen to him recounting the events of the last week. Craig has only 
recently come out publicly as transgendered and gay. His colleagues are having 
problems accepting his male identity and things are pretty well becoming intolerable 
for him at work. A snide comment that a female supervisor made to him about shaving 
1 Unpublished poem, reproduced with permission from Craig Andrews. 
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is preying on his mind. He tells me that he can no longer bring himself to have lunch 
in the staff cafeteria and has instead taken to eating alone outside in the quadrangle. It 
is a poignant moment that conveys to me the lived reality of Craig's feelings of 
difference, isolation and rejection (Field notes, December, 1997). 
The above field notes from my lunchtime meeting with Craig illustrate the politics of 
the spaces in which narratives, events, identities and experiences are at play. Craig 
experiences his work as a hostile space where his transgendered identity is barely 
tolerated. The place where Craig works is further divided into more or less threatening 
spaces, the informal atmosphere of the staff cafeteria being the most intimidating. 
These spaces require different enactments of self; at his workstation he is able to adopt 
a more impersonal professional demeanour, in the cafeteria a more personal relational 
self is required. Craig's work is a space in which narratives about transitioning across 
binary gender categories are not able to be expressed freely. The restaurant, where he 
is known and accepted as a gay man, is by contrast a place where Craig feels relatively 
safe and largely unconcerned about people overhearing our conversation. Craig's story 
highlights the relational and spatial aspects of personal narrative. This chapter 
examines the relationship between narrativity, corporeality, spaces and the process of 
story production. 
Social life is storied (Somers, 1994: 614). Identities are not unitary or static. They 
are instead shaped by the narratives in which they are embedded (Somers, 1992: 
1994). Narratives in turn are not unitary or neutral; they are shaped by the spaces in 
which they are articulated (Plummer, 1995). They are also constrained by the internal 
structures of language, the discursive production of selves in social interaction, and the 
politics of the spaces in which stories are expressed and received. This chapter brings 
together Margaret Somers' (1994) arguments about the narrative construction of 
identity, Bronwyn Davies and Rom Harre's (1990, 1999) ideas about 'positioning' and 
Ken Plummer's (1995) argument that stories emerge from interaction shifting and 
changing according to the contexts in which stories are told and heard. Through a 
discussion of Margaret Somers' ideas about narrativity and narrative identity I explore 
the destabilising spatial and temporal aspects of narratives. Holding 'public stories'2 
and the particularistic features of narratives in play I argue that both stories and 
identities emerge from interaction; they shift and change according to the spaces and 
2 Public stories are the narratives that transcend the individual; they are the cultural stereotypes that 
exist in the wider communities of interpretation through which stories circulate (Plummer, 1995: 22). 
Public stories may be local, national, or global. 
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times in which they are embedded (Plummer, 1995). Or to put it another way, 
narrative identities, like narratives themselves, are unstable, relational, temporal and 
spatial. I argue that Somers does not adequately explore the way that narratives are 
shaped by time, space and relationality. I incorporate into Somers' concept of narrative 
identity an analysis of the destabilizing, temporal, spatial, and relational aspects of 
narratives. I argue that stories, contexts and bodies are important to the representation 
of a gendered self. Bronwyn Davies and Rom Harre's (1990, 1999) work on 
positioning and subject position is used to explore how people orient themselves in 
relation to their experience of interactions, practices and public narratives embedded 
in conversational story-lines (Davies and Harre, 1990: 52). Transgender narratives 
about gender identity are shaped by the particular characteristics of the contexts in 
which they present themselves. I argue that it is not just discourses but also 
corporeality and spaces that make available certain subject positions to actors. It is the 
particularistic, socially and spatially situated narratives that are the subject of 
discussion in this chapter. 
Narrativity: evolving stories, (e)merging identities 
Social life is 'storied', the networks through which subjectivities are constituted may 
be traced through narrativity. Narrativity may be thought of as stories and action in 
relation to times, selves and settings (Plummer, 1995: 17-20). It is a social process and 
stories or narratives are crucial to that process. Somers (1994: 607) suggests that by 
tracing narratives it becomes possible to map the complex and contradictory means by 
which social relations are organised, made meaningful and maintained through 
complex inter-linkages within networks of relations which shift over time and space. 
She argues that narrativity is a social process that is embedded in four inter-related 
dimensions of narratives: ontological or personal narratives, public or cultural 
narratives, conceptual or theoretical narratives and meta-narratives such as the master 
narratives of historical explanation (Somers 1994: 618-619). Ontological narratives 
are the stories that social actors use to make sense of themselves and their relationship 
to the world. Transitioning across binary gender categories is an exercise in ontological 
narrativity. Transgendered individuals are able to construct narratives about 
themselves as people who have 'chosen' their gender - who have transitioned or are in 
the process of transitioning. People draw on ontological narratives in order to act in 
their lives. The ontological dimensions of narrativity bring certain people into being, 
they shape identities and selves; narrative identities structure choices and activities. 
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Story-actions in turn produce new narratives and hence new identities, politics and 
communities (Plummer, 1995: 152; White, 1992: 13-14). Identities are crafted, 
modified and abandoned, and particular courses of action followed, according to how 
people are located by and locate themselves, however temporarily, in a range of given 
narratives. Narrative identities are never complete; they are always in the process of 
being formed. In this sense they embed identities in an ever unfolding flow of 
temporally and spatially specific social relationships (Somers, 1992: G03; 1994: G18). 
Ontological narratives are crafted out of existing stories that circulate in certain 
contexts. These public narratives transcend the individual; they are the cultural 
stereotypes that exist in the wider communities of interpretation through which stories 
circulate (Plummer, 1995: 22; Pahl, 1995: 151). Public narratives may be local, 
national, or global. The story of the ideal transsexual who always knew that they were 
of the other gender is a public narrative, or Western stereotype, that many transsexual 
people draw on in order to explain their identity to themselves and to others. An 
example of this narrative is provided in the following opening lines of Jan Morris's 
autobiography Conundrum: 
I was three or perhaps four years old when I realized that I had been born into the 
wrong body, and should really be a girl. I remember the moment well, and it is the 
earliest memory of my life (Morris, 1974: 11). 
Morris appropriates psychiatric discourses and public narratives about 
transsexualism in the story that she tells about her childhood self. Morris writes that 
she was 'born into the wrong body' and she locates her transsexual identity in her 
earliest memory - both narrative conventions that imply an immutable, pre-discursive 
or biological origin for her 'conundrum'. Morris's personal narrative about her 
unconventional gender identity is embedded in broader public narratives about sexual 
difference. Her narrative illustrates the way shared social narratives, such as those 
associated with public narratives of transsexualism, biology and gender, encompass 
both the individual and the collective, while personal narratives are defined in relation 
to the broader public narratives in which they are embedded. Narratives are 
simultaneously general and specific because they are both individually produced and 
embedded in shared understandings of the social world (Somers, 1994). 
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Norrie May Welby, a transgender activist interviewed for this project, is critical of 
dualistic understandings of sex and gender, and narrow media stereotypes of 
transsexuals such as those found in women's magazines, which impose limits on 
possible ways of being for 'tranys': 
... we live in a society that insists on the binary, and one that pushes these views 
of tranys at us, you lrnow "Women's Day", "I was a tortured transsexual and I 
could not wait until I had the operation to become a real woman ... ". 
(Norrie May Welby, 1997) 
Welby is critical of the limited range of public narratives associated with 
transsexualism in the print media - narratives that focus on immutable binary 
sex/gender categories, pathology, medical intervention and heterosexuality. 
Individuals who identify as transgendered often selectively appropriate public 
narratives about sex, gender and transsexualism in the stories that they tell about 
themselves. However, Welby's narrative indicates that social actors are not free to 
fabricate ontological or public narratives at will. In other words, to paraphrase a 
famous expression from Marx, social actors construct their narrative identities but not 
under conditions of their own choosing/making. There is 'only a limited repertoire of 
available representations and stories. Which kind of narratives will socially 
predominate is contested politically and will depend in large part on the distribution of 
power' (Somers, 1994: 630). 
The limited repertoire of representations and stories means that certain 
unintelligible experiences, events and identities will not be accommodated easily 
within the range of available cultural, public and institutional narratives. The limited 
repertoire of stories that transsexuals may draw on in constructing narratives about 
themselves is illustrated by the uncertain status of gay identified female-to-male 
transsexuals. Amy Bloom (1994) discusses the case of Louis Sullivan, a female-to-male 
transsexual, who was also a gay man with AIDS. Before his death, Sullivan talked to 
the influential psychiatrist Dr Ira Pauly, in the hope of educating the professionals in 
the 'gender community' about the difference between gender and sexual orientation. 
The gender-dysphoria 'clinics rejected Sullivan, because he not only lrnew that despite 
his female anatomy he was male, he knew that he was a gay male' (Bloom, 1994: 42). 
In a video-taped interview Sullivan says: 
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They said, 'It can't be,' and I said 'It is ... They told me that I must not really be 
transsexual. After all, they thought, if I just wanted to sleep with men, why go to all 
the trouble ... ' (Bloom, 1994: 42) . 
The clinicians' failure to recognise Sullivan as transsexual, because of his sexual 
orientation, highlights the heterosexual assumptions held by most medical 
professionals involved in the field of sex reassignment. Sullivan's experiences are 
unintelligible in relation to psychiatric discourses surrounding transsexualism which 
assume a post-operative/non-operative heterosexual identity. Sullivan, however, also 
disrupts notions that all transsexuals are individuals whose commitment to 
expectations about heterosexuality as normative drives their attempts to change their 
gender identities.3 One reading of Sullivan's story is that he wanted to be transsexual in 
order to be gay. Sullivan adopts an either/or approach to physiological gender 
identity, but is comfortable with a transgressive sexuality. 
Conceptual narratives are the macro-theories and analytic categories that 
sociologists use to make sense of social life. Somers (1994:620) argues for a temporal 
and relational conceptual narrativity, but says that most of the analytical concepts that 
sociologists use have actually been 'de-narrativised'. A narrative has been de-
narrativised when it is abstracted from its conceptual origins. A classic example is the 
story of the progressive development of society from traditional to modern forms of 
social organisation.4 Public narratives that are so pervasive that their temporal and 
spatial origins are obscured are categorised as master-narratives or meta-narratives. 
Meta-narratives are the master narratives of contemporary social life, such as 
democracy and its binary opposite autocracy, capitalism/ communism, 
individualism/ collectivism. In the area of sexuality Foucault's eloquent deconstruction 
of the 'repressive hypothesis' (Foucault, 1978: 17-18) - that prior to the Victorian era 
sexuality was typified by 'primitive' sexual freedom while Victorian sexuality and 
discourses surrounding sex at that time were characterised by silences and prohibitions 
3 See Chapter Five for further discussion of the relationship between transsexualism and heterosexuality. 
4 Examples of the story of the progressive development of society may be found in Durkheim's theories 
about the relationship between the division of labour and the h'ansition of society from traditional 
(mechanique solidarity) to modern (organique solidarity) forms of social organisation (Bilton, et.a!., 
1981: 699-702). Tonnies' concepts of Gemeinshaft and GeseIIschaft also reflect this traditional/modern 
dichotomy. Gemeinschaft is associated with the 'natural', GeseIIschaft with the 'rational' (Tonnies, 
1957: 249). Gemeinshaft is a community of people who have close familial and/or social relationships. 
Within these communities there are simple types of economic exchange such as bartering. GeseIIschaft is 
a society or class. It is characterised by the rise of individualism and the deVelopment of forms of 
economic exchange that involve contracting relationships between individuals for services (Tonnies, 
1957: 250-259). 
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(Foucault, 1980: 3-4) - is another example of a meta-narrative that has been 
challenged (or re-narrativised) through historical analysis. 5 
The master-narratives associated with sexual difference have also been 
'denarrativised' (Somers, 1992: 594) through their association with a naturalistic and 
ahistorical understanding of male and female. The location of sexual difference in a 
biology that is understood as fixed, universal and transhistorical, facilitates an 
explanation of social differences between the sexes in terms of the natural (Butler, 
1990: 7). Contemporary meta-narratives surrounding sex and gender include the 
historical construction of woman as modified man. This model was eventually 
replaced by a construction of women as separate, unique biologically different beings, 
thus introducing a biological justification for the differential treatment of women 
legally and politically (Laqueur, 1987: 1-4, 1995; Martin, 1987: 27-32). Thomas 
Laqueur (1987: 1-4; 1995) argues, for example, that modern definitions of biological 
sex are not transhistorical; instead he amasses compelling evidence that shows how 
understandings of male and female bodies are context specific. In the early 1800s the 
homologous nature of the male and female body, including the reproductive organs, 
was rapidly replaced by a differentiated model whereby the bodies of women were 
defined in opposition to men. Laqueur (1987: 4; 1990: 152) argues that this process 
was not a result of increased scientific/medical knowledge, but rather a cultural 
development whereby differential representations of 'sex and gender became a critical 
issue of political theory and practice'.6 Laqueur renarrativises modern 'scientific' 
models of sexual difference by exploring their historical origins in medical diagrams, 
scientific texts and written public narratives of the time. 
5 Foucault (1978: 4) argued that under the Victorian regime sexuality was not simply 'driven out, 
denied, reduced to silence'. Instead he suggested that from the 17th Century onwards there was a 
'proliferation of discourses concerned with sex' (Foucault, 1978: 18). Sexuality was 'put into discourse' 
through the development of certain technologies of power and knowledge (Foucault, 1978: 11) such 
as religious confession, sexology and the state administration of bodies. As such, Foucault (1978: 5) 
suggests that it is problematic to claim that contemporary sexual expression, characterised perhaps in 
the 'sexual revolution' of 1960s and 70s, is 'freer' than it has been in the past. 
6 Laqueur states specifically that 'the context for the articulation of two incommensurable sexes was, 
however, neither a theory of knowledge nor advances in scientific knowledge. The context was 
politics ... When for many reasons, a preexisting transcendental order or time-immemorial custom 
became a less and less plausible justification for social relations, the battleground of gender roles shifted 
to nature, to biological sex. Distinct sexual anatomy was adduced to support or deny all manner of 
claims in a variety of specific social, economic, political, cultural or erotic contexts .... Whatever the 
issue the body became decisive' (Laqueur, 1990: 152). 
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Meta-narratives or ideologies are often incorporated into the conceptual narratives 
of sociological theory - Progress, Industrialization, the Enlightenment (Somers, 1994: 
619) - to name a few. Sociological concepts relating to economic change and the 
project of political 'freedom' are brought to mind in the binary oppositions associated 
with capitalism/communism and democracy/autocracy for example. 'Concept' implies 
a more static and fixed definition than 'narrative' /'narrativity' which I use in this thesis 
to convey the situated, contingent and relational nature of stories and story telling. Or 
to put it another way, in relation to meta-narratives the word has been divorced from 
its contextual origins. For public and ontological narratives words and contexts are 
simultaneously in play. Although Judith Butler (1997: 14) would caution us that all 
words are subject to resignification, some words, such as 'homosexual' or in relation to 
this thesis 'transsexual', are so powerful that they carry their contexts with them; for 
other words, such as 'gender' or 'transgender' the meaning comes into play at the 
moment of their deployment (Butler, 1997: 13). The temporal and spatial origins of 
these conceptual narratives may be reintroduced by exploring the way that they are 
historically and relationally constructed through ontological and public narratives. 
Transgender subjectivities are not easily accommodated within dominant public and 
institutional narratives of sexual difference. Sex and gender inconsistencies are 
'problems' that are specific to individuals. 'Renarrativisation' (Somers, 1992: 595) 
involves exploring the historically and culturally specific origins and relational 
complexities of master narratives and the social scripts that they legitimate. Thomas 
Laqueur (1987: 6-11) reproduces anatomical sketches from the 15th to 19th Centuries 
which represent female genitals and reproductive organs as modified male organs. In 
this historical narrative female as modified male did not invoke the sharp dichotomous 
thinking that dominates contemporary thinking about sexual difference. Laqueur's 
work renarrativises contemporary understandings about biological sex pointing out 
their specific social and cultural origins. Writing counter narratives that reflect 
variation and difference is also a crucial political strategy when identities are not 
expressed, or experiences represented, in the dominant public narratives. The multiple 
subjectivities, or non-unitary subjectivities (Bloom, 1998), of transgender people for 
example, which emphasise the situated, active, fluid and contingent nature of identities 
undermine the abstract, universal, rational actor typically embedded in the master-
narratives of classical social theory (Somers, 1994: 633-635). Somers recognises how 
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some identities, experiences and events are othered by a limited range of dominant 
public and cultural narratives. But this is not the same as exploring the way that time, 
space and relationality destabilise narratives. I argue that stories, contexts, and bodies 
are important to the (re)presentation of a gendered self. This is demonstrated in the 
way that the ontological narratives of transgender people may be disrupted in social 
interaction - I will return to this point later. In the following section I draw on 
feminist theories about how the internal structure of language makes self 
representation difficult for women in order to suggest that transgendered people are 
also excluded from the linguistic signifying economy. Somers' arguments about 
denarrativisation and renarrativisation are considered in relation to the radical 
deconstruction of sex and gender as a political strategy among some transgender 
activists. 
Language, meanings and stories 
Language, traditions and the story-telling genre itself impact on the formation of 
both ontological and public narratives. Ontological and public narratives consist of 
meanings and categories through which people may also constitute their identities. As 
a result, feminist criticisms of the relations and processes by which meanings and 
categories are constituted through language are relevant to an analysis that considers 
the relationship between stories and identities. Narratives are comprised of meanings 
that reflect social/institutional inclusions and exclusions. In New Zealand and New 
South Wales, for example, the state legitimates heterosexual marriage and specifically 
denies gay couples the right to marry. Meanings that achieve relative internal stability 
may be referred to as definitions. Definitions create a hierarchy of knowledge among 
existing narratives; they distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate cultural 
representations. Paula Treichler (1990: 124) argues that definitions are formulated 
through a set of complex cultural processes whereby particular meanings become 
official and enter discourse in the form of a constructed definition. The meanings 
associated with sex and gender, for example, are constructed, codified, and 
institutionalised through the discourses and practices of the State, the medical 
profession and their transgender clients. 7 Medical professionals define the rules for 
7 I refer here to Hausman's (I995: 129) assertion that transsexuals have been 'actively engaged in 
defining their position within medical discourses' (see Chapter Seven). In New South Wales state 
recognition of transgender identities was achieved through forms of political activism within the gay, 
lesbian and transgender communities - this legislation is discussed in Chapter Eight. 
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recognising gender differences and the clinical characteristics of transgendered clients. 
Definitions contribute to understandings about the subject positions available to actors 
and the meanings we attach to particular social identities, experiences, events and 
practices. In Chapter Eight I discuss the legislation surrounding changing the sex 
designation on the birth certificate in New South Wales. This legislation is an example 
of the way that particular contested meanings associated with transsexualism are 
incorporated into the definition of sexed identity that is recognised officially by the 
state. 
Some narratives carry more weight than others; Somers refers to these narratives as 
public narratives or traditions, Bloom (1998) uses the phrase 'master scripts' and 
Butler (1990) refers to these dominant narratives as 'normalising fictions'. Judith 
Butler (1990) argues that gender and heterosexuality are 'normalising fictions'. She is 
critical of the treatment of gender as a social construction of sexuality for the way it 
naturalises lines of connection between sexuality, gender and anatomy (Butler, 1990: 
70).8 Women who have penises and men who have vaginas problematise the way in 
which language and knowledge associated with sexual difference are constituted 
through mutually exclusive binary oppositions. Their conventionally 'unintelligible' 
biology, combined with the lack of a suitable gender-neutral pronoun, reflects the 
difficulties of self representation for transgender people within language. 
Feminist debates surrounding gender and narrativity also hinge on understanding 
how women are signified through language. Judith Butler (1990) argues that there 
are two major theories about the possibilities and difficulties of representation for 
women within language. The first follows a model of failed reciprocity in which 
women are defined through the identification of particular characteristics that are 'not 
masculine'. The second is based on the failed reciprocity model but foregrounds 
women's exclusion from the male (white, heterosexual, class based) signifying 
economy. Following de Beauvoir (1953: 15-16), the failed reciprocity model considers 
women as 'Other' to men. Only the feminine gender is marked, inasmuch as the 
feminine is defined through a series of exclusions that are based on everything that is 
'not masculine'. The universal person and the masculine gender are conflated (de 
8 In Chapter Eight I explore how the New South Wales Births Register naturalises lines of connection 
between gender and anatomy via the exclusion of intersexed individuals from marriage and through the 
surgical requirements within the legislation allowing individuals to change the sex designation on their 
birth certificate. 
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Beauvoir, 1953: 15-16). The masculine gender is marked through cultural signifiers 
of (hegemonic) masculinity that exclude alternative forms of masculinity -
homosexuality for example. The universal person or social body is unmarked in ways 
that mask its original structural biases (masculine, white, heterosexual, able bodied) 
This model maintains the Cartesian split between mind/body, male/female, 
transcendencelimmanence inasmuch as the masculine/feminine binary is predicated 
on maintaining rather than questioning these oppositions (Butler, 1990: 7-13). 
The second model of unequal representation, often associated with the work of Luce 
Irigary, takes as its base the major premises from the first model - the notion that 
women are "Other" to men. Within this model women are unrepresented and 
unrepresentable within the existing signifying economy because both the subject and 
the "Other" are masculine (Butler, 1990: 10-11). The signifying economy is 
masculine, the feminine is a masculine construction of women. Women are excluded 
from the signifying economy as this Otherness is defined by those who have the power 
to construct and enforce definitions ofthe Other (Butler, 1990: 7-19). Transgendered 
people are also unrepresentable within the existing signifying economy. The fact that 
there is no satisfactory alternative to male and female - and the pronouns9 associated 
with each of those categories - in itself creates a problem as it forces narratives, and in 
turn identities, to be expressed in words contingent on this dichotomy. In Chapter Five 
Norrie May Welby, for example, talks about the gendered nature of language and the 
difficulties of finding appropriate words that reflect identities that are in between. 
Language is not neutral. It produces and reproduces social inclusions and 
exclusions. The stories or narratives that are crucial to narrativity also reflect these 
linguistic inclusions and exclusions. Leslie Bloom (1998) outlines the problems of 
narrative representation for women within the context of feminist arguments about the 
unrepresentability of women within language and in relation to the master-scripts or 
public narratives of female selfhood. The exclusion of women from the normative 
signifying economy, the seductive appeal of normalising cultural fictions about 
women, (femininity, heterosexuality, and motherhood for example), combined with 
the conventions of the narrative genre itself, which privilege coherent, linear and 
progressive stories, reproduce structures of domination that work to sustain sexual 
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difference - even when they focus on being about women and correcting invisibility. 
Drawing on Teresa de Lauretis (1987) and Sidonie Smith (1987), Bloom argues that 
'when women create narratives, they often unconsciously reproduce patriarchal 
ideologies because these ideologies work like "master scripts" on the individual subject 
regardless of sex' (Bloom, 1998: 62). Ontological narratives directed at empowerment 
and control may draw on conceptual narratives that assume 'progress' or 'modernity', 
and the same time these agentic story-lines may be disruptive of those conceptual 
narratives. 
Feminist theories about the possibilities and difficulties of representation for women 
within language may also be applied to people who identify as transsexual, or as 
intersexed, or as transgendered. Transgendered individuals are also excluded from the 
normative signifying economy. The transsexual person does not have access to the 
same normatively valued forms of symbolic representation that are traditionally 
available to (white, heterosexual, middle class, able bodied) men and women. The 
exclusion of transgendered people from forms of representation is evident in the way 
binary gender categories and heterosexuality dominate public space (Namaste, 1996a). 
The heterosexual domination of public space constructs homosexuality and 
transsexuality as invisible, unnatural, specific and out of place (Brickell, 2000: 165: 
Namaste, 1996a: 226-228). The social construction of the spatial in relation to binary 
gender categories is discussed further in Chapter Nine. The gradual erasure of 
intersexed bodies from forms of public representation has been achieved through the 
twin institutions of law and medicine (Hird and Germon, 2001: 163-164). In 
Australia, for example, the law requires that either a male or a female sex has to be 
entered on the Births Register. The state regulation of sexed bodies and identities is 
taken up in Chapter Eight. Medicine produces normatively sexed bodies and gendered 
subjects by the regulation, interpretation and management of intersexed infants. The 
physical appearance of these anomalous bodies is 'corrected' through the use of 
'desh'uctive' medical technologies including surgery and hormones (Chase, 1998; Hird 
and Germon, 2001). The discourses and practices of the medical professionals aim at 
producing a standardised body, one in which biological ambiguity is removed. The 
construction of sex, gender and sexual orientation in the medical management of 
9 'It' is an unsatisfactory alternative because it is non-sexed and non-gendered and has negative 
connotations - see Chapter Five in relation to this. 
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intersexed bodies is considered further in Chapter Four. These examples suggest that 
sexed bodies which trouble binary gender categories are considered Other in relation 
to normative sets of understandings about the relationship between gender and 
anatomy. Their subjectivity is marked and defined through a series of exclusions that 
are based on their difference from sets of medical and social understandings about the 
relationship between sex and gender. This Otherness has been traditionally defined by 
those who have the power to construct and enforce definitions of the Other. 
The meanings that are associated with transsexualism are mediated through social 
and political institutions and practices which organise inclusions and institutional 
exclusions. The medical profession and the state are key actors in this regard. A limited 
range of powerful public and cultural narratives about the relationship between sexual 
difference, (hetero)sexuality and identity also inform the lives of most transgender 
people. Transgender subjectivities are unintelligible in relation to these narratives 
because they may be both male and female, heterosexual and homosexual. More 
recently some transgender people have begun to invent their own narratives and 
understandings about their identities which do not take as their basis powerful medical 
definitions of transsexualism and which refuse or challenge commonsense 
understandings about sexual difference (Stone, 1991; Bornstein, 1994, Feinberg, 1996, 
Nataf, 1996; Halberstam, 1998). These new narratives are part of a political project 
that involves creating inclusive private stories that are accessible in public contexts. 
They celebrate the possibilities afforded by multiple, shifting and fractured identities, 
they recognise the temporal and cultural specificity of identity categories and they 
criticise and contest theoretical dichotomies that support hierarchical forms of 
difference. Sandy Stone (1991), for example, comments on the disruptive potential of 
the 'transsexual text' within language. Stone's transsexual text potentially disrupts and 
multiplies the meanings and categories of gender and sexuality: 
In the transsexual text we may find the potential to map the refigured body onto 
conventional gender discourse and thereby disrupt it, to take advantage of the 
dissonances created by such a juxtaposition to fragment and reconstitute the 
elements of gender in new and unexpected geometries... I suggest constituting 
transsexuals not as a class or problematic "third gender", but rather as a genre - a 
set of embodied texts whose potential for productive disruption of structured 
sexualities and spectra of desire has yet to be explored (Stone, 1991: Z 96). 
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In a similar vein, Nataf (1996: 58) anticipates a future in which gender diversity is 
accepted in the same way as cultural diversity. Nataf suggests that transsexuals are 
currently forced into binary gender categories because of threats of violence and loss of 
social legitimacy. He looks forward to a time when binary gender categories are 
replaced by multiple categories of sex and gender: 
All this deconstruction and yearning for fluidity anticipate future evolutions of 
social genders and physical sexes, the actual outcome of which can only be 
speculated about. For now, these circulating representations of new genders to 
come urgently reveal the limitations of our existing categories, although our lives 
are already creating queer dissonances and unexpected geometrical combinations 
(Nataf, 1996: 56). 
I also encountered narratives that were critical of binary gender categories among 
some of the people that I interviewed. In the following excerpt, Jack suggests that ideas 
about binary gender categories are still dominant. This dominance is beginning to be 
challenged by the recognition of different sexualities, and combinations between 
sexuality and social gender: 
I think the problem is that society constructs the fact that there is only male and 
there is only female. .. I believe that the larger thing is that there are still only 
two genders, and I know I read somewhere that they talk about not a third 
gender but an acceptance of variables in between because there are variables. 
You have probably got your heterosexual male and then your gay male and 
then your hermaphrodite, your trany girl, your trany boy, your dyke and then 
your heterosexual woman and who is to say that there are not splits within each 
one of those again and again and again. Where does it end? We know where it 
starts, it starts with Adam and Eve Inc. . . . Look the medical profession has 
towards society to say: "This one has a dick and it is a boy and this one has a 
cunt and it is a girl". And I'm sorry there is nothing else, it is a boy and it is a 
girl. Make up your mind. We can only have one or the other ... let us reason 
that there are more than just the one, two or three. So bloody many variables 
that society is I think slowly learning to be more aware of the variables and to 
treat people in general with more respect but you will always have the winners 
and losers ... 
Jack, ITM, 1996 
Jack places combinations between gender and sexuality on a continuum in which 
straight male and straight female are polar opposites; gay men, hermaphrodites, 
transgendered people and lesbians occupy the spaces in between. Jack suggests that 
there are probably more variables within the categories of sexual difference that are 
named in his continuum model. In this narrative a mythical 'Adam' and 'Eve' 
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represent irreducible differences between men and women (Stone, 1991: 294). The 
medical profession legitimates, and reinforces, normative physiological and social 
differences between the sexes. 
Nick, a trany boy whom I interviewed in Sydney, comments on the way the trany 
community is singled out as different because people who identify as transgendered do 
not conform to normative understandings about the relationship between anatomical 
sex and social gender: 
Our community is only different because society makes it different. We still 
bleed like you, our bones can still break like you, and I don't mean any 
disrespect when I say that, because we are no different, society makes us 
different because they accept that there is male and there is female and male 
should look like this and female should look like that. It is unfortunate that is 
the way that it is. The majority of flack comes from people who do not 
understand and are not prepared or are not game enough to ask the why. Some 
people might not ask because they are petrified, or they are unsure about their 
own sexuality. A lot of people confuse gender and sexuality and the two have 
nothing to do with each other. People have to relate gender to sex and in reality 
your gender is male, the female has a vagina, but that is only because society 
says so. And they have to either be one, or the other, why can't there be third 
sex, or whatever you want to call it? 
Nick, FTM, 1996 
Nick identifies similarities between transgender people and the non-transgendered 
world by appealing to a common humanity. He is critical of definitions of male and 
female that focus on the appearance of the genitals, suggesting that lines of connection 
between social gender and anatomy discriminate against transgendered people. I 
identify is Nick's narrative Bornstein's (1994) notion of 'third sex' which is used to 
question binary understandings of sex. At the same time, Nick recognises that 'third 
sex' may be problematic for some transgendered people. 
Transgender activists, like Nick, are involved in the renarrativisation of sex and 
gender as a political strategy. They locate these terms in dominant cultural 
representations, institutional practices and relationships to others pointing out their 
heterosexist assumptions and institutional exclusions. Nick is critical of the way gender 
and sexuality are often conflated and identifies a fear of homosexuality as one reason 
why transgendered people encounter a lack of understanding among people that they 
meet. Nick also questions the oppositional categories of male and female by which he is 
classified as Other. At the same time in saying "your gender is male" Nick conflates 
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social gender with biological sex. Nick does not identify as butchlfemme, nor would 
he identify with Halberstam's (1998) ideas about female masculinity, which retain 
female as the primary identity category. For Nick male equates to self, female 
represents the Other. He does not associate female with himself and he is careful not to 
conflate his genitals with who he is. Nick refers to the disruptive potential of third sex, 
but still positions himself as male within the male/female binary. Nick's talk illustrates 
the way that stories and bodies act as both resources and as constraints on identity. 
Both Bloom (1998) and Somers (1994) talk about the unconscious reproduction of 
'master scripts' by social actors. In my research narrative location was often very 
deliberate/ strategic. People who transition across gender consciously locate 
themselves, both metaphorically and bodily, in public narratives of sex and gender. 
This is indicated in the following narrative: 
I think as you go along you start to, I feel as though you start to have the gender 
stuff break down, but the fact is there can't be that much broken down if I 
know exactly where I should be. I must have a pretty rigid framework there to 
be able to hang the pieces on. So, I can't really say it is breaking down. 
Craig, FTM, 1996 
It is this conscious appropriation of public narratives associated with sexual 
difference, combined with critical attention to the way that biological sex and social 
gender are deployed as conceptual categories, that brings into focus the situated 
character of narratives and the narrative identities of transgendered people. The 
narrative identities of transgendered people are shaped by discourses that are dominant 
in the context(s) in which they are developed. The contextual nature of narratives 
suggests that the meanings of stories are not fixed. Stories have multiple 
interpretations, whereby particular meanings become salient in different relational 
settings. The next section looks at the politics associated with the spaces in which 
transgender stories are told and heard. Attention to the situatedness of narratives 
recognises the political dynamics of stories and spaces. 
Situated narratives and the politics of spaces 
Narratives are most unstable, that is most temporal and relational, at the level of 
ontology. Public narratives, or traditions, and 'denarrativised' meta-narratives are the 
most stable. According to Margaret Somers, the process of constructing and 
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communicating stories is the social glue that holds together multiple identities, events, 
times, spaces and relationships. She recognises the spatial character of narratives but 
this is not developed in her analysis of the practice of narrativity (Somers, 1994: 164). 
Somers attaches history and relationality to social identity, social action, social agency, 
experience, events and relationships, but not to narratives and spaces per se. In 
Chapter Nine I argue that spacelO is relational in the sense that it is constituted by and 
constitutive of social processes (Massey, 1992: 80-81; 1994: 2). The social dynamics of 
space are indicated by its gendered and sexualised dimensions. 11 The following section 
of this chapter explores the way that subject positions are made available to actors in 
social interaction through shifting associations between spaces, discourses and 
corporeality. 
Attention to narrative identity involves locating social action in the network of 
relationships in which actors are embedded, and in the numerous cross-cutting story-
lines with which people identify (Somers and Gibson, 1994: 67). Social relationships 
and cultural practices are embedded in the stories through which people constitute 
their identities. Somers' focus on reinterpreting historical data means that 
consideration of the dynamic aspects of inter-personal social encounters is not the 
focus of her analysis. How people orientate themselves in relation to their experience 
of interactions, practices and the public narratives embedded in conversational story-
lines is, however, outlined in the work of Bronwyn Davies and Rom Harre. Davies and 
Harre (1990, 1999) explore how selves are discursively produced in social interaction. 
According to Davies and Harre, selves are located in conversations; telling a story 
positions self and other in relation to the story-lines told. They refer to this process of 
relational story-telling as 'positioning' (Davies and Harre, 1990: 52; Davies, 1992: 54-
55). Positioning is embedded in the dynamic aspects of social encounters. In 
conversational speech participants draw on personal and cultural resources in order to 
actively construct the present moment. The social meaning of a conversation is 
dependent upon the way actors are positioned in and through the speech acts of 
participants and the place in which it occurs. In conversational speech actors are 
located (or may locate themselves) in subject positions which are in turn embedded in 
historically and culturally specific shared understandings about the rights, obligations, 
expectations and social structures associated with that position. Thus actors' 
10 I understand, and use 'space' as geographical (McDowell, 1996: 32), political (Massey, 1992: 66), 
physical (Wendell, 1992: 69; Chouinard and Grant, 1996: 176),embodied (Grosz, 1994: 79-80), 
relational (Massey, 1992: 80-81; McDowell, 1996: 29) and social (Plummer, 1995). 
11 Space and place are also discussed in Chapter Nine. 
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understanding and experience of their social identity, the social world and their place 
in it is discursively constructed' (Frazer (1990) cited in Davies and Harre, 1990: 45). 
People who are in the process of transitioning across opposed gender categories are 
acutely aware of their own gendered subject position and the way that they are 
positioned as male or female in conversations with others. Davies and Harre's 
arguments about positioning are best demonstrated in the following narrative about 
getting a haircut from a person who had only recently transitioned: 
I used to think that there was a certain haircut that you could get, I went to the 
hairdresser, this guy down the road, I was going to him for ages and I said to 
him: "If you were cutting a guy's hair would you be cutting it like you are 
now?" And I thought he would say "no", and he goes: "Oh yeah, I'd be cutting 
it differently". It just floored me, it was just devastating, he was just basically 
doing a number 1 all over, or a number Z, and fixing it up around the edges, 
and I thought that was a guy's haircut, and that is what he was doing. And I 
said: "Well if you were cutting a guy's hair now how would you change?" And 
he goes: "Oh, I would be cutting it a lot sharper around here", like he was 
doing stuff to my head, showing me. "I would make this a bit sharper and I'd 
have all the lines a bit sharper". He said: "For a female I'm doing it a lot softer 
and a lot more easier". I didn't go back to him ever again ... So of course, then 
I went down Devon Street, and there is a seven buck shop, or something, and I 
picked out a girl there who I thought, and I was right, she's a lesbian, she's got 
everything pierced, she has got her head shaved, little tufts of coloured pink 
hair sticking up. I got her, explained the situation to her, exactly everything, 
well not everything, very briefly, and she has cut my hair ever since perfectly. 
And I went into a shop yesterday, because I get my eyelashes done every now 
and then, and I just wanted to get a time with someone. I know the other girl 
there thinks I'm a guy, but this girl, I'd never seen before, she must have 
thought I was a girl and she goes: "I really like your hair, God I couldn't go that 
short you know". And I'm completely thrown. I'm just sitting there thinking 
I'm not following you at all. And then I realised she thought I was a girl, she 
was assessing my haircut in terms of what she could do, and how brave I was as 
a girl, in the girl's club you know. But it only made sense to me later, all of the 
things she was saying, if you were one of the club and you were challenging the 
club's rules or something. That's happening a lot, I guess because maybe I'm 
sort of still on the boundary there, or something, or I look on the boundary ... 
Craig, ITM, 1996 
Craig provides an amusing anecdote about the seemingly mundane practice of 
'getting a haircut' which illustrates Bronwyn Davies and Rom Harre's (1990, 1999) 
arguments about positioning. In the first part of the narrative Craig is positioned as a 
female by the hairdresser who gives him a feminine version of a number one hair cut. 
Craig is so surprised by this that he asks the hairdresser to demonstrate the difference 
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between a male and a female haircut. Craig's objection to the hairdresser's positioning 
of him as female motivates him to seek another hairdresser. In conversation with me 
Craig indicates his opposition to being positioned as a woman by the hairdresser. In 
the actual salon Craig suffers this positioning in silence, he does not correct the 
assumptions of the hairdresser regarding his gender identity, and he remains in the 
chair until his haircut is completed. Craig's thwarted subjectivity exemplifies the way 
gender identities are constituted and reconstituted in conversations and through the 
social interactions in which people participate. Craig learns that, although they appear 
to be short all over, number one haircuts are gendered. Male haircuts are 'sharp', 
female haircuts are 'soft'. He considers that his 'soft', 'female' haircut is incompatible 
with his view of himself as a man. In other words, in the area of appearance an aspect 
of self and other is learnt in this interaction. 
Craig justifies his positioning of the second hairdresser as a lesbian by referring to 
the culturally established meanings associated with the cluster of attributes, body 
piercing, a shaved head, and tufts of pink hair, displayed by the hairstylist. Craig 
identifies these attributes as markers of lesbian 'unfashion' (Hebdige, 1979: 107). 
Craig's anecdote draws on cultural stereotypes about lesbians which provide non-
verbal clues as to the hairdresser's sexual orientation. This illustrates the way that 
people are sometimes passively positioned by others in public space. Craig chooses 
someone he defines as a lesbian as his new hairdresser because he assumes that she 
will be sympathetic to his situation. In order to ensure that this hairdresser 'reads' 
Craig as a man, and provides him with the desired male haircut, he provides her with a 
story about his gender identity. 
Craig then goes on to describe another incident in a beauty salon in which he was 
unwillingly positioned by the receptionist as a woman. As is the case with most 
interactions, the receptionist's positioning of Craig as a woman was unintentional or 
taken for granted. Craig, who admits that his gender identity is currently ambiguous, 
was displeased at being positioned as a woman in this 'feminine' space. Craig interprets 
the receptionist's reaction to his haircut as violating the unspoken rules of the 'girls 
club'. In the context of Craig's ambiguous body the male haircut should work to 
provide strangers with non-verbal clues as to his male gender identity. In this 
interaction the short masculine haircut does not signify a male identity, but is instead 
read by the receptionist as challenging public scripts of femininity. Craig's narrative 
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about being positioned as a 'girl' in the beauty salon is also shaped by the particular 
characteristics of the context in which he presents himself. A beauty salon is typically 
used by women, Craig wants his eyelashes dyed - a service that is more commonly 
requested by women. The salon and the procedure influence his interaction with the 
receptionist and therefore the likelihood that she would position him as a staunch 
female rather than as a male. This section of Craig's anecdote illustrates the 
significance of context to the way that we present ourselves; it is not just discourses but 
also spaces that make available certain subject positions to actors. 
Harrison White (1992) argues that identities become salient when individuals 
encounter inconsistencies between their narrative constructions of (male) self and the 
social contexts (such as the salon) in which they interact. The different ways that Craig 
positions himself and is positioned by others in this narrative illustrates the complex 
ways that identities are negotiated in everyday social encounters. His narrative also 
indicates that 'positioning' is not just a conversational phenomenon; subject positions 
are also tied to spaces and to a person's corporeality. Craig wants to position himself as 
male physically rather than through just words or conversation. He pursues an 
embodied maleness and his story is about how he acquired the right number one male 
haircut only to find himself identified as a staunch 'girl' in a particular context. People 
who transition across binary gender categories may be viewed as bricoleurs12 (Levi-
Strauss, 1966; Hebdige, 1979: 103-106) who improvise in constructing their narrative 
identities out of public discourses of sex and gender. This bricolage is often made 
possible by the spaces in which transgender people are located. 
The place of stories, contexts and bodies in constructing a gendered self is 
demonstrated through Craig's narrative. Craig's anecdote also illustrates the way self 
and other are enacted in everyday conversations. The words of the receptionist, and the 
actions of the first hairdresser, contain images and metaphors that assume and invoke 
problematic ways of being for Craig. Craig is aware of the way that he is positioned by 
the first hairdresser and the receptionist. Shared understandings about Craig's male 
gender identity are absent from both of these interactions. Davies and Harre (1990, 
12 Drawing on Roland Barthes' (1956; 1993: 100) arguments about signifier, signified and sign, 
Hebdige (1979: 106) describes bricolage as the 'juxtaposition of two apparently incompatible realities in 
order to disrupt and reorganise meaning'. Transgender activists who appropriate objects typically 
associated with one gender and reassemble them in order to disrupt or challenge categories of sexual 
difference are bricoleurs. The process of changing or subverting the role of an object in order to convey 
a different meaning is bricolage. See Chapter Five for a more comprehensive discussion of bricolage. 
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1999) and Davies, (1993: xv) observe that the positions created for oneself in 
autobiography are not necessarily non-contradictory or linear. Craig's narrative 
concludes with a reflection on the difficulties associated with keeping a particular 
narrative of identity going when his current ambiguously gendered appearance means 
that he may be positioned as either male or female in social interactions. Implicit in this 
narrative is Craig's previous identity as female and his current identity as male. Craig 
is able to do both - the challenge is how successfully he manages to present himself as 
male and to efface his femaleness. The relative success or failure of these attempts 
depends on the context of the interaction. 
Craig presents to me as a male who has transitioned from being a 'girl', and he also 
hints that he told the second hairdresser about his ITM transgender status. Craig's 
positioning of self and other in conversation is dependent on his learning oppositional 
categories, specifically in this case male/female, masculine/feminine, soft/sharp, 
straight/gay. Craig participates in interactions where the meanings associated with 
these categories become salient. He recognises which categories he belongs to and 
positions himself as male in relation to the meanings associated with those categories. 
Craig's narrative illustrates the way subject positions offered by participants in 
conversation may confirm identities or block access to desired identities. As a result, 
contradictions between the self identity of transgender people and the way they are 
positioned by others in social interactions provides an important site for exploring 
what it means to be a gendered person.1 3 
Craig's narrative about the incident in the hair salon indicates that it is not just 
narratives but also spaces that make certain subject positions available to actors. 
Subject positions offered in conversations are not just discursive, or performative, but 
are tied to a person's corporeality. Stories do not simply reflect social life. Rather the 
contexts in which lived narratives are assembled play an active role in the story-telling 
process. Craig's narrative about being positioned as female in the beauty salon, and my 
field notes about his problems at work, indicate that stories and identities are 
constrained by the internal dynamics of the spaces in which they are told and heard. 
Interviews open up spaces for telling stories that would not easily be heard in other 
13 Craig responded to my analysis of his words in this section by suggesting that as he has always 
identified as a man his attempts at escaping the 'girls club' were thwarted - rather than his male identity 
- in his interaction with the receptionist in the beauty salon. 
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contexts. Stories about transitioning across gender are an example of this kind of 
marginal story. 
Shared understandings about legitimate and illegitimate narratives reflect patterns 
of domination which facilitate or frustrate the capacity to tell a story. These patterns 
are not fixed but change over time and in relation to the author and the audience 
(Plummer, 1995). Certain spaces close down the possibility for particular stories to be 
heard; others open them up. There are very few spaces/places in which stories about 
transitioning across gender may be reasonably freely articulated. One of my research 
sites, the Gender Centre a centre for transgender activism, is a space in which these 
narratives circulate. In this place/space state funded support services are targeted at 
transgender people, energetic local political activism occurs, debates focusing on 
transgender issues appear in local queer newspapers. In this locale a significant 
number of people who identify as transgendered have ready access to a range of 
narratives about transitioning across gender. Ken Plummer (1995: ZZ) argues that the 
telling of a story is bound up with the life worlds of the speaker and the wider 
imagined 'communities of interpretation' through which stories circulate. In Sydney 
local knowledges about transgender politics and public narratives about sex and 
gender provide the personal and cultural resources for speakers to draw on in 
constructing their lived narratives. In the following extract, Michelle, a male-to-
female transsexual interviewed for this project, talks about the way her narrative about 
self changes from one moment to another: 
If I could reach that sense of belief and acknowledgement in the world (as a 
woman) then that would be my preferred space, but because I don't feel 
comfortable about that then I adopt a transgender identity with pride if you 
like. I think it would be nice to (pass)... it is such a philosophical question 
because in not identifying as transsexual we are then supporting the binary 
gender system which we generally tend to find offensive anyway. And I change 
on this one, I have to confess that my attitude at one moment may not be the 
same as another. My attitude at present is probably that having spent most of 
my life living one lie, I think that I would be then living another lie if I just then 
tried to say I was female and always was female. Transgender is my true space, 
but I guess it would be more comfortable as one or the other, safety in numbers 
you know you just melt in. Transgender, you really are standing out, you are 
sticking out, you are a good target. But philosophically, I guess that I would like 
to see gender as we know it evaporating. 
Michelle, MTF, 1996 
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Michelle's narrative about self shifts and changes in relation to the political ideas 
about identity and gender that she encounters in her local transgender community. She 
understands the politics of claiming and positively affirming an identity category that 
has previously been negatively valued. At the same time 'passing' or being identified as 
an ordinary female is attractive because it is 'safe'. Michelle says she agrees with 
philosophical debates advocating the abolition of binary gender categories but her 
enthusiasm for these ideas is tempered by her experiences of discrimination. 
Transgender as a 'preferred space' in Michelle's narrative is really transgender as an 
identity category. Michelle's preferred space is, however an uncomfortable place to be, 
one that makes her a potential 'target' for vilification. 
Transgender identities are not only limited to local contexts but are also constituted 
in relation to national and international processes. In this view, local, national and 
international contexts introduce difference into the category 'transgender'. Wendy, an 
MTF, comments on the difficulties of applying Kate Bornstein's (1994) arguments 
about gender fluidity to the Australian context: 
Nobody knows the truth about gender, that is an open question. People have to 
explore that, and find that out for themselves. It would be good if we could 
just abandon all constructs of gender altogether - Kate Bornstein's argument. 
But you have to remember that Bornstein's argument comes out of the North 
American experience. Over in America there is a huge transsexual! 
transgender culture there, out in the open, in all the big cities in America. The 
culture is huge with businesses run by transgenders for transgenders (and 
others). Bornstein's ideas represent just one extreme end of the spectrum, one 
voice, in a very vibrant and diverse trany culture. In Australia there is no large 
transgender culture, her ideas are not (yet) appropriate here ... 
Wendy,MTF, 1996 
Wendy argues that the sheer size of transgender communities in the large North 
American cities means that narratives developed in those communities are not 
particularly helpful to transgendered people living in other places. In Wendy's 
narrative different relational settings are important to the forms of political activism 
available to people and therefore the stories that are able to be told about being 
transgendered. Ken Plummer (1995) argues that the power to give voice to a narrative, 
or to remain silent, is part of the political process through which narratives are 
regulated. Wendy implies that it is easier to claim a non-gendered identity and to have 
a 'voice' in a 'vibrant and diverse trany culture'. Both Michelle and Wendy indicate 
that crafting transgendered identities in their own local settings is much more difficult. 
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Towards a corporeal narrativity 
In summary, how individuals take up and are taken up by particular narratives and 
resist others is under-theorised in Somers' (1992, 1994) arguments about narrativity, 
agency and sUbjectivity. Transgender identities and ontological narratives are 
managed in the context of occupying bodies that confound public narratives associated 
with sexual difference. The inter-personal, social, relational and spatial dimensions of 
ontological narratives may be accessed through attention to the contexts in which 
narratives are in play. The telling of a story is bound up with the life world of the 
speaker and the wider communities of interpretation through which stories circulate. 
The meanings of stories are not fixed; stories have multiple interpretations, whereby 
particular meanings become salient in different relational settings. 
Somers' (1992, 1994) concept of narrativity and Plummer's (1995) arguments 
about the internal dynamics of spaces embed identity, experience, social action and 
social agency in numerous cross-cutting relational storylines which are particular to a 
specific time and place. Somers pays attention to differences in narratives across 
geographic space, while Plummer's work explores the social spaces in which stories are 
expressed and received. The internal dynamics of spaces need to be developed 
through attention to physical spaces - the workplace, the cafeteria, the restaurant, the 
hairdressers, the beauty salon - the social locations that facilitate or inhibit stories, 
embodiment and the practice of narrativity. People construct identities, however 
multiple and changing, by locating themselves or by being located in stories or public 
narratives that shift over time and space. Stories are similar to identities in that both 
are dynamically and progressively achieved. We have selves because we have 
storylines - our capacity to be a self, to be an agent depends on our capacity to craft 
stories about ourselves. Selves are located in conversations; as a result subjectivity is 
generated through discursive practices. Narrative identities shift according to the 
subject positions made available in stories and in one's own and others' discursive 
practices. The narratives that social actors use to craft identities are also shaped by 
their location at any particular point in time in certain social relations. Understanding 
narrative identities as embedded in the politics of spaces, cultural representations, 
public narratives and relationships to others foregrounds the active, fluid, contingent. 
and social nature of stories and sUbjectivities. 
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In this chapter I have argued that attention to the dynamic aspects of inter-personal 
encounters facilitates an exploration of the unstable, relational, temporal and spatial 
dimensions of narratives and narrative identities. My sociological research was 
negotiated within this dynamic interplay between temporally and spatially contingent 
stories and identities. 
In the next chapter I explore the way in which research stories are co-produced 
through interaction between the researcher and the people who participated in this 
study. This combines key methodological concerns with details about the actual process 
of doing research. I consider methodological debates that privilege women and/or 
gender as the subject of feminist research and reflect on these debates in relation to my 
position as a woman interviewing people who have been both (sometimes 
simultaneously) male and female. 
Generating collaborative stories 
... stories are not simply 'languages' or 'texts' or even 'discourses'. I want to move 
right away from the current, almost obsessive, concern of much analysis which 
reduces dense, empirical human life to texts. Social reality may be approached 
metaphorically as a text, but it is not in actuality a text ... the sexual stories I will 
be discussing must be seen to be socially produced in social contexts by embodied 
concrete people experiencing the thoughts and feelings of everyday life ... 
Ken Plummer (1995: 165 italics in the original) 
Nick, a self-identified ITM, is a cocky young man the same age as me. He is full of 
bravado and confidence; he does a particularly macho working class version of what 
Bob Connell (1995) would refer to as 'hegemonic masculinity'. Armed with coffee we 
settle into the comfortable sofa in his sunny living room for the two-hour interview. 
Nick proceeds to tell me calmly the sad and harrowing tale of his life - of orphanages, 
of being gang raped at eighteen to 'make him straight' and of transitioning across 
binary gender categories. It is a story of survival from a man who refuses to be a 
victim. It is also a practiced story, one that he has told many times before both publicly 
and privately. Some months later, I tune in to late night TV in order to see Nick telling 
an abridged version of this story to a national audience (Field notes, December, 1996). 
* * * * * 
It has been a long day. I've been attending a conference on transgender issues and I 
have been listening to people who have diverging opinions on transgenderism 
attempting to find some common ground across entrenched ideological, class, ethnic 
and surgical barriers. The conference is an example of the very real practical 
difficulties associated with a politics of difference within marginal communities. I 
meet Jude at the conference and she insists on being interviewed that very evening. I 
have my tape recorder, interview schedule, spare tapes and batteries so I agree to go 
home with her. It's Australia Day; a fact that has escaped my attention until the 
interview is punctuated with the sound of fireworks exploding on Sydney Harbour. 
Jude, an avid reader, quotes back to me Judith Butler's ideas about gender as 
performance and post-structuralist theories about identities as multiple, shifting and 
contingent. She wants to know about Foucauldian theory, aspects of which were being 
used by some transgender activists at the conference, and we talk at length. Jude 
provides her own analysis of the politics of the day, one that pays attention to 
contradiction and difference (Field notes, January, 1997). 
* * * * * 
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Wendy sits in my room at the university, she is very hostile, she wants to know what 
my research is going to achieve for transgendered people. Wendy has a master's 
degree and she understands how research findings sometimes get appropriated for an 
investigator's own ends with little benefit to the people who have contributed to the 
study. She wants to make sure that I am not one of those researchers. Wendy is a 
prominent person in the community that I wish to study. It is a tense moment, one that 
could make or break my presence in that community. I'm not prepared for her 
questions, and I already feel that my position as researcher in the community is 
marginal and tenuous. I don't answer her questions directly, because, even to my own 
ears, such answers would sound rehearsed and therefore insincere. Instead we talk at 
length about how I came to be interested in the topic, what I thought about different 
theoretical positions on transsexualism/transgenderism, how I am going to use the 
interview data. Wendy's hostility subsides as she listens to my responses to her 
questions. Wendy admits that my interview schedule covers some interesting issues. 
But her questions are disquieting. She is right; I cannot see how my research is going to 
help transsexual/transgendered people in any immediate, practical way. This is the 
first of many subsequent conversations in which Wendy tests my skills as a researcher 
and extends me intellectually (Field notes, October, 1996). 
These three vignettes from l!1Y field notes illustrate some of the issues that I wish to 
discuss in this chapter. They concern the contexts in which research narratives are co-
produced, reproduced and consumed. Sociological research is not simply an often 
frustrating and ultimately solitary process through which texts about the social are 
produced. To paraphrase Plummer (1995: 165) research is conducted in particular 
social contexts 'by embodied concrete people experiencing the thoughts and feelings of 
everyday life'. It is the contexts, the people and their emotional investments in the 
narratives co-produced during my field research that are the focus of discussion in this 
chapter. Through this discussion, I want to highlight the interpersonal dimensions of 
narrativity, the interaction between individuals, stories, the interview context and the 
particularistic, socially situated narratives that I encountered while doing my research. 
This chapter combines key methodological concerns with details about the actual 
process of doing research. In the previous chapter, I argued that stories and identities 
both emerge from interactions, shifting and changing according to the spaces and 
times in which they are embedded. My sociological research is negotiated within this 
dynamic interplay between temporally and spatially contingent stories and identities. 
Somers (1993, 1999) provides historical analyses that reproduce and reinterpret 
existing narratives. I generate my own with people who participated in this research. 
My interaction with Wendy reflects this difference between Somers' historical actors, 
who contribute to, but are not actually involved in the research process, and my 
encounters with critical narratives in face-to-face situations. I explore the way 
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research stories are co-produced through interaction between the researcher and the 
people who participated in this study. I consider methodological debates that privilege 
women and/or gender as the subject of feminist research. My position as a woman 
interviewing people who have experiences of being both male and female is also an 
opportunity to address debates about the positioning of researchers and the politics of 
knowledge production. 
Getting into place, generating stories 
Constructing a methodology chapter is rather like imposing order and coherence on 
a process characterised by chance and contingency. Fieldwork, according to Goffman, 
(1989 [1974]: 125) is a way of generating data through subjecting your self, body and 
personality to the set of contingent circumstances in a particular research setting. 
Research for Goffman (1989 [1974]: 126-127) is a matter of 'getting into place', and 
'making a world' by providing a plausible story for your presence. It involves opening 
yourself up to new experiences and people in ways that may make you vulnerable, but 
it also involves exploiting any opportunities that may arise (Goffman, 1989 [1974]: 
128). Although Goffman's advice refers to the sort of fieldwork that involves extended 
covert participant observation, I recognise in his suggestions and anecdotes aspects of 
my own research experience doing qualitative interviewing at a particular locale. 
Most of my research was carried out in a different country in cities with which I was 
only marginally familiar. I had the amazing good fortune to secure accommodation at 
Sydney University on the inner city border of the bustling suburb of Newtown. In the 
summer of 96/97 the clubs and cafes of Newtown, as it turned out, were the local 
hangout for many of the politically active transgendered people that I met during the 
time that I spent in Sydney. 
The point of fieldwork for Goffman (1989 [1974]: 128) is to experience the field 'as 
a witness', 'not as an interviewer'. This involves attending to how the people that you 
observe react to what is going on around them. Interviewing, as Goffman implies, is 
often characterised as the sort of research that involves getting in, getting information 
and getting out with minimal involvement in the day-to-day complexities of people for 
whom your research topic is the stuff of everyday life. While I used interviewing as a 
research strategy, I lived in my research site and I could not help but experience my 
research in Sydney both as a witness and as an interviewer. People came to my home, 
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'they told me secrets, they invited me out, and they demanded that I share more of 
myself than is normally expected in the interview context. 
I did not achieve the 'deep familiarity' (Goffman, 1989 [1974]: 130) with my 
research site that is the desirable goal of fieldwork. This is because I was not doing 
fieldwork, but I was familiar enough with the context to be able to triangulate what 
people were saying with actual events. Three events dominated the narratives of all of 
the people that I interviewed: the passing of the Transgender (Anti-Discrimination and 
Other Acts Amendment Bill) 1996 in the New South Wales Parliament, the ongoing 
political divisions within the community and the February Gay and Lesbian Mardi 
Gras. The legislation came into effect on October 1, 1996, only a matter of weeks 
before I arrived in Sydney in late October. An extended discussion of this legislation, 
and the way that it informed the narratives of the people that I interviewed, is explored 
in Chapter Eight. Chapter Nine considers how communities are 'imagined' through 
collective rituals such as the 1997 Sydney Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras. Political 
divisions are also explored through an analysis of the way that the boundaries of 
communities are constructed and problematised through internal debates about who 
should represent and provide services for the Sydney transgender community. 
One of the issues I wanted to address in the thesis was the way in which research 
informants might be viewed as theorists and experts in their own lives and realms of 
experience (Lemert, 1997: xi). Several of the people whom I interviewed presented 
gender as work.! In doing so they gave a sense of the 'expert knowledge' that is 
involved in doing gender (Smith, 1990: 203). 2 Charles Lemert (1997: 5) refers to this 
tacit knowledge as 'sociological competence'. Being transgendered involves keen 
attention to social processes and high levels of reflexivity. MTFs and ITMs have 
expertise at being men and women. This allows them to reflect on the tacit knowledges 
surrounding doing gender that most of us take for granted. Knowledge about doing 
gender requires more than a sociological imagination (Mills, 1959). It requires 
practice and practical knowledge. The talk of those who are transgendered is one way 
of accessing gendered expertise. The task of the sociologist is to provide access to this 
practical knowledge through the explication of individual experience set in the context 
1 For specific examples of respondents who represented gender as work see Craig's narrative about 
getting a haircut in Chapter Two and Robyn's Story in Chapter Three. 
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of the discourses and practices that make this experience possible (Bourdieu, 1988: 
782; Bourdieu and Wac quant, 1992: 205-206). 
Sociological research is not neutral; it is shaped both theoretically and empirically. It 
does not provide a complete picture of a social world that is only partially 
comprehended by the individual (Bourdieu, 1988: 780). As a result, tensions between 
researcher and researched are an ever-present problematic in sociology (Du Bois, 
1983; Fonow and Cook, 1991; Bloom, 1998). The sociological gaze, our ways of 
collecting and interpreting information and our connection to academia, implicitly 
construct a hierarchical opposition between the researcher as knower and informants 
as those who are known about (Bourdieu, 1988: 780). Instead of accepting this 
distinction, I wanted to acknowledge the way research stories are co-produced through 
interaction between the researcher and the people who participated in this study. 
Davies and Harre (1990, 1999) explore the way subjectivities are generated 
through discursive practices which 'position' people in social encounters. According to 
Davies and Harre selves are located in conversations; telling a story positions self and 
other in relation to the story-lines told. There is only a limited repertoire of available 
representations and stories; people tailor personal narratives to fit these stories, and 
shared public narratives are in turn consolidated by the stories that people use to 
constitute their identitieS. Similarly, Ken Plummer (1995) considers the interactions 
that emerge around story-telling. Plummer (1995: 21) suggests that as a researcher I 
am a 'coaxer', and therefore a producer, of stories. My research questions, for 
example, contained texts that offered a range of subject positions to informants and 
asked them to comment on alternative ways of articulating themselves. Our face-to-
face interactions were vital to their interpretation of whether they were to 
accommodate themselves to these given questions or contest them. Thus, stories about 
transitioning across gender were co-produced in the interview context. Transgendered 
people, for example, often talked about how different spaces enabled or required 
different enactments of self and therefore different ways of locating themselves in their 
2 Smith argues that the fashion industry does not simply determine women's appearance in local settings. 
Femininity and fashion are instead a resource where women are competent 'active, skilled, make 
choices, consider are not fooled or foolish' (Smith, 1990: 203). 
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stories. 3 It was important at times that I was familiar with some of those places and 
spaces. Personal stories generated in social research situations enable people to reflect 
upon themselves, their relationships with others and with the social worlds in which 
they interact. In this way stories generated through research may be seen as joint 
actions between participants in (staged) conversations (Plummer, 1995: 20). 
Interviewing involved both the respondents and me positioning ourselves in 
particular story-actions. I positioned myself in the interview context as a 'non 
transgendered' female researcher interested in 'gender issues'. During their 
interactions with me as researcher, the people often presented themselves as strategic 
actors who crafted the 'right' gender identity, but also as people who might still be 
framed in terms of their previous gender identity. Respondents also positioned me as an 
academic researcher and student, but also as an outsider - twice removed. This was 
made explicit in one of my conversations with Craig where I voiced my concerns about 
being a non-transgendered 'outsider' and how this would impact on the sorts of stories 
that I would be able to access. Craig's quick reply was that as I was not an Australian I 
was always going to be an 'outsider' anyway. 4 
It is perhaps fortunate that in most research settings there are always one or two 
'locals' who are prepared to contribute to your research in ways that extend beyond a 
one-off interview. I made friends with a small number of people who acted as 
'informants' while I was in Sydney. These people talked to me frankly about their 
experiences of transitioning across binary gender categories, relayed to me interesting 
gossip and filled in the history of the community from their 'point of view'. I was able 
to ask them about observations or comments made by other (anonymous) research 
participants that I found 'unusual' or 'challenging'. These people also made material 
contributions to my research. One of them let me have access to her extensive archives 
of material about the Sydney Gay, Lesbian and Transgender Community. I was 
provided with on-going written observations about the divisions in the community by 
one person, while another gave me copies of state funded research reports on the 
Sydney transgender community. These people and the networks I developed within the 
community ensured that the interviews were not the only strategy for learning about 
3 See, for example, Craig's email at the end of this chapter and my discussion of Robyn's story in the 
following chapter. 
4 This comment reflects Craig's own position - Craig holds dual citizenship and at the time I recorded 
this conversation saw himself as in some ways a 'non-Australian' 'outsider' (Field notes, January, 1997). 
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doing gender and living transgendered lives. While I was in Sydney I also started up a 
weekly reading group with two other post-graduate students who, like me, were doing 
research around transgender issues. The reading group provided an informal forum in 
which I could discuss concerns about my research process. I was also able to draw on 
the local knowledge and historical memory of the other participants in the reading 
group in order to cross-check comments made by informants and research 
participants. The embodied, concrete and social dimensions of research are indicated in 
the following extracts from my field notes which were written in response to an 
interaction in this reading group: 
We were sitting on my balcony in the sun drinking coffee and talking about the 
latest readings (Haraway's (1991) 'Gender for a Marxist Dictionary', and 
Fausto-Sterling's (1993) 'The Five Sexes') when someone said to me totally out 
of the blue: 
"When did the shark get you?" 
I said confused and not understanding the reference: "Pardon?" 
He said: "Your arm, did you get bitten by a shark?" 
I said, suddenly understanding, "Oh no, I've had a kidney transplant and 
that is where I used to put the needles in for kidney dialysis." 
I did not really want to answer the question but felt obliged to do so. Attention 
to the reading stopped at that point and I had to explain my illness at great 
length, which meant recounting a great deal of my personal biography as well. 
This is not the first time this sort of thing has happened to me, and when this 
does happen I always wonder how long that person has wanted to say 
something to me, and how many other people notice my arm and do not 
comment on it. Usually I find that the people who do ask have had illnesses 
themselves, or are involved in the medical profession, and therefore tend to be 
less awkward about asking. It transpired that the person who broached the 
subject of my problematic arm in the reading group had survived cancer. I feel 
absolutely ambivalent about talking about my own experience of illness; it is a 
narrative that I usually like to keep private. In reflecting on the reasons as to 
my ambivalence to my 'illness narrative' I think it has a lot to do with the way 
in which illness and disability are 'othered' in contemporary Western societies 
and that the experiences of people with disabilities are silenced (Field notes, 
January, 1997). 
My experience of illness and ambivalence to it enables me to understand the way 
that transgender stories are also silenced and transgendered people 'Othered'. My life-
long experience of disabling illness has also taught me that we ignore our bodies at our 
peril. My own body, its capabilities and incapacities, what may be read from samples 
of blood and tissues, has had a significant impact on my sense of self and the choices I 
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have been able to make. This 'embodied' expenence has underpinned a healthy 
skepticism of the linguistic or discursive turn in the humanities and social sciences 
(Frank, 1996: 55; Davis, 1997: 11).5 It is perhaps ironic that, while the body has 
become an acceptable topic for sociological analysis (Shilling, 1993; Scott and Morgan, 
1993; Connell, 1995; Davis, 1997) the focus until recently has been on discursive 
practices rather than the lived reality of the body (Connell, 1995; Frank, 1995, 1996). 
Arthur Frank's (1995, 1996) attention to the embodied experience of cancer and 
Wendy Seymour's (1998) focus on post-trauma rehabilitation both utilise and cut 
against the grain of the discursive turn in social theory. Prior to 1995 such first-hand, 
theoretically engaged accounts of the way that bodies may be experienced as 'other' 
were rare (see Wendell's 1992 [1989] post-structuralist account of disability). The 
corporeal turn in the social sciences represents a welcome turn towards incorporating 
the experiences of people with disabilities into mainstream feminist social theory. 
Sadly, Witz (2000: 3) uncritically suggests that the feminist distinction between sex as 
a biological and gender as a social category retrieved women from the realm of the 
corporeal or natural and instated them within the realm of the 'social'. This turn to 
gender has coincided with a turn away from corporeality and embodiment while 
attending to body politics. Witz (2000: 6) states, for example, that feminist work has 
rarely problematised embodiment or taken it as a starting point. 
Witz observes that the new sociology of the body (Turner, 1984; Shilling, 1993; 
Frank, 1995, 1996) pays attention to 'his abject male body' and not her 'excluded 
female body'. Women are incorporated into the new sociology of the body through 
analyses of desire and patriarchy, which tend to re-associate women with the body, 
sexuality and reproduction and to leave under-theorised the wider issues of gender and 
power. Witz (2000: 8) is also uncomfortable with the way that the sex/gender 
distinction is absorbed into the Foucauldian sex/sexuality distinction in feminist post-
structuralist theories of the body (see Butler, 1990, 1993; Grosz, 1995). She argues 
that these theories have de-naturalised sex at the expense of critical engagement with 
gendered sociality. For Witz (2000: 9) gender is a complete set of social relations that 
cannot be reduced to sex or sexualities. 
5 The theories of Michel Foucault (1978) and Judith Butler (1990, 1993) are most commonly associated 
with the discursive turn in the humanities and social sciences (see Davis, 1997: 11-15; Williams and 
Bendelow, 1998, 35 and 127). 
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The turn away from the body in feminist theory has meant that women with 
disabilities, and women who have had experiences of chronic illness, may find the 
focus on abjection in the 'new' sociology of the body (Shilling, 1993; Frank, 1995; 
1996) more useful than feminist theories that focus on issues of gender and power at 
the expense of embodiment per se. Certainly Witz's arguments, while challenging, 
continue this feminist tradition of excluding the abject female body from the feminist 
conversation. I could not have the above discussion about my problematic arm and tell 
the story about my history of illness without having had this deeply embodied 
experience. At the same time feminist theories about medicine as a patriarchal 
profession (Davis, 1988; Martin, 1987; Sawicki, 1991) framed, and helped me to make 
sense of, my experiences in the medical setting. My personal experience of these 
tensions between the biological and the social, an idea that this opposition reflected the 
sex/gender distinction within feminist theory, and a willingness to work through these 
issues, informed the set of theoretical concerns that I wanted to bring to the thesis. My 
thesis has therefore been a personal project about how feminist sociology may pay 
attention to bodies while also focusing on the sociality of gender. 
Posing questions, doing research 
The ethics committee application protocol prepared by the Human Ethics Committee 
at the University of Canterbury required that an interview schedule be submitted along 
with the application. This requirement meant that I had to develop my questions 
before I left for Australia and started to interact with those who participated in this 
project. The ethics committee application directed me to doing interviews, rather than 
embracing the uncertainty and flexibility of fieldwork, and my interview schedule 
excluded the sort of research that involved exploring a range of topics rather than 
answering specific questions. I did not at the time consider supplementing my 
interview schedule with other research methods such as life history or participant 
observation. I had the opportunity to do both during my field research in Australia. I 
took up the former option and decided against systematic participant observation at a 
gender reassignment clinic. Perhaps if I had trained as an anthropologist rather than 
as a sociologist, I might have considered a less structured and more explorative 
research strategy.6 My initial view of my project, which limited my research sh'ategy 
6 Amit (2000: 1) suggests that the distinction between sociology and anthropology is often unclear. She 
points to ethnographic research as the defining feature of anthropology. Anthropological research 
involves extended 'experience in the field' usually in a foreign setting. Ethnographic research in this 
view is a total experience; it is embodied and performed, the implication being that sociological versions 
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to one semi-structured interview schedule, turned out to be unrealistic and restrictive 
once I entered the research setting. Learning in the research setting could not be 
limited to my interview schedule; it involved interaction with key informants, 
participation in local networks and attention to the broader contexts that framed the 
narratives of people that I encountered. 
The incongruity of constructing research questions in Christchurch, New Zealand 
for research sites in Australia became obvious within the first two or three interviews 
in Sydney. I had placed issues of community at the beginning of the interview schedule 
because I thought that this would be a comparatively neutral subject and it would ease 
respondents into the interview, allow me to build rapport and establish trust. I did not 
expect that the comparatively neutral issue of community would be so problematic for 
so many people - a cautionary tale perhaps about developing an interview schedule so 
far away from the research field. I was the unsuspecting sociologist who entered the 
field precisely at the time when issues of community were most problematic. 
Community was subject to contestation through different forms of political activism 
and through the emergence of a new form of transgender identity politics from North 
America. When I asked people about issues of community most people backed off from 
making definitive statements about community. Some people even asked me to turn off 
the tape recorder while they answered these questions. Long silences indicated that 
people were obviously and carefully choosing their words and some qualified their 
responses with statements like "don't quote me on this but..." or "it is my 
understanding that ... but other people may view that differently". Initially I did not 
understand what was going on. I was puzzled about these long silences, uncomfortable 
body language, and just general reluctance to talk about the major issues within the 
transgender community. It was only when one of my informants carefully explained 
the context to me that I understood the difficulties I was experiencing with this section 
of the interview schedule. 
of ethnography are a poor imitation involving bounded research, at home (Amit, 2000: 1). This 
distinction is now somewhat problematic given that some anthropologists are now doing their research 
'at home' (see Caputo, 2000). Bourdieu (1988: 778) also characterises the division between sociology 
and anthropology as an 'absurd' one that inhibits the genuine cross-fertilisation of ideas. 
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Interviews open up spaces for telling stories that would not easily be heard in other 
contexts. Stories about transitioning across gender are an example of this kind of 
marginal story. In my own research I had to work hard to create a 'safe' space in which 
marginal stories could be explored. The potentially sensitive nature of my research 
topic meant that I considered it necessary to use a structured interview format with 
clearly delineated questions. This format had the added bonus of giving me credibility 
in the field. It indicated to potential respondents that I was open to exploring a range of 
ideas about transsexualism and that I was interested in transgender politics. Several 
respondents commented that they had decided to participate in my research because it 
was the most interesting 'questionnaire' that they had seen. The interview schedule 
(see the Research Appendix) was divided into three sections. The first section explored 
issues of community and asked respondents to detail their involvement in the local 
transgender community. The second section asked people to respond to extracts from 
various texts that attempted to represent the experiences of transgendered people. 
These extracts where assembled together from disparate sources such as popular 
magazines and transgender, feminist and medical literature about transsexualism and 
transgenderism. The schedule demonstrated the range of reading that I had done and 
my perception of debates among transgendered people. The third section asked 
questions relating to use of, and knowledges about, medical technologies associated 
with transitioning across binary gender categories. 
Twenty-four people from Australia and New Zealand participated in the study. 7 
People were recruited through a variety of strategies including: advertising in local 
publications, information sheets left at relevant social agencies, attending social 
gatherings, contacts established at conferences, by email and through friends of 
research participants. I conducted face-to-face semi-structured interviews lasting 
approximately two-and-a-half hours each with most of the participants. Participants 
were given copies of the interview schedule prior to the interview. Only two people 
did not read the questions prior to the interview and most people had written pre-
prepared answers on the interview schedule that they then referred to during the 
interview. Access to the interview schedule meant that most people who participated 
7 The transgender communities in New Zealand and Australia are not large enough to ensure that 
respondents who wish to remain anonymous will not be identified. Throughout the thesis I have tried to 
blur national and state differences between the people that I interviewed in order to ensure 
confidentiality. For this reason New Zealand respondents are not identified separately in the thesis. In 
Chapters Eight and Nine, which locates respondents in New South Wales, new names have been used for 
some participants who appear in other parts of the thesis. 
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in the research offered responses that were well thought out, often theoretically 
informed, and grounded in their own experience(s) and their experiences of 
interactions/ conversations with others. 
Pilot interviews were conducted with three New Zealand participants, two 
interviews developed out of personal contacts and through an introduction from one of 
these contacts to a person via email. One Australian participant was recruited through 
an email address provided at the bottom of an article and another telephoned me the 
day that I moved into my accommodation at Sydney University. Advertising through 
the magazine Polare and leaving copies of an information sheet about my research at 
the Gender Centre secured six participants. Attending conferences led to five contacts, 
introductions through other people facilitated contact with another five participants, 
and attending social gatherings led to contacts with three participants. I interviewed 
four people who identified as FTM and nineteen who identified as MTF. Of these 
people, three MTF and two FTM respondents also said that they were 'biologically' 
intersexual. One person identified as 'spansexual' - claiming neither a male or a female 
identity. The majority of respondents were European, four were Maori and one was a 
Pacific Islander. 
I designed the interview schedule so that the people I interviewed could answer the 
questions, or comment on the texts, without giving away too much about their 
personal biography. I also made it clear, at the time of the interview, that they were 
welcome to draw on personal experience, but did not have to include it in their 
responses to the interview questions. I did this because I was aware that some of the 
questions touched on potentially sensitive topics. In any event, all of the people that I 
interviewed did draw on personal experience and openly volunteered information 
about such deeply personal topics as their sexuality and anatomical gender status. The 
following extract from Melanie's interview provides an example of the kind of personal 
information that informants disclosed to me: 
I am not a male, I am not a female, I've got hormones from both, which most 
people have anyway; mine are more in the female side even before I took 
hormone therapy ... I have still got the male genitals so I am still genetically 
classed as a male. I use the term transgender mainly because I don't feel like a 
male and I don't really feel like a female, I'm me, I'm a person ... I feel happier 
within myself since I changed over and living the lifestyle, than I did when I 
was playing the role, acting out being a man. I was a poor man anyway as far 
as sex (was concerned) even with the genitals that I have got didn't really work 
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and size wise was below average. There is too much emphasis, most people talk 
to me about the change, one of the first questions they ask is: "Have you had the 
op?" Or: "how do you have sex?" All they are thinking about is the act of sex 
not sexuality, or how you feel or anything else. It is strictly: "Have you got tits 
or have you got a vagina?". Or: "How do you have sex?" And that is all that 
they are interested in and they can't think any further than that. 
Melanie, MTF, 1997 
Some respondents were post-operative and 'in the closet' about being transsexual. 
Most of these people contacted me via my advertisement in the Gender CentreS 
magazine Polare. I also met two of these people at the Gender Centre. The people 
whom I interviewed who were not openly transgendered entrusted me with their 
secrets about their former gender and/or transsexual identity and past experiences. As 
I had designed the interview schedule in a way that enabled people to respond to 
questions without drawing on individual experience, the sharing of personal 
information during the interview turned out to be a welcome addition to my research. 
The usefulness of providing people with prior access to the interview schedule was 
demonstrated in Jude's interview. This interview was the only one that I did on the 
spur of the moment, where the person that I was interviewing did not have prior access 
to the questions outlined in the interview schedule. This situation arose because I met 
Jude in the afternoon at a conference and if I was to interview her it had to be that very 
evening or not at all. I chose to talk to her without following my usual practice of 
giving participants the schedule to read before the interview. During the interview I 
became aware of the inappropriateness of some of the questions on my interview 
schedule. The first of several questions in the schedule which I thought might be 
problematic asks people to respond to a summary of Janice Raymond's position in an 
extract from an article by Amy Bloom. Bloom (1994: 38) summarises Raymond's 
position as 'transsexuals are psychologically unstable victims of a society that over-
emphasises the roles of sexual insignia (zender) and sexual difference (anatomy)'. It 
occurred to me, after we had started the interview, that it might be inappropriate to ask 
someone to respond to this question, along with questions about gender reassignment 
surgery, when they had not had a chance to read the full interview schedule prior to 
the interview. 
8 The Gender Centre is a state funded resource and community cenh'e for people who have 'gender 
issues'. See Chapter Nine for further discussion of the Gender Cenh'e. 
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Jude had a copy of the interview schedule and we both went through each of the 
questions systematically. As each question was completed we were one question closer 
to what I began to suspect would be a problematic subject. I started to worry about 
how Jude would react to the first of the questions that I had identified as potentially 
problematic - the Raymond/Bloom extract. If Jude had not been holding a copy of the 
interview schedule I think I would have skipped this section. 9 I remember my mind 
racing, trying to think of ways to get around it, realising that I could not, and trying 
out different scenarios in my head. While I was doing this I was barely able to 
concentrate on the interview. Finally the critical moment arrived - I heard myself 
apologising for posing this question. The surprising calmness in my voice belied the 
silent turmoil that I had been experiencing. Jude re-read the question in silence; her 
reply is reproduced below: 
SF: Ok (deep breath, audible on the tape recorder), have you read the 
'Transsexual Empire' by Janice Raymond? 
Jude: No. 
SF: Well, she is not very complementary and this is a quote from her, don't 
take it to heart, she is only one voice among many others. Raymond 
suggests that transsexuals are psychologically unstable victims of a 
society that over emphasises the roles of sexual insignia (gender) and 
sexual difference (anatomy). How do you respond to these comments? 
Very long silence (in which Jude studies the question and I resist the 
temptation to speak) 
Jude: I don't think that Janice Raymond characterises transsexuals as unstable, 
she is able to see the folly of a rigid sex/gender system. The only thing I 
see as a little bit of a problem is in relation to her analysis of identity. To 
be a woman you must have a particular type of genitalia that is not 
surgically constructed. She buys into a cultural ideal of what a woman 
is, what makes a woman. Does she see herself as being just as 
constructed? 
SF: No. But then again it was written in the 1970s. 
Jude: No, I didn't think so, natural? 
SF: Yes, well essential woman, whereas she might characterise transsexuals 
as inessential or not natural. 
9 The problem here is that I felt that Jude had consented to the interview without having had time to read 
the interview schedule in private and to make a considered decision to participate. I did have one 
incident in which a person initially agreed to an interview and subsequently decided not to participate in 
the research after I had given her a copy of the interview schedule. 
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Jude then brought up the subject of cosmetic surgery as a way to construct a 
'natural' female body, and relieved, I skipped to the questions relating to this which 
follow the section on Raymond and Bloom in my interview schedule. Jude's response 
indicated that, even though she had not read the Transsexual Empire, she was 
knowledgeable about Raymond's argument. This is not surprising, given the way that 
academic texts tended to circulate in the inner Sydney 'transgender community'. 
To my immense relief Jude responded much more positively to the question than I 
had expected. I had anticipated that the question would invite Jude to step into the 
position of a 'psychologically unstable victim'. In saying, 'don't take it to heart', I 
indicated to Jude that I had identified aspects of this position with her. The above 
interchange was an unforeseen response to a research strategy that involved going 
through a long and sometimes complex interview schedule together. With the benefit 
of hindsight I now realise that my concerns about Jude's reaction to this question were 
not well founded. Going through the interview schedule together meant that Jude 
knew that this question was not directed specifically at her, because this question was 
addressed to all the people that I interviewed. This interaction does highlight, however, 
that the strategy of giving respondents prior access to the interview schedule meant 
that I was more confident about asking people to respond to potentially personal and 
conh'oversial questions. I also relied on their reading of the schedule to be aware that I 
was interested in their response to a variety of political commentaries on transgender 
and gender reassignment technologies. 
Cautionary tales 
The major drawback with the interview schedule was that its academic focus 
blocked access to people who were not familiar with the ideas that it contained. There 
were also some cultural barriers. For instance, I spoke to one Samoan Fa'afafine and 
four Maori sex workers: My experience of interviewing indigenous migrants who had 
gravitated to Sydney in order to 'escape' social expectations within their own cuitures10 
confirmed for me that the academic focus of the interview schedule did not reflect the 
complex social issues and different interestsll of these people. The sex workers were 
10 Pacific Island transgenders could be sexually active and access gender reassignment technologies in 
Sydney more readily than at home. The Sydney-based Maori transgenders that I spoke to talked about 
escaping whanau (family) obligations. 
11 For example, inadequate housing, concerns about HIV / AIDS and other STDs, violence, drug addiction 
and police harassment. 
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able to talk without difficulty about their life worlds and to identify some of the 
external factors that locked them into the sex industry.12 Through their contribution to 
my study, for example, I was able to better understand the geographical divisions and 
surgically based hierarchies that existed in the Sydney community. I quicldy realised, 
however, that the complex networks that organise the worlds of the transgendered sex 
workers could not be added on to this thesis - this topic would be a thesis in its own 
right. 
The sex workers I met in Kings Cross used me as a resource and asked me questions 
about breast implants and other medical technologies and the 'politics' on 'the other 
side of town' (a colloquial expression meaning Newtown and the Gender Centre). 
Interestingly, other Sydney-based sociologists told me that transgender sex workers 
would not talk to me because they had a history of non-cooperation with researchers. 
Undeterred, I introduced myself to a contact whom I knew sex workers would trust 
and arranged for that person to introduce me to a sex worker who could set up 
interviews on my behalf. This person did this, distributing interview schedules and 
arranging the three interviews that I did in quick succession (two in one day and one 
the following day), before I told my contact that the difficult (social) issues and 
different interests of the sex workers that I had interviewed meant that I needed to go 
back to the drawing board with my interview schedule. As I said this, I was aware that 
conducting research in a different country over the October-February University 
break, when the Ethics Committee at Canterbury University meets less frequently, 
meant that realistically I would be unable to produce a second interview schedule for 
the sex workers before I left Sydney in February. 
As the number of interviews that I completed accumulated, and I became familiar 
with the range of possible answers for particular questions, I began to think that the 
interview schedule was too rigid. This was because it resulted in fragmented personal 
stories that ultimately became frustrating. I became increasingly interested in the 
biographical details of the lives of the people that I interviewed. The research 
12 For example, some transgender people who had recently arrived in Sydney, and therefore were not 
Australian citizens, could not get access to welfare benefits. This forced them onto the street and into the 
sex industry. Lack of demand for the services of post-operative MTF sex workers meant that pre-
operative h'anssexual sex workers were prevented from having surgery if sex work was their only means 
of income. Those who wanted to have surgery, and were saving for this eventuality, needed to be able to 
exit the sex indushy following their surgely. Their marginal status as transgendered, combined with 
discrimination, a lack of personal contacts outside of the sex industry and scarce economic resources, 
meant that exiting the industry was not a realistic option for the sex workers that I met. (I met and talked 
to more sex workers than I interviewed - all of them were either Maori or Pacific Islanders). 
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questions gave me access to tantalising components of participants' biographies. These 
stories were however, limited to aspects of their lives that related to particular 
questions. I did not pursue too much biographical detail during the interview as I was 
aware of the length of time that it took to go through the questions and had to force 
myself to keep to the arranged format. I was also aware that the information sheet I 
had distributed did not suggest a focus on the personal life stories of participants. I did 
depart from the interview schedule on one occasion and recorded a life history instead. 
I had given Robyn a copy of the interview schedule prior to her interview. When I 
arrived for the interview Robyn confessed that she had not read the interview schedule. 
My motive for asking Robyn for an interview was because I had observed that she was 
a good story-teller. I decided to abandon the interview schedule altogether and let her 
tell me how she came to be involved in the transgendered community. This decision 
resulted in Robyn's story, aspects of which are reproduced in the following chapter. 
Feminist theory as resource and constraint 
Feminist theories about gender and transsexualism tended to work in my research as 
both a resource and as a constraint. At times, being a 'feminist sociologist' was not a 
subject position that I felt comfortable claiming in the interview situation. Wendy, for 
example, provided me with this direct challenge to academic theories about 
transgender identities which she considered to be incomprehensible to most lay people: 
I am not a believer in a single construct of transsexualism. I am a believer in 
people's right to choose. There is an incredible arrogance of dictating how 
people should live and should create identities, in relation to transsexualism, 
amongst academics .. .I have a real problem with this power/knowledge thing 
within the academy. It is greeted by blank incomprehension on the street. The 
two [academics and non-academic transgendersl are opposite ends of a 
continuum. 
Wendy,MTF, 1996 
At other times being a feminist sociologist was a subject position that I could use as a 
resource. Some of the people whom I interviewed thought that my position as an 
academic meant that I could engage in feminist debates on their behalf, and be taken 
seriously by other feminist academics because I was a 'woman'. The thesis was made 
possible because of a rich history of sociological, feminist and queer theory writing 
about transgender/transsexual issues (Garfinkel, 1967; Epstein, 1990, Hausman, 
1995). But my research was also constrained by the baggage associated with some of 
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the less sympathetic feminist literature on transsexualism13 - or rather some of the 
people I interviewed perceived the feminist literature as predominantly negative about 
transgendered/transsexual people. Some of the people I interviewed had also 
experienced hostile reactions to their transgender status by people whom they 
identified as 'feminists'. Norrie May Welby, for example, responded dismissively to the 
question about Janice Raymond's work discussed previously in relation to Jude's 
interview. The following interview extract explores my attempt to draw out a more 
considered response from Welby by pointing out some of the more useful aspects of 
Raymond's work. Welby then goes on to describe Janice Raymond's early feminist 
analysis of transsexualism as 'alienating': 
SF: One of the things that I quite like about Janice Raymond's book is the 
fact that she says that society over-emphasises the connections between 
gender and anatomy. She puts that on the agenda way back in the 
1970s, and it has taken a while for transgenders to tune into that, but 
they have now and tranys are starting to get politically active and to 
develop ideas within queer theory in the late 1980s and 90s. 
NMW: Well, it is not surprising that we were not too friendly to her views given 
how much she alienated us. 
SF: Yes, she is incredibly hostile. 
NMW: She didn't seek the obvious allies. I mean tranys are the obvious allies 
[to feminists] in the breaking down of gender. As tranys have seen 
feminists as obvious allies in the breaking down of gender. 
Norrie May Welby, 1997 
Doing research, as a feminist sociologist against a background of radical and lesbian 
feminists' critiques of transsexualism, meant that I was often too anxious to clarify my 
own position in relation to these discourses. In agreeing that Raymond's work was 
'incredibly hostile' I was attempting to maintain empathy by indicating that I was not 
in total agreement with her analysis. 
If I felt ambivalent about identifying as a 'feminist sociologist' in the research 
setting, one subject position that I could not avoid was that of a female/woman 
interviewing people who identified as transgender, or who currently or previously 
13 Janice Raymond's (1980) Trallssexual Empire is the classic example. Also see Germaine Greer's 
(1986) review of Jan Morris' 'CollulldrunT in 'The Mad Woman)s UllderclotheS. 
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identified as transsexual. Within feminist methodological debates feminist research 
has been classically described as research by women, for women, about women 
(Stanley and Wise, 1990: 21). The focus of the research process is on consciousness 
raising with a view to changing women's lives (Stanley and Wise, 1990: 21). 
Deconstructing the hierarchical opposition whereby the researcher is the knower and 
the people who participate in the research are the known (du Bois, 1983) has also been 
a project of feminist research. Within feminist literature there are examples of texts 
that discuss the pleasures and difficulties of women interviewing women (Oaldey, 
1981; Finch, 1993; Bloom, 1998). There is also discussion of the difficulties of 
interviewing across ethnic (Edwards, 1990; Song and Parker, 1995) and class barriers 
(Stacey, 1990). In the sociological literature there are examples of methodological texts 
about men interviewing men (Hearn, 1994; Plummer, 1995; Flood, 2000) and 
examples of research across class (Willis, 1977; Newby, 1977; Connell, 1995) and 
ethnic (Wacquant, 1998a, 1998b) barriers. In all of these examples, gender is a given 
category. There is an assumed empathy between researcher and informant based on 
gender similarities. There are examples of the difficulties associated with women doing 
research about men's lives (Layland, 1990; Scully, 1990; Fitzgerald, 1996; Elizabeth, 
1997) and women have also produced text-based analyses of masculinity 
(Ramazanoglu, 1992; Bordo, 1993b, 1999; Tait, 1999). Researching across gender, 
gender becomes problematic (Layland, 1990), although the binary categories 
themselves are not in question. Michelle Owen's (2000: 56) research on queer 
community activists indicates that she interviewed people who did not identify as 
either male or female. However, she does not reflect on how this impacted on her 
research process and methodology. 
Some feminist researchers have argued that 'friendship' rather than distanced 
objectivity is the condition for good research (Oaldey, 1981). Bloom (1998: 152) 
acknowledges the difficulties of this utopian model and instead advocates a friendly-
stranger relationship that is maintained only during the research process. The 
respondents in Bloom and Munro's (1995) and Bloom's (1996, 1998) research were 
educated professional women who had a common interest in participating in a 
collaborative feminist research project. In my own research, apart from a shared 
experience of medicalisation, I initially felt that I had very little in common with the 
people I interviewed. Their life experiences were very different from my own. Some 
people told stories about violence and discrimination that shocked me. Some saw 
feminism and feminist criticisms of transsexuals as contributing to their 
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discrimination. Despite these differences, it was possible to come across similarities in 
our experiences. 
ITM respondents shared with me a personal history of being female. In interview 
situations that common history provided an important point of connection. All of the 
ITM respondents with whom I talked had experiences and opinions which were 
available to them because they had lived as women. One of the FTM respondents, for 
example, had been married, another had given birth, and another had been raped. 
Their world views often incorporated feminist critiques of patriarchy and reflections 
on forms of 'male' discrimination against women made all the more painful by their 
exposure to these ideas in the worlds that they now moved in. Despite these 
commonalities, we were also very different. FTM respondents moved in worlds to 
which women do not normally have access. In order to survive in these worlds they 
had learnt to move, dress and talk like 'straight men' (to be seen as effeminate, and 
therefore possibly gay, could invite unwelcome attention). They talked about the fear 
associated with their lack of social and embodied competence when moving in these 
worlds for the first time. They had a degree of pride in having mastered the initially 
confusing codes of behaviour required in male-only face-to-face interactions. Every 
day they faced potential violence should their transgender status be exposed. This 
meant that they always had to think ahead and to monitor the situations in which they 
participated. Concern about the consequences of exposure meant that the female 
designation in the passport of an FTM whom I interviewed, combined with the thought 
of being body searched, made international travel too risky - a personal freedom that 
many people simply take for granted. 
I shared with MTF respondents a common social identity as women, but different 
personal histories as male and female. All of the MTF respondents talked about their 
former lives as men. Some had married and/or fathered children and two had been in 
the armed forces. Most commonly they reflected on how they were never comfortable 
or happy as men. I did feel a sense of connection with their talk about being 
reprimanded by adults when they were young for behaviour that was considered 
inappropriate for someone with a 'male gender'. This talk reminded me of how I 
resisted and resented the imposition of forms of conservative feminine dress and 
behaviour that were imposed on me as a child by my parents. As women we had a 
similar relationship to the discourses and practices of femininity (Smith, 1990). Some 
of the people I interviewed were critical of masculinity, drawing on feminist critiques 
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of patriarchy and heterosexuality in the process. Transgendered people problematise 
the object of feminist research. If MTFs are excluded from feminist constructions of the 
category 'women' because they are not born female (Grosz, 1994: 207) are FTMs then 
to be included by the same criteria? It seems that transgendered people fit 
uncomfortably into these debates within feminist theory and methodology. Critical 
analysis of transgender bodies and identities enables a different perspective on the 
relationship between sex, sexuality, the body, gender and power that may be useful for 
feminist scholarship. Through attention to the discourses and practices that frame 
individual experiences of being transgendered, for example, I came to understand that 
it is important to explore how particular definitions of sex and gender are used in the 
mobilisation of resources, actors and networks. In Chapter Eight the Federal and State 
legislation regUlating transgender bodies and identities is used to explore how sexed 
identities are regulated by modern state(s). In that case, localised gender identities, 
differentiated by place of birth, are constructed through non-local state and federal 
legislation that specifies how the sex designation on the Births, Deaths and Marriages 
register is to be administered in different state and national settings. 
Interpretation: reproducing narratives, consuming stories 
... writing is to some extent blind, that it cannot know the hands into which it 
will fall, how it will be read, and used ... 
Judith Butler (1997: 8) 
Judith Butler suggests that audiences bring diverse experIences to reading that 
enables texts to be interpreted and used in new ways. Ken Plummer (1995: 22) also 
notes that the meanings of stories are not unitary or fixed. Rather, they shift according 
to the contexts in which stories are produced, interpreted and read. I chose particular 
narratives from the interview material because they could be read in a variety of 
different ways or because they illustrated particular themes at work within the thesis. 
The thesis was not driven by a specific set of theoretical ideas. Nor did I collect the 
interview material and then cast arollnd for ideas that I could employ to 'explain' my 
data. In the initial stages of researching the thesis I was immersed in the literature on 
transsexualism and a set of theoretical problems focused around issues associated with 
narrativity, agency and corporeality. In the months following the field research I was 
absorbed with the mundane task of transcribing the interviews and identifying 
narratives or fragments of stories that illustrated these earlier theoretical concerns -
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this work became chapters two, four, six and seven of the thesis. I was left with a larger 
set of narratives that extended beyond the agendas that initially shaped the thesis. 
These narratives related to the local, state and national contexts that influenced 
interaction in the research setting in which the narratives were produced. This 
material was eventually incorporated into chapters five, eight and nine. 
The thesis contains detailed accounts of Robyn's story in Chapter Four and Norrie 
May Welby's interview in Chapter Five. Robyn's story is reproduced at length because 
it brings together most of the themes and issues that were the initial focus of analysis in 
this thesis. Dreger (1998: 1 G 7) notes that there are few personal archives of patients, 
let alone intersexuals, in the social history of medicine. For this reason it seemed 
appropriate to dedicate one of the substantive chapters to Robyn's story. I have also 
dedicated a chapter to the analysis of Welby's narrative because s/he provided 
wonderfully articulate and complex narrative about the doing and undoing of 
transgender identities. I felt this complexity would be lost if this narrative was split 
across several different chapters. The first version of Norrie May Welby's interview sat 
in a computer file for several years as I was reluctant to impose an analysis on an 
interview that provided so much interviewee analysis. I knew that I wanted to use 
performativity theory in my analysis, but it was not until I decided to use the ideas of 
both Judith Butler and Pierre Bourdieu that I found a way to condense and analyse this 
interview. 
The remammg substantive chapters in the thesis contain extracts of narratives 
selected from different interviews. In these chapters I use material from the interviews 
to raise questions and indicate alternative ways of theorising about the social practices 
surrounding changing sex and/or transitioning across gender. The purpose is to 
provide a sense of the similarities and differences in the narratives of participants in 
order to compare and contrast different opinions on the same issue. My research is not 
meant to be representative of the experiences, discourses and practices of the total 
population of people who identify as transsexual or transgendered. Instead of 
generalising from these examples, I focus on specific cases that problematise 
theoretical and cultural generalisations about transgender embodiment and its relation 
to the discourses and practices of sex, gender, embodiment and medical technologies. 
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The 'litmus test' for any piece of research is how it is received by people whose 
experiences are reflected in the study or who are familiar with the community on 
which the investigation is based. Readers bring different experiences and agendas to 
the way that research is 'read'. A reader may scan a text not only for what is included 
but also for what is omitted or silenced. Leslie Bloom's research generated the later 
experience. I read Bloom (1998) with a growing sense of unease about what her 
analysis meant for the process of interpretation in my own research. I scanned Bloom's 
text primarily as a feminist sociologist interested in issues of narrativity. But I also read 
her work as a person who has received a kidney transplant. Bloom mentions that 
Sandy, one of her key informants, has also had a kidney transplant. This significant 
aspect of Sandy's life is unexamined - silenced. There is no discussion about why 
Sandy's illness narrative is absent from Bloom's texts (Bloom and Munro, 1995; Bloom, 
1996, 1998). I wonder who made the decision to exclude this narrative Sandy or 
Bloom? I recognise in Sandy's narrative aspects of my own experience and I wonder 
how much Sandy's experience of illness frames her narratives about career and gender 
relations. Bloom's (1998: 144) resolute attention to gender and sexuality as central 
analytic categories forecloses the possibilities of an alternative interpretation, one that 
explores the impact of illness on identity in the context of a culture which values 
health. As a result of this experience my attention was drawn abruptly to the reader of 
the text - my text. 
With my reaction to Bloom's book fresh in my mind it was with considerable 
apprehension that I let chapters of this thesis be read by people who had expertise in 
this area or who had contributed to the research. Elizabeth Riley, the education officer 
at the Gender Centre in Sydney, read and verified the factual details in Chapter Eight. 
A Christchurch based MTF provided ongoing feedback and encouragement during the 
writing of the thesis. Craig Andrews,14 a FTM who participated in this research, read 
and commented on chapters two, four, five and nine. After Craig had read Chapters 
Two and Four he chose to offer the following comments about narrative conventions 
among transgendered people: 
Being tg/ts myself, there is an enormous temptation to play about 
with the narrative. And one we are encouraged to do so 
especially in that first appointment with the endocrinologist. 
"So, tell me about your childhood"... The temptation is to 
embellish, enhance all those appropriate [male] gendered 
behaviours, and diminish all those other [female] gendered 
14 Craig Andrews real name is used with his permission. 
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behaviours in the narrative we tell about 'how we came to be who 
we are today ... '. I think it is also about wanting a sense of a 
cohesive personal narrative. One that lends history to our sense 
of being. I recognise in my self a reluctance to speak, however 
confidentially with researchers, into the FTM experience, because 
ul timately I have to tell a story about my process, my history 
etc. And rather than feel that I've been selective in telling 
that story, I don't even bother. The more I tell a story, the 
more I think I'll reshape it. And to be really honest with you, 
that scares me. The urge in one is strong to make sense out of 
one's life. Naturally - that goes for everyone (doesn't it??). 
We want to make sense out of our lives? And honestly there are 
lots about the stories of tg/ts folks which just does not make 
sense. Which you cannot make sense out of. And that's scary. 
To not be able to make sense out of your lived experience .. ?? ... 
That's really uncomfortable. Narrati ve is such an interesting 
phenomenon amongst tg/ts people. The shifts of those narratives, 
the little embellishments that creep in. There is probably tons 
of stuff you would not have been told, no matter how much you 
think you were told. That's what narrative is all about. That's 
what interviewing is all about and that is the drama of 
ethnography. You have some very interesting narratives from tg/ts 
people who have re-written and probably continue to re-write 
their lives. Tg/ts people badly want an 'about me' story like 
anyone else on the planet, and they're doing their best to write 
that narrative. 
Email correspondence, Craig Andrews, September, 2001 
Craig's comments are relevant to an analysis of the place of narrative within post-
structuralist theories and the lives of transsexualltransgendered individuals. If 
identities are shifting and contingent, and different settings require the enactment of 
different relational selves, then the narratives about self that we tell in those settings 
will also shift and change. Craig suggests that transgendered people are actively 
engaged in reworking their identities and rewriting their histories - in many cases 
these modifications are ongoing projects. These comments illustrate the ways in which 
interviews are social encounters that involve much more than simple exchanges of 
information. Sociological inquiry is as much about what is omitted as what is included 
in stories that are told through research. Some of these issues are taken up in the 
following chapter of the thesis. 
Changing bodies; shifting genders 
Robyn's Story 
Do we truly need a true sex? With a persistence that borders on stubbornness, 
modern Western societies have answered in the affirmative. They have 
obstinately brought into play this question of "true sex" in an order of things 
where one might have imagined that all that counted was the reality of the 
body ... 
Michel Foucault (1980: vii) Herculine Barbin 
Introduction 
I first met Robyn in the mid 1990s at a support group for people who identified as 
transsexual or transgendered. I approached her for an interview after listening to her 
talking to the other participants in the group. Robyn had a knack for telling stories and 
it was this quality that I was interested in capturing on tape. I arranged to come to her 
house the following week and we sat around her kitchen table and drank numerous 
cups of tea while she talked about everything from her life story to physics and 
building plans. It was my decision to abandon my interview schedule, and ask Robyn 
to tell me her life story, that gave her the space to narrate the incredible series of events 
that led to her eventual decision to change his/her15 social gender. 'Robyn's story' is 
comprised of extracts from this interview. 
Robin was born in the 1920s. He started life as a male and lived for more than 60 
years as a man. He went to a boys' school, played rugby, was drafted into the army in 
World War Two, married and fathered four children. Medical intervention following 
an accident in his backyard in the mid 1980s revealed that he had one testicle, which 
had stopped functioning as a result of the accident, and one ovary which had begun 
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functioning as a result of his lower testosterone levels. Robyn also had a partly formed 
uterus. Eight months after the accident doctors informed him that he was a suppressed 
female hermaphrodite. Robyn's interpretation of this conversation is that the doctors 
informed him that he was a 'girl' /woman. Robyn initially tried to prevent the 
feminising effects of the female hormones emanating from his one functioning ovary 
by taking male hormones. This strategy, however, turned out to be unsustainable as 
the 'artificial' male hormones interfered with his general health. In the early 1990s 
Robyn decided to change his social gender to that of a woman. At the time I 
interviewed her, Robyn had been living as a woman for several years and was nearly 
70 years old. 
Robyn's story is both extraordinary and mundane, it traces the life trajectory of a 
male from boyhood to adulthood and beyond that is not unusual; in fact it could be 
interpreted as a typical story, one that could be applied to many men born in the 
1920s. Robyn's story is also remarkable in that it recounts the story of a body that 
'accidentally' changed gender. Robyn's story is unusual because s/he overtly re-
interprets his/her history in light of new knowledges about his/her body. Old 
narratives of identity, based around stories associated with masculinity, rugby, war, 
work, marriage, and fatherhood, become problematic in light of Robyn's new 
knowledges about his/her body. Unable to keep these particular narratives of identity 
going Robyn reinterprets his/her past in terms of a new narrative of identity; one that 
privileges femininity. His physicality, marriage break-up, emotionality, disinterest in 
girls and lack of acceptance as 'one of the boys' become resources for her to construct a 
'continuous' narrative of femininity that predates his/her medical diagnosis. 
This chapter has three interrelated levels of analysis and interpretation that broadly 
correspond to issues of gender, biography and methodology. Robyn's life history 
provides the context through which a methodological discussion of the issues 
associated with doing and presenting life histories is explored. Two stories emerge out 
of Robyn's narrative: a man's story centred around work and masculinity and a 
woman's story centred around embodiment and the social practices associated with 
doing femininity. Robyn defines herself, and inhabits a social world, in which s/he 
15 The pronouns he, she, s/he his/her are used interchangeably in this chapter. They reflect the fluidity 
with which Robyn refers to his/her gender in his/her narrative and they illustrate the difficulties of 
70 
constantly moves from one gender to another; physically, psychologically, 
linguistically, socially and symbolically. As a result, Robyn's narrative is a destabilising 
one that constructs an identity that is shifting and contingent in which words and 
images can give only an approximate view of Robyn's identity and experience. 
Robyn's experience of gender is deeply grounded in his/her relationship to his/her 
body. An argument is made about the relationships between biography and public 
narratives of medicine, sex and gender. Robyn's story speaks to the construction of 
essentialism both at the personal level and in public medical discourses and practices 
associated with gender reassignment technologies. Robyn defines herself by bringing 
into play a complex narrative about medical knowledges, biology and personal 
biography. Her slight build, lack of facial hair, the shape of her pubic hair, use of 
hormones to maintain her body shape and issues associated with menstruation and 
menopause are all important to the way that Robyn attempts to rework her old male 
identity and construct a new female identity. Robyn's marginality allows her to reflect 
on the construction of her gender identity. Rather than being an exception to binary 
notions of gender, her narrative clearly illustrates the interaction between bodies and 
gendered conventions. It is possible to see Robyn not as peripheral to binary notions of 
gender but as an example of how gender identities come to be codified, constructed 
and crafted in the everyday practices of individuals. 
Robyn's Story 
My involvement in the trans gender community is something I got forced into in actual fact. It wasn't 
actually a desire of mine, and I actually tried to prevent it happening for nearly three years. But (it) wasn't 
medically possible you see and so here I am about half way there. Do you want a history of me? 
SP: Yes 
First of all the tranys that I know don't know why I'm a trany in that sense. They believe that I'm like 
most of them, whereas in actual fact I'm not. I'm actually a biological woman you see and always have 
been. But nobody knew, until mid-1986, when, we still didn't know then, or I didn't know then, in fact 
nobody knew then because I hadn't even presented to the medical profession to wonder what was going 
on. But what actually happened was, I had an accident on the scaffolding outside. It was scaffolding that I 
made myself, you know with no railing or anything, and I fell from the top of it. What actually happened 
was that I had an accident out there which damaged my genitals you see, and at the same time I dislocated 
my right knee - pulled it almost right out I think. Of course, I got a lot of bumps, a bleeding head and nine 
or ten big splinters from this decaying timber. Because it was rough sawn stuff that had been in the house 
of a friend of mine's ceiling for years, and he put a second storey on, and I got all this old left over wood, 
so you can imagine what the scaffolding looked like. 
gendered language in so far as there is no satisfactory intermediate term. 
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Well what actually happened was, I'd worked all night you see, at that stage I was doing some shift work, 
and because I went to sleep at about 2pm of an afternoon and got up at ten to go to work I would spend the 
morning until lunch time fixing up the house. It was a little bit of a foggy morning and there was dew that 
had settled on planks and run-off from a leaking gutter had also wet the top of it you see. And I was 
rearranging the planks. I carried two of these long, wide and thick planks, up on my shoulders, and when I 
got to the top I had to swing them around you see, and they scissored on me, you know they came apart. 
One of them hit the house and knocked me off balance and I slipped on this blooming wet wood on the top 
of the scaffolding and fell off backwards - head first. My right ankle went into the one of the scaffolding 
supports and it locked there. At this stage one of the two planks had been very diligently following me 
down there end on, and it went straight between my legs and wallop! Of course I let out this unholy 
blooming yell, and I don't know whether I was unconscious at all but all I know is that the next thing was 
my neighbour was leaning over the fence saying: "Are you all right? Are you all right?" 
And I said: "No. Come in here and get me out of this." 
Somehow-or-rather I got one arm underneath at a funny angle through the scaffolding you see, and there I 
was with this blasted timber plank between my legs, my foot still locked up in the thing with virtually no 
skin around me ankle at all anywhere, all these splinters in me and head pouring blood out of it, and the 
knee out of joint there was nothing much I could do. 
My neighbour couldn't move me, she's only a small woman like yourself, she couldn't do it. So she flew 
into the house here and rang up her son who works close by and he come flying down and they got me out 
and bundled me into his big car up the hospital you see. The doctors were concerned about my knee, 
attending to all me cuts and abrasions and removing all the splinters you know, shaving a bit of my hair off 
and stitching up the wound in the tip of my skull and so forth. And of course I was black and blue and 
mauve all around here too, you know they said you will be walking around with stiff legs for a while, 
which it was true. But nobody thought that there was any actual physical damage done of the nature that 
did happen and of course it had destroyed one testicle and there was only one there to work as it so turned 
out, it took years to find that out from September to May. (meaning 57 years of living as a male, and then 
the months following the accident) 
Nothing happened then until I sort of was having funny night sweats and insomnia and all sorts of things. 
But I didn't put it down to the damage that had been done on the day that my neighbour had carted me off 
to the hospital to put my knee back in and so forth and fix up all the scratches. It took till January the 
following year before I presented myself to a doctor about this. And the reason I presented myself was 
that the previous Sunday evening when I was bathing I noticed that one of my genitals, the right one, was 
about 3 times the size of the other one, and I thought my goodness there's trouble there. So the next day I 
presented myself down at the local clinic where my doctor was, and she examined it all and everything, 
and they took x-rays and they wouldn't tell me the result. And then they asked me ifI'd come in and have 
some ultra-sounds done on the scrotum and so forth, which I did. Then they asked me if I'd go into 
hospital and have a CAT scan of my lower abdomen you see, which I also did. They took little bits of 
fingernail, and pinched skin off the end of my ear, and some hair and a few other things, and a whole lot of 
saliva. Anyhow it took till May when the doctor rang me up on my day off, it was a Thursday. And she 
said: "What are you doing this morning?" 
And I said: "Oh nothing particular much." 
She said: "Oh we have got some results of all these tests." 
You see, because they had been putting me off for months and I couldn't understand why they were 
putting me off. 
She said: "I'll come and collect you because we are going to the Hospital to a couple of specialist guys in 
there." 
So she came, and I got ready in the meantime, and she arrived and we drove in to the hospital. There was 
a geneticist there and a couple of other characters and a psychologist. Anyhow they were sitting on the 
side of their table and my doctor and I sat on this side, fairly well apart. The psychologist was up one end, 
and he started just talking to me and the other three were talking to my doctor. I sort of wasn't listening, 
well not properly because I was talking to this other man. He was questioning me about my youth and, 
and how I got on at school and all sorts of things, what I thought when I came out of school, whether I 
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liked girls and all this sort of thing. I was getting a bit uptight after about three quarters of an hour of this, 
and eventually I said to him: "Listen, now what did we come in here for?" 
Just like that you see. The Professor in the middle he just said to this man, they had obviously called him in 
you see: "What do you think?" 
And he said: "Yes, I think he'll be alright". 
So he then addressed me, and he said: "Well Robyn what we have got you in here for is that there is no 
cancer or anything like that. But the only trouble is you are a girl." (Laugh) 
I sort of said: "WHAT?" (Laugh). 
Anyhow what it appears to have happened was that I was what they called a suppressed female 
hermaphrodite. I had one ovary and a fallopian tube and something that looked like a bit of a uterus, but 
non-functional stuff, no vagina of course or anything external. I only had one testicle, the left one, and the 
right one was a little bunch of cysts, like a little bunch of grapes, and when I bashed them apparently they 
developed. They (the cysts) apparently were not there at all, and I never knew prior that I only had one 
testicle and of course I thought it was rapidly growing cancer obviously. But in actual fact that is what had 
happened, and of course the tests had proved that the original accident had stopped the testicle working 
and the result was that my hormonal balance was now going the other way. This single lousy little ovary 
was doing its job for the first time in its life and that is why I was having these silly problems you see, 
being emotionally upset and what not, it is the same thing as hormonal withdrawal you know. There 
wasn't enough of either (hormone), so after some discussion and explanations by everybody in their turn 
they said, you know you have only really got one choice and that is to have a double mastectomy when 
there is sufficient development for us to be able to do it, including the removal of the 2 ribs to get at all the 
glands that are underneath inside the rib cage as well, because of the bit of hormone, they generate female 
hormones, and a hysterectomy including the fallopia and an ovectomy, or whatever they call it, and of 
course I wasn't too keen on all of that. And so I said: "What is the other alternative, or is there another 
alternative ?" 
And he said: "Oh yes, we can fill you up with testosterone and keep you the way you were." 
And so they tried that for nearly three years actually, but it failed in the end. As the process went on I 
guess the hypothalamus and pituitary gland at this stage found out what they were there for and were doing 
the right thing for a change, after all these years. You see when that accident happened I was 57 years old 
at that stage. In the end when they decided in early 1994 that if they kept giving me this artificial 
testosterone, at the level they were now giving them to me in you know, that they were going to do a lot of 
other damage. The liver didn't like it very much, and I don't think, although the kidneys weren't quite so 
bad, they were not behaving well either at that stage. So I said alright let it happen, so they stopped that. 
They have been fiddling around ever since with different dosages of both the two hormones to stop things 
going mad basically, and so I'm a girl. 
SP: This is unbelievable, that is an unbelievable stOlY! 
Yes, well unbelievable stories are unbelievable and that is why they are true. But so then of course, ever 
since then I've been going to see this same psychologist fellow and attending the clinic, because they have 
to treat me like a transsexual you see, basically because there is no other way. So I've just been sort of 
learning the ropes basically and having to forget something like 62 years of being a bloke and learning 
some of the habits of women but I tell you what, it is a lot of hard work and I make a lot of mistakes. 
SP: So how did yourfamily react to that? 
Well my mum and dad are in their middle 90's you see and I have not told them. The rest of them are OK. 
I'm not really sure, maybe, I mean I did have some female traits, there was no doubt about that. Prior to 
that, like I didn't have any body hair for example, and, although I didn't realise it at the time, the female 
tract of puberty hair, you know straight across the top and the triangle, and down, instead of the diamond 
going up to the navel which the males have, I don't have that you see, 1've got small feet and so forth. I'm 
not a big strong person and never ever was, even though I played football and trained at the gym and 
everything. I never really developed any big muscles no matter what I did, but I never put them together, 
and nobody else put them together to say there was something wrong with me, or something different, not 
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so much wrong I guess as different. But anyhow the kids are bit, oh what would they be, they get 
embarrassed a bit when they have to introduce me as a woman, and their father, to their friends for the first 
time. Now that is a little dicey on it and I can understand that too. If you were a son and introduced me to 
someone , meet my Dad - and it is a woman standing in front of them and without explanation, what do 
those people think? Straight away they think I'm a queer, or something-or-rather. You know, why are you 
like this Dad? And the answer is I don't know son. So that is it, but I haven't told Mum and Dad. Mum's 
asked some questions at different times and I've always been able to conjure up a suspiciously evasive 
answer. You know she questions some of the clothes I wear you see, and the long fingernails and the hair 
down here. And she is always going on about the blooming hair you see. Of course originally when I was 
first going through all this testosterone and everything like that I had my hair cut in a normal masculine 
manner you know. But when I knew that that was going to be off, I let it get a little bit longer like the 
modern guys do, but not like down here where it is now. They were saying well you know you have got to 
practise being a woman. 
The first time I wore a woman's dress and so forth and walked down steps I thought everybody in creation 
was looking at me. It was very embarrassing to me internally but most people didn't even notice, you 
know just walked past. But you get inconsistent things you know. A classic case was when I was 
inquiring about a bus number down at the terminal at the little kiosk. The elderly gent there, well in his late 
50s or so, he considered me a woman and he said yes madam and so forth, and it is there and it's just over 
there, and he referred to my sex directly several times as female. I went over to the bus and the bus came 
along. The man in the kiosk had given me about 6 or 7 different bus numbers you see, and I was a little 
confused when the bus turned up as to whether it was the right one. So I asked the driver and he said: 
"Yes mate", within 30 seconds of the other one telling me I was a chick all the time. So you get those sort 
of things all the time. However, they are becoming less frequent. 
Lots of people have asked me why I decided to change my appearance to female instead of hiding the 
female and remaining male. You are not the first to have asked me that. I don't know why. Except that 
I'm biologically female and I figured there is an adventure to see what happens basically, what will 
happen. Whether or not I have the surgery done to my male genitals or not is another matter. I'm still not 
keen at letting them have a go at those either you see. I mean I didn't let them have a go at the female 
ones, I'm not likely to let them have a go at the male ones am I? But I may. My view keeps changing. 
Some times I'm very happy to be female and on other days I hate the idea, it is just one of those things, 
moody women you see, that is what it is. 
I was brought up male, I was very much a male, but I was never in the male fraternity. What do I mean by 
that? In a group of fellows, I was a hanger-on, you know they didn't really accept me. I was as good as 
them at most things, particularly sport for example. As I said I played football at school. It was a rugby 
school, a Catholic College, and I was in the first 15 for my age group and then when they got to the senior 
level I played in the college first 15. Now that school had nearly 1000 boys at it so I was able to do the 
male things but I was never big. I played the halfback, and of course the forwards used to say, don't worry 
about it, I was Robin spelt with an 'I' of course to them in school. "No don't worry about it Robin we 
won't let anybody at you." Because they were giants of kids, when I say kids they were 18, 19 years of 
age in those days in the senior school, and they were big, they were men particularly the forwards, they 
were giants you know. And of course they did very well. I very rarely got clouted by anybody I can tell 
you, occasionally but not often and that sort of thing happened all the time. I got caught (up) in the army 
and so forth, you know at the end of the war fortunately. They were training me to go to Japan as an 
occupational troop you know, but the world governments changed the composition of the occupying 
forces. The company that I was in was disbanded, so it didn't really matter. But I had a commission in the 
war so I was able to be a bloke and do all the things that men did. Even when I went to work I trained as a 
radio operator and went to sea on a ship originally, but I came inshore and did all the electronic courses 
and so forth, and in the end I worked in the telecommunications industry. And I ended up as the principal 
technical officer, the highest grade you can get in the public sector. They made a special grade for me to do 
a special job in the last 3 years of my employment. And then disbanded it when I finished the job and I 
left straight after. So I was able to compete with them, but I was never really one of them you know. 
When they went to the pub they never asked me to go for example, if I went along it was OK, but they 
didn't say you have got to come too Rob you know. It is a funny thing I was sort of on the outer all the 
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time as a male. Of course I didn't have a lot of joy with girls either when I was young neither, because I 
didn't have very much interest in women, and I guess that was the female bit in me too. You know you 
don't chase around after girls if you are one, but I didn't know. Of course I didn't court a girl, even though 
I got married to one. I got proposed to by the sister of a friend in actual fact and I accepted her. And it 
lasted 30 years, she made a fairly good choice, but I think she may have left because of it. Because we 
didn't have a row or anything, or we weren't incompatible or anything, everything seemed to be pretty 
good to me but ... (cake in the oven due to come out, turned off tape). 
So you see that is what happened to me, but the girls at the clinic they don't know that story, they think 
that I've always believed, you know like most of us or like most of them do, that they were women all 
along and wanted to be so. I'm sort of driven to it, as I said I have my on and off days but it is an 
adventure for me, it is definitely an adventure. I can't say any more than that. 
SP: I think that is the most amazing story I've heard. You know 30 odd year married, and you had how 
many children? 
Four 
SP: Four. It is unusual for hermaphrodites to be fertile too. 
Oh it worked. I worked! 
SP: Looking at the medical literature. 
Yes that is right, the single left testicle worked apparently very well. 
SP: Until you fell off the scaffolding. 
But for the accident I might never have known. That is what they say you see, that there is probably, they 
reckon there is about one in 14 million people that are like me. The reason that the figure is so big is that 
you have got to have something unique happen to find them because they don't do the genetic tests on 
children. They lift them up, if it has got a penis it is a boy, if they haven't it is a girl and that is about the 
end of it. Unless they show signs, if they are intersexed then they show signs of both genitals as a baby. 
They find out what they really are these days, they might not have in the 1920s but they do now and of 
course they fix it up, get rid of what is not supposed to be there in the first fortnight or so of life and that is 
it. But if they had done that with me I might never have had any children. Because I didn't have a vagina 
and a proper uterus you see. But the thing is I should have just died you see eventually still a male and 
nobody ever would have known. And they say there is probably quite a lot of us around and they do just 
exactly that. They are men that are effeminate, or they are women that are a bit masculine, and they die, 
but if you have something odd happen to you, the you know, sort of turns the switch (then) you are in the 
business for a change ... 
SP: So how does that make YOll feel about sex and gender, I mean YOll must think they are a bit strange 
then. 
Well yes, I'm not an analytical person in that sense. I'm a technician and I can resolve lots of things 
logically, but emotional things and so forth like that I don't work out at all very well. Yet you know I used 
to be jeered at and laughed at because I'd cry at the movies and watching television and so forth, and that 
was all before it happened you know and they would say ah you carryon like a baby. Was that the lady in 
me? I don't know. The reason my wife left was for that reason, that she could see something that I 
couldn't, but she never ever told me and hasn't done so even now when she knows what is what. 
I wasn't aiming to be female intentionally. But I'm prepared to accept it. I've always been a realist you 
see. That is probably why - even though I told them "no I'll stay a male", initially if they had of succeeded 
I would have. Only I didn't want to ruin my health and stay a male and be sick for the rest of my life so I 
said well, you know, "stop it". But they had to wean me off you see then, they just couldn't stop like that, 
75 
and to some extent they still are because I still have some testosterone and still have some oestrogen type 
things to take. 
They are not sure in my case whether I'm going to go through puberty or not. See as far as I can gather 
from talking to everybody that most of these do it much younger and they have got a far greater chance of 
physically transforming to look more womanly if they are going to women, or more masculine if they are 
going the other way. You can't do anything with old bones. I've had the necessary instructions to say stop 
growing, as in length and things like that, and of course you can't make a skeleton any smaller than it 
originally was, and you can't do anything about your throat either, so I'll always have a masculine voice. I 
mean you can train to speak so you have a higher pitch as so forth, but who wants to work on that all the 
time. They offer all kinds of operations to shorten the chords and all this kind of thing, but I'm not keen 
on having a go at that either. 
If I ever go the whole hog in this matter, or have it look as though it is the whole hog at any rate if 
nothing else, well I guess I'm not too sure how clever these surgeons are that do these sorts of operations. 
If they could gain access to the vagina anyhow or the uterus from the one they make, I don't know if 
they can do that or not. Normally they just do a blunt dissection don't they, like push a stick in the mud 
and make a hole basically. But they have got something to aim at in my case, it just doesn't need to go 
sort of anywhere. It is a bit involved because the uterus in it's normal position is slightly above the 
bladder, and the bladder of course being to the side, well not the side really to the front. Whereas they 
avoid going anywhere near the bladder and the rectum when they make these artificial pseudo things, so 
I don't know how they would get around it they made an attempt to do so, but of course there are lots of 
funny things you see. They don't know how old I am genetically at this stage and they don't know 
whether I'm now in a state of puberty or whether I've past menopause you see. The problem is that if I 
start to menstruate they have got real troubles because there is nowhere for it to go. Initially, the body 
would initially have to absorb it, if I ovulate, if I ever do, but there is going to be a big hassle if that 
should happen, but so far there is no sign of that. Menstruation will force the issue there is nothing 
surer than that. Hopefully at nearly 70 years of age next birthday I should be past it by rights. 
Ufe stories as fragments of biography 
Luc Botanski (1987: 8) suggests that interviews are not naturalistic; they are always 
shaped by the conditions in which they were obtained and, I would argue, retold. Life 
history interviews may be read as 'staged sites' whereby individual trajectories and 
experiences are reordered, reformulated and reinterpreted. Interviews require a 
particular 'language game' (Botanski, 1987: 8) that is organised around disclosure, 
confession, self-reflection, privacy and secrecy. Robyn's story begins with a confession 
- that she is not transgendered. She then goes on to set the conditions under which she 
is prepared to disclose her story. During the course of the interview she reflects on 
his/her past and reinterprets that past in light of her new knowledges about his/her 
body. Robyn is a member of a minority group, his/her story is told to me one-on-one 
and in 'confidence'.16 The subject matter is extremely personal and a 'secret' between 
Robyn and a select group of people - some, but not all, members of her family, her 
doctors, and myself. At the same time life histories are public conversations that are 
retold through the often-complex process of turning private talk into words on a page. 
16 Robyn's story is reproduced with Robyn's permission. 
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The life history interview makes some things explicit and others implicit. The 
language used, the way in which the story is told, what aspects of his/her life the 
speaker chooses to include, the interpretation of what is said are relatively transparent 
in the (re)presentation of a life history narrative. The attributes of the speaker, what 
she has said elsewhere, the aspects of their life the speaker has chosen to exclude, how 
the story is retold through editing, and revisions made to ensure anonymity also have 
an 'absent presence' (Shilling, 1993) in the life history narrative. Or to put it another 
way, the life history is a (re)construction of events that are organised to tell a story 
about the story that is narrated by the informant. In Robyn's story identifying features 
such as his/her name and occupation, the names of other actors, local place names, 
and the exact dates on which particular events described in the life history occurred 
have either been changed or omitted. Robyn also confesses that s/he has given different 
accounts of self to her parents, doctors, counsellor, to other transgendered people (and 
possibly to the researcher). Robyn's story is a combination of what is said in the 
presented transcript and also what is omitted; it is both a form of public disclosure and 
a private conversation that is not without consequences. 
Tensions between public face and private life are reflected in Robyn's concerns 
about the need for me to protect her identity in the context of the transgender 
community in which she was a regular participant. Acceptance within her local 
transgender community was important to Robyn, as she valued the support and 
knowledges associated with transitioning across gender that were available to her 
within that community. Robyn shared with me enough of his/her life story to make 
her clearly identifiable to others regardless of the use of a pseudonym, therefore, she 
placed a tremendous amount of trust in me to protect her identity. The transcript 
begins with concerns about maintaining anonymity, which are repeated in the course 
of the interview but not reproduced in the transcript. In order to protect Robyn's 
identity changes have been made to the above interview extract. These changes do not 
significantly alter the narrative that is fore grounded in the transcript, which is Robyn's 
story about his/her body changing sex/gender. For reasons of anonymity, details 
about Robyn's life, outside of his/her story about the events that led to his/her medical 
diagnosis and treatment as a hermaphrodite, are also kept to a minimum. This means 
that some of Robyn's quirky and unique narratives about her experiences of 
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transitioning across gender have also been omitted, as I am sure she would have shared 
them in her support group as enthusiastically and as animatedly as she shared them 
with me in the interview. 
With each editing of Robyn's story, he/she has necessarily become more and more 
one-dimensional. For example s/he is presented as an anonymous male/female, who 
has an undifferentiated work history, whose story takes place at a non-specific locale 
over an unspecified time period. I am deeply ambivalent about this process of 
rendering Robyn unrecognisable and I regret that the richness of Robyn's life, those 
aspects of experience that make us fully human, cannot be reflected in the final 
transcript. The process of writing Robyn's story demonstrates the way that research is 
never 'objective', but is always a series of negotiated compromises. In this way the 
processes associated with writing life histories are similarly organised around 
disclosure, confession, self-reflection, privacy and secrecy. At the beginning of this 
chapter, for example, I 'disclosed' aspects of Robyn's story as she narrated it to me, I 
have 'confessed' to changing, or omitting, parts of her story in order to ensure the 
anonymity of the informant, and in the following sections I 'reflect' on the process of 
doing the life history, of retelling and interpreting Robyn's story. 
A problem of language 
Ontological and epistemological issues of continuity and discontinuity underpin 
Robyn's life history narrative. On the one hand, Robyn's conscious reinterpretation of 
her past may be read as a response to the way conventional understandings about the 
relationship between sex and gender, as fixed and immutable, reflects and inscribes a 
reality that does not fit comfortably with Robyn's biography. On the other hand 
Robyn's attempts to weave continuity into a conventionally discontinuous narrative of 
identity (Davis, 1995: 98-99, 113) may be interpreted as an outcome of the process of 
narrating the life history itself. 
Life histories are everyday conversations about how selves are crafted through 
personal experience. As such, they usually demand a particular narrative style; one 
that is consistent and linear (Benson, 2001: 50). For most of us our sexed identity, and 
as a consequence our gender, are taken for granted as part of a fixed and unchanging 
framework through which we experience the world. For Robyn such biological 
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certainties are no longer tenable. Robyn defines herself, and inhabits a social world, in 
which s/he constantly moves from one gender to another; physically, psychologically, 
linguistically, socially and symbolically. As a result, Robyn's narrative constructs an 
identity that is shifting and contingent. That is, different identities become salient 
depending on the context to which s/he is referring or in which s/he is physically 
present. For example, although Robyn claims a biological and social identity as a 
woman, he also retains a male identity as a son and father. Robyn simultaneously 
operates with biologically determinist understandings of gender - "I'm actually a 
biological woman ... and always have been ... ", "this silly little ovary was doing its job 
for the first time in its life and that is why I was having these silly problems you see, 
being emotionally upset..." - and ideas about it as socially constructed - "I've just been 
learning the ropes basically and having to forget something like 62 years of being a 
bloke and learning some of the habits of women ... "; "you have got to practice being a 
woman". Robyn's story is therefore a destabilising one in which words and images can 
give only an approximate view of Robyn's identity and experience. 
The linguistic resources Robyn uses to tell her story are also a product of the social 
groups in which Robyn is, or has been, involved. Robyn describes her transgender 
identity as something that was forced upon her, and suggests that she masquerades as 
transgendered in order to access the support and specific knowledges available to 
people within that community. Robyn claims authenticity as a woman, which raises 
concerns about unauthenticity in the context of the transgender support group. She 
sees herself as in some ways more authentically female than others in this group. She 
considers that her involvement in the transgender community is involuntary. Ironically 
she has concerns about being exposed as a transgender fraud because, unlike the 
transsexuals with whom she is acquainted, Robyn is able to ground her identity as a 
woman in her anatomy. Robyn distances herself from other 'tranys', saying that she is 
not like them, and in the context of the transgender community describes herself as a 
woman impersonating a male-to-female trany. Robyn describes herself as about half 
way there, neither male nor female, s/he is ambivalent about her male biological 
identity and yet continues to retain aspects of her male biology and her male identities 
as both son and father. At the same time as Robyn claims to have always been a 
woman, she reworks her personal history as a boy, and later a man, in relation to her 
new knowledges about her body, and at the time of the interview preferred to claim a 
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biological and social identity as a woman. His/her identity as a hermaphrodite is not a 
significant discourse in the interview transcript, and is not presented explicitly as a 
potential identity in its own rightP Although Robyn is in some ways reconciled to 
his/her own 'problematic' hermaphroditic body, preferring to postpone any decisions 
about surgery in the meantime, she also talks about the hermaphrodite as a 'problem' 
that is usually resolved at birth. 
At the heart of Robyn's dilemma, surrounding his/her attempts to construct a 
coherent and continuous narrative of identity, is his/her use of conventionally 
incompatible discourses associated with boy and girl, man and woman. On the one 
hand, Robyn's story is about the boy who becomes the soldier, worker, father, husband, 
lover, and on the other, her story is about acknowledging the girl, and becoming a 
woman. Robyn's identities, as male and as female, are a product of these 
contradictions. S/he cannot abandon either. Each represents a fundamental aspect of 
his/her experiences and history, yet the construction of language around sets of binary 
oppositions ensures that neither can work comfortably together - his/her identity as a 
male and as a female are incompatible as they usually cancel each other out (Botanski, 
1987: 10). At the same time stating that these discourses about being male and female 
are incompatible, because they cross the boundaries of what are conventionally 
considered to be disparate realms of practice, assumes that Robyn should attempt to 
resolve contradictions surrounding his/her identity by taking an either/or position in 
relation to his/her sex and gender. Robyn's history ensures that s/he will always be 
both regardless of his/her social gender. 
Robyn's story may be read as a problem of language, and the way in which language 
reflects and inscribes a reality that does not fit comfortably with Robyn's biography. 
Moreover, Robyn's story demonstrates how it is possible to be both (or neither) sex(es), 
and how it is possible to alternate between two incompatible discourses at the same 
time. Robyn's story is not an exception to sets of understandings about sexual 
difference, Instead her story illustrates the constructedness of language, in this case 
17 Cheryl Chase (1998) is a self-identified intersexed person who is critical of standard surgical 
correction of intersexuality in infants. She embraces the both/ andness of intersexed bodies and argues 
for the rights of intersexed people to be able to choose their sex/gender in later life. Epstein (1990), 
Findlay (1995) and Wijngaard (1997) provide excellent critical histories on the cultural/medical 
construction of intersexuality. Dreger (1998) and HiI'd and Germon (ZOO 1) are also critical of the way 
intersexed bodies have been disciplined, and their identities erased, through medical intervention. 
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around sets of understandings about sex and gender, its basis in the social, its 
assumption of unambiguous oppositions, and its troubling of those dualisms by 
illustrating the ways in which oppositional ways of thinking are interdependent. 
Robyn's story is problematic precisely because s/he blurs the boundaries of sexual 
difference in ways that lay bare the processes through which inclusion in one category 
is dependent upon exclusion from its opposite. 
Robyn's story is culturally embedded in sets of understandings about the 
relationship(s) between male and female, men and women, masculinity and femininity. 
Language and knowledge are constituted through binary oppositions which are 'a 
series of mutually dependent opposite pairs in which one side of the pair has a positive 
definition, whilst the other side is defined as everything that the other is not' (Roberts 
et.al. 1995: 526). Examples of these dualisms include: mind/body, nature/culture, 
male/female, masculine/feminine, and rational/irrational. Robyn's embodiment 
deconstructs the malelfemale binary opposition, since s/he is both the woman with a 
uterus and one functioning ovary and the male with testes and a penis. In other 
contexts Robyn refers to his/her-self as both the "mate" and the "chick", and a "bloke" 
and a "girl". The dualisms constituting nature and culture and their respective 
associations with female and male, irrational and rational are also disrupted in this 
story. When referring to herself as a female s/he describes herself as "moody" and 
"emotional"; when he talks about his male identity he is "practical" and the 
"technician". 18 Robyn's story illustrates the ways In which these dualistic 
understandings about sexual difference may be applied to the bodies of individuals. 
The agents in Robyn's story operate with oppositional understandings about the 
relationship between male and female, men and women, maSCUlinity and femininity. 
These understandings are reflected in, and in turn construct, public narratives of 
sexual difference, gender, maSCUlinity and femininity. 
18 Gill and Grint (1995: 8 and 10-11) argue that 'technical competence has come to constitute an 
integral part of masculine gender identity' such that a particular version of masculinity is central to 
definitions of technology. 
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Doing masculinity, being feminine 
Two stories about gender emerge out of Robyn's narrative: a man's story centred 
around work and masculinity and a woman's story centred around issues of 
embodiment and the social practices associated with doing femininity. Robyn's story 
maps many identities, each of which is constructed in relation to sets of understandings 
about masculinity and femininity. At the same time these identities are deeply 
embodied stories about how corporeality mediates the interface between culture and 
sUbjectivity. Robyn's marginality allows her to reflect on the construction of her 
gender identity. Rather than being an exception to binary notions of gender, her 
observations point to the way that gender identities come to be codified, constructed 
and crafted in relation to public narratives of masculinity and femininity and the 
everyday practices of individuals. 
Robyn describes her past as a man m relation to sets of understandings about 
'hegemonic masculinity'. Bob Connell (1995: 77-78) defines hegemonic masculinity 
as an historically unstable and contested set of culturally accepted ideas, strategies and 
practices which are taken to legitimise existing patriarchal relations and thereby 
guarantee the dominant position of men and the subordination of women. Connell 
notes that hegemonic masculinity is defined through a series of exclusions that are 
based on gender, class, race and sexuality, which also tend to privilege particular 
groups of men vis-a.-vis other groups of men. Key sites where sets of understandings 
about hegemonic masculinity are legitimated include the family, the military, the state, 
labour relations, heterosexuality and sport. Robyn talks about the way masculine 
identities are crafted through familial relationships, work, heterosexuality, drinking 
and sport, these identities being described in relation to sets of understandings about 
'hegemonic masculinity'. When Robyn talks about how he has practised masculinity in 
his own life he refers to his participation in rugby at school and reflects proudly on his 
achievement at making the first XV. Robyn uses several discursive strategies to 'shore 
up' or normalise his identity as a heterosexual male including his place in the army in 
World War Two, drinking at the pub, career, marriage, fatherhood, disparaging 
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comments about "queers", and response of "Oh it worked, I worked"19 to my 
suggestion that it was unusual for people in his situation to be fertile. 
Robyn also reflects on the discourses and practices associated with doing 
masculinity from the vantagepoint of his current identity as a woman. Difficulties he 
experienced in gaining the acceptance of his male peers, both as a child and as a man, 
are reinterpreted in light of newfound knowledges about his body. An idealised 
masculinity is used implicitly as a yard stick against which Robyn compares his 
problematic physicality, the assumed heterosexuality associated with his disinterest in 
girls - "you don't chase around after girls if you are one" - and lack of acceptance as 
"one of the boys". The discourses about masculinity that come into play in Robyn's 
story can be interpreted as a commentary on the construction of a particular kind of 
masculinity that is defined through the exclusion of ideas and practices typically 
associated with the feminine. In Robyn's story masculinity is strongly associated with 
action, mateship, heterosexuality and work, while femininity is associated with 
emotionality, indecision and body image. Like all of us, Robyn is not inherently 
masculine or inherently feminine, but instead recognises himself, or herself, as 
masculine or as feminine in relation to sets of understandings about masculinity and 
fe:ll1inini ty (Pringle, 1989: 89). 
Robyn explains her decision to reconstruct her social gender in accordance with her 
female biology. These new knowledges about her body mean that it is problematic for 
her to maintain a masculine narrative of identity which is uncontaminated by qualities 
normally associated with the feminine. Instead Robyn attempts to craft a new story 
about herself by drawing together disparate sets of social conventions surrounding sex 
and gender, a process which is dependent on medical technologies, language and 
doing femininity. Hegemonic discourses and practices associated with masculinity, 
femininity, medicine, and biology become resources for Robyn to rework his old male 
identity and construct a new female identity. When Robyn identifies as a woman a 
different set of assumptions and expectations come into play, ones that are typically 
associated with public narratives of femininity (McRobbie, 1991, 1994; Jamieson, 
1997, 109). 
19 I take 'oh it worked, I worked' in this context to refer not only to Robyn's ability to father children but 
also as an indication that his penis was of sufficient size so that he was able to have penetrative sexual 
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Robyn talks about the way feminine identities are crafted through body image, 
fashion, beauty and heterosociality. These identities are described in relation to 
stereotypical understandings about femininity. The woman is a relatively recent 
identity in relation to Robyn's life trajectory. She does femininity through dress, make-
up, hairstyle, motility, speech patterns, interacting with others (and baking a cake 
during the interview for a 'ladies a plate'20 function the following day). In another 
part of the interview she talked about having voice lessons, resisting the urge to lead at 
dances, learning to construct a fashionable image and to put on makeup. Robyn 
operates with stereotypical understandings of women and femininity but at the same 
time resists the expectation that she should adhere to such expectations all the time. 
Robyn is constantly catching herself in the act of constructing her identity. She does 
femininity, but it does not come easily, she has to constantly 'work' at it, and she admits 
that she makes mistakes. 
Robyn's new female identity is precarious because, in certain contexts, her old male 
identity has the potential to disrupt or undermine her carefully crafted femininity. For 
example, Robyn talks about inconsistencies in the way people refer to her 'sex' in 
evelyday interaction. In the above transcript she describes an incident at the bus 
terminal where, in reply to her request for information about a bus number, the kiosk 
attendant referred to her as 'madam', while minutes later at the bus the driver referred 
to her as "mate" - which is understood by Robyn as a highly gendered term that is used 
only by men to refer to other men. It is interesting to note that when describing the 
above incident at the bus terminal Robyn talks about how being called "madam" is a 
reference to her 'sex' rather than her gender. This suggests that Robyn still employs 
generalised understandings about the commensurability of sex and gender even 
though s/he has had experiences which indicate otherwise - both personally and 
through exposure to others in his/her transgender support group. Robyn's female 
identity also has the potential to disrupt his male identity as son to his parents. Robyn, 
for example, talks about having to come up with 'suspiciously evasive' answers to his 
mother's questions about the length of his hair and nails. 
intercourse (with a woman). 
20 'Ladies a plate' is a quaint colloquial term that is commonly used in New Zealand and Australia to 
indicate that women attending a function should bring along some finger food for the supper/afternoon 
tea. 
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Biological sex, gender and sexuality are analytically separate but in social practices 
they are often linked. Robyn defines herself by bringing into playa range of narratives 
about gender, medical knowledge, biology, and personal biography. Her story both 
confirms and disrupts sets of understandings about sexual difference. Instead of 
questioning the social structures that make Robyn's body 'problematic', Robyn tells a 
story about the ways in which she attempts to bring her body into line with binary 
notions of biological sex and social gender. Medical discourses and practices also blur 
the categories and boundaries associated with sex and gender. These understandings 
about sexed bodies need to be set in the context of feminist debates surrounding 
medical power/knowledge. By looking at the dominant themes and images of 
medicine in popular culture, feminist literature and medical literature two stories 
about medical knowledges and practices emerge: one which emphasises partnership 
and co-operation and another which emphasises power and control. 
Medicine and public narratives of sex and gender 
There are two public narratives typically associated with the medical profession, one 
of a progressive, caring profession in which medical technologies are presented as a 
solution to a wide range of individual pathologies, the other of an oppressive 
patriarchal profession in which medical technologies are used as a mode of discipline 
and as a means of control (Fausto-Sterling, 1993: 24; Albury, 1999: 169-170). The 
latter story usually focuses on women's contradictory relationship to medicine. It 
emphasises the physical dangers associated with 'unnecessary' medical interventions 
and explores the unique political risks that medical objectification and control pose to 
women. According to this perspective the medicalisation of women's bodies 
individualises, and therefore depoliticises, health problems deflecting attention away 
from the way that 'objective' medical definitions of pathology are also embedded in 
social relations and processes (Sawicki, 1991). In this latter story medicine is not 
considered to be a solution to a range of 'health' issues that are typically associated 
with women [for example, body image (Bordo, 1993a, 1993c; Wolf, 1991; Hesse-
Biber, 1991), infertility (Raymond, 1994; Wacjman, 1991; Klein, 1989; Martin, 1987; 
Corea, 1985), menopause (Lupton, 1996; Coney, 1991), disability (Munford, 1995; 
Wendell, 1992)] but is instead presented as part of the problem, in that medical 
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discourses and practices uncritically take up assumptions about beauty, disability and 
gender. 
Bringing feminist criticisms of medical practices like infertility treatment, cosmetic 
surgery or sex reassignment surgery into popular discourse has important political 
implications for individuals who may choose to engage in these technologies. This is 
because it allows for the possibility that the social meanings and power relations within 
which the practices of the medical professionals are inscribed may be challenged, and 
alternative resistant or critical discourses and practices produced (Sawicki, 1991; 
Davis, 1991; Albury, 1999: 169-171). These negative understandings about medical 
technologies have also been criticised for being overly pessimistic and moralistic. 
Analyses of patriarchal power, as operating through violence, objectification and 
repression, are unable to explain why many women view medical technologies as 
beneficial and enabling or why women voluntarily engage in them (Sawicki, 1991; 
Davis, 1991). Rhetorics of medical violence, danger and control also tend to construct 
women as passive casualties of larger external processes - the workings of free market 
capitalism or the heterosexual dictum that women should make themselves attractive 
to men for example - and to position women who use medical technologies as cultural 
dupes rather than active negotiators with the medical profession over their health care 
(Davis, 1991, 1997; Cussins, 1998). An alternative explanation of women's 
relationship to medical technologies is one which considers complexity by 
acknowledging the potential pleasures and benefits of medical interventions for 
individual women while also exploring the contradictions, ambiguities and risks 
involved in women's health care decisions (Davis, 1991, 1993, 1995; Sawicki, 1991; 
Phibbs, 1994). 
The issues raised in the above discussion of public narratives associated with the 
medical profession are relevant to an analysis of Robyn's story about her relationship 
with the medical professionals associated with her case. Robyn presents herself as a 
passive product of processes that are largely beyond her control - an accident in her 
backyard, her biology, medical diagnosis, and her body's response to treatment with 
male hormones - all of which she struggles to make sense of in relation to her present 
situation. At the same time, she uses the medical profession strategically to legitimate 
her female gender identity, to enhance her biological status as a woman through the 
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use of hormones, and she considers the possibility of sex reassignment surgery. 
Robyn's story is also a story about how she negotiated with the medical profession to 
maintain her sexed identity initially as male and subsequently as female. 
Robyn's story speaks to the construction of essentialism within feminist, medical and 
common sense understandings of sex, gender and sexuality. Essentialism is indicated by 
common sense assumptions of unproblematic continuity between biology, anatomy and 
social gender. These assumptions are also evident within academic feminism (Grosz, 
1994: 207, Hausman, 1995)21 and medicine. The medical professionals associated 
with Robyn's case attempt to resolve Robyn's problematic body by offering surgical 
solutions that realign biology, anatomy and social gender. Binary oppositions 
constituting essentialism and social constructionism, body and performance, doing 
gender and being gendered are disrupted in Robyn's story. This is because Robyn's 
account of gender also rests on the notion of an embodied choosing subject. Robyn is 
ambivalent about being a woman - in an interesting turn of phrase that indicates a 
mind/body split, she says "sometimes I'm very happy to be female and on other days I 
hate the idea". Robyn accepts the biological reality of it, but sometimes hates the idea or 
representation of that reality perhaps because of the "work" involved in doing 
femininity, and attributes this indecision to "moody women" - i.e. biology. 
Distinctions between essentialist and social constructionist approaches to the body 
are not clear cut. Arthur Frank (1996) argues that people adopting social 
constructionist approaches must consider the interaction between the body as flesh, 
self or subjectivity which he terms the body-subject, and the ways in which bodies, 
specifically those subject to a medical gaze, are inscribed with social meanings. For 
Frank, it is only through bodily-located knowledges, or the interaction between flesh, 
inscription and intention that embodiment becomes 'experience' (Frank, 1996: 58). 
21 Elizabeth Grosz's critique of transsexualism, for example, draws on essentialist-notions of malelfemale 
bodies, behaviours, identities and experiences: 
' ... Men, conh'ary to the fantasy of the h'anssexual, can never, even with surgical intervention, feel or 
experience what it is like to be or live as women. At best the transsexual can live out his fantasy of 
femininity - a fantasy that in itself is usually disappointed with the rather crude transformations effected 
by surgical and chemical intervention. The transsexual may look like a woman but can never feel like or 
be a woman ... ' (Grosz, 1994: 207). 
For Grosz, female gender identities are made through the experience of occupying the social position of 
woman for a lifetime. Transsexual bodies are problematic because they disrupt lines of connection 
between biology, identity and experience. She emphasises social identity based on experience and 
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Frank's argument, developed in the context of his personal experience of illness, may 
be appropriated to an analysis of Robyn's story without doing too much violence to the 
original meaning of Frank's text. 
Robyn recogmses him/herself as male/masculine or as female/feminine, and 
constructs his/her identity as male or as female, in relation to sets of understandings 
about maleness/masculinity or femaleness/femininity. Robyn's subjectivity is crafted in 
the context of occupying a body that confounds conventional discourses associated 
with gender and sexual difference. This lack of fit between embodiment, subjectivity 
and 'ordinary' discourses about sexual difference/gender as fixed and immutable 
suggests that identities are not simply a product of discourses and social practices. 
Robyn's story illustrates some of the ways in which gender identities are socially 
constructed, but it is also a deeply embodied story about the relationship between 
sUbjectivity and corporeality. Robyn's story challenges assumptions that the 
relationship between social gender and the anatomical body is immutable. At the same 
time Robyn's use of hormones, and attention to the possibilities associated with gender 
reassignment surgery, reinforces the notion that anatomy and social gender have to be 
consistent. Yet they will never be totally consistent because Robyn's identity also 
reflects her social history as male. She will always be a son and a father for example. 
It would be impossible for Robyn to tell his/her story without having had the 
experience of occupying his/her body. Robyn's identity is a product of the interaction 
between embodiment, experience, subjectivity, intention, and sets of understandings 
about gender and sexual difference. Robyn's decision to change his/her social gender 
is a response to the acquisition of new knowledges about his/her body. These 
knowledges are both 'felt' in his/her experience of bodily changes and confirmed 
through medical diagnosis and suggestions about treatment. Following diagnosis, 
Robyn's subjectivity initially as male, and subsequently as female, is actively negotiated 
through a range of medical options presented to Robyn as a solution to his/her 
'problematic' physicality. To use Frank's terminology explicitly, Robyn's subjectivity is 
in part a product of his/her bodily-located knowledges. It is through the interaction 
between flesh, inscription and intention that Robyn's embodiment becomes experience. 
suggests a distaste for genital transformation. See Chapter Seven for a discussion of the use of 
essentialism in Hausman's (1995) analysis of tl'anssexualism. 
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Moreover, Robyn's story illustrates the ways that subjectivity is not only crafted 
through actively taking up, and being taken up by, particular discourses and practices, 
but it also points to the way that bodies impact on the discursive positioning of subjects. 
I want to make it clear that in suggesting that stories are embodied I do not want to 
adopt an either/or position in relation to bodies and narratives, or to assert the primacy 
of one vis-it-vis the other, but to explore the ways in which stories and bodies are 
interconnected. Narratives and bodies do not exist in opposition but are instead 
interdependent. Robyn's story is a specific example of the way that personal narratives 
may be used to complicate and disrupt assumptions about the discursive construction 
of embodiment and its relationship to subjectivity. I am not suggesting that embodied 
stories are more authentic than others, for example medical narratives about gender 
and sexual difference, but instead argue that attention to bodily experience in the 
strategic stories of actors enables sociologists to offer more complex analyses of the 
ways in which individuals make sense of, and craft, their identities. Robyn, however, 
was not the only person who was born a hermaphrodite that I encountered during this 
research. 
Nick, an ITM interviewed for this project, also states that his decision to change his 
social gender was in response to the physical changes that occurred in his body when 
he was a teenager: 
They (the doctors) put me on female hormones to try and bring on my 
period. That is why when I was in the (children's) home and they took me off 
them my mother went off her brain, went to the government and everything. 
They thought I was on the pill for sex, they did not realise I was on them for a 
hormone imbalance. In addition, if I have to blame someone for my decision, 
(to change social gender) which I don't, but if I had to blame someone I'd blame 
the government agency. Because initially what they have done is taken that 
choice away from me. I didn't have a choice when I was little. Look I didn't get 
ripped off once, I got ripped off twice. Once when I was born, my mother she 
had this decision to make years ago and she made it and reality shows that she 
made a mistake, but that is in hindsight. I accept that I'm not bitter about that at 
all, because that is the way it was. When I was thirteen they took me off female 
hormones. I was 18 when I found out that I was a hermaphrodite my Nana told 
me. (She said) "Now that you are 18 I think you should know because your 
mother would not tell you about it." Makes you want to go to the pub ayeT She 
told me I was born with an extra bit. It was like I had this, what I first thought 
of was this big jigsaw and I had this one piece that would just not fit, when my 
Nan told me it was like it (the jigsaw) was finished, it fits, it makes sense. So, I 
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wasn't one of those people who realised that they were transgender at four or 
five, it never occurred to me. I changed gender purely because it was a logical 
change. I grew facial hair, my voice broke, and I changed gender. I believe that 
is a rare thing. 
Nick, ITM, 1996 
Nick's account of how his body forced gender identity issues for him is remarkably 
similar to Robyn's story. My interpretation of Nick's story is that he was born 
intersexed and had 'corrective' genital surgery as an infant that made his genitals 
conform to those of a girl. He was raised as a girl and entered a children's home in his 
early teenage years when his mother became too ill to look after him. Nick had been 
taking female hormones to correct a hormonal imbalance and this medication was 
stopped when he entered the children's home. During puberty Nick's body 
masculinised. When he turned 18 his grandmother told him that he had been born 
intersexed. Nick took on a male identity from that point onwards. He sees this decision 
as responding to the physiological changes that he was experiencing. 
Nick identifies primarily as a male; in the interview with me he also claimed an 
identity as a trany in relation to his political activism, and as a hermaphrodite when 
describing his personal history. He distances himself from stereotypical public 
narratives associated with transsexualism by stating that he did not always identify as a 
male. Nick's childhood self is that of a 'girl' ~ in another part of the interview 
transcript (that is not reproduced here) he argues that he was never a woman because 
he did not menstruate. Nick is able to ground his identity as a girl in his childhood 
experiences and his female genitals. His identity as a man is crafted in relation to his 
masculine physical appearance and his more recent history of living as a 
(heterosexual) male. Nick's biography is both/and; it traverses conventionally 
incompatible identities initially as female and later as male. Nick, like Robyn, is able to 
ground both of these identities in her/his biology. 
Diana Fuss argues that both essentialism and social constructionism are historically, 
socially and politically specific categories, which position and constitute 'things' like 
the gendered subject. They do not exist in opposition, but constitute and re-constitute 
each other (Fuss, 1989: 3-4). Fuss argues that 'there is no essence to essentialism', and 
that social constructionism 'really operates as a sophisticated form of essentialism' 
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(Fuss, 1989: xii). For example, some constructionist use of the plural to emphasise 
heterogeneity and to disrupt unitary understandings about men and women may be 
underpinned by a form of nominal essentialism that is based in the linguistic 
designation associated with the collective categories (of man and woman) (Fuss, 1989: 
3-4). zz Essentialism contains traces of social constructionism and vice versa; 
essentialism is both fixed and fragmentary. Fuss, an 'anti-essentialist' (1989: xiv), 
cautions against dismissing essentialist rhetoric as 'bad' or unsophisticated, and 
suggests instead that it may be more useful to explore the ways in which essentialism is 
deployed within discourse, and to interrogate its origins, purposes and textual effects 
(Fuss, 1989: xi). 
In order to make sense of her ambiguous physicality Robyn draws on both biological 
and social essentialisms. She explains that, although she never felt like 'one of the 
boys', he could compete successfully with other men, in sport, in the army, and also 
through the acquisition of technical knowledge and in gaining promotion at work. In 
Robyn's narrative masculinity is associated with a form of social essentialism that is 
based on (social) position - the rugby half back, the army corporal, the senior technical 
officer are her masculine identities - accomplished through competition with others. 
Moreover, biological essentialism underpins this narrative in the sense that an 
unproblematic male biology is accepted as the standard against which male 
competence is measured. Femaleness is also embodied, but rather than being taken for 
granted it is acknowledged in Robyn's experiences of physical and emotional change. 
Similarly, Robyn's decision to change her social gender, and therefore the embodied 
practices associated with doing femininity 'work', are grounded in her biology. The 
different forms of essentialism that underpin Robyn's narratives about maleness, 
femaleness, maSCUlinity and femininity suggest that for Robyn essence is more fluid 
22 Fuss (1989) suggests, for example, that constructionism is dependent upon the 
essentialist/constructionist opposition to do its work. This oppositional relationship is evident in 
essentialist/constructionist debates surrounding 'the natural' and 'the body'. According to Fuss 'the 
essentialist holds that the natural is repressed the by the social, the constructionist maintains that the 
natural is produced by the social' (Fuss, 1989: 3 italics in the original). 'For the essentialist the body 
occupies a pure, pre-social, pre-discursive space' (Fuss, 1989: 5). For the constructionist the body is 
produced through socially and politically situated systems of representation. Further, to say that the body 
or the natural are socially produced is not to preclude essentialism entirely because there are forms of 
social essentialism. Fuss suggests that it might be necessary to look at how essence can change and how 
constuctionism may be normative (Fuss, 1989: 5-6) Robyn's story provides an opportunity to explore these 
ambivalences. 
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than perhaps some feminist theorists have generally allowed.z3 In Robyn's narrative 
essence IS both fluid and fixed, continuous and discontinuous, embodied and 
constituted through language. Essence is continuous in the sense that Robyn's 
identities as male and as female are based on sets of general understandings about 
biology and the social/psychological practices associated with gendered subject 
positions. At the same time, Robyn's experience of essence is discontinuous in the sense 
that s/he is able to constitute and re-constitute his/her identity as male and as female. 
Some feminist criticisms of male-to-female transsexuals as 'artificial' women tend to 
be based on an implied assumption that genetic women are 'natural' and that female 
biology is unproblematic (Raymond, 1980; Grosz, 1994; Hausman, 1995). Bernice 
Hausman (1995: 139-140) for example, suggests that female sUbjectivities crafted 
through the use of medical technologies, such as hormones or surgery, are less 
legitimate than other forms of sUbjectivity crafted by women without the use of these 
technologies. In this sense Hausman's argument is underpinned by a form of biological 
essentialism that locates identity in the 'natural' (i.e. pre-medically-enhanced) 
physiological body. This argument problematically suggests that socially constructed 
subjectivities are more natural than technologically constructed subjectivities (Garber, 
1993: 334). Robyn is able to ground her female identity in her biology. However, 
Robyn's decision to change her social gender late in life, her use of medical 
technologies to maintain her gender identity, her involvement in the transgender 
community in order to access the support and knowledges about transitioning across 
gender from people who identify as transsexual, and the secrecy surrounding her 
intersexuality, places her experiences at odds with some feminist writers who argue 
that female gender identities are made through the experience of occupying the social 
position of woman for a lifetime (Grosz, 1994: 207; Lienert, 1995). 
Robyn's and Nick's stories pointedly illustrate the way in which biology does not 
exist outside of culture but is instead a social discourse that is open, shifting and 
contingent (Haraway, 1991: 134). Robyn provides an account of her relationship with 
the medical professionals associated with her case. The narrative builds to the 
dramatic moment in which she describes her visit to the local hospital and recounts the 
23 See Grosz, (1994) and Vance (1992) for examples of feminist discussions of essentialism that tend to 
emphasise 'fixity' over strategic use. 
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conversation that reveals the results of her tests, and therefore, her diagnosis as a 
woman. She describes the preferred option presented to her during that conversation 
with her doctors; one in which all vestiges of her female biology are surgically 
removed. Robyn asks if there is an alternative, and the doctors confirm that they could 
use male hormones to keep him the way he is. 
The narrative that is not emphasised in Robyn's story about his conversation with 
the doctors is his diagnosis as a hermaphrodite. Instead Robyn tells a story about how 
the doctors informed him that he was a "girl". It is impossible to know if Robyn would 
tell a different story about that conversation if he had been able/chosen to remain a 
man. However, if we accept Robyn's version of events some interesting contradictions 
emerge. The first is the use of biology to interpret social gender, and the second is the 
use of social gender to interpret biology. In each case neither strategy is clear cut; both 
work together in complex and interrelated ways. Concerning the use of biology to 
interpret social gender, at the point of diagnosis, despite his external male genitalia, 
social gender and familial relationships as son and father, the medical professionals 
told Robyn that he was a 'girl'. One reading of this narrative is that as the accident had 
left Robyn unable to function sexually as a man, and as the hormonal balance in his 
body shifted towards that of a woman, Robyn no-longer unambiguously occupied his 
own and the doctor's medical definition of male. If Robyn was not male then only one 
acceptable possibility remained: that Robyn was female. Hence the doctors presented 
to Robyn the idea, and therefore the possibility, that he was, or could become, 'a girl'. 
Moreover, this assumption is based on a form of essentialism that locates the potential 
for Robyn to assume a female gender identity in her physiology. In this interpretation 
of Robyn's story gender relations are restored to the stark simplicity of biology. Robyn's 
narrative is illustrative of way in which biological essentialisms are socially 
constructed. Her account speaks to the particular understandings about the 
relationship between biology, sexual orientation and social gender of the actors 
involved in the story. At the point of diagnosis, both Robyn and the doctors explain 
Robyn's latent female identity in terms of her female physiology. His male identity is 
located in the assumed heterosexuality associated with his interest in girls, his male 
genitals and history of living as a male. 
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Another twist on the theme of essentialism in Robyn's narrative is the use of social 
gender to interpret biology. Faced with the uncertainty associated with Robyn's 
ambiguous biology the doctors initially revert to a form of social essentialism that 
attempts to define Robyn's biological identity in terms of his sexual orientation and his 
social gender. Specifically, Robyn's female biology is downplayed in favour of his 
personal history of living as a male and the psychiatrist's confirmation of Robyn's 
heterosexuality by his 'interest in girls'. Instead of surgery to remove his female 
anatomy, Robyn is prescribed hormones to ensure that he stays male. Robyn's body 
however, resists medical attempts to discipline and control his problematic female 
biology. Health problems associated with using male hormones to maintain his male 
body, and therefore male gender identity, means that in order to continue along this 
path Robyn will eventually be forced to have major surgery. His body stubbornly 
continues to feminise in such a way that over time Robyn comes to redefine his social 
gender in terms of his female biology. Robyn's ambiguous body becomes the catalyst 
for his eventual decision to move from one gender into the other - a strategy that has 
recourse to biological essentialism. Again medical professionals defer to her chosen 
social gender in order to interpret her ambiguous biology. Robyn is presented with a 
second option, one in which she sheds all of the vestiges of her masculinity and her 
male biology - which is in some ways a symbolic gesture given her personal history of 
living as a man. For the second time Robyn refuses the medical professionals offer to 
rectify her problematic biology surgically. 
The discourses and practices of the medical professionals associated with Robyn's 
case aim at producing a standardised body; one in which biological ambiguity is 
removed. Medicine provides the institutional support for the formation and 
attachment of certain sexed identities to particular bodies. Robyn's story suggests that 
these identities are based on (hetero)normative ideals about the relationship between 
sex, gender and sexual orientation (Epstein, 1990; Fausto-Sterling, 1993; Hausman, 
1995; Chase, 1998; Dreger, 1998). The clinicians associated with Robyn's case 
operate within a framework of "scientific progress", decisive clinical action and 
professional autonomy. Genetics and medical imaging technologies allow the medical 
professionals to read Robyn's body differently to the usual external signifiers of 
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biological sex.24 In attempting to ascertain Robyn's sexed identity, the doctors attend 
not only to Robyn's genital morphology, hormonal, chromosomal and gonadal markers 
of sex, but also to his/her biography, sexual orientation and social gender. As Robyn's 
biological markers of sex fragmented, gender identity as a social/psychological concept 
replaced his/her physiology as the basis for interpreting Robyn's ambiguous biology. 
Instead of defining and specifying the relationship between sex and gender, Robyn's 
story illustrates the ways in which medical discourses and practices blur the categories 
and boundaries of physiological gender determination (Garber, 1992: 106). 
As there is no undisputed medical definition of male or female (Hausman, 1992; 
Garber, 1992) Robyn's story illustrates how medical professionals associated with 
his/her case conceptualise the relationship between biology, sexual orientation and 
social gender. Moreover, the medical professionals' responses to Robyn's 'marginal' 
status provides a unique insight into the sets of understandings about sex and gender 
within medicine that may be applied by medical professionals to all of us. Robyn's 
biology does not fit with the medical professionals' understandings about binary 
notions of sex and gender. Distinctions between sex and gender are based on 
assumptions that the boundaries constituting male and female, masculinity and 
femininity, are fixed and unambiguous. Binary notions of sex and gender obscure 
rather than clarify the way in which these discourses and practices are applied to the 
body. In Robyn's story the boundaries between biology and social gender are blurred. 
His/her story suggests that in cases where biological sex is unclear medical definitions 
of sex and gender are discursively constructed rather than grounded in any obvious 
and unambiguous differences between the sexes. 
The medical discourses and practices surrounding transsexualism draw on 
contradictory understandings of gender as both based in corporeality (endocrinology 
and physiology) and in the way identities are learned through socialisation and 
signalled through gender-marked behaviours and appearances. The reinterpretation 
and resignification of gender within medicine and psychology is complemented by 
philosophical theories about the historical discontinuity of gender categories (see Riley, 
1988; Butler, 1993). Discontinuities within medical definitions of sexual difference 
suggest that gender identities are historically unstable and contested through discursive 
24 See Cameron (1996) for a discussion about the 'sex-testing' of female Olympic athletes. Cameron 
outlines the way that this test privileges genetics over anatomy and social gender. 
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formations such as those associated with medicine, legal and state regulations based on 
common understandings about sexual difference, and public narratives associated with 
masculinity and femininity. 
The naturalistic view of biological sex neglects the fact that sex and gender are 
socially situated categories that may be understood only in relation to other social facts. 
Biology is not external to society; it continues to be one of the major strategies of social 
differentiation which a naturalistic view of anatomical sex invariably obscures. A 
study of transgender embodiment provides a unique vantage point from which to 
examine why gender categories have proved so enduring and so persuasive. Robyn's 
life history is one person's story, but it is also a story about the medicalisation of sex 
and gender and it is also a story about the sociallinstitutional expectations associated 
with particular gender identities. 
Resisting conclusions 
Robyn's story is interesting because it brings together many of the questions that any 
sociologist doing an analysis of sex and gender would want to explore. Her story 
speaks to the relationship between biological essentialism, social essentialism and 
niedical power/knowledge. It is a story in which gender fluidity, multiple identities, 
contradiction, ambiguity and uncertainty are central themes. It contains talk about 
how personhood is defined in relation to sex and gender, it explores the difficulties 
associated with keeping a particular narrative of identity going, and it looks at how 
individuals who have 'transgendered' bodies craft themselves in the practices of 
everyday life. It is perhaps ironic that this story, which clearly illustrates the ways in 
which gender, sexual difference and sexuality are socially constructed is so deeply 
embodied. Robyn's experiences point to the way that the body impacts on the 
discursive positioning of sUbjects. Her ambiguous anatomy and the (re)inscription of 
Robyn's body as female through medical diagnosis all interact to position and 
reposition Robyn in the 'field' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 94, 101) in which 
gender relations are constituted. Her embodied experiences bring to light the limits of 
that 'field', the gaps or asymmetries between the meanings about sexual difference that 
are active in the field, its underlying (linguistic) structures and its rules and conditions 
for acceptance. 
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Robyn's narrative also demonstrates the way that life histories require a 'language 
game' that is organised around the use of past and present and 'then' and 'now'. 
Conventional understandings about life histories suggest that they are cumulative or 
progressive explanations about how we arrive at certain points in our lives set in the 
context of reflections on how those moments are determined by earlier life events. Life 
histories then, explore how the past influences the present by using the present to 
reflect on the past. The use of the 'now' to reflect on the 'then' is often taken for 
granted in the (re)presentation of a life history narrative. In Robyn's case this process is 
an overt part of the narrative itself. A good example of this play on 'then' and 'now' 
was provided in Robyn's use of his/her new knowledges about his/her body to 
consciously reinterpret her masculine past and to construct a new feminine identity for 
herself. At a particular point in her life, Robyn gained certain knowledges that enabled 
her to look at her past experiences, and her/self, in a new light. Robyn's life history 
also told a story about how the present enabled her to craft new stories about his/her 
past. 
For sociologists, Robyn's story raIses a more fundamental question than that 
concerning the relationship between sexual difference and gender, namely how do we 
as sociologists write about, interpret and understand the groups of people we choose to 
study? While my research is about people who identify as transgendered or as 
transsexual, the very act of naming my research topic also makes it problematic. As 
with any research involving groups of people who are identified by, and may in turn 
identify with, a unitary category it seems that the very process of doing research 
ensures that the collective group disappears into a variety of disparate individuals 
whose very diversity problematises the category under investigation; it is in short a 
problem of definition. Recognition of this disjuncture between the characteristics of 
individuals and the groups with which they identify is not new - it was noted in 
Botanski's (1987: 27-29) study of 'cadres' who are middle class French engineers. 
Feminists have also argued convincingly that the category "woman" is so diverse as to 
be unrepresentable (Butler, 1990: 1-6 and 142-143; also see: Riley 1988; Scott 1992; 
Barrett 1992, for example). 
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Robyn's story illustrates the many contradictions associated with the use of identity 
categories. In her story the identity categories typically associated with gender, and 
with transsexualism, are simultaneously fixed and fluid, strategic and given, forced 
and chosen. Robyn describes herself as a biological female, she claims a social identity 
as a woman, and yet she has a personal history of understanding herself as a biological 
male and of constructing her identity as a man. She suggests that her current situation 
is unintentional, even forced. However, she says that she chose to alter her social 
gender to that of a woman - but she retains her male social identities as son and father. 
Robyn's biology and her personal history problematises the very categories with which 
she identifies. At the same time, Robyn crafts her identities in relation to these 
categories as if the categories themselves are fixed and unambiguous. Robyn's life 
history illustrates the ways in which identity categories are not homogeneous and 
unvarying, but instead are diverse and unstable in ways that make them singularly 
unrepresentable. This is indicated in the difficulty of finding the 'right' pronoun to 
represent Robyn. In other words, Robyn's identities, as male or as female or as 
transsexual, appear to be determined neither by biology, nor by the social practices 
associated with gender, but by the existence of the categories with which she identifies . 
. At the same time individuals like Robyn or Nick craft their identities as men, as 
women, or as transsexual in ways that take the existence of these groups for granted. 
The information provided by informants often problematised the social groups with 
which they identified.z5 Robyn's experiences challenge fundamental modernist 
assumptions that the binary oppositions constituting male/female, 
masculine/feminine, nature/culture are naturally determined. At the same time 
Robyn's use of hormones, and attention to the possibilities associated with sex 
reassignment surgery, reinforce the notion that challenges to conventional masculinity 
and femininity have to be associated with changing the physiological make-up of the 
body. Robyn challenges categorisation, but maintains the association of bodies with 
behaviours and thus notions of the relation between physiological and social 
categories. Rather than being an exception to binary notions of gender, Robyn's story 
clearly illustrates how gender identities come to codified, constructed and crafted in 
the everyday practices of individuals. 
25 These issues are taken up again in Chapter Nine where I explore connections and differences in the 
inner city Sydney transgender community. 
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The next chapter also explores the doing and undoing of (trans)gender identities 
through the story of transgender performance artist and well known political activist 
Norrie May Welby. Welby's narrative about performing gender and crafting identities 
provides an opportunity to explore post-structuralist theories about subjectivity in 
general and Pierre Bourdieu's arguments about habitus (1990) and field (1992) and 
Judith Butler's (1990, 1993) views about performativity in particular. Welby's story is 
in stark contrast to the very private story told by Robyn. 
All the world's a stage: 
Performing transgender subjectivities 
Norrie May Welby's story 
Stand by your gender1 
(Sung to the tune of 'Stand by Your Man') 
Sometimes it is hard to be a woman 
Proving to the world you are not a man 
For it is a sad sin 
If you don't fit in 
Though you'll do everything you can 
(like cut and paste birth certificates) 
Sometimes it's hard to be a woman 
Sometimes it's hard to be a man 
Sometimes it is not fun 
Deciding which one you are 
Or which you want to ram 
Stand by your gender 
And show the world you conform 
Don't tell the world that it's wrong 
Or you'll be cold and lonely 
Stand by your gender 
Make sure you got the right one 
Live life according to God's plan 
Stand by your gender 
Stand by your gender 
Make sure you've only got one 
Keep being half of all you can 
Baby, (or mate as the case may be) 
Stand by your gender 
Extract from the performance piece "What Makes a Man?" 
1 Reproduced with permission from Norrie May Welby. The lyrics are the property of Norrie May Welby 
and may not be reproduced or performed without his/her permission. 
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Introduction 
The prevIOus chapter explored how Robyn attempted to craft a female/feminine 
identity while occupying a body that confounds conventional discourses associated with 
gender and sexual difference. In this chapter I consider the ways in which 
performance artist and transgender political activist, Norrie May Welby, uses drama 
and song to trouble binary gender categories and the social codes by which they are 
legitimated. While Welby acknowledges that gender is performance, the body is a 
central feature of both his/her talk about the performance and the actual performance 
itself. The success of Welby's performance is dependent upon his/her having a 
particular type of body - one that contains traces of both male and female, masculinity 
and femininity.z Welby uses performance to speak about the body and to suggest ways 
of being in the world that use both social constructionist and essentialist approaches to 
the body. Norrie May's post-structuralist account of gender, as multiple, fluid, shifting, 
contingent and contradictory, also rests on a notion of an embodied choosing subject. I 
argue that it is through the talk of people for whom contemporary understandings of 
sex and gender are 'problematic' that we are able to access the tacit social agreements 
that are embodied in individual everyday performances of gender. The chapter draws 
on observation of his/her performance and Welby's discussion of this performance and 
how s/he manages an ambiguous gender identity in his/her daily life. 
Analysis of Welby's performance and the talk about sex and gender draws on the 
sociological concepts of 'habitus (Bourdieu, 1990) and field (Bourdieu and Wac quant, 
1992) and Butler's (1990, 1993, 1997) arguments about performativity. I understand 
Bourdieu's notion of habitus as institutionalised, routinised practices; the processes by 
which norms are authorised, incorporated and reproduced in the everyday social 
actions of bodies. Bourdieu's 'fields' are constituted through shifting and contingent 
relational networks of power (Calhoun, 1993: 64; Pringle, 1998: 22). Social fields 
include the actors and institutions that occupy the different social positions - and 
engage in struggles over control of and access to the political, economic, cultural, social 
and symbolic resources5 - that are available within a given field (Jenkins, 1992: 84-85; 
2 Aalten (1997: 52) also observes that 'masculinity and femininity can be seen as enacted through the 
bodies of male and female dancers'. Moreover, female ballet dancers are selected on the basis of their 
physical size and deportment - in other words, a professional ballerina also has to have a particular type 
of body. 
3 For Bourdieu economic capital refers to money, cultural capital refers to qualifications, social capital 
refers to networks and social connections and symbolic capital refers to 'the form the different types of 
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Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Pringle, 1998: 22; McNay, 1999: 100). Bourdieu's 
attention to ordinary bodily practices is in contrast to Butler's focus on the subversive or 
disruptive potential of the performative. For Butler a focus on the normative 
conventions of action, exemplified in Bourdieu's concept of the habitus, fails to account 
for performances that confound the norms by which social conventions are authorised, 
institutionalised and regulated. Butler suggests that unauthorised performances, or 
speech acts, involve a break from prior usage associated with routinised practices or 
ordinary locutions. Norrie May Welby's talk about transgender performance provides 
an opportunity to examine the transformative potential of unauthorised gender 
performances/ speech acts. I suggest that such performances do not involve a radical 
break with prior conventions; rather they engage with those conventions in order to 
expose prevailing forms of authority and the exclusions by which they are legitimated. 
In this regard, transgender performance simultaneously embodies traces of the unruly 
associated with incoherent gender identities and the normative associated with 
conventional gender identities. In this respect it traverses the agendas addressed by 
both Bourdieu and Butler. 
Gender as performance 
NMW: In performing gender I don't want to give them answers, I just want to make them ask questions ... or 
to -see that there are questions there. Like I can do a number "What Makes a Man?" I begin as a drag queen 
and then strip down and take off the drag, take off the knickers. Underneath the knickers I've got this sh'ap-
on, take off the strap-on4, put on men's h'ousers. Take the stuffing out of the bra, take off the bra, suddenly 
I've got breasts, quickly put a male shirt on and change my body. I've actually done that number totally 
naked all the way through and done it just with body posture, changing my gender back and forth. The way I 
hold my body, and in that song the way I do my voice, and so I demonstrate that gender is performance, 
which can be done naked. I can convince people I'm a man with a naked body, I can convince them I'm a 
woman with a naked body. It is performance, cultural clues that they pick up, and when I demonstrate it by 
switching back and forth, they have to question, even if they go: "This person is naked and I don't know what 
sex they are", it is an important question. 
SF: You are velY much playing around with gender fluidity and questiom'ng people's assumptions about 
gender and its association with the anatomical body. So those techniques) both in terms of the way you use 
your body and in the words to the sonS? it actually forces people to address those issues. 
NMW: I always aim to do it with humour, because when people are laughing they are not on guard, so for a 
moment their policing of self, their policing of their beliefs is relaxed and you have got a good chance of 
getting through to them. I think it is very important for any fundamental education, when someone 
challenges something that someone's fundamental beliefs is, to be entertaining. Because if they are sitting 
there with a prune face and the people around them are laughing their heads off, they will get that they are 
the ones with the problem. 
capital take once they are perceived and recognised as legitimate' (Bourdieu, 1987: 3-4 cited in Calhoun, 
1993: 70). 
4 'Strap-on' refers to a fake penis or a 'dildo' commonly used by female-to-male transsexuals (and 
sometimes lesbians) for penetrative sexual intercourse. 
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SF: That is ve1Y much part of the dynamics of being an audience member. But there is always the chance 
that by doing something that is so off the waIJ you actually make the thing that you are criticising almost, lin 
reluctant to use the WOJ1:~ but almost n01ma!. So that is my concenl about radical peJi'onnance. 
NMW: People will interpret things how they interpret them, I mean I am not responsible for the individual 
audience reaction. When I do "What Makes A Man?" I leave the audience having sighted the drag queen 
and having been naked, as a man. I leave as a man, with man's shirt, man's trousers, and body language, 
which I do very consciously and walk out through the audience so that I'm walking and moving as a man, 
and some of them come up to me afterwards and they are convinced I'm a man because that is the last image 
I left them with. But still they have seen the body differently, they see me perform female, they have seen the 
body look female, so that question must still be lodged there somewhere deep in their subconscious. Even if 
they the!'l slap a gender on me. 
In the performance piece "What Makes a Man?" Norrie May Welby describes the 
way gender is performed through body posture, movement and voice. Welby begins 
the piece as a male impersonating a female. Femininity is signified through decoration, 
voice and body movements. S/he strips off the drag revealing a body that has no penis 
and female breasts. Welby's corporeality signifies femaleness introducing a double 
cross-dressing to the beginning of the performance - one in which a female 
impersonates a male impersonating a female. Welby then proceeds to dress this 'female' 
body in men's clothing at the same time signifying masculinity through male body 
movements, voice and speech patterns. It is a performance that is about the 
performativity of gender. For the social theorist it represents an ironic doubling (or 
perhaps even parody) of Judith Butler's (1990, 1993, 1997) theory of the performative. 
Butler (1990: 24-25) argues that gender and the gendered subject are not pre-given 
entities. Instead, gender and SUbjectivity are continually constituted and reconstituted 
in the very moment that gender identities are performed. Butler argues that '[tjhere is 
no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively 
constituted by the very "expressions" that are said to be its results' (Butler, 1990: 25). 
How gender is done in the everyday practices of individuals is 'compelled by the 
regulatory practices of gender coherence' (Butler, 1990: 24). The regulatory practices 
associated with binary gender categories are maintained through lines of connection 
between bodies, genders and (hetero) sexuality; she terms this triad 'the heterosexual 
matrix' (Butler, 1990: 5). Heterosexual desire requires and reproduces discrete 
oppositions between male and female, masculinity and femininity (Butler, 1990: 17). 
Historical and cultural variation within gender categories are the discursive/cultural 
means by which 'sexed nature' or a 'natural sex' is produced (Butler, 1990: 7),5 Rather 
than conceiving of gender as that which overlays 'natural' biological differentiation, 
5 Thomas Laqueur's (1987, 1990) discussion of the cultural construction of the sexed body is outlined in 
Chapters Two and Seven. 
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Butler asserts that these assumed 'prediscursive' differences are cultural constructions. 
Transgendered bodies and performances disrupt assumptions about the continuity 
between sexed bodies, culturally constructed genders and heterosexuality. Judith 
Butler, for example, argues that drag is not an imitation of a prior and original gender; 
instead it demonstrates that both 'drag' and 'gender' are performatively constituted: 
In imitating gendeI) drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender 
itself - as well as its contingency (Butler, 1990: 137 italics in the original) 
Drag is subversive to the extent that it reflects on the imitative structure by 
which hegemonic gender is itself produced and disputes heterosexuality's claim 
on naturalness and originality (Butler, 1993: 125). 
It is significant that Welby opens his/her act as a drag queen. The drag queen is a 
familiar cultural trope in which a sexualised, hyper-femininity is understood as a 
facade. During the performance different male and female characters are introduced. 
Once audience members become acquainted with these characters, another layer of 
imitation is revealed. In the performance both drag and gender are overtly presented as 
an imitation that troubles the authenticity of the gender that is being imitated. Norrie 
May Welby is a thinking subject who uses drama to appropriate and subvert dominant 
identities in order to challenge them. This critically reflexive subject, who reads, 
engages with and uses performativity theory subversively, is not anticipated in Butler's 
theory of the performative (Allen, 1998: 466-467; Nelson, 1999). While agency has its 
origins in the subject; it is not the intentional liberal humanist subject who enables 
action (Butler, 1990: 144-147; 1997: 7). Instead, agency is constructed and enabled in 
and through 'unpredictable' and 'inadvertent' variations in the practices of repetition 
(Nelson, 1999: 343). It is in these slippages that new and subversive possibilities for the 
expression of gender may be produced. Norrie May Welby indicates that s/he has an 
awareness of how (gendered) agency is constituted in discourse and in his/her own 
performances of gender. It is through Welby's talk about performing gender that the 
relationships between agency, embodiment and performativity are explored in this 
chapter. 
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Habitus, field and performativity 
Sociological analyses of performativity focus on action In relation to the social 
dimensions of cultural production - the actual embodied doing of the social. According 
to this view, performance is part of everyday life; it is a way of generating meaning 
through embodied processes and practices (Smith, 1990). For Pierre Bourdieu these 
embodied processes and practices are part of the 'habitus (Bourdieu, 1977, 1992). 
Butler (1997: 152) usefully describes the habitus as 'those embodied rituals of 
everydayness by which a given culture produces and sustains belief in its own 
"obviousness"'. Bourdieu's (1977,1990; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) theory of the 
habitus emphasises the reproduction of the social through routinised practices that are 
structured and organised within the social fields in which people are embedded. While 
habitus is structured by what Bourdieu refers to as 'the field' - the networks, meanings, 
rules and institutions that constitute social identities - the social actor's perceptions of 
the field are provided by the habitus (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 127). Gender, 
for example, is produced within the individual through primary socialisation into codes 
of masculinity and femininity. These codes are provided by the fields in which gender 
relations are embedded. 
The field is elusive, and in ordinary interaction gendered practices are taken-for-
granted. Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant; 1992: 1(8) argues that hidden structures 
of domination produce identities/people. He explores the subtle processes whereby 
'cultural values' are 'made body' (Bourdieu, 1977: 94). Drawing on Goffman, 
Bourdieu argues that corporeality inscribes and is in turn inscribed by the political 
oppositions between males and females 'which organize the whole system of values 
(that) reappear, for example, in the gestures and movements of the body ... '. (Bourdieu, 
1977: 94). 'Bodily hexis' (Bourdieu, 1977: 93-94) refers to the routinised 
performances embodied in the way in which people dress, stand, speak, think and feel. 
The habitus in this view is 'the social made body' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 
127). Butler's arguments about the disruptive potential of the performative may be read 
as a critique of Bourdieu's concept of the habitus as routinised practices. Butler's 
attention to a habitus that is structured within 'the conventional games of the social 
field' (Butler, 1997: 154) leads her to argue that 'Bourdieu fails to take account of the 
way in which a performative can break with existing contexts, refiguring the terms of 
legitimate utterance themselves' (Butler, 1997: 150). I argue that the field is precisely 
the site where these contests over meaning are in play. 
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Bourdieu's (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 97) concept of the field encompasses 
the social conditions that organise and legitimate particular social! gender identities 
and social! gendered practices. Perceptions of the field and the codes that it sustains are 
provided by the habitus - the way in which people do masculinity and femininity in 
everyday interaction. In this view both habitus and field are interactive (McNay, 1999: 
100) - comprised of 'objective relations' that 'exist independently of individual 
consciousness or will' (Bourdieu, 1990: 56; Bourdieu and Wac quant, 1992: 96-97). 
The limits and boundaries of the field are marked by institutionalised exclusions that 
are defined by the field itself. These exclusions, which mayor may not be formally 
written into law, are potential sites for political action and change. As a result, the 
boundaries of the field are always contestable. At each moment it is the state of relations 
between actors and institutions that define the structure of the field (Bourdieu and 
Wac quant, 1992: 99). The field is dynamic - a place of struggle and therefore a site of 
potential disruption and change (Bourdieu and Wac quant, 1992: 101-102). 
Norrie May Welby's performance brings together three fields - art, gender and 
transgender politics - in order to draw attention to how the social codes of gender are 
regulated through institutionalised forms and reproduced in everyday interaction. 
Practices that are intelligible within the field are juxtaposed against those that are not, 
drawing attention to where the limits of the field are located. Forms of 'bodily hexis' -
dress, voice, gestures and movements of the body - are used to contest the political 
oppositions between male and female. Signifiers of masculinity and femininity move in 
and 'out of phase' with the anatomical body, drawing attention to the bodily practices 
that are sanctioned within the fields that organise contemporary gender relations. 
Social conventions surrounding gender suggest, for example, that it is not possible to 
have a male voice, posture and body movements, breasts and an absent penis. 
Performances of gender that are positively sanctioned (masculine men and feminine 
women) and those that are not (effeminate men) also illustrate the forms of symbolic 
capital6 that operate within the field (Krais, 1993: 170-171). Actors are defined by the 
field, but they may also transform partly, or completely, the rules/configuration of the 
relations of force/meanings that make up the field (Bourdieu and Wac quant, 1992: 
99). Welby is defined by the field, but his/her stage performance also troubles the 
6 Symbolic capital in this context refers to reputation, prestige and social honour. This could be 
interpreted as 'social status'. Status is often associated with political entitlement and legal location within 
civil society. But status also incorporates the idea of style. Social status involves cultural practices that 
emphasise and exhibit distinction and differences such as those involving dress, speech, outlook and 
bodily dispositions (Jenkins, 1992: 130). 
106 
meanings about sex and gender that make up the field. In the naked version of his/her 
performance Welby suggests s/he is able to convincingly present her/him -self as male 
(a man without a penis) or female (a woman with a vagina). In this example, Welby 
uses his/her body to draw attention to the fields through which gender is inscribed on 
the body and institutionalised as naturalised difference. My reading of Bourdieu is that 
habitus and field are constantly in play, and as such, transformations in the field may 
also effect changes in the habitus. 
In Chapter Two I argued that stories, contexts and bodies are important to the 
representation of a gendered self. Gender, and the gendered subject, achieve their 
stability and coherence through the combination of a series of embodied repetitions of 
gender norms (Butler, 1990: 145; Nelson, 1999: 331,338). As a result, the contingent 
and constructed nature of gender may be illustrated through slippages in the stylized 
repetition of gendered practices (Butler, 1990: 140). Bourdieu (1990: 57-58) also 
suggests that when bodily practices match the habitus an illusion of 'durability' and 
'universality' is produced. The habitus is most visible in bodily practices that are 'out of 
phase' with the social conditions in which they were produced (Bourdieu, 1990: 62-
63). Welby suggests that he initially changed gender because he encountered resistance 
to being a 'feminine male': 
My motive in changing gender in the first place was to have the power to express 
myself without this bullshit. And I initially found that I couldn't do that as a male 
behaving femininely, as someone that was more female behaving femininely I had 
permission to be myself that was the power. And then I grew and evolved and 
really took on board feminism and practically that meant I started to act in ways 
that were labelled androgynous, and I've claimed that power too. 
Norrie May Welby, 1997 
A 'feminine male' is incompatible with the limited range of embodied dispositions 
that are intelligible within the gendered social field. Welby changed his gender so that 
his behaviour was no longer 'out of phase' with the habitus. His/her narrative 
illustrates the forms of gendered symbolic capital that operate within this particular 
field. A male behaving femininely has less symbolic capital than a female behaving 
femininely. Exposure to feminist theory enabled Welby to understand how social 
practices are regulated through the construction of sex, gender and heterosexuality as 
normative. Welby states, for example, later in the interview that as a woman s/he 
found that "gender play is not flattering, even if it reinforces your (female) gender 
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identity, because gender in our society is a power relationship". For Welby, taking on 
an androgynous identity is a way to both escape and challenge this power relationship. 
Bricolage and stage(d) performances 
The social meaning(s) attached to Welby's stage performance are dependent upon the 
way s/he is positioned by self and other in and through the performance. Welby is 
located in and locates him/her -self in subject positions that are in turn embedded in 
historically and culturally specific understandings about the social structures and 
expectations associated with those positions. Man and woman are already constructed 
categories; cross-gendered performances critique gender representations that are already 
encoded in a system of signification (Garber, 1998[1992]: 181). The transgender 
performer is both a 'signifier and that which signifies the undecidability of signification' 
(Garber, 1998 [1992]: 179). Welby's performance, for example, embodies and enacts a 
slippage from sex to gender, male to female, maSCUlinity to femininity. In doing so, it 
demonsh'ates how inclusion in one category is dependent upon exclusion from its opposite 
(Garber, 1998 [1992]: 179). As a result, Welby's transgender performance draws on both 
authorised and unauthorised gender conventions. It does not involve a radical break with 
prior conventions; rather the subversive meanings associated with Norrie May Welby's 
gender performances are dependent upon differences that are defined in relation to the 
traditional and the ordinary. In this regard, transgender performance is both subversive 
and conventionaL 
Queer/transgender performance involves the simultaneous production and 
SUbjugation of subjects through creating a 'space in which norms about gender are 
mimed, reworked, resignified' (Butler, 1993: 124-125).7 People who transition across 
binary gender categories may be viewed as bricoleurs (Levi-Strauss, 1966; Hebdige, 
1979: 103-106) who improvise in constructing their narrative identities out of public 
discourses of sex and gender. Drawing on Roland Barthes' (1982 [1956]: 100-102) 
arguments about signifier, signified and sign, Hebdige (1979: 106) describes bricolage 
as the 'juxtaposition of two apparently incompatible realities in order to disrupt and 
reorganise meaning'. Bricolage is the process of changing or subverting the role of an 
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object in order to convey a different meaning. Welby's performance appropriates 
objects typically associated with one gender and reassembles them in order to disrupt or 
challenge categories of sexual difference. This bricolage is made possible by the 
creation of the space in which the transgender performance is located. 
In Welby's performance the body is the object, sIgn and subject of subversive 
appropriation. Artifacts associated with masculinity and femininity, and ideas about 
sexual difference, are also brought into service as props for this performance. Corporeality 
is used to draw attention to the ordering of nature and the ordering of society and in the 
process new meanings about this relationship are produced. Welby's performance is 
aimed at the subversion of common sense in order to trouble oppositional categories 
through a celebration of the abnormal and forbidden (Hebdige, 1979: 104-105). In 
Norrie May Welby's stage performance gender is presented as an imitation that troubles 
the authenticity ofthe gender that is being imitated (Dean, 1993: 2). Welby suggests that 
movement and the appearance of the body provides 'cultural clues' as to the shifting 
gender identity of the performer. The performance works because Welby's sex is 
uncertain. But gender also becomes an illusion cobbled together through signs and 
references, the meanings of which shift throughout the performance. The performance is 
ingenious because Welby simultaneously disrupts biology, gender and representation, 
leaving the audience with no stable referent. It is a performance that would not be possible 
if gender was simply a set of objective relations that exist independently of 'individual 
consciousness or will' (Bourdieu, 1990: 56). It is also a performance that is deliberate and 
strategic rather than the result of an 'accidental' slippage in the regulatory practices of 
gender coherence (Butler, 1990: 24). In this regard Welby's stage performance extends 
both the habitus and Butler's theories about the performative. 
During Welby's stage performance, identities are crafted, modified and abandoned 
through actively locating him/her -self in public narratives surrounding sex and gender, 
masculinity and femininity. Welby's cross-gendered performance indicates that subject 
positions are not just discursively produced they are also embodied and spatial. Stage 
7 See Gregson and Rose (2000) for a discussion of the performative qualities of space. Gregson and Rose 
(2000: 446) argue, for example, that 'performances articulate their own spatialities, as opposed to being 
just located in space'. 
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actors are allowed to violate the social codes surrounding gender and sexuality.8 The 
stage in this view becomes a privileged site of transgression (Garber, 1998 [1992]: 178). 
Welby's h'ansgender performance creates a space in which essentialist ideas about 
identities as coherent, consistent and linear may be disrupted through the presentation of 
selves that are simultaneously interchangeable and transgressive. Welby refers to both 
gender ('I demonstrate that gender is performance') and to sex ('this person is naked and I 
don't know what sex they are'). When the categories of sex and gender are disrupted in 
this way (hetero) sexuality is also called into question. If it is not possible to tell what sex a 
person is, it is no longer possible to make assumptions about their sexuality (or the 
sexuality of their partner). Welby's transgressive performance troubles dualistic 
understandings of gender and at the same time it calls into question the sets of social codes 
by which categories of sex and sexuality are policed and maintained (Garber, 1998 
[1992]: 177). In talking about and doing the performance s/he demonstrates that these 
categories are interchangeable if not equivalent (Butler, 1990; Garber, 1998 [1992]: 
177). Welby troubles the meanings that make up the fields of sexuality and gender. In 
doing so heterosexuality is h'oubled through drawing attention to the social codes of, and 
perceptions about, normative sexuality that operate within the field. 
The slippage from sex (malelfemale) to gender (masculinity/femininity) performer 
to audience in this talk mirrors the slippage between these categories in the 
performance itself. Welby describes his/her performance as one that educates at the 
same time as it entertains. As a result, the audience is not constructed as a passive 
spectator of the performance. The anonymous spectators in Welby's narrative are 
conservative and heterosexual - they may have gender issues but they are not 
'transgendered' according to Welby's use of the term.9 Welby's performance 
encourages the audience to 'read' Welby's body in a number of ways. During the 
performance the sexed body goes through a series of transformations. Does Welby's 
performance denaturalise and subvert the norms associated with sex, gender and 
anatomy? Welby's critical gender performance involves a re-staging of the terms 
through which gender is constructed. Welby uses the habitus, represented in forms of 
'bodily hexis', to shift the covert assumptions and meanings within the field in which 
8 In Elizabethan England, for example, the stage was exempt from the sumptuary laws that dictated dress 
codes for class and gender (Garber, 1998 [1992]: 178). 
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gender relations are constituted. S/he takes up and disrupts commonsense 
understandings about the relationship between anatomy and social gender. Through 
juxtaposing unintelligible gender performances with intelligible ones s/he draws 
attention to the institutionalisation of gender and heterosexuality in routinised bodily 
practices. The performance, however, may acquire new meamngs and/ or 
interpretations that are not intended by the performer. Welby talks about how s/he is 
constituted by discourses about sexual difference by the (male) gender that people use 
to address 'him' after the performance. Transgender performance is caught in this 
tension between appropriation, subversion, and reinscription through hegemonic 
understandings about the relationship between sex and gender. 
Welby draws attention to the body as the instrument through which public 
narratives about male and female, masculinity and femininity are enacted. Corporeality 
is used to demonstrate the interchangeability of sex and gender. In doing so s/he 
indicates that these concepts are not mutually exclusive, ahistorical or natural. Butler 
argues that cross-gendered performances, such as drag, trouble 'naturalised' lines of 
connection between biology, gender and sexuality and the social codes by which these 
connections are policed and maintained: 
To claim that all gender is like drag, or is drag, is to suggest that "imitation" is at the 
heart of the heterosexual project and its gender binarisms, that drag is not a 
secondary imitation that presupposes a prior and original gender, but that 
hegemonic heterosexuality is itself a constant and repeated effort to imitate its own 
idealizations (Butler, 1993: 125). 
Butler (1993: 127-128) is critical of radical feminist interpretations of cross-
dressing as offensive because it is based on an imitation that involves ridicule and 
degradation of women. In these feminist critiques male-to-female cross-dressing is 
interpreted only in terms of a misogynistic male homosexuality.lO Butler suggests that 
9 For Welby 'h'ansgender' involves a refusal of gender categories. The assumption here is that the 
majority of people who have 'gender issues' do not question binary gender categories or affirm an 
identity that is in between. 
10 Peggy Phelan (1993: 101) argues that '(g)ay male cross-dressers resistthe body of woman even while 
they make its constructedness visible. This is in part why the misogyny which underlies gay male cross-
dressing is so painful to women' (italics in the original). Jance Raymond (1979: 103-104) equates MTF 
transsexualism with rape. 'Rape, of course, is a masculinist violation of bodily integrity. All transsexuals 
rape women's bodies by reducing the real female form to an artifact, appropriating this body for 
themselves ... Rape, although it is usually done by force, can also be accomplished by deception'. Stone 
(1991:283) claims that The Transsexual Empire is 'still the definitive statement on transsexualism by a 
genetic female academic'. 
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this analysis makes drag about reinscribing the 'heterosexual matrix' at the centre of 
male homosexuality.1 1 The way to oppose the reduction of drag to the misogynistic 
appropriation of women is to call attention to the way it destabilises and denaturalises 
gender and therefore troubles assumptions about the connections between sex, gender 
and (hetero)sexuality (Butler, 1993: 128). Butler cautions that this analysis is tenable 
only as long as there is a rupture between the idealised norm and the performance. 
When this rupture cannot be read into the performance, as in the case of transsexuals 
who successfully pass as women, then the radical potential of drag is subverted (Butler, 
1993: 129). Ki Namaste (199Gb: 188-189) argues that Butler's reduction of drag or 
transsexualism to performances of gender denies the possibility of (essentialist) subject 
positions to people who identify as transgendered. Namaste also suggests that Marjorie 
Garber (1992) reduces the transvestite to a textual figure, denying the possibilities of 
viable transgender identities.1z Sally, a post-operative transsexual and former member of 
Les Girls says that she felt 'degraded' when people refused to acknowledge that 'she' was a 
'real' person: 
We (female-to-male transsexuals and drag queens) are confronting to people, 
confronting to feminists and to females, a lot of men think oh that bloke looks 
beautiful, it must not be a bloke. Particularly with Les Girls you often hear the 
comment "they are more beautiful than real women". On the one hand, that 
might sound good, but it is really degrading because they are really just saying it's 
just drag, you might as well be a mannequin in a store. The way they treat you as 
if you have got no feelings or anything like that because you are not a 'real' person. 
Everything about you is artificial, your eyelashes, your tits and everything else. 
Sally, MTF, 1997 
Sally wants to pursue 'realness' and to be taken seriously as a woman. She is insulted 
by the idea that her whole female persona may be interpreted as inauthentic because 
11 Phelan (1993: 99) for example suggests that 'male cross-dressing makes manifest the psychic structure 
of "traditional heterosexual culture" - which is to say homosocial culture'. Woman is a necessary point 
of tension because she reflects and assures male authority'. 
12 Transgender activists, such as Namaste, associate Butler's ideas about the performativity of gender with 
a form of discrimination that they experience within gay and lesbian communities. Gay and lesbian 
identities are presented as 'natural' prior to performance. Transgender identities are considered to be 
enacted through performances of gender and therefore to be 'unnatural' or 'fake'. Drag performances, for 
example, are often limited to forms of entertainment within gay and lesbian communities. In Sydney 
transgendered people are the showcase for the annual Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras but their contribution is 
not recognised in the title of the festival. These examples underpin issues of power within queer 
communities. As a result, Butler's theories about the performativity of gender, or Garber's textual analysis 
of transsexualism, may be problematic for transgendered people who want to be able to pursue 'realness' or 
'essentialist' identities in the same way that gay and lesbian people are able to in queer spaces. Post-
structuralist theories of identity, in contrast, explore the way that gay, lesbian, trans gender and gender 
identities are not 'natural' or prior to culture but 'performatively constituted'. 
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she dresses as a drag queen and imitates hyper-femininity on stage. Sally makes a 
distinction between imitating gender on stage and doing gender in everyday life. For 
Welby this distinction is blurred. Sally's radical performance on stage destabilises 
gender troubling heterosexual desire ('that bloke looks beautiful, it must not be a 
bloke'). In everyday life this radical potential is lost because Sally is able to pass 
successfully as a woman (although sometimes she strategically claims a transgender 
identity in order to disrupt stereotypes about transsexuals as 'males' who are obviously 
dressed as women). In Sally's world subversion and conformity are part of the same 
game - Sally chooses when, where and how she plays it. 
Welby, unlike Sally, did not confine his/her performances of gender to the stage. 
The politicisation of identity through imitating gender was also a strategy that s/he 
used in everyday locations such as the street or nightclub. In the following narrative 
s/he comments on how people reacted to him/her in social situations when s/he is able 
to be read as a male wearing a dress and behaving femininely. In these situations men 
sometimes react to him/her by performing hyper-masculinity: 
I notice performances of gender, I'm conscious of that point. I notice that a lot 
in tranys (laugh). I notice it particularly were people feel confronted by me 
being very obviously transgender, and will try to, or people, maybe when I'm 
not being obviously transgender, maybe if I'm being more apparently feminine 
and they think they have sprung me as a woman, as a trany, and go: "How are 
you mate". You know when I'm wearing a dress, and they are doing a parody, 
they are doing almost a characterisation of a male role. Like trying to treat me as 
a male and their performance: "Hello man, mateship, mate, blah blah blah". And 
so I parody that right back at them. So even people performing one gender 
perform that in terms of parody very often. 
Norrie May Welby, 1997 
Hyper-masculinity and performances of gender that trouble lines of connection 
between social gender and anatomy expose the social field in which gender relations 
are constructed. Gendered self-parody involves variation on repetitive bodily practices 
that illustrate the performative status of the natural. Parody may also serve to 
consolidate the distinction between naturalised gender configurations and those that 
appear to be a copy. Sally, for example, talked about how she experienced parody as a 
consolidation of 'natural' gender through the association of 'her' with the inauthentic 
and the fake. In this regard, parody may result in the exclusion of marginal genders 
from the territory of the mainstream and the 'real' (Butler, 1990: 146-147). The radical 
potential in parody is located in its disturbing of the very notion of a 'natural sex' or a 
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'real woman'. In this regard, transgender performances trouble essentialist 
understandings of identity in which sex and gender are naturalised as 'universal' and 
'ahistorical' (Butler, 1990: 138). The next section of the chapter explores Welby's talk 
about how s/he performs gender in everyday life. 
The doer behind the deed 
Welby's performance of gender in everyday life, like his/her stage performance, is 
both subversive and conventional. Welby claims a gender identity that is neither gender 
and both genders enabling him/her to trouble the meanings about sex, gender and 
sexuality that make up the social field. Norrie May's post-structuralist account of 
his/her gender as shifting, contingent and contradictory, also incorporates an 
embodied choosing subject. A knowing agentic subject is not a significant feature of 
Butler's (1990, 1993) theories of the performative (Hughes and Witz: 1997: 53; 
Nelson, 1999) and Bourdieu's concept of the habitus. Repetitive and consistent bodily 
practices are the means through which an illusion of universal and durable binary 
gender relations are sustained within the habitus. Bourdieu pays attention to gender 
inflected practices through his observations about the way in which cultural values are 
reflected in the appearance, gestures and movement of the body. For both Bourdieu 
and Butler gendered practices/performances are a product of habit and repetition. 
Therefore, they are practices that are without the forms of conscious thought or agency 
that characterise liberal humanist understandings of action. IS Welby's stage 
performance, and talk about the way bodies, gender, sex and sexuality, are constructed 
and enacted in the everyday world, provides an opportunity to explore intersections 
between performativity theory, 'gender inflected embodiment' and personal lived 
history. I argue that Welby's narratives about sex, gender and sexuality are critical and 
reflexive invoking a post-structuralist understanding of SUbjectivity as partial, unstable 
and contested. At the same time his/her experience of gender is shaped by complex 
historical, social and political processes in which essentialist understandings of identity 
located in the 'natural' pre-discursive body and an embodied choosing Enlightenment 
subject are at play. 
13 Liberal humanist concepts of agency are premised upon a knowing subject who makes rational 
choices, and takes responsibility for those choices based on moral imperatives (Davies, 1991: 42-43; 
Davies, 2000: 166). See chapter six for further discussion of liberal humanist and post-structuralist theories 
of agency. 
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Elizabeth Grosz defines essentialist ideas about gender as the 'attribution of a fixed 
essence to women' (or men) founded in either biological or natural characteristics, 
psychological processes and/or social practices. For Grosz (1995: 47-48) essentialism 
refers to 'the existence of fixed characteristics, given attributes, and ahistorical 
functions that limit the possibilities of change and thus of social reorganisation'. In 
relation to femininity, essentialism refers to a pure untainted 'natural' female essence 
which exists outside of, or prior to, the social. Essentialism is usually defined in terms 
of a fixed set of differences and as such has been positioned in opposition to post-
structuralism (Fuss, 1989: xii, 2). Similarities between habitus and essentialist ideas 
about identity within feminist theory may be identified in relation to how social 
differences between men and women are internalised as forgotten history (Bourdieu, 
1990: 56) or naturalised through stylised repetitions of gendered practices (Butler, 
1990: 140). Bourdieu's attention to naturalised bodily practices within the habitus 
connects to Butler's (1990: 7) critique of the naturalisation of sexual difference 
through the sex/gender distinction. 
Throughout the interview Welby indicates that s/he has had exposure to recent 
feminist scholarship that questions the naturalness, or neutralness, of biological sex as 
the basis for understandings about differences between men and women (see Martin, 
1987; Butler, 1990; Haraway 1991; Fausto-Sterling, 1993; Bornstein, 1994). Social 
constructionist theories suggest that the sUbjective significance and cultural meanings 
associated with essentialist understandings of gender and sexuality are dependent upon 
the historical, geographical and social contexts in which they are embedded (Vance, 
1992: 133-134). Social constructionist theory posits that lines of connection between 
subjectivity, biology, gender and sexuality are not fixed but constructed at the level of 
culture and history. According to this view, the categories of sex and gender are 
discursively produced and legitimated through the oppositional relationship that is 
constructed by the respective alignments of sex and gender and nature and culture. 
Dominant understandings about physiological and social differences between men and 
women are based on dualistic understandings about the relationship between and 
within sex and gender categories. 
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Drawing on, and reworking, post-structuralist theories, feminists have critically 
interrogated the networks, meanings, rules and institutions through which gender 
identities and (heterosexual) social arrangements are constituted as 'natural' and 
universal (Martin, 1987; Treichler, 1990i Butler, 1990, 1993; Gatens, 1996).14 The 
'philosophical field' (Jenkins, 1992: 86) has not escaped this critical gaze as feminist 
theorists have also interrogated the reproduction of normative social arrangements in 
the field of social theory itself (Gatens, 1996; Witz, 2000). Moira Gatens (1996), for 
example, explores the way that the body politic within social and political theory is 
constituted through institutionalised exclusions that are at work in the theoretical and 
political fields. Gatens suggests that the 'neutral' body of social and political theory is 
implicitly coded as male excluding women from the body politic,15 Welby also draws 
attention to the social and medical fields through which biological sex is constructed 
and reproduced as naturalised difference. S/he argues that biological differences 
between the sexes are social constructions: 
We may need to acknowledge that socially constructed also means constructed 
out of what? Out of possibly genetically pre-determined factors, but how these 
factors manifest of course is constructed by society... What turned on the light 
for me was when I read about intersexed children and I realised that even nature 
does not agree with the view that we have to be men or women. Are there more 
than two sexes? Well that begs the question of defining sex. If you are defining 
chromosomally, yes there are more than XX and XY. Although there is a 
presumption that's not the case. If we define sex as a biological thing then there 
are only two aspects to sex, you know the production of sperm or the production 
of ova, in terms of biological reproductive sex but even that is not necessarily 
divided into two individuals, because you can have one hermaphrodite that can 
produce both,16 And we have many individuals that produce neither ... When I 
was finally confronted by what with me proved that nature disagrees with the 
view that we are male or female, and that one sex precludes the other, and that 
it is very exclusive, and that was the turning point for me and I then applied 
that to myself and to society. I don't feel it is mutually exclusive, transgender is 
a category that we only came up with in the last few years "the transgender 
community". 
Norrie May Welby, 1997 
14 For critical analyses of social and cultural constructions in medical descriptions of the female body see 
Martin (1987) in childbirth see Treichler (1990). Butler (1990,1993) provides an important 
interrogation of naturalised difference within cultural narratives about sex and gender. Gatens (1996) 
explores the situated body in political theory. 
15 See Chapter Eight for an extended discussion of Gatens' arguments. 
16 Welby refers here to the very rare hermaphrodite regis who is fertile as both male and female - they 
may menstruate and produce sperm but not necessarily concurrently. 
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Reading about intersexed children enabled Welby to realise that genetic, chromosomal, 
hormonal, reproductive and biological sex differences do not map neatly onto male and 
female bodies. If there is no biological site for the unambiguous determination of binary 
sex categories, then both sex and gender must be social rather than 'natural' categories. 
The bodies of intersexed children represent the 'natural', and therefore undeniable truth, 
that sexed differences between males and females are not mutually exclusive. If biological 
sex is both/and or neither then it becomes possible to understand that social differences 
between men and women may also be both/and or neither. At the same time the 
realisation that sex and gender are social categories enabled Welby to affirm transgender 
as an alternative identity category. Instead of trying to make him/her -self fit binary 
gender categories, a strategy that s/he had pursued in the past, s/he instead questions the 
categories of sex and gender themselves and the social exclusions that these categories 
legitimate. For Welby, intersexed bodies prove that: 
Nature makes a dupe of things that don't fit with our ideas of what should be, 
and the problem is not the territory, the problem is our road map. 
Norrie May Welby, 1997 
Welby locates his/her refusal to accept binary gender categories in a form of biological 
essentialism that is based in the 'natural' anatomical bodies of intersexed children. 
Reading about intersexed bodies enabled Welby to realise that in some cases anatomy does 
not determine social gender. In this example, Welby's narrative, which is directed at 
empowerment and control, also incorporates a 'master script' about a denial of sexual 
difference that is based in biology. At the same time this agentic story-line is also 
disruptive of conceptual narratives about sex and gender as mutually exclusive, 'natural' 
categories. Welby's experience of gender is shaped by his/her location in a particular 
temporal and spatial field where complex social and political redefinitions of sex and 
gender are in play. His/her narrative draws on post-structuralist critiques of the 'natural' 
and understandings of identity as fluid and contingent, essentialist understandings of 
identity located in the 'natural' pre-discursive body, and an embodied choosing 
Enlightenment subject. 
Social construction theory posits that lines of connection between SUbjectivity, biology, 
gender and sexuality are not fixed but constructed at the level of culture and history 
(Vance, 1992: 133-134). Within this analysis the social is a discursive field that provides 
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subject positions for actors. Welby refuses to position him/her -self as a gendered subject. 
This refusal is a deliberate and strategic act that forces people to decide for themselves 
whether Welby is male or female. The ambiguity of his/her gender in everyday 
interaction, like his/her stage performance, forces people to confront the taken-for-
grantedness of binary gender categories. At the same time Welby acknowledges 
differences between people who affirm transgender as an identity category and those who 
do not: 
My personal solution is to not identify as having a fixed gender and to let other 
people decide whether I am male or female or neither or both and I've become 
comfortable with that. Other tranys insist on having their personal agenda 
validated at the same time as acknowledging their transgenderedness. Others want 
to deny their transgenderedness and pursue real women and insist on that. I'm 
talking very much about male to female here, but many of these are applicable the 
other way too. 
Norrie May Welby, 1997 
Welby suggests that s/he is comfortable with allowing other people to position 
him/her as a gendered subject. Essentialism is brought into service as an explanation 
for differences between transgender people who want to pursue 'realness' and those, 
like him/her-self who do not. Welby is also critical of transsexuals who pursue 
essentialist approaches to identity: 
I think that people who want to jump into one gender from the other have no 
idea what gender truly is. Why jump from one jail into the other? Like they just 
have not got, or even had presented, the idea that gender is a social 
construction. A lot of tranys still think that their identity is their truth. That their 
identity is intrinsic to their being, and that if you threaten their identity and call 
them 'him' or a 'bloke' then you are threatening their being. 
NOTI'ie May Welby, 1997 
Identities are thwarted and/or confirmed through the language that people use to 
address an individual. Self-hood is threatened when these forms of address do not 
match the gender identity of the person being summoned (Butler, 1997: 2). Welby 
suggests that the ideas about selves, used by other tranys, are based on essentialist 
understandings of their gender identity as 'intrinsic to their being'. Essentialist 
discourses were not confined to Welby's descriptions of other transsexuals who wanted 
to pursue 'realness', or who considered their social gender to be their 'true' identity. In 
the following narrative s/he draws on essentialist and social constructionist 
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understandings of identity to make sense of his/her experiences of gender. The view 
Welby had on gender before s/he internalised 'society's views on gender' may be read as 
an essentialist position. S/he also identifies values, or sets of understandings, about 
maleness and femaleness as social constructions. Both essentialism and social 
constructionism are used as ways of explaining his/her experiences and articulating 
his/her subjectivity. Sets of understandings about the way gender identities are 
constructed are set in opposition to essentialist ideas about a natural pregiven 'gender'. 
Inclusion in one category is articulated by refusal of the other: 
I've gone back to my view on gender that 1 had before (I internalised) society's 
views on gender. It is not essentially something new. It is something I can now talk 
about with other people, because the language did not exist before, but it is not 
something that has come out of the woodwork, it is not something that has come 
out of the blue, it is something that rings true for me, for my sense of self before 1 
was given all these values about maleness and femaleness. 
Norrie May Welby, 1997 
Norrie May Welby is resistant to transsexuals who insist that their 'gender identity is 
their truth' and at the same time s/he asserts that a gender-free pre-existing self is 
his/her 'truth'. Welby acknowledges the centrality of language to his/her ability to 
articulate his/her experiences of gender. This acknowledgment of the way that 
language constitutes the subject, that subjectivity is spoken into existence, is 
reminiscent of a post-structuralist account of subjectivity. However, s/he draws on an 
essentialist notion of gender, as a pre-discursive or natural maleness or femaleness that 
may be revealed through stripping away the artificial layers of culture. One reading of 
the way essentialism is deployed in this extract could be that, given a lack of fit between 
transgendered subjectivity and embodiment and biological essentialism, Norrie May 
attempts to fix gender in relation to a pre-discursive self. The continuity of the subject 
is achieved through a denial of discourses about male and female as mutually exclusive 
categories and through an appropriation of discourses that locate that continuity in a 
pre-discursive identity that precedes social gender and its association with biology 
(maleness and femaleness). Biological essentialism is refused and an essentialism based 
on the pre-discursive as the 'natural' embraced. The complexity of this discursive 
positioning of self requires attention to both social constructionist and essentialist 
understandings of identity. It also suggests that there is not one essentialism, but many 
essentialisms that can be deployed in multiple, complex and contradictory ways. 
119 
Recognition of diverse essentialisms allows for an understanding of the ways in which 
essentialism itself is constructed through complex historical, social and political 
processes which shape and continue to shape individual experiences of gender. 
In Chapter Two I discussed the gendered nature of language while in Chapter Four I 
considered how non-linear stories expose the difficulties of self-representation for 
people whose gender identities are in between. Norrie May Welby also comments on 
the difficulties of self representation within language for people who are both/and or 
neither: 
People have (been) brought up in a society where we are either male or female so 
yes, and we don't have pronouns that are not gender specific, it is either he or she 
and 'it' is taken to be derogatory. In English we have third person plural that can 
be used were the gender is not known or is ambiguous, or when you don't want to 
specifY. I use that a lot in my life. I believe that generally this kind of work is very 
influential in changing society, and it helps get the ideas out there amongst the 
population. Movies like 'Priscilla' do that a hell of a lot. Some queens complain: 
"Oh that is not how we really are". Or: "It is made for a heterosexual audience". 
Of course, there is no point in preaching to the converted. If you have already got 
a queer consciousness you don't need to be converted to it. 
Norrie May Welby, 1997 
Judith Butler (1997: 7) draws attention to language as the instrument through 
which power is exercised. She argues that through the social rituals of naming and 
addressing each other 'we are formed in language constituted in its terms' (Butler, 
1997: 2). Welby draws attention to the way dualistic categories of gender are 
incorporated into the forms of language that are used to refer to a person. For Welby, 
the erasure of transgendered people from the signifYing economy is demonstrated by 
the lack of personal pronouns in the English language that are not gender specific 
(he/she, him/her) and unlike 'it' also have a positive meaning. Norrie May Welby 
refuses to name him/her -self using gendered language. Instead, they appropriate 
'third person plural' (their/them/they) using singular and plural in the same sentence 
in a way that is disruptive of the conventional structures of language. Mimicking 
Welby's use of language I wrote, in Chapter One for example, that I interviewed 'one 
person who used their (not his/her) ambiguous body in order to challenge binary 
notions of gender'. Welby considers this strategy of linguistic refusal and appropriation 
to be a political act. 
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Destabilising heterosexuality through performativity 
One way to affirm transgender identities has been to assert their differences from 
male and female through an articulation of new discourses about gender that do not 
appropriate or sustain the male/female dualism (Butler, 1993: 128). Butler (1990: 141) 
argues that the loss of gender norms would have the effect of proliferating gender 
configurations and destablising heterosexuality, both of which require discrete oppositions 
between male and female, man and woman. This idea has been taken up by transgender 
activitsts, such as Kate Bornstein (1994), who advocates a third space that is outside of 
male and female. Welby also claims an identity that deconstructs dualistic 
understandings of sex and gender by incorporating oppositions between male and 
female, man and woman, gay and straight: 
I describe myself as spansexual. I explain that to people in terms of a bridge 
spanning the two genders, which has simply two aspects. And like a bridge I am 
in both places at once, and travel from one space to the other, a bridge spans the 
divide. 
Norrie May Welby, 1997 
During the course of my research in Sydney several of the people that I interviewed 
identified Welby as someone who lived in a space that was outside of, or in between, 
male and female. I asked him/her what s/he thought about Bornstein's (1994) 
arguments about 'third space' and other research participants' identification of 
him/her as someone who occupied that space: 
SP: So would you be a transgender person who lives in the third space) what Kate 
Bornstein calls the third space? 
NMW: I think that depends on your use of her definition (of the third space). I'd 
like to think about my spansexual definition too. Because I think the trouble with 
third space notions, as she points out, is that people think it is another category. 
Whereas I don't want another, I don't want you know male, female new sex, this 
sex, that sex, third sex, I don't want another division ... 
SF: Interesting enough other participants that I have spoken to) and have asked 
that question) /ldo you think there are some transgenders who are in the third 
space now?/I have named you as the person they would Identify as being such a 
person. 
NMW: In a sense in a third space, but it is a space that encompasses the other two. 
I don't want to get into that there is any male space or any female space, but I also 
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don't want to buy into the notion that as woman I am not man, or as man I am not 
woman. As an individual I am both male and female and neither and both. I am 
wary of third space and I think Kate is also wary of third space because she does 
not want to be left outside of male and female spaces. She is saying there is maybe 
not a third space, maybe another way of looking at it, and given that men and 
women is one way of looking at it, not two ways of looking at, one way of looking 
at it, I think maybe we are rather than in third space we are looking for a different 
perspective and new way of looking at things. 
Welby is critical of third space definitions which imply another category. Instead 
s/he suggests that ideas like third space and alternative identities like 'spanssexual' are 
about creating a new language and/or alternative way of visualising gender that are 
inclusive of bodies and identities that both conform to and diverge from male and 
female spaces. His/her use of the term 'spanssexual' deconstructs the opposition 
between straight and gay which Butler uses to 'explain' transsexual demand for sex 
reassignment surgery. 
In Gender Trouble Butler responds positively to butch/femme conventions, but 
critically to sex reassignment surgery. She both acknowledges that transsexual identity 
blurs the normative association between 'anatomy', 'natural identity' and 'natural 
desire' (Butler, 1990: 71) and suggests that transsexualism is a denial of homosexuality 
that maintains a false association between culturally constructed desires, 
heterosexuality and anatomy. For Butler (1990: 70-71), the sexed surface of the 
transsexual body thus emerges as the necessary sign of a natural(ized) identity and 
desire. Butler suggests that transsexuals who opt for sex reassignment conform to the 
heterosexualisation of desire and also to the naturalisation of pleasure to gender-
specific body parts (i.e. the penis, vagina and breasts). Butler assumes that transsexuals 
who use gender reassignment technologies to change their gender identities do so in 
order to enjoy intimate sexual relationships with individuals of the same gender to 
which the transsexuals were originally assigned. One of my questions in the interview 
schedule addressed this issue. I asked participants to 'respond to suggestions by some 
feminists that transsexuals are erotically attracted to those of the same gender and change 
their anatomy in order to be heterosexual'P Norrie May Welby provided the following 
answer: 
17 Esther Newton's (1972) 'Mother Camp: Female impersonators in America' suggested, for example, that 
'cross-dressing is a cultural expression of the conh'adictions generated by the social stigma of 
homosexuality' (Dean: 1993: 4). Tim Dean (1993: 5) argues that Newton implies that if 'no social stigma 
were attached to homosexuality, then transvestism- and transsexuality - would simply not exist'. 
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That is so generalised I'm not sure that it dignifies a response. But if we take it not 
as a blanket statement, but if it is something that may apply to some individuals, 
yes it does apply to some individuals. Yes we have a homophobic society so a hell 
of a lot of tranys have all this internalised homophobia. There was a trany at the 
conference yesterday that wanted to have genital resh'Uctured surgery so that she 
could have heterosexual sex because she did not want to have homosexual sex. 
And I stood up and said, "well what is the difference between heterosexual sex and 
homosexual sex, I can't think of anything that I've done with men that I have not 
done with women - as a man and as a woman". So yes, there is definitely a lot of 
homophobia in the trany community but I don't know if it affects the majority of 
tranys. And you have to also take into consideration that a lot of tranys are not 
merely attracted to men or to people of the opposite sex if it goes the other way. A 
lot of tranys are bi-sexuals, a lot of tranys identify as lesbians, I even know of some 
ITMs that identify as gay men. And then we have tranys having sex with each 
other of all descriptions, so it all falls in a heap there. 
NOTI'ie May Welby, 1997 
Welby's description of transgender sexualities 'troubles' Butler's (1990) 
interpretation of transsexualism as a set of practices that privileges sexuality over 
gender. I8 Welby's analysis indicates that gender identity may be more crucial than 
conformity to heterosexual regimes. Transsexuals who have had genital surgery and 
want to claim homosexual identities disrupt the notion that trans sexuality is primarily 
driven by acceptance to hegemonic norms of heterosexuality. Welby also suggests that 
changing gender, and having genital surgery, cannot be read as normalisation to 
heterosexual regulatory regimes because it is more deviant than being homosexual: 
I don't know how much it [homophobia] affected my decision to change my 
anatomy. I always identified as queer and as deviant and accepted that that was 
OK. So I didn't have a problem identifying as homosexual or as gay or realising 
that I was sexually deviant, and I didn't think that that would change when I 
changed gender because, goodness me, that is pretty deviant changing your 
gender, let alone changing your body and your genitals. If I can be totally honest 
about it I didn't see that it made me less [deviant] than [before] just because it made 
me different, so that [decision to have surgery] in a sense wasn't from homophobia, 
it wasn't from fear of people thinking I was queer or a sexual deviant. Although in 
a sense it was to escape other people's homophobia. In a sense it was to try to fit in 
with other people's demands by at least making an attempt to not be a sexual 
deviant too, but not in terms of my erotic practice, more in terms of the 
contradictions of gender expression or social expression. People censured me for 
18 Butler's (1990) theory ofthe performativity of gender destabilizes sexuality. Transgendered people 
destabilize gender. For Butler transsexual desire for gender reassignment surgery is located in and 
reinforces the heterosexual imperative. My research suggests that the diversity in gender expression and 
sexuality within transgendered communities is similar to that encountered in non-transgendered populations 
(see Chapter Nine). Although Butler provides a more nuanced discussion of transsexualism and gender 
reassignment surgery in her 1993 work, her 1990 comments lend academic credibility to negative public 
stereotypes about transsexuals which continue to impact on the lives and self-esteem of transgendered 
people. 
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appearing to be male and behaving female or dressing male and behaving female 
or dressing female [and behaving male]. 
Norrie May Welby, 1997 
Contradictions in gender expression disrupt the field in which gender relations are 
constituted. Welby's narrative illustrates how actors are defined by sets of 
understandings about sex, gender and sexuality that are at work within the social field. 
Performances of gender that are not culturally intelligible, such 'a person appearing to 
be male and behaving female' disrupt the habitus drawing attention to the way that 
norms are incorporated in the body and reproduced in everyday social action. Welby's 
decision to change his/her gender because s/he experienced negative responses to 
his/her contradictory gender expressions illustrates the way that habitus and field are 
constantly in play in social interaction. 
Habitus, performativity and the social field 
This chapter has provided an analysis of the way that sex, gender and heterosexuality 
are troubled in Welby's stage show 'What Makes a Man?" Welby's transgressive 
performance of gender is made possible by the creation of the space in which the piece 
is located. His/her performance is also dependent upon having a physical body that is 
both/neither male and female, masculine and feminine. His/her ambiguous body 
enables him/her to trouble the social field in which public narratives about male and 
female, masculinity and femininity are codified and reproduced in routinised bodily 
practices. Bourdieu (1990: 56) writes 'the habitus - embodied history, internalised as 
second nature and so forgotten as history - is the active presence of the whole past of 
which it is the product'. In the stage performance Welby draws attention to this 
embodied forgotten history by the way that gender is actively achieved both in forms of 
signification and through bodily practices. Corporeality is used to demonstrate the 
interchangeability of sex and gender. In doing so, s/he indicates that these concepts are 
not mutually exclusive, ahistorical or natural. The body acts as the conduit between 
male and female, masculinity and femininity, problematising both essentialist 
understandings of identity that are located in the body and social constructionist 
understandings of identity as discursively produced. 
Transgender performances traverse the agendas addressed by both Bourdieu and 
Butler. Similarities between habitus and essentialist ideas about identity within feminist 
theory may be identified in the way that social practices are naturalised in the body and 
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in belief. For both Bourdieu and Butler, these naturalised distinctions are cultural 
constructions. Bodily practices insititutionalised as naturalised difference through the 
habitus are disrupted by performances that are unauthorised by normative conventions 
of action. In everyday life, as well as on stage, Welby represents gender as a process of 
doing and becoming sustained through an illusion of connection between anatomy and 
social gender. When these lines of connection are disrupted the habitus is exposed and 
gender is represented as an imitation of an imitation. Welby talks about the way that 
gendered subject positions are made available to him/her through how other people 
interpret his/her corporeality, dress and body movements. Welby's stage show and 
performances of gender in everyday situations simultaneously embody traces of the 
unruly associated with incoherent gender identities and the normative associated with 
conventional gender identities. This is because transgender performance is already 
encoded in a system of signification. Welby's transgressive performance reworks 
perceptions about gender within the social field in order to expose the social scripts by 
which coherent performances of gender are legitimated. 
Welby's narratives about sex, gender and sexuality are critical and reflexive 
involving post-structuralist understandings of sUbjectivity as partial, unstable and 
contested. At the same time his/her experience of gender is shaped by complex 
historical, social and political process in which essentialist understandings of identity 
located in the 'natural' pre-discursive body and an embodied choosing Enlightenment 
subject are at play. Welby's initial decision to have genital surgery, his/her talk about 
going back to a gender free pre-existing self, not identifying with a fixed gender and 
his/her reinvention of self as 'spanssexual' are discursive practices that may be 
identified with the autonomous choosing subject of Enlightenment theory. These 
agentic narratives are formulated in and through the interaction between his/her 
corporeality, identity and context. As such, Welby's talk provides a unique opportunity 
to explore the inter-relationships between habitus, field and performativity. 
The use of ideas that broadly correspond to social constructionist and essentialist 
understandings of identity in Welby's narrative illustrate that conceptualisations of the 
subject as either a post-structuralist subject wholly constituted in language (Davies, 
1990, 1997; Jones, 1997), or an essentialist subject that is based on prediscursive 
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understandings about self, are ultimately untenable.19 Welby is a subject that is 
constituted in and through language and embodiment. Analysis of his/her 
performance and his/her life story entails attention to the strategic use of essentialism 
in post-structuralist accounts of identity. The both/ andness of subjectivity and agency 
needs to be reflected in social theory. These issues are taken up in relation to debates 
surrounding liberal humanist and post-structuralist theories of action discussed in the 
following chapter of the thesis. 
19 Anne Game (1990: 148-185) crafts a similar argument in relation to how the rural and urban binary 
is constructed through complex intersections between the two terms. 
Storied social action 
Agency and the local achievement of identities 
What is agency? What does it mean to be a subject with agency? How are agents 
constructed in contemporary social theories about cultural practices? These basic 
sociological questions inform the analysis of agency advanced in this chapter. I argue 
that theoretical understandings about agency have fundamental implications for how 
sociologists interpret information and construct informants in sociological research. A 
range of narratives about action and identity that may be identified with essentialist, 
liberal humanist and post-structuralist theories are now available in non-academic 
communities. I am interested in how the people to whom I spoke draw on and utilise 
these contemporary social theories of agency and identity in research conversations 
about transitioning across binary gender categories. In this chapter I argue that 
transgendered people have heterogeneous sexed identities that are inconsistent and 
discontinuous. These ideas are illustrated through attention to the way that 
transgendered people present themselves as unitary and consistently gendered subjects 
while also operating with multiple gendered and shifting identities. 
One reading of people who engage in elective surgical alteration of the body is that 
they attach considerable authority to conventional discourses about bodies and 
identities, masculinity and femininity. Women who engage in cosmetic surgery, for 
example, demonstrate corporeal dedication to conventional discourses about 
femininity. Similarly, people who use gender reassignment technologies conform to 
normalising discourses about the relationship between gender and anatomy. At the 
same time, elective surgical alteration of the body is a radically unconventional act that 
goes against dominant understandings of bodies and selves as 'natural'. The people 
whose experiences embody this contradiction provide an opportunity for research on 
and analysis of agency in this chapter. 
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In traditional social theory, agency is normally characterised as a property of the 
'individual' and is understood as the power to act (Connell and Dowsett, 1992: 72; 
Cussins, 1998: 168). This understanding of agency characterises much of social 
science and feminist literature associated with cosmetic surgery and gender 
reassignment technologies (Spitzak, 1988; Morgan, 1991; Davis, 1991, 1993, 1995; 
Balsamo, 1996; Kaw, 1998; Hausman, 1995; Fausto-Sterling, 1993). This 
individualisation of agency sits alongside and in tension with the collective agency of 
groups and/or social movements. This theoretical tension is reflected in connections 
between agency and structurelindividual and society oppositions within sociology, 
whereby agency and the individual are traditionally aligned in an oppositional 
relationship to structure and society (Connell and Dowsett 1992: 72). Collective 
agency is discussed in Chapter Nine. This chapter focuses on the way people construct 
themselves as agents with the power to act autonomously. At this stage I want to 
recognise that agency is not just the property of the individual; social action is both 
individually and collectively produced. The deconstruction of the agency/structure 
divide is achieved through bringing together an analysis of narrativity and identity. 
Social life is storied (Somers, 1994: 613-614; Somers and Gibson, 1994: 38). 
Shared social narratives, such as those associated with gender, nationality, or sexuality, 
'encompass' both the individual and the collective, while personal narratives are 
defined in relation to the broader public narratives in which they are embedded. 
Narratives are simultaneously general and specific because they are both individually 
produced and embedded in shared understandings about social life. Margaret Somers' 
concept of narrativityl incorporates the personal and the collective, effectively 
deconstructing the individual! society and agency / structure oppositions within 
sociology. The way in which individuals negotiate everyday encounters, take up 
particular subject positions and resist others, tends to be assumed in Somers' arguments 
about narrativity, agency and subjectivity. This chapter seeks to develop a theorisation 
of narrativitity and agency by exploring how people understand themselves as agents 
and draw on narratives of agency in research conversations. I will argue that people 
1 According to Somers (1994: 618-619) there are four inter-related dimensions ofnarrativity: ontological or 
personal narratives, public or cultural narratives, conceptual or theoretical narratives and meta-narratives 
such as the master narratives of historical explanation including ideas about progress, industrialisation, and 
the Enlightenment. Somers' concept of narrativity embeds identity, experience, social action and social 
agency in numerous cross-cutting relational storylines that are particular to a specific time and place. For 
example, Somers argues that people construct identities, however multiple and changing by locating 
themselves or by being located in stories or public narratives that shift over time and space. See Chapter 
Two for a more comprehensive discussion of Somers' concept of narrativity. 
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who transition across binary gender categories consciously locate themselves, both 
metaphorically and bodily, in public narratives of sex, gender and sexuality. 
Most of the people whom I interviewed had used, or were using, medical 
technologies to modify their bodies so that they more accurately reflected their desired 
gender identities. The people who participated in this study also had access to, and were 
often aware of post-structuralist and transgender theories about identities as multiple, 
contingent and contradictory. They were knowledgeable about the processes, 
procedures, benefits and risks associated with gender reassignment technologies. Most 
were familiar with academic critiques of the medical practices in which they are 
engaged. Academic and public narratives about medical technologies as beneficial and 
enabling or as oppressive and controlling were available to them as they moved 
through the various stages in their transition and as they interacted with the medical 
professionals associated with each of those stages. In transitioning across binary gender 
categories, transsexuals have already gone through the process of positioning 
themselves in relation to these multiple and contradictory discourses. The marginality 
of transgender people, their experience of maintaining a particular gender identity 
while occupying a body that is differently sexed, and the attractions of a body in which 
gender and anatomy are consistent, means that the narratives of transgender people 
make a rich site for an exploration of agency. 
This chapter considers the relationship between agency, corporeality, narrativity, 
selves and technologies through the local achievement of identities. I understand and 
use agency as social (White, 1992: 14) as well as personal (Davis, 1991: 33; Connell 
and Dowsett, 1992: 72; Hausman, 1992: 110). It is embodied or corporeal (Connell, 
1995: 61; Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; Williams and Bendelow, 1998: 51); involves 
simultaneous orientations to past, present and future (Emirbayer and Mische 1998: 9 
62) and, is embedded in social relations and processes (Granovetter 1985: 487; Somers 
1994: 629). Through attention to the talk of three of those who participated in this 
study, Jack, Anita and Chelsea, I present a case for more complex analyses of agency 
and SUbjectivity that explore how agency, bodies, technologies, discourses/narratives 
and practices are co-implicated in the construction of identity. 
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Stories, actions, identities 
In Chapter Two I argued that stories and identities emerge from interaction, shifting 
and changing according to the spaces and times in which they are embedded. I used 
Bronwyn Davies and Rom Harre's (1990, 1999) work to illustrate the way that 
sUbjectivities are generated in and through conversations which 'position' people in 
social encounters. It is the active and embodied constitution and reconstitution of 
identities in social interaction, and through the use of medical technologies, that is of 
interest in this chapter. Davies and Harre (1990, 1999) explore the way in which 
individual identities are dynamically constituted and reconstituted in everyday social 
encounters through access to a limited range of subject positions that are made 
available to participants in conversational story-lines which are collaboratively 
produced. The complexity of an individual's relationship to social life may be captured 
through recognition of the way in which individual identities are made up of multiple 
selves, each of which is crafted in relation to shared narratives which are context 
specific. The contextual nature of identity means that selfhood is experienced by 
individuals as both historically continuous and as multiple and fragmentary. 
According to this analysis, the isolated and singular character of selfhood implied by 
the term 'identity' is abandoned in favour of discourses about multiple selves and 
intersubjectivity which foreground the active, fluid, contingent and social nature of 
individual identities. 
Identities emerge from error, 'action and counteraction' (White, 1992: 13); they are 
shaped by contingent responses to events and are accompanied by stories which help 
create sufficient uncertainties for fresh action. Stories act as both resources for identity 
claims and as constraints on identity (White, 1992: 13). Action is "temporally" situated 
in social life; actors' responses to unfolding events are shaped by past experiences and 
by a future imagined as the consequence of a particular course of action. (Emirbayer 
and Mische, 1998: 692). These courses of action provide the resources or possibilities 
for new forms of action, which in turn become the basis for new identities (White, 
1992: 14). Decisions about sex reassignment surgery, for example, may be made in 
relation to a desire for a future identity in which anatomical and social identities are 
consistent. The relationship between sUbjectivity and action identified in White's 
analysis suggests that agency is key to the production of identity (White, 1992; Somers, 
1994: 618; Somers and Gibson, 1994: 61). 
130 
Perceived discontinuities between the anatomical bodies and social identities of 
transgendered people illustrate how the experience of agency is embedded in the 
relationship between corporeality and discourses about male and female, masculinity 
and femininity. The meta-narratives (Somers, 1994: 619) through which we all craft 
our identities, those of class, gender, sexuality and ethnicity for example, are inscribed 
by and in turn ascribe a particular corporeality (Goffman, 1997 [1977]; Bourdieu, 
1977; Bart1<y, 1988; Bordo, 1993a, 1993c). Pierre Bourdieu (1977: 93-94) argues that 
cultural values associated with maleness and femaleness, class and ethnicity are 
reproduced in the gestures and movements of the body. These embodied differences 
are enacted in routine social interaction through the way in which people dress, stand, 
speak, think and feel.z Susan Bordo (1993a: 186-195) explores the moral, economic, 
gender and class coding of body shape and size. Bordo argues, for example, that 
muscularity currently plays an important role in middle-class conceptions of 
attractiveness; it is associated with self-discipline, control and upward social mobility. 
Historically muscled bodies have also symbolized: 
masculine power as physical strength, frequently operating as a means of coding the 
"naturalness" of sexual difference... But at the same time ... they have been 
associated with manual labor and proletarian status, and they have been suffused 
with racial meaning as well (Bordo, 1993a: 193-195). 
The body is not neutral; instead it is a surface on which cultural meanings associated 
with social values, such as age, gender, class, ethnicity and sexuality are inscribed 
(Grosz: 1994: 141-142). The experience of agency is therefore embedded in a complex 
set of interrelationships between context, corporeality, identity and narrativity. 
Charis Cussins (1998) traces the different forms of agency exercised by women who 
participate in IVF technologies. When IVF results in a successful pregnancy, Cussins 
characterises the women as exercising agency by co-operating with doctors in their 
own medical objectification, maintaining selfhood through interaction during 
consultations and examinations, and exercising self discipline so as to be seen as a 
'good' patient. When IVF is unsuccessful, Cussins suggests that the women experience 
alienation from the technologies and the medical procedures because their orientation 
to a future identity as a pregnant woman/mother is foreclosed. The experience of 
agency by research informants is closely related to the identities associated with 
2 See Chapter Five for a more detailed discussion of Bourdieu's (1977,1990) arguments about culturally 
inscribed bodily dispositions. 
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parent/non-parent and the existence of meta-narratives which construct stories about 
bio-medical technologies as enabling or alienating. The stories of empowerment 
through accepting medical regimes or victimisation where medicine is reframed in 
terms of discipline and control pre-exist these specific experiences. Thus locality,s 
corporeality,4 identities, personal narratives about participation in IVF technologies, 
public narratives about parenthood, and meta-narratives about medicine as either 
beneficial or oppressive come together in Cussins' analysis of agency. 
The relationship between technology and the local achievement of identity is also 
considered in the analysis presented in this chapter. I look at corporeality, agency, 
narrativity and identities through research informants' talk about the use of medical 
technologies for crafting gender. Conversations about crafting identity through the use 
of medical technologies are also discussions about the medicalisation of sex and gender 
and the social expectations associated with particular gender identities. The decisions 
that people with transgendered bodies make about their use of medical technologies 
produce a conscious, thinking critically reflexive post-structuralist subject through 
engaging in embodied social action. 
Many feminists who write about clients' relationship to, and use of, medical 
technologies (Spitzack, 1988; Sawicki, 1991; Davis 1991, 1993, 1995; Morgan, 1991; 
Dull and West, 1991; Sullivan, 2001) tend to use agency unproblematic ally. For 
example, Bernice Hausman's (1995: 110 and 118) use of agency is narrowly defined as 
'transsexual demand for surgery'. She suggests that her use of agency is not 
unproblematic - but this is not developed (Hausman, 1995: 11 0). Kathryn Pauly 
Morgan (1991: 41-44) urges feminists either to refuse to engage in cosmetic surgery, 
or to engage in ways that subvert, or parody the ideological foundations of cosmetic 
surgery. Both of these strategies require an understanding of the individual risks and 
oppressive contexts associated with elective surgical alteration of the female body. It is 
clear that a knowledgeable humanist subject underpins Morgan's suggestions for a 
'radica1' political response to cosmetic surgery. 
3 How women experience a particular IVF clinic, whether the clinic had a good atmosphere and the staff 
were friendly and understanding, was seen as important by many of the women who participated in this 
study. 
4 Corporeality in the sense of their bodily functioning and also whether their bodies would co-operate at the 
cellular level and accept the artificially implanted egg(s). 
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Sandy Stone outlines the ways in which 'theorists of gender' have denied agency and 
sUbjectivity to transsexuals: 
Theorists of gender have seen transsexuals as possessing something less than agency. 
As with "genetic" "women," transsexuals are infantilized, considered too illogical or 
irresponsible to achieve true subjectivity, or clinically erased by diagnostic criteria; 
or else, as constructed by some radical feminist theorists, as robots of an insidious 
and menacing patriarchy ... In this construction as well, the transsexuals have been 
resolutely complicit by failing to develop an effective counterdiscourse (Stone, 1991: 
294). 
Stone suggests that transsexuals are able to reclaim their agency by writing critical 
counter-discourses that are located in their embodied experiences of gender and 
medicalisation. Kathy Davis (1991, 1993, 1995) also appeals to individual agency as a 
solution to feminist constructions of women who engage in cosmetic surgery as cultural 
dupes. She argues that women who engage in cosmetic surgery are knowledgeable 
actors and that feminists need to take their agency seriously. Anne Balsamo (1996: 78) 
concludes that she is reluctant to view women who engage in cosmetic surgery as 
simply victims of the technological colonisation of women's bodies. Instead she 
acknowledges that cosmetic surgery may be a site where 'women consciously act' to 
rework their bodies in order to craft new 'cultural identities'. There is a tension, 
however, in these appeals to agency as a solution to the simplistic construction of 
research informants as cultural dupes, in that Hausman, Stone, Morgan, Davis and 
Balsamo use agency uncritically. 
Agency is not an undisputed or neutral concept; there are ongoing debates within 
feminist philosophy (Davies, 1991, 1997; Jones 1997) and sociology (Giddens, 1984; 
Granovetter, 1985; Somers, 1994; Emirbayer and Mische, 1998) about how to 
understand agency. Feminist assumptions about the agency of people who engage in 
medical technologies need to be examined in the context of these different 
philosophical debates about agency. They also need to incorporate sociological ideas 
about the relationship between agency, corporeality, narrativity, selves and 
technologies outlined above. Integrating different perspectives on agency into research 
enables a more nuanced analysis of the way that people draw on humanist and post-
structuralist understandings of selves, including why they may take up particular 
subject positions and resist others. I turn now to a summary of recent feminist debates 
in the area of individual agency and their relevance for my analysis of the agency of 
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those who transition across gender boundaries. These discussions centre around what 
may broadly be termed liberal humanist and post-structuralist theories of agency. 
Liberal humanist actors 
Liberal humanist perspectives suggest that individual agency is achieved through 
rational, coherent choices made in the context of particular structural constraints, such 
as financial resources, geographic location, availability of technology, access to 
information about the risks, side effects and so on. Liberal humanist concepts of agency 
are premised upon a knowing subject who makes rational choices, and takes 
responsibility for those choices based on moral imperatives (Davies, 1991: 42-43; 
Davies, 2000: 166). Underpinning the liberal humanist agentic subject is an 
understanding of identity as progressive, linear, continuous, unified, rational and 
coherent5 (Ormrod, 1995: 33). 
Liberal humanist theories of action and identity are caught within the 
agency / structure, voluntarism/determinism oppositions within sociology, whereby 
individual agency and voluntarism (or choice) are traditionally aligned in an 
oppositional relationship to social structure and determinism (Gatens, 1996; Jones, 
1997). Mark Granovetter (1985) is critical of the atomised actor embedded in the 
voluntarist/ determinist, agency/structure debates that pervade the social sciences. In 
the following discussion of Granovetter's arguments voluntarism is represented by the 
'under-socialised' actor and determinism is represented by the 'over-socialised' actor. 
Granovetter's (1985) arguments about under- and over-socialised accounts of 
economic action are instructive for an analysis of the construction of transsexuals in 
much of the academic and medical literature surrounding gender reassignment 
surgery. The construction of transsexuals as subjects who engineer themselves (Billings 
and Urban, 1982; Hausman, 1995: 129) may be interpreted as an under-socialised 
5 Ormrod (1995: 33) argues that in conventional sociology, such as that offered by Parsons or Giddens 'the 
agent is defined as a unitary, rational, knowledgeable, conscious, pre-given entity'. More recently 
sociologists Emirbayer and Mische (1998: 962) have reconceptualised 'agency as a temporally embedded 
process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its "iterational" or habitual aspect) but also oriented 
toward the future (as a "projective" capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as 
a "practical-evaluative" capacity to contextualise past habits and future projects within the contingencies of 
the moment'). Following Granovetter (1985), Emirbayer and Mische (1998) develop an understanding of 
agency that situates the actions of individuals with an established history of social relations that are 
continuously constructed and reconstructed in social interaction. 
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account of action. According to this interpretation transgendered individuals are 
constructed as atomized actors who make self-interested choices that are minimally 
influenced by either gender relations or social structure(s). Similarly, constructions of 
transsexuals as cultural dupes of the binary sex/gender system (King, 1987; Bornstein, 
1994) and/or heterosexual regulatory regimes (Butler, 1990; Lienert, 1995), or as 
having an under-developed or 'inappropriate' gender identity (DSM-IV, 1994) are 
over-socialised accounts of action. In this account, social structural factors, such as 
gender roles and/or gender attributes, are internalised to the extent that they determine 
action. 'Social influences are contained inside an individual's head, so in actual 
decision situations, he or she can be as atomized' (Granovetter, 1985: 486) as the self 
interested individual in the under-socialised account of action. 
In both under-socialised and over-socialised accounts of action the problem of order 
is resolved by the construction of individuals as atomized actors abstracted from their 
immediate social context (Granovetter, 1985: 485). Both accounts are underpinned by 
an under-socialised account of action; individual decision making processes are 
abstracted from the messy materialities of everyday interaction. The specificities of 
individuals' relationships to others, involvement in decision making groups or histories 
of interaction are 'relegated to a minor role in the overall conceptual scheme' 
(Granovetter, 1985: 486). Referring to the construction of agency within classical and 
neo-classical economic theory Granovetter argues that: 
[alctors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they 
adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of social 
categories that they happen to occupy. Their attempts at purposive action are 
instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations (Granovetter, 
1985: 487). 
Granovetter (1985: 485-486) argues for a middle ground position that situates the 
actions of individuals within an established history of social relations that are 
continuously constructed and reconstructed during 'routine' interaction. My approach 
to the analysis of transgendered lives similarly attends to the actions of individuals in 
the context of social networks and the circulation of knowledges about medical 
technologies and gate-keeping strategies of health professionals. In this view culture 
shapes and is shaped by the actions of its members. As Granovetter suggests, access to 
the contradictions and ambiguities associated with agency requires attention to the 
messy materialities of everyday interaction. 
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Under- and over- socialised accounts of action are also present in some of the 
narratives of people interviewed for this research project. Jack, a trany boy, critically 
reflects on the way gender is not actively chosen, but is instead enacted as habit. He 
equates the taken-for-grantedness of gender, among people who do not have gender 
identity issues, to having a poorly developed sense of gender: 
Once gender is socialised into your brain you don't even have to think about it. 
It becomes habit. So to me that says that gender is poorly developed. You have 
not developed anything for yourself, you have just gone along for the ride. 
Jack, ITM, 1996 
One reading of Jack's narrative is that he provides an over-socialised account for the 
acquisition, and performance, of gender among non-transgendered people. Gender is 
internalised to such an extent that it determines action. For Jack, gender is contained 
within the person's head, the individual is abstracted from his or her immediate social 
context. This represents the atomised actor in the under-socialised account of action. 
Jack's talk implies that for him gender is not 'poorly developed', unlike non-
h'ansgendered people, he has not simply 'gone along for the ride'. Instead he makes 
choices regarding his gender identity that are minimally influenced by conventional 
gender relations or social structures - it is non-transgendered people who are the 
cultural dupes. Jack takes a reflexive stance on the over-socialised actions of non-
transgendered people. At the same time Jack's account of his own actions draws on an 
under-socialised account of agency. 
Similarly, in the following interview extract transgender performance artist Norrie 
May Welby suggests that women who engage in cosmetic surgery, and people who 
have or desire gender reassignment surgery, are simply responding to dominant 
cultural representations about masculinity and femininity: 
SP: Cosmetic surgerYJ you have already opel1ed this up to some extel1t. Do you 
thil1k people who have) or desire) gel1der reassigl1mel1t sU1;gery differ from 
people who have) or desire) cosmetic surgery? 
Not in quality, only in degree. They are having surgery to fit in with some set 
image that they have of themselves. Some set image which is always been given 
to them by other people in society, from magazines and whatever. 
Norrie May Welby, 1997 
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My reading of Welby's narrative is that s/he provides an over-socialised account of 
why people may choose to surgically alter their bodies. Public narratives about gender 
and sexual difference, encountered in the media and in the expectations of other 
people, are internalised to such an extent that they determine action. Individual 
relationships to others, their personal histories and their experience of the everyday 
world is of minimal importance in their decision making processes. Welby suggests that 
there is no qualitative difference between other forms of cosmetic surgery and sex 
reassignment surgery. However his/her use of "degree" in the context of this extract 
does suggest that sex reassignment surgery is a more radical form of cosmetic surgery. 
Analyses of action that go beyond under- and over-socialised accounts of agency 
take into account the everyday experiences of individuals, as the complexities of their 
relationships to others, contingent circumstances, life stories and public narratives 
interact. This view, for example, situates individual decisions to use gender 
r~assignment technologies within the ongoing social contexts that frame their 
experiences of being transgendered. Post-structuralist approaches which focus on the 
fluidity and multiplicity of identities are able to capture the dynamic aspects of social 
action. It is to a discussion of post-structuralist theories of subjectivity and agency that 
underpin post-structuralist accounts of action and identity that I now turn. 
Post-structuralist perspectives 
According to post-structuralist perspectives subjectivity is provided through subject 
positions which are made available to individuals through a variety of discourses. 
Individuals simultaneously constitute themselves and are constituted in discourse. 
However, we are not free to take up, or choose, subject positions at will as we can only 
make choices 'within the terms of available discourses' (Davies, 1991: 42). Therefore, 
post-structuralist perspectives suggest that, because individuals are subject to discourse, 
human agency is 'fundamentally illusory' (Davies, 1991: 46). In other words, 
individuals are able to choose from only a limited repertoire of available narratives, 
representations, positions or options, suggesting that agency is constrained by this 
limited choice. In addition, which kinds of narratives or 'choices' will predominate is 
'contested politically and will depend in large part on the distribution of power' 
(Somers, 1994: 630). The limited repertoire of representations and stories means that 
certain unintelligible experiences, events and identities will not be easily 
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accommodated within the range of available cultural, public and institutional 
narratives. Post-structuralist perspectives suggest that the continuity of the subject is 
experienced through embodiment, the capacity to tell coherent stories about the self 
that are sequential, and people's material relationship(s) to discourses(s) rather than 
through a linear or essentialist concept of identity. Underpinning post-structuralist 
understandings of agency is a post-structuralist understanding of sUbjectivity as 
multiple, discontinuous, contingent and contradictory. 
Post-structuralist understandings of SUbjectivity locate the continuity of identity in 
the relationship between bodies and discourses (Davies, 1991; Jones, 1997). Public 
narratives about the relationship between personal biography and identity often assume 
that the sexed body is unchanging. Assumptions about embodied continuity in 
commonsense understandings of identity are potentially problematic for many 
transgendered individuals who experience significant discontinuities between their 
corporeality and their gender identity. In the following narrative Jimmy talks about 
having an ambiguous gender identity and the way that this 'forces' him to identify as 
transgender: 
I guess right now I identify as, I guess I have to identify as transgender. Like I 
don't want to, but maybe further down the track I can drop that label in my 
own mind, and maybe my friends can drop it, and maybe I'll be in a position 
where it doesn't come up, or it doesn't have to come up, or it doesn't have to 
stay with me. 
Jimmy, ITM, 1996 
Jimmy operates with multiple gendered and shifting identities - he has a personal 
history of living as a woman/girl, he currently identifies as male but accepts his interim 
transgender identity. Jimmy's ambiguous corporeality is the basis for accepting a 
transgender, rather than a homogeneous male, identity. The temporal dimensions of 
agency are also indicated in the reference to present and future in Jimmy's talk. Jimmy 
is already anticipating being able to make distinctions between his transitional and 
post-transitional identities. He suggests that his current transgender identity is not 
chosen; he looks forward to a time when his body is less ambiguous and he is able to 
exert more control over his identity - and therefore present himself as a unitary and 
consistently gendered subject. The contextual nature of identity represented in Jimmy's 
narrative suggests that Jimmy's experience of selfhood is both historically continuous 
and multiple and contradictory. This point about the historical dis/continuity of gender 
identities is also taken up in another interview with Chelsea, a MTF: 
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I guess the bottom line is, me as a person is the sum total of everybody that I 
have been in the past, so that I can't deny my past and say I should have done 
this (transition) earlier because I would not be here right now without being 
that person, without being those steps on the pathway. 
Chelsea, MTF, 1996 
Chelsea's narrative indicates that identities are historical, relational and corporeal. 
Rather than presenting herself as a unitary and consistently gendered person, Chelsea 
characterises her identity as multiple and discontinuous. Continuity in this narrative is 
constructed through the metaphor of a 'pathway', which represents her journey 
through life. Research informants who use liberal humanist understandings of the self, 
which emphasise essentialist and unitary identities, problematise post-structuralist 
constructions of agency and SUbjectivity which do not take into account how identities 
are lived and experienced. Alison Jones (1997: 268) for example, draws on a 
disembodied and over-socialised actor when she argues that identities are shaped 
through and by the culturally specific meanings associated with the particular 
structural categories (gender, class, sexuality, race, occupation) that a person happens 
to occupy. As a result '(t)he real embodied individual is largely irrelevant to the 
performance' (Jones, 1997: 268). 
Liberal humanist and post-structuralist theories of identity may be further 
complicated by research informants who draw on both in constructing stories about 
themselves as men, women and/or transgendered. To illustrate this point, 
transgendered research informants who participated in this research often drew on 
essentialist understandings about their gendered selves, presenting themselves as 
unitary and consistently gendered subjects with agency. At the same time, they 
inhabited bodies that they acted on as subjects and they operated with multiple 
gendered and shifting identities. Transgendered research informants offer distinctions 
between their pre-transitional and post-transitional identities. Their bodies and 
identities were not therefore unchanging but multiple, inconsistent and discontinuous -
depending on time and context. 
Bronwyn Davies (1991: 42) attempts to unhook agency from its liberal humanist 
origins and reinvent it in terms of feminist post-structuralism. Davies redefines agency 
as 'lying in the inscription of some forms of humanist self, and more significantly, as 
lying in the reflexive awareness of the constitutive power of language that becomes 
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possible through post-structuralist theory' (Davies, 1997: 272). Or to put it another 
way, individuals achieve a sense of agency through humanist discourses that constitute 
subjects as active agents. According to this perspective individuals are not 'essentially' 
agents but only agents in so far as they are constituted, and constitute themselves, as 
agents through access to stories about agency that arise out of liberal humanist 
discourses. A post-structuralist agentic subject is aware of the linguistic processes 
through which agency and sUbjectivity are constituted and reconstituted. Post-
structuralist theory is used to deconstruct, disrupt or subvert linguistic processes 
through which human beings constitute themselves as subjects, the most important of 
which are binary oppositions constituting male and female sUbjects. Davies (1991: 
1992: 57-58) outlines this project explicitly in this way: 
To think of agency while the male/female dualism is intact is to think, inevitably, in 
terms of male, other-than-female... To conceive of agency once the male/female 
dualism is abandoned is to think of speaking subjects aware of the different ways in 
which they are made subject, who take up the act of authorship, of speaking and 
writing in ways that are disruptive of current discourses, that invert, invent and 
break old bonds, that create new subject positions that do not take their meaning 
from the genitalia (and what they have come to signify) ... (Davies, 1991: 50). 
To understand male and female in terms of a binary opposition, whereby masculinity 
and femininity are positioned as opposites in a hierarchical relationship, is 'to 
concentrate on the fixity and continuity of gender relations' (Ormrod, 1995: 34). Post-
structuralist analysis suggests that male and female, masculinity and femininity are not 
fixed essences or unchanging features that belong exclusively to men or to women. The 
alternative is to see male and female, masculinity and femininity as a product of a 
complex set of interactions between discourses, or ways of constituting knowledge 
(Weedon, 1987: 108), social practices and contested relations of power between 
socially constituted sexes and genders (Bourdieu, 1977: 93; 1990: 58). Once the 
male/ female dualism is deconstructed then it becomes possible to explore how 
gendered subjectivities are produced through positions in discourse. Post-structuralist 
understandings of sUbjectivity allow for an exploration of how identities are crafted 
through multiple subject positions. They offer a more theoretically sophisticated 
understanding of social change, and they allow for the possibility that new discourses, 
and therefore, new subject positions (read different relations of power between the 
sexes) may emerge over time (Davies, 1992: 58; 1993: ix-x). Gender then is not a 
descriptive category; rather it is a performative construct that is produced and 
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reproduced in the everyday interactions of individuals, as personal narratives, chance 
events and public stories interact (Butler, 1990, 1993; Bourdieu, 1990). 
Liberal humanist understandings of agency are resisted in post-structuralist 
accounts of subjectivity; agency is refigured as an ability to recognise the ways in which 
subjects are positioned in relation to particular discourses and practices (Davies, 1991: 
47). Political action, according to the post-structuralist perspective, involves 
developing new discourses or writing counter-narratives which provide new 
possibilities for constituting our social identities and for locating ourselves in social 
relations (Somers, 1994: 630-331). The post-structuralist subject speaks or is spoken, 
writes or IS written into existence. However, emphasis on the 
speaking/writing/reading subject in post-structuralist accounts of agency assumes an 
ability, or a willingness, to speak and/or write and/or read. For Davies (1991: 52; 
1993: xviii) the post-structuralist agentic subject is one who possesses particular 
authoritative knowledges about the relationship between discourse and subjectivity: 
To be feminist, and a feminist theorist is itself to engage in the very act of choosing to 
speak, of discovering the possibility of authority and using that speaking, that 
authority, to bring about fundamental changes in the possible ways of being that are 
available to oneself and others (Davies, 1991: 52). 
How is this knowing, choosing post-structuralist subject substantially different from 
liberal humanist concepts of agency which focus on rational choice or essentialist 
understandings of subjectivity? Perhaps, as Davies suggests, there is a degree of 
continuity between humanist and post-structuralist understandings of SUbjectivity and 
agency despite attempts to construct them as mutually exclusive positions.6 
A second, and related observation, is that the ways in which subjects take up 
particular subject positions, and resist others, are under-theorised in post-structuralist 
accounts of both SUbjectivity and agency. Alison Jones' discussion of how individuals 
are actively constituted as subjects, appears to reflect this lack of attention to the actual 
6 Alison Jones (1997) attempts to construct a distinction between liberal humanist and post-structuralist 
positions on agency. She (1997: 265) notes that it is in the areas of individual agency and social change 
that post-structuralist themy sometimes struggles to maintain a clear distinction between the humanist 
and the post-structuralist subject. Social change is achieved through the productive possibilities afforded 
by the multiple meanings through which post-structuralist subjects are produced. Drawing on Davies' 
work as an example of how liberal humanist understandings of choice may be read (mistakenly) into 
post-structuralist theories, Jones suggests that the individual who 'takes up' the different subject positions 
made available within discourse is 'both a constituted subject and a choosing one too' (jones, 1997: 266). 
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doing (and undoing) of identities in post-structuralist theory more generally. People 
who transition across gender offer accounts about their lives that are shaped by the 
discourses with which they are most familiar. In the following narrative, for example, 
Chelsea suggests that both medical discourses about 'gender dysphoria' and public 
narratives about sexual difference draw on sets of social understandings about the 
relationship between gender and anatomy: 
I would say that gender dysphoria is a problem of having the wrong gender [in 
relation] to your body. It has to be a social issue too because it is how society sees 
those genders as applying to your body. That doesn't change the fact that I still 
want it [sex reassignment surgery], and even in a world where we didn't have 
that problem I would still want my body changed. Because I still have a body 
image and that body image is separate from the society pressures ... 
Chelsea, MTF, 1996 
These comments suggest that Chelsea is aware of how she is constituted as different 
through medical discourses (referring to 'gender dysphoria' and 'having the wrong 
gender in relation to your body') and in public narratives about the relationship 
between gender and corporeality. My interpretation of this narrative is that Chelsea 
indicates that the body is represented as a surface on which social meanings about 
gender are inscribed ('It has to be a social issue too because it is how society sees those 
genders as applying to your body'). At the same time Chelsea is actively engaged in 
constructing her identity through the use of gendered technologies of the body in 
general and surgical interventions in particular ('I still want my body changed'). When 
research informants constitute themselves as the authors of their lives, they 
demonstrate the way they use liberal humanist discourses and public narratives m 
their understandings of identity, choice and action. 
People now have available to them post-structuralist understandings of selves as 
multiple, contradictory and contingent. As a result, they may offer stories that draw on 
liberal humanist and/or post-structuralist discourses in different contexts. These shifts 
and contradictions in the narrative construction of identity may be found in the stories 
of the people that I interviewed. In the previous chapter, for example, Norrie May 
Welby's stage performance, and her talk about gendered bodies, indicates that s/he is 
consciously negotiating the doing and undoing of identities. In this regard his/her talk 
and actions are consistent with post-structuralist theories about identities as situated, 
constructed and contingent. At the same time, s/he draws on an essentialist notion of 
identity that is located in the 'natural' pre-discursive self which is either non-gendered or 
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multi-gendered or both. In this latter narrative, Welby embraces a form of biological 
essentialism that is based on the construction of the body that exists prior to gendered 
socialisation. Welby is aware that s/he is positioned as a gendered subject in interaction 
and through narratives and forms of representation and s/he presents him/her -self as an 
embodied choosing (liberal humanist) subject. 
Liberal humanist understandings about choice and post-structuralist ideas about 
identities as multiple, shifting and contingent are consistent with Jack's narrative about 
gender reassignment technologies. In the following narrative Jack acknowledges the 
risky and experimental aspects of ITM surgery and he talks about the dynamics of 
being negatively positioned in conversations with medical professionals: 
I'm quite resigned to the way my genitals are, but that is for a couple of reasons, 
I know that the surgery available is not great at all. I know that the doctor who 
performs it is not real happy about performing it, and does not listen to 
anything that you have got to say anyway - well that is the indication that I get, I 
could be wrong with that. But why should I do that to myself? And as much as 
I do want a dick, you know I can rationalise so much why I should have it, but 
the older I get the more I say is it really worth it? 
Jack, ITM, 1996 
Jack indicates that female-to-male transsexuals are not positioned in relation to 
medical technologies in the same way as male-to-female transsexuals. Rather than 
colluding with the medical profession and encouraging a therapeutic response from 
clinicians (Hausman, 1995: 128-130), Jack indicates that he felt excluded, or 
marginalised, by the surgeon involved with his case. Jack's indecision about sex 
reassignment surgery, and criticism of the medical technology, is consistent with a 
liberal humanist understandings of agency where choice is constructed as the property 
of the individual understood as the power to act. In this interview Jack also talks about 
having to apologise to a clinician after the doctor took offence at Jack's suggestion that 
medicine was 'a patriarchal profession'. Jack brings a feminist critique of the medical 
profession to his experiences in the clinical setting and in doing so implies that his 
relationship with some of the medical specialists associated with his case was at times 
tense. His talk also suggests that, in his interactions with the medical specialists, he felt 
that he was occasionally positioned as a woman. These narratives and positions are 
available to Jack because he has lived as a woman. Harrison White (1992) argues that 
identities become salient when individuals encounter inconsistencies between narrative 
constructions of self and the social contexts in which they act. The way that Jack 
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negotiates this encounter, and takes up a particular subject position as a feminist in 
order to resist the inferior one that is made available to him by the medical specialist, is 
illustrative of White's point about the dynamic constitution of identity. 
Previously in this chapter I suggested that there is a tendency in feminist analyses of 
medical technologies to construct individuals who choose to surgically modify their 
bodies as cultural dupes. In the clinical setting Jack encounters inconsistencies between 
his social identity as male and his perception of how he is gendered female and 
marginalised by the medical specialist. Jack attempts to maintain control in this 
situation and to assert selfhood through indicating knowledgeability about feminist 
critiques of the medical profession - thereby positioning himself as a person with 
agency and as a female in this interaction. Post-structuralist constructions of agency 
sometimes characterise individuals as agents who are not reflexively aware of the 
discursive processes through which agency is constituted. For Jones, it is the expert 
theorists who knowledgeably foreground language and meaning as they 'wrestle to 
speak' (Jones, 1997: 263) about the post-structuralist subject who comes into existence 
in and through discourse. She argues that some inexperienced students [and 
presumably those members of the general public who are also unfamiliar with post-
structuralist theory] misrecognise the way that the acting, choosing, unitary liberal 
humanist subject is constituted/produced as such through language and discourse 
(Jones, 1997: 263-266). 
Donna Haraway (1991: 198) notes that agency transforms the entire project of 
producing social theory and argues that acknowledging the agency of research 
informants is the only way to avoid 'false knowledges' in the human sciences. For 
Haraway incorporating the agency of research informants into theorising is one way of 
ensuring that feminist theories remain relevant to the everyday world. Haraway does 
not however, consider how the agency of research informants is to be understood. In 
my earlier work on elective breast surgery I emphasised the agency and 
knowledgeability of women who engaged in cosmetic surgery. Agency was deployed as 
a critique of feminist analyses of cosmetic surgery that implicitly constructed women as 
'victims' or 'cultural dupes' of the cosmetic surgery establishment (Phibbs, 1994). 
Negative feminist analyses of women who engage in cosmetic surgery and theoretical 
debates surrounding humanist and post-structuralist approaches to agency also tend to 
simplify the way choices are made by individuals, and in doing so, to homogenise their 
experiences. Anne Game (1991: 6- 7), for example, argues that the emphasis on the 
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knowing subject in classical sociology has meant that individual desire for agency has 
largely been under-theorised. My research suggests that there are continuities between 
contemporary post-structuralist social theories of agency and the way in which clients 
attempt to recraft their identities through the use of medical technologies. 
In my earlier work on cosmetic surgery the women I spoke to were aware of the 
ways in which they were constituted in and through discourses about beauty, youth 
and femininity. Transsexual subjects also talked about having to conform to binary 
notions of gender in order to get by in the world. In other words, research informants 
recognised that they lived in a world that was discursively produced and they presented 
themselves as strategic actors within it. The deeply embodied nature of surgical 
modification, combined with feminist analyses that construct it as a problematic 
practice, suggest that contemporary theories about agency must be held in tension with 
how choices are made, and explained, by individual actors. A more complex analysis of 
agency and subjectivity is needed, one that explores how corporeality as well as 
discourses and practices, are co-implicated in the construction of identity by research 
informants. This complexity may be seen in the words of individuals who use medical 
technologies to craft their gender identities. Chapter Four, for example, considered how 
Robyn employed his/her 'problematic' body, medical discourses and medical 
technologies to craft his/her identity initially as male and later as female. In the 
following section I explore the place of corporeal diversity within post-structuralist 
theories which focus on the discursive production of bodies, actions and identities. 
Embodied action and corporeal identities 
Feminist attention to corporeal diversity is yet to be adequately represented in some 
sociological theories of agency. There are many good examples of post-structuralist 
writing that pay attention to corporeal diversity (See for example Davies, 2000; 
Williams and Bendelow, 1998; Robillard, 1996; Shildrick and Price, 1996; Williams, 
1996; Frank, 1991, 1995, 1996; Sobchack, 1995). While some sociologists pay 
attention to bodies (see Connell, 1995; Frank, 1996), this position is different from 
other sociologists who do not explore in detail how corporeality may impact on action 
(see Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994; Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). A lack of attention 
to the relationship between embodiment, identity and action, as well as to the corporeal 
limits of some bodies, is evident in Emirbayer and Goodwin's (1994) discussion of 
agency. Emirbayer and Goodwin argue, for example, that human agency ... 
145 
entails the capacity of socially embedded actors to appropriate, reproduce, and, 
potentially, to innovate upon received cultural categories and conditions of action in 
accordance with their personal and collective ideals, interests and commitments 
(Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994, 1443). 
In this under-socialised account, agency is a disembodied phenomenon. Access to 
the contradictions and ambiguities associated with theories of agency necessitates 
attention to the messy materialities of bodies. This requires recognition of embodied 
diversity rather than an implicit assumption of a universal and transcendent body. 
Sociologist Bob Connell (1995: 60) adopts a more controversial position about the 
relationship between agency and embodied differences, one that explores 'the activity, 
literally the agency of the bodies in social processes'. Or to put it another way, Connell 
asks that we take into account how embodied experience interacts with discourse, 
meaning and subjectivity to frame individual actions. In Chapter Four I discussed the 
way Robyn's understandings about and experience of her changing body impacted on 
her sense of self and the choices that she was able to make regarding her gender 
identity. 7 Arthur Frank (1996: 58) also argues that bodies are not simply positions in 
discourse or the product of social practices. For Frank it is only through bodily located 
knowledges, or individuals' experiences of the interaction between their flesh, forms of 
inscription and their intentions, that bodies come to have personal significance and 
meaning. In Chapter Seven I argue that identities are the outcome of a complex 
interaction between corporeality, culture and subjectivity. Transgender identities are 
managed in the context of occupying bodies that confound conventional discourses 
associated with sexual difference. The liminality of people who identify as transsexual 
or transgendered allows them to reflect on the relationship between gender identity, 
corporeality and medical technologies. I look at the contradictions and ambiguities 
associated with transgender embodiment through research informants' narratives 
about the relationship between identity, corporeality and gender reassignment 
technologies. 
Recent theoretical debates in sociology (Granovetter 1985; Emirbayer and Mische, 
1998: 962) and feminist philosophy (Davies, 1991, 1997; Jones, 1997) surrounding 
7 Actor-Network Theory considers the relationship between humans and nonhumans. It ascribes agency 
to artifacts in so far as they influence or force changes in human behaviour and/or social relations (Law, 
1992; Latour, 1992, 1999). In Robyn's case cells, hormones and body parts force changes in Robyn's 
gender identity. 
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agency address how understandings about embodied social action are produced. This 
involves recognising that public narratives about choice and action are socially 
produced. Similarly, 'agency' is a sociological construct and not something that is 
outside of discourse. Only a minority of people elect to permanently transition across 
binary gender categories or to surgically reconstruct their bodies, often in the face of 
resistance from others. Consequently the way they present themselves as people with 
the power to act, by drawing on discourses that may be identified with liberal humanist 
understandings of choice, is of particular relevance to sociological understandings of 
agency. In conversations with people who engage in these practices, informants often 
presented themselves as knowledgeable and informed people rather than those with 
limited awareness of the consequences of their decisions or arguments against the 
course of action that they had taken. In the next section I look at narratives of research 
informants as examples of the way that agency is social (White, 1992) as well as 
personal (Davis, 1991; Hausman, 1992). I provide examples of narratives about 
identity that involve simultaneous orientations to past, present and future (Emirbayer 
and Mische, 1998) and that recognise the messy materialities of everyday interaction. 
The agency, corporeality, action interface 
I suggested above that agency is tied to action, identity, corporeality and experience. 
The complexities associated with agency may be seen in the narratives of some of the 
people who participated in this research. This section explores the way research 
participants combine experience of their bodies, discourses of sexuality and gender, 
and knowledge about the pain and risks involved in surgery in order to construct 
themselves as agents or people with the power to act. In the following narrative Jack 
talks about his experience of inconsistencies between his narrative construction of self 
and his corporeality. Jack begins by talking about the way identity is collaborative1y 
produced through relationships to others in a particular (work) setting (Kondo, 1990). 
He then goes on to talk about the difficulties ITMs encounter doing 
masculinity/sexuality in the bedroom: 
I don't run around everyday saying all the time "hey I'm a transsexual male, I'm 
a female to male transsexual". So on the one hand, by not admitting my trany 
stuff I'm just living my life as a man, that is what everyone that I work with 
thinks, that is what everyone I meet and work with thinks, I mean I don't see 
why I need to. I mean I know who I am, I know what I have done with my life, 
I'm not a professional transsexual. But it is still an essence, it is still part of you. 
You will always be transitioning until the day you die, because there is always 
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something that is happening to you, whether it be another shot in the backside 
every two weeks, or whether it be a (hormonal) implant every six months or 
whatever. When you look down and find that six inch dick that you dream of is 
only one or two inches long, or when the one that you take to bed is made of 
rubber and you put it in the drawer at the end of the night. So one way or 
another, if you are still doing hormones or you are still pre-surgical in some 
senses, you will always be transitioning. But to my way of thinking, once you 
have got passed a certain point you are a man, well yeah I'm a trany that is sort 
of secondary, the primary thing is you are a male. 
Jack, FTM, 1996 
The personal and social nature of identity is indicated in both the concealment 
engaged in the public world of work and the vulnerability involved in the very private 
and intimate world of love-making. In the world of work identities are 
unproblematic ally constructed through public narratives about sexual difference which 
assume continuity between anatomy and social gender. Jack's body is sufficiently 
masculine, and his performance of masculinity convincing enough, so that he is able to 
pass in both at work. In the bedroom Jack's identity as a man is disrupted by his lack of 
a penis. In intimate situations Jack feels that his body does not allow him to pass 
convincingly as a male lover. In this narrative, the body acts as both a resource and as a 
constraint on identity. Jack's identity does not have an unproblematic continuity: in 
certain contexts he is comfortably male, in others he is uncomfortably other. For Jack 
the control or certainty over his identity that he thinks a penis would provide him with 
makes surgery an attractive option for the future - despite his reservations about the 
risks associated with the procedure. 
In this interview, Jack's talk draws on multiple and contradictory subject positions; 
he explains his identity in the medical setting, and in intimate situations, as that of a 
male with female genitalia. Secrecy and disclosure are determined according to shifting 
contexts. Among his network of personal friends, among other transsexuals and in the 
interview with me, Jack identifies as a FTM. At work he is male and secretive about his 
transsexualism. Jack has a partner who identifies as a lesbian. As a result of this 
relationship he continues to maintain a network of friends within his local lesbian 
community. He is saddened by the fact that, despite years of service in this community, 
he is sometimes marked problematically as a straight man, a position that Jack 
interprets as a challenge to his membership. Having a girlfriend means that in public 
Jack finds himself unmarked as a 'straight man'. Jack comments on the novelty of being 
unmarked in public space and he finds this situation to be somewhat ironic given his 
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personal history and politics. Jack resists the way others position him as 'straight' and 
therefore 'conventional' within the lesbian community, but accepts this positioning by 
his work colleagues and the general pUblic. It is not hard to imagine that negotiating 
these different contexts, and maintaining continuity/credibility in the presentation of 
his gender identity, requires a good memory, considerable skill and capacities for 
performance. While Jack's management of his identities enhances his sense of the 
fragile and embodied nature of agency, he is also self-conscious about his power to act 
- he is acutely aware that he might act differently. 
Davis and Harre (1990: 59) argue that liberal humanist and essentialist theories of 
action and identity are inclined to focus on routinised practices underpinned by an 
understanding of sUbjectivity as entirely self produced or pre-discursive, consistent and 
unitary. Post-structuralist theories tend to explore the contingent and contradictory 
nature of action and identity (Davies, 1993: xv). They argue that the humanist self is 
convincingly achieved through the 'ongoing, constitutive force of language' (Davies, 
1997: 274). Identity and action are discursively produced and therefore constantly in 
process. According to post-structuralist perspectives the continuity of the subject and 
agent within liberal humanism is invented through the production of consistent or 
non-contradictory story-lines and lived narratives: 
The sense of continuity that we have in relation to being a particular person is 
compounded out of continued embodiment and so of spatio-temporal continuity and 
shared interpretations of subject positions and the story-lines available within them 
(Davies and Harre, 1990: 59). 
Most people who identify as transsexual or transgendered have had experiences of 
attempting to craft coherent sexed identities in the context of occupying bodies in 
which their gender and anatomy are inconsistent. As a result, they sit on the cusp of 
tensions between these different social theories about action and identity. Or to put it 
another way, liberal humanist discourses and public narratives that assume consistent 
and unitary identities are at odds with transgender people's post-structuralist-like 
accounts of identity which are often experienced as non-unitary (Bloom, 1998), 
contingent and contradictory. The way in which people who transition across gender 
draw on and utilise a range of essentialist, liberal humanist and post-structuralist 
understandings about action and identity in research conversations is instructive for 
exploring the way that identities are taken up and reproduced in the everyday 
interactions of individuals, as personal experiences, unfolding events and shared 
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narratives interact. Jack, for example, currently identifies as a male, in public he has an 
unambiguously masculine body and yet he has a history of living as a female and of 
crafting an identity as a woman. For Jack, the continuity of identity is contextually 
crafted in relation to shifting discourses about maleness, femaleness, masculinity and 
femininity. Jack's story illustrates how sexed identities may be crafted independently of 
conventional discourses about the relationship between anatomy and social gender. 
In Jack's narrative the continuity of Jack's identity is experienced through his 
relationship(s) to discourses(s) about corporeality, femaleness, maleness/masculinity, 
and (hetero)sexuality rather than through a linear or essentialist concept of 
embodiment or identity. Jack is able to draw on a range of conventionally incompatible 
identities such as male, female, straight and lesbian. His story is therefore consistent 
with post-structuralist understandings of subjectivity as multiple, discontinuous, 
contingent and contradictory. At the same time Jack describes transitioning as 'an 
essence' because it is an ongoing process for him. In this narrative, essentialism is 
located in the daily corporeal work associated with maintaining a coherent male 
identity. Essentialism here is experienced as a verb, a process of doing, rather than as a 
noun which assumes a stable, coherent and pre-existing being (see Davies and Harre, 
1990: 47). The essentialist nature of being transgendered, or being male, in Jack's talk 
is consistent with a liberal humanist understanding of the self which acknowledges the 
routineness or consistency of actions associated with identity. For Jack, essence is 
embodied and actively constructed. This section of Jack's narrative suggests that for 
some people essentialism is more fluid and contradictory than is acknowledged in 
feminist debates surrounding humanist and post-structuralist theories about 
subjectivity. 8 
The different ways that Jack positions himself and is positioned by others in this 
interview illustrate the complex ways that identities are negotiated in everyday social 
encounters. Jack's identities are constituted and reconstituted through access to the 
subject positions which are made available to him in conversations that are 
collaboratively produced. Jack sometimes resists and sometimes goes along with these 
8 For a discussion of the fluid and contradictory nature of essentialism see the discussion of Fuss (1989: 1-
6) in footnote 22 Chapter Four, and Kirby (1991). Vicki Kirby (1991: 9) suggests, for example, that 
rethinking essentialism entails looking at how essence is 'installed "as such" and naturalized within ou1r 
throughtand our being' . In relation to transsexualism, see my discussion of essentialism in Elizabeth 
Grosz's (1994) work (footnote 21, Chapter Four). Also see Chapter Seven for a discussion of the 
problematic use of essentialism in Hausman's (1995) analysis of transsexualism. 
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positionings. Jack's story illustrates the way that people are passively positioned in 
public space. Davies and Harre (1990, 1999) observe that the pre-existing meanings 
associated with identity categories provide non-verbal contributions to identity. In 
Jack's narrative, male, female, masculinity, femininity, straight and, gay form part of 
the personal and cultural resources that other actors draw upon in constructing Jack's 
identity. In the public arena Jack's appearance, manner, body shape and clothing also 
provide non-verbal contributions to his identity. People make judgements about Jack's 
identity by combining this visual information with their historically formed 
expectations about the sorts of behaviours typically associated with the particular social 
categories that they identify with Jack. At the same time, discourses and practices of 
masculinity are resources that Jack uses to craft his identity as 'male'. Convincing 
performance relies on congruence between Jack's historically acquired knowledges 
about masculinity and that of his 'public'. The novelty of Jack's situation means that he 
notices the way that he is positioned by the people that he interacts with and by 
anonymous others in public space. 
Drawing on Nancy Frazer (1990), Davies and Harre argue that an individual's 
'experience of gender, ... their personal-social identity, can only be expressed and 
understood through the categories available to them in discourse' (Frazer cited in 
Davies and Harre, 1990: 45-46). Identities are not necessarily individual - for example 
professions or communities may have identities - however it is important to note that 
both group and individual identities are collaboratively produced. That is collective 
identities have individual 'faces' while individuals craft their identities in relation to the 
larger identities in which they are embedded - nation, sex, class etc. Harrison White 
(1992) argues that these categories are not internally coherent because human 
actions/ selves cut across these realms. It is the social dimension of agency, the 
interaction between the individual, stories and the social context of action that is of 
interest in White's account. 
The contextual nature of identity means that selfhood is experienced by individuals 
as both historically continuous and as multiple and fragmentary. Anita, a male-to-
female transsexual interviewed in 1997, talks about the pleasures and possibilities that 
sex reassignment offers. For Anita sex reassignment surgery offers the pleasure of 
seeing her 'self' reflected in her body image, and the possibilities of having a 
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relationship with a man as a heterosexual woman. At the same time, she suggests that 
she will still be 'basically the same person' - meaning that, as she is already female, 
surgery will not change her identity: 
I want sex reassignment surgery so I can look in the mirror and see myself 
reflected back, and so I can have a loving relationship with a male... (But) the 
surgery itself doesn't change anything, it doesn't mean that all of a sudden all of 
your problems are gone. Your whole history is still there in your mind, your 
whole experience, people you have known, you are still basically the same 
person you were before. For me it is still worthwhile because the ideal is to 
function sexually as a female, whether or not to be able to because of inadequate 
vaginal depth is something that is not the issue, as much as having the so called 
offending limb removed or whatever. I think maybe because it (the penis) is 
associated with what male is about in our society. 
Anita, MTF, 1997 
Anita's comments hint at the difficulties associated with maintaining a feminine 
identity while her anatomical sex and social gender are incongruent. At the same time 
Anita's observations draw on sets of understandings about the penis/phallus as site and 
sign of sexual difference, and a symbol of male superiority. One reading of Anita's talk 
is that her desire for sex reassignment surgery is a form of conformity to binary 
understandings of sex and gender as well as to heterosexual regulatory regimes 
(hegemonic conformitylfalse consciousness). Another is that Anita's distancing from 
sets of expectations about masculinity is a radical critique of that institution and 
personal form of resistance to hegemonic masculinity. Yet another reading may be that 
Anita's actions constitute an undermining of binary understandings of sex and gender 
as fixed and immutable. The point is that Anita's narrative may be read in a variety of 
different ways. It is precisely at those critical junctures where struggles over meanings 
occur for Anita that we find our analytical concepts challenged. 
Ken Plummer (1995: ZZ) argues that the meanings of stories are never fixed but 
shift in relation to the different spaces and times to which they are linked. The spatial 
dimensions of stories are discussed in Chapters Two and Nine. This section considers 
the way that metaphors of time are embedded in stories about action and identities 
(Massey, 1994; Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). Anita justifies her decision to have 
gender reassignment surgery in terms of her desire for a future identity in which her 
anatomical and social identities are consistent ("I can look in the mirror and see myself 
reflected back"). Surgery provides the resources and possibilities for Anita to imagine a 
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different future, one in which she constructs herself, and is constructed by her sexual 
partner, as a heterosexual female. Anita refers to a present in which she experiences 
her identity as a woman with a penis as fragmented or incomplete. At the same time 
Anita acknowledges that identities are historically continuous ("you are still basically 
the same person you were before" [the surgery]), and that post operatively her 
orientation to the present and the future will still be shaped by her past experiences 
("your whole history is still there in your mind"). Anita's narrative incorporates the 
active, fluid, contingent and social nature of agency. 
Medical technologies provide the resources for Anita to craft a new body and 
thereby change her embodied relationship to structural narratives about gender and 
sexuality. Anita refers to her own over-socialised concept of self; she uses medical 
technologies in order to appear a certain way and to have certain types of penetrative 
heterosexual encounters. However she also suggests that the presence or absence of a 
penis is symbolic because her 'female self' is not transformed by the surgery. At the 
same time the female self that seeks the surgery is also a self with memories of life as a 
male. Anita's identities are fractured by a lack of continuity between body and mind, 
past and present. This rupture enables Anita to think about how her identity is 
constructed in relation to her anatomy and sexuality. 
In the following narrative, Chelsea talks about deliberately locating herself in 
discourses and practices surrounding masculinity and femininity. She is actively 
engaged in crafting her gender identity and, at the same time, recognises the 
constructedness of gender in her own practices: 
Chelsea: I think ultimately in society gender is arbitrary, and fitting people into 
an arbitrary pattern you are going to have people who don't fall into any 
categories and will fall out of them, or they have to adapt to them, and I guess I 
am the same. I enjoy being a woman, but I have to work at it, because I have 
had all this social overlay on me, I have to unlearn what it means to be a man. 
SF: So that suggests that what it means to be a man is not naturaL 
Chelsea: Exactly, what it is to be a man is not the opposite to what it is to be a 
woman, because there are lots of qualities that fall into both categories ... and it 
is not a one dimensional scale from masculine to feminine. 
153 
SP: That raises the point about whether transsexuals are unstable victims of 
binary gender categories? 
Chelsea: Well I think there comes a point where you have to be unstable in 
order to make change, for the change to take effect and to exist. If you are 
ultimately very stable and you are happy in your role then you would never 
make a change. And it is when the pain of staying the way you are exceeds the 
pain of change that you make that change. I think there comes a point in every 
transgendered person's life where the pain of staying who you are, and 
pretending to be what you are, exceeds the pain of making the change. And it 
varies in each person's life, I began transitioning when I was in my 30s. I wish I 
began my transition earlier but I didn't because of social constraints. I thought 
if I began my transition one of two things would happen. I would upset 
everybody around me and I would be put away in a mental institution and 
because of that I didn't make my transition until much later. 
Chelsea suggests that masculinity and femininity are socially constituted yet also 
unstable categories ("gender is arbitrary"). Her narrative is consistent with the view 
that male and female, masculinity and femininity are not fixed essences or unchanging 
features that belong exclusively to men or women ("there are qualities that fall into 
both categories"). Similarly, her talk about 'working at' femininity and 'unlearning' 
masculinity indicates that Chelsea is aware that gender is a performative construct that 
is produced in the everyday interactions of individuals (Butler, 1990, 1993). 
People who transition across binary gender categories draw on and utilise ideas 
about action that may be identified with humanist theories about agency and identity. 
Chelsea indicates that an awareness of the negative consequences that may be 
associated with transitioning across binary gender categories prevented her from 
following this desired course of action. Her relationships to others, and fears about 
being portrayed as 'abnormal' and therefore 'mentally ill', acted as constraints on her 
initial ability to make choices about her gender identity. Chelsea recognises the way 
that transgender people are positioned as 'other' in relation to discourses and practices 
that assume continuity between bodies and identities. Early in the interview she refers 
to her over-socialised male-self in which gender roles and attributes determine action 
and identity ("staying what you are"; "pretending to be what you are"). Prior to 
transitioning across binary gender categories Chelsea's orientation to a future identity 
in which her body image and social gender are consistent is foreclosed. She utilises 
humanist discourses that construct a knowing subject to eventually make choices about 
her gender identity in the face of disapproval and risk. 
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Granovetter (1985) argues that an analysis of action that pays attention to the way 
that behaviour is 'embedded in networks of inter-personal relations' is able to 'avoid the 
extremes of under and over -socialised accounts of action' (Granovetter, 1985: 504). 
Chelsea's narrative does not fit comfortably with an under-socialised account of action 
because she does not make self-interested choices that are minimally influenced by 
social relations and/or structures. Chelsea describes, for example, how kinship 
relations delayed her decision to change her gender identity because she did not want 
to upset established connections with significant others. General assumptions about 
lines of connection between anatomical bodies and social gender also contribute to 
Chelsea's decision to defer her transition across binary gender categories. At the same 
time, social structural factors, such as gender roles or gender attributes, do not wholly 
determine Chelsea's decision to change her gender identity as an over-socialised 
account of action would suggest. In order to reconstruct her identity as female, Chelsea 
eventually circumvents normative understandings about the relationship between 
bodies and identities. Or to put it another way, Chelsea's female identity is not 
determined by the sexed social category to which she was ascribed at birth. Making 
sense of Chelsea's narrative involves attention to her immediate social context and the 
established histories of social relations that frame her interactions with others 
(Granovetter, 1985: 486). In this regard, Chelsea's talk is consistent with Granovetter's 
(1985) arguments about the way in which purposive actions are tied to the inter-
contingencies of routine interactions that are simultaneously embedded in ongoing 
systems of social relations. 
A post-structuralist perspective would consider the way that Chelsea's actions as a 
'knowing subject' are produced by discourses about gender that are manifest in his/her 
everyday actions and in the telling of the story. Post-structuralist perspectives suggest 
that actors are not free to take up subject positions at will because individuals are able 
to choose from only a limited repertoire of available narratives, positions or 
representations. Transgender identities are excluded from the range of subject positions 
that are usually available to actors. Chelsea reflects on the way that her female 
sUbjectivity was thwarted because transgender identities are not easily accommodated 
within the range of available cultural and public narratives. For Chelsea, stories about 
transsexualism, embodiment, masculinity and femininity act as both resources for 
identity and as constraints on identity. In this narrative Chelsea is both constituted by 
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and takes up different subject positions as male and as female. Or to put it another way, 
she is both a constituted subject and a choosing subject. Through transitioning Chelsea 
characterises herself as making choices or as having agency. At the same time she 
recognises that she lives in a world that is discursively produced and she presents 
herself as a strategic actor. 
Agency and identities 
This chapter has explored differences and connections between liberal humanist and 
post-structuralist theories of agency. I have suggested that links may be developed 
between different epistemological positions on 'agency' through attention to narratives 
about action and identity articulated by people who participated in this research 
project. Most people do not consciously think of themselves as 'doing agency'. Some of 
the people who participated in this research did talk about agency in language that may 
be identified with a theoretical positioning. These people were actively engaged in 
crafting their identities and, at the same time, recognised the constructedness of gender 
in their own practices and in the practices of non-transgendered others. 
Transgender identities are managed in the context of occupying bodies that 
confound conventional discourses associated with sexual difference. This lack of fit 
(White, 1992) between embodiment, SUbjectivity and 'ordinary' discourses about 
sexual difference as immutable allowed people who identified as transsexual or 
transgendered to reflect on the relationship between bodies, identities and gendered 
conventions. People who transition across binary gender categories have the capacity to 
tell inconsistent or contradictory stories about themselves. They are aware that their 
biography does not fit with the social! grammatical conventions for lived narratives to 
be consistent and linear (Davies and Harre, 1990: 59). In negotiating identity in the 
context of significant discontinuities between their corporeality and their gender 
identities, Jack, Anita and Chelsea sometimes emphasised essentialist and unitary 
identities as male/female or as transgendered, while at other times they provided post-
structuralist accounts of identity as constructed, shifting and contingent. 
Transgendered people draw on essentialist understandings about themselves, 
presenting themselves as a unitary and consistently gendered subject with agency. At 
the same time they inhabit bodies that they strategically work on and they operate with 
multiple gendered and shifting identities. Consequently, the way people positioned 
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themselves in public narratives of sex and gender, and constructed themselves as 
people with the power to act, is able to be accessed in research informants' talk about 
the use of medical technologies for crafting gender. How embodiment impacts on the 
discursive positioning of subjects, and the constitution of subjectivity, is also explored in 
the following chapter. Similarities and differences between feminist analyses of 
cosmetic surgery and gender reassignment surgery are considered, as are connections 
and differences in the talk of clients who engage in elective surgical technologies for 
'crafting gender'. 
Crafting gender through medical technologies 
Corporeality as resource and as constraint 
SP: Do you think that gender reassignment surgery is different to cosmetic 
surgery? 
" .. .I'd like to answer, yes, they are different, but in reality they are not, because 
all sex reassignment surgery, besides the functional aspect of being able to have 
sex in your chosen gender role, is cosmetic appearance. So in reality it is no 
different than cosmetic surgery, other than it can ease one's mind. But then 
again cosmetic surgery does that for people as well - they might be paranoid 
about their nose or whatever. So no, I don't think it is any different. .. ". 
Anita, MTF, 1996 
Anita's talk simultaneously collapses the distinction between cosmetic surgery and 
sex reassignment technologies and uses sexuality to maintain a distinction between 
them. Anita considers that the only difference between cosmetic surgery and gender 
reassignment surgery is the "functional aspect of being able to have sex in your chosen 
gender role". She suggests that both forms of surgery are performed for 'cosmetic 
appearance' and that they may 'ease' the client's mind. Unlike cosmetic surgery, male-
to-female gender reassignment surgery is not just aesthetic, it is functional in that it 
makes it possible for Anita to act in certain ways, to engage in penetrative heterosexual 
sex in her chosen gender identity. In this narrative, the focus is on changing the body 
to 'ease the mind'. This assumes that minds are 'disturbed' by bodies that do not 
conform to certain expectations. Bodies should therefore be brought into line by 
surgery and it is this that is identified as one of the points of connection between 
cosmetic surgery and gender reassignment surgery. 
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Medical technologies associated with crafting gender make available a range of new 
possibilities for actors, who may in turn reshape their design, distribution and use.1 In 
New Zealand for example, collective action associated with the risks of silicone breast 
implants have led to new technologies in the field of breast implants and new 
regulation of the relations between surgeons and clients. In short, technologies, 
including medical technologies, are inseparable from relationships of power. However, 
the meanings associated with different forms of surgical technologies and the way they 
are defined and understood at the level of everyday interaction, practice, and use may 
be quite diverse. Interviews with transgender people suggest that the significance of 
and moral codings attributed to those individuals who choose to engage in breast 
augmentation are different when it is used to enhance femininity, as in the case of 
women, to when it is used to change gender as in the case of male-to-female 
transsexuals. Despite this diversity, there are, I think, quite striking similarities first in 
feminist analyses of these practices, and second in the talk of clients who use cosmetic 
surgery and gender reassignment technologies. Indeed, one interpretation of this 
practice is that both cosmetic surgery clients and sex reassignment surgery clients are 
in some ways using medical technologies to craft gender and to construct themselves as 
agents, as people with the power to act. 
This chapter considers some of the connections between sex reassignment 
surgeries and the general category of cosmetic surgery. Distinctions between sex 
reassignment surgery and cosmetic surgery are not clearly defined, as there are many 
ways in which these surgical categories may be understood as involving similar 
discourses and practices. Overlaps between cosmetic surgery and gender reassignment 
surgery extend to the feminist literature in the two areas, the medical! surgical training 
required, including techniques used by surgeons, the types of surgery used by clients 
and the way clients and practitioners articulate the desired outcomes of the surgery. 
This chapter explores similarities and differences in cosmetic surgery and gender 
reassignment surgery with a particular focus on issues of agency. Clients' talk about 
1 For example, complaints from women about problems experienced with silicone beast implants led to 
implants being withdrawn from sale in New Zealand in 1994. Saline implants are now presented as an 
option to silicone. Women who choose silicone implants are required to agree to quite detailed conditions 
prior to surgery, first by acknowledging known and unknown problems associated with silicone implants 
and second by giving formal signed consent to be placed on a register (Phibbs, 1994; Aush'in and Phibbs, 
1996). These conditions were implemented as a solution to the 1993/94 international scandal 
surrounding silicone breast implants and to complaints about problems experienced by New Zealand 
women. 
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their surgical procedures is discussed in the context of critical academic analysis of 
these forms of body modification. 
Gender reassignment technologies 
Most feminists who write about gender reassignment surgery take a negative view of 
this form of surgical reconstruction (Raymond, 1980; Garber, 1992; Hausman, 1995; 
Fausto-Sterling, 1993; Lienhert, 1995, 1998; Grosz 1994). They tend to explain clients' 
relationship to, and use of, sex reassignment technologies in terms of conformity to 
heterosexual regulatory regimes and the binary sex/gender system (Raymond, 1980; 
Billings and Urban, 1982; Butler, 1990; Hausman, 1995). According to this view the 
medical technologies involved in sex reassignment are shaped by dominant 
heterosexual understandings about sexuality, they reflect certain gender relations and 
assumptions about sexual difference and in turn shape public narratives about gender 
and therefore (in)appropriate gender identities (Haraway, 1991; Connell 1995). 
Moreover, individuals who engage in gender reassignment are constructed as cultural 
dupes and/or victims of the rigid binary "sex/gender system" in Western societies 
(Hausman, 1995: 140) . 
. Bernice Hausman (1992, 1995) provides a detailed historical analysis of the 
development of gender reassignment technologies and the emergence of the transsexual 
subject. Her central argument is that the contemporary concept of gender was invented 
through the emergence of the transsexual subject within medical discourses (Hausman, 
1995: 7). In this account, transsexuals are not victims of the sex/gender system, but are 
instead unwitting colluders in the medical and cultural maintenance of binary sex and 
gender categories (Hausman 1995: 139). The story of the transsexual as the unwitting 
colludeI' in the cultural maintenance of sexual difference is in contrast to Hausman's 
story of the transsexual as active agent in his/her interactions with medical 
professionals. Transsexuals, for example, 'worked to refigure' existing psychological 
categories in order to distinguish themselves from homosexuals and transvestites 
(Hausman, 1995: 130). 
Transsexuals were successful in getting doctors to target their bodies and not their 
behaviours for medical intervention (Hausman, 1995: 130). Early transsexuals, such 
as Agnes (Garfinkel, 19G7; Hausman, 1995: I-G) and Wegener (Hausman, 1992: 270-
271), manipulated sympathetic doctors into providing hormonal and surgical solutions 
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to their 'psychological malaise' (Hausman, 1995: 15). Attention to pioneer or 'celebrity' 
transsexuals - Agnes, Einar Wegener (Lili Elbe), Christine Jorgensen, Renee Richards,z 
- and to medicalised transsexual subjectivity means that the voices of 'ordinary' 
transgender people tend to be absent from Hausman's work. Hausman declares, for 
example, that as transsexual subjectivity is constructed by a demand for surgical and 
hormonal sex change, transsexual agency may be traced through the discourses of the 
medical professionals (Hausman, 1995: 110). Hausman's analysis tends to present 
transsexuals as strategic colluders with medical clinicians in a horrifying medical 
appropriation of the power to define socio-cultural understandings of gender. 
According to Hausman: 
[that] the demand for sex change became the key signifier for transsexualism 
demonstrates the centrality of technology to the consolidation of transsexual 
subjectivity - asking for technologically mediated sex change is one and the same 
gesture to name oneself as transsexual and to request recognition as transsexual 
from the medical institution. In addition, by making their desired treatment 
absolutely clear, transsexuals encouraged a therapeutic response on the part of 
clinicians. In this way, transsexuals were actively engaged in defining their position 
within medical discourses (Hausman, 1995: 129). 
The emphasis on demand for surgery as the primary symptom of transsexualism 
(Hausman, 1992: 278) makes transsexualism, and subsequent access to hormonal and 
surgical sex change, dependent upon self-diagnosis. Transsexualism is a medically 
regulated form of social identity that 'pushes patients toward an alluring world of 
artificial vaginas and penises rather than toward self-understanding and sexual politics' 
(Hausman, 1995: 128). Furthermore, the precarious identity of the MTF transsexual 
subject is evident in their ongoing need to use a range of technologies in order to mask 
their original sex: 
Genetic sex cannot be altered; other secondary sex characteristics remain. In order 
to maintain the form of the chosen sex, transsexuals must engage daily in material 
practices that counteract the operation of those physiological processes that signify 
their original sex. Most of these practices are not unique to transsexual subjects 
(hormone intake, electrolysis, make-up, hairstyling, manicure, among others), but 
taken together these practices take up a significant portion of the transsexual 
subject's life and define the experience of living in a transsexual body. These 
material practices serve as reminders of transsexuals' transgressions of their original 
sexual physiology because they must be engaged in routinely in order to maintain 
the physical signifiers of their chosen sex. While this may, in fact, be a result of the 
2 See Hausman (1992, 1995) for her discussions ofLili Elbe (1992: 270-271; 1995: 15-19);Jorgensen 
(1992: 275-278); Anges (1995: 1-6); and Renee Richards (1995: 11-12). 
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resistance of the body's "real code" to the technological regulation of its processes, it 
signifies that this disruption of sexual difference is contingent upon continued and 
accurate technical management of physiological processes (Hausman, 1995: 240). 
Hausman implies that transsexuals' compulsive relation to technology is problematic 
for three reasons. First, it masks the extent to which transsexuals are subjects who 
'engineer' themselves; second, this self-engineered sUbjectivity is less 'authentic' than 
other forms of subjectivity because of its ongoing dependence upon technology; and 
third, it shores up binary notions of sex and gender (Hausman, 1995: 139-140). In 
Hausman's account, medical technologies are presented along a continuum of 
technologies of gender, including makeup, hairstyling, electrolysis, manicures, 
hormones, breast enhancement, sex reassignment. Hausman suggests that, because 
MTF transsexuals have to use more of these technologies in order appear feminine, 
their construction of femininity is less authentic than that constructed by "genetic 
women" (sic) (Hausman, 1995: 140). Her argument that subjectivities crafted through 
surgical intervention are not as authentic as other forms of SUbjectivity implicitly 
invokes the natural pre-surgical body in opposition to the 'artificial' post-operative 
body. In this sense, Hausman's analysis is underpinned by a form of biological 
essentialism that locates identity in the 'natural' (i.e. pre-surgical) physiological body. 
This argument suggests that socially constructed sUbjectivities are more 'natural' than 
technologically constructed subjectivities (Garber, 1993: 334). The hormonally 
enhanced feminine sUbjectivities of transsexuals, and presumably HRT consuming 
menopausal women (or 'Viagra' consuming men), also fall into this category of 
illegitimately crafted subjectivities, as do the surgically reconstructed bodies of women 
who use cosmetic surgery. 
Norrie May Welby, a transgender performance artist interviewed for this research, 
draws on ideas that are consistent with Hausman's argument about the centrality of 
medical technologies to the development of transsexualism and at the same time turns 
this argument on its head. Welby acknowledges transsexuals' dependence on medical 
technologies, but rather than privileging a medical narrative of the demand for sex 
change surgery s/he locates this demand, and therefore transsexuals' dependence on 
medicine, in social relations and processes that privilege normative understandings 
about the relationship between the biological body and social gender. 
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I want to emphasise that sex change surgery is only sought because it exists. 
Prior to its invention it was not sought. There were not individuals seeking to 
change their anatomy prior to medicine's inventing that technology which 
happened partly as a result of them operating on intersex children, partly as a 
result, in my view, of them doing genital surgery on people damaged by land 
mines... I believe that in a society where I'm OK, you're OK, is the rule, not the 
exception, then no-one will bother to seek any form of cosmetic surgery. And I 
define cosmetic surgery as that which is undertaken not to save our lives, or not 
to make us more biologically healthy, but to assist those to fit into some role that 
we think we should fit into. Whether that is strictly gendered male or female, or 
whether we think as women we have to look young and attractive when we are 
fifty, and have face lifts ... 
Norrie May Welby, 1997 
Welby locates the demand for surgeries to recraft identity in a complex nexus 
between technological advances in medicine and social relations and processes that 
privilege lines of connection between anatomy and social gender. Welby suggests that 
individuals who seek either cosmetic surgery or sex reassignment surgery are pressured 
into altering their bodies by the availability of the surgery and social expectations about 
youth and beauty or lines of connection between genitals and social gender. Both 
women who engage in cosmetic surgery and individuals who use gender reassignment 
technologies in acquiescing to these pressures create and perpetuate the demand for the 
surgical alteration of the body. Welby argues that there is very little distinction 
between cosmetic surgery and gender reassignment surgery because both forms of 
surgery are performed to make bodies conform to conventional expectations. S/he 
locates the demand for surgical alteration in social expectations about gender and 
suggests that clients internalise these expectations to the extent that they are prepared 
to use medical technologies to recraft their gender identities. His/her analogy 
simultaneously collapses the distinction between cosmetic surgery and gender 
reassignment surgery as discrete medical procedures, the distinction between the social 
origins of these surgeries and the distinction between clients who use these procedures. 
Both Welby and Hausman are resistant to surgically crafted sUbjectivities and operate 
with what Granovetter (1985) would refer to as an over-socialised concept of 
transsexuals and women who access cosmetic surgery. 
Welby and Hausman are critical of the construction of self through surgical means. 
Norrie May Welby suggests that women who engage in cosmetic surgery, and people 
who have or desire sex reassignment surgery, do so in order to bring their body into 
line with generalised understandings about how their bodies should appear. Hausman 
(1992: 288-289) correctly points out that sex change surgery is made possible only 
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through the acceptance of fixed notions of psychological identity, while the body is 
viewed as a plastic and malleable commodity. The same argument could also be made 
in relation to the discourses and practices surrounding cosmetic surgery. The location 
of gender identity in the psychological realm privileges the mind over the body, and 
this analysis implicitly deploys a mind/body split argument. However, conceiving of 
the physiological body as the 'natural' template on which normative constructions of 
social gender are built, also in some respects privileges the body over the mind. An 
explicit example of the way that a form of biological essentialism associated with the 
natural body is used in Hausman's work is provided in the following extract in which 
Hausman argues that attention to the way transsexuals use technology to engineer their 
chosen sUbjectivity in the face of the bodily resistances from its 'real' (presumably 
genetic) 'code' is to: 
recognise the significance of the surgical and hormonal construction of the natural 
body to the social configuration of subjectivity (Hausman, 1992: 301 and 1995: 140 
italics my emphasis). 
Hausman's analysis of transsexualism does not adequately explore the way that 
biology is also a social discourse that is open, shifting and contingent (Haraway, 1991; 
Findlay, 1995). Thomas Laqueur (1987, 1990), Donna Haraway (1991), Deborah 
Findlay (1995), Marilyn van den Wijngaard (1997) and Alice Dreger (1998) argue, for 
example, that scientific statements about 'sexual difference' are not independent of the 
cultural work that is done by 'gender'. Thomas Laqueur (1990) traces the historical 
development of the modern two-sex model. He notes that, following the scientific 
revolution, the 'cosmos' could no-longer justify hierarchical differences between the 
sexes. By the Eighteenth Century the stable ahistorical sexed body provided the 
epistemological foundation for the social order. Within this model the 'uterus provided 
the naturalistic explanation and justification for the social status of women' (Laqueur, 
1990: 150). Furthermore, Laqueur states that these dualistic understandings of sexual 
difference are 'imagined': 
Despite the new epistemological status of nature as the bedrock of distinctions, and 
despite the accumulation of facts about sex, sexual difference in the centuries after 
the scientific revolution was no more stable than it had been before. Two 
incommensurable sexes were, and are, as much the products of culture as was, and 
is, the one-sex model (Laqueur, 1990: 153). 
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Laqueur (1990: 151) suggests that the modern sexes continue to be 'invented'. 
Donna Haraway (1991: 76) also argues that claims about sexual difference that 
identify the 'truth' of biology in the origin of the gene are indicative of the power of 
language to 'make flesh'. Scientific knowledge, nature, the gene and the word are 
pressed into service as technologies of power for an 'androcentric science'. Deborah 
Findlay (1995) and Marianne van den Wijngaard (1997) provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the forms of androcentric bias that have characterised sex-difference 
research. They argue that dualistic understandings of the body, sexuality and 
behaviour that have originally been constructed through laboratory research are 
simplified and maintained in medical practices (Findlay, 1995: 37-39; Van den 
Wijngaard, 1997: 84). Research findings that did not fit with dualistic understandings 
of masculinity and femininity were less likely to be accepted as 'scientific fact'. Van den 
Wijngaard argues for example that: 
Dual images of masculinity and femininity were conditions for the scientific 
acceptance of the prenatal hormone paradigm: Presence of androgens, "male" 
hormones, made a brain masculine, absence of this chemical made a brain feminine. 
The similarity with Freud's thinking is striking: presence or absence of a penis is 
constitutive for being a man or a woman (Van den Wijngaard, 1997: 97) . 
. The dualistic ideology concerning hormonal functioning is also evident in the area of 
genetics. Alice Dregar (1998) notes that the X and Y chromosome pattern is typically 
understood as determining sexual difference. However, genes related to nonsexual 
characteristics are located on the X chromosome and genes related to sexual 
development appear on chromosomes other than X and Y chromosomal pattern 
(Dreger, 1998: 4). The relationship between XX chromosomes and female bodies and 
XY chromosomes and male bodies is also disrupted by people with androgen 
insensitivity syndrome (AIS).3 These people have XY (male) chromosomal patterns and 
female bodies. The construction of AIS as a pathological condition maintains the binary 
whereby XX is aligned with female bodies and XY with male bodies (Dregar, 1998: 7; 
Kitzinger, 2000: 388). In this regard the genetic code located in the 'sex chromosomes' 
is privileged over physiology. 
3 Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (CAIS) occurs in one in every 20,000 foetuses with 
approximately half diagnosed at birth and the remainder at puberty when menstruation fails to begin. 
Partial Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (PAIS), a variant of AIS, results in mixed genitals (See Kitzinger, 
2000). 
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The combined works of Laqueur, Haraway, Van den Wijngaard and Dreger suggest 
that scientific discourses about anatomy, hormones and genetics are shaped by cultural 
understandings about maSCUlinity and femininity. Hausman's (1995:140) reference to 
genetic sex as that which cannot be altered - as evidence of the 'truth' of male and 
female biology and by implication the falsity of post-operative transsexual bodies - is 
problematic in light of these arguments. Or to put it another way, Hausman's 
construction of transsexuals as 'other' maintains 'the fiction of proper and normal 
genders' (Halberstam, 1998: 162). Hausman does not take the opportunity to question 
the way in which the ideology of sex change surgery, and her objections to it, privileges 
the genitals as the site and sign of sexual difference. Rather than taking an either/or 
approach to the relationship between the mind and body, it may be more productive to 
explore contradictions and ambiguities in the way that mind, body and technologies are 
co-implicated in the construction of identity - of which transsexualism, sex 
reassignment surgery and elective breast surgery are exemplary examples. 
Hausman's (1995: 139) argument that transsexuals use a range of technologies to 
engineer themselves rests on an assumption of an undifferentiated transsexual who 
occupies a unitary position in relation to clinicians and medical technologies. 
Transsexual or trangendered people are not unified in their identification with the label 
'tl'anssexual' or 'transgender'. Nor are they unified in their relationship to, and use of, 
medical technologies. There are just as many differences between individual 
transsexual's opinions about medical technologies as there are similarities, the former 
being potential sources of cleavage within transgender communities.4 Wendy, a post-
operative male-to-female transsexual interviewed in 1996 suggests that medical 
narratives about transsexualism do not reflect the diversity that she has observed 
among people who identify as transsexual or transgendered: 
What I am saying is that there is accepted dialogue, language and terminology, 
to describe groups of people, but these are often abstractions, and they are often 
borrowed from the medical world, and they fit uneasily with what I have 
observed myself over the last say two years of (people who have gender issues) 
coming into contact with me. 
Wendy,~TF, 1996 
4 See Chapter Nine for a discussion of social and political differences among people who identify as 
transgendered or transsexual. 
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All transsexuals do not occupy the same position in relation to sex reassignment 
surgery - for example there are significant class and gender differences as well as 
differences on the basis of surgical status, sexual orientation and culture. Jimmy who 
identifies as a "trany boy" talks specifically about this difference in the relationship to 
medical technologies for female- to-male transsexuals: 
... in my opinion MTFs can go out and get an operation, or they can raise the 
money, they start off as men so their income is, like it is a big assumption I 
guess, but their income is better to start with and they usually fall into those 
kind of jobs where they are earning more, or they have got the money there to 
start with. Then also surgically in terms of operations and stuff it is quicker for 
a MTF than a FTM. [For FTMs] it is a more drawn out process, and it is more 
expensive in the long run and it is more of a health-taxing thing. 
Jimmy, FTM, 1996 
A sense of frustration at the lack of surgical options for FTMs is also captured in the 
following narrative in which Jack talks about being unable to be spontaneous as a 
heterosexual male. Jack also draws on a master script that associates heterosexuality 
with penetrative intercourse: 
With the boys I guess most of us really do desire, it is a real pain in the butt 
having to put a dick on and a dick off in the day time and have another one for 
sex. A detachable penis is the sign of our lives. We have to choose what time of 
the day it is. Is it time for a fuck, or is it time to be just using day wear, you 
know what I mean. I suppose we are lucky, it is like a girl with a frock, she has 
her day wear and she has her evening wear, ours are like stuck in our pants 
instead. 
Jack, FTM, 1996 
Female-to-male transsexuals are not positioned in relation to medical technologies in 
the same way as male-to-female transsexuals. Judith Halberstam (1998: 161) also 
critiques Hausman for her failure to critically analyse differences between the surgical 
options that are available to MTFs and FTMs. Hausman (1992: 286-289) does outline 
the history of the development of phalloplasty and vaginoplasty. She comments that 
'there is a significant gender gap in the alterability of human genital tissue'. For 
Hausman these differences are not the result of an androcentric medical profession 
more interested in constructing vaginas than perfecting penises. Instead they are 'real 
distinctions' that are the result of corporeal limitations in (re)constructing 'the physical 
signifiers of sex on the operating table' (Hausman, 1995: 288). 
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Some feminist analyses of transsexualism link demand for surgical sex change to a 
denial of homosexuality and/or conformity to heterosexual expectations about lines of 
connection between genitals and social gender (Raymond, 1980; Butler, 1990: 71; 
Findlay, 1995: 42-43). This interpretation of transsexualism privileges sexuality over 
gender; instead feminist analyses of hormonal and surgical sex change should be open 
to the possibility that gender identity may be more crucial than conformity to 
heterosexual regulatory regimes. In the following narrative Jack suggests that for many 
lesbian identified MTF transgenders it is sexuality that is fixed, gender and anatomy are 
changeable: 
... They [lesbian identified MTFs] still feel that they are women, and they are still 
attracted to women. What they are doing is they are changing their gender they 
are not changing their sexuality. Like I'm still attracted to women but then 
again I've started becoming attracted to men too. Whoever you are sexually 
attracted to is not necessarily affected by the fact that you are changing your 
gender. People make that presumption, they get confused by gender and 
sexuality being one and the same, and they sure as hell ain't. That is why I 
consider myself a transgenderist not a transsexual. 
Jack, FTM,1996 
For Jack the term 'transgender' more accurately represents his journey across binary 
gender categories than does the term 'transsexual'. Jack resists the label transsexual, as 
for Jack the words 'sex' and 'sexual' contained within the term 'transsexual' 
problematically collapse the distinction between biological sex and sexuality, a 
distinction which Jack wants to maintain. Chelsea also wants to maintain a distinction 
between sexuality and gender. She suggests that a transgendered person's gender 
identity is not defined by who you have sex with: 
I think this is a misguided idea that gender is the same thing as sex. The bottom 
line for me is that who you have sex with does not define yourself as either a 
man or a woman. I've seen this criticism labeled at, there are some lesbians who 
think that transgendered guys are just lesbians with lots of guilt, which is silly 
because I have seen transgendered men and transgendered women have all sorts 
of sexual orientations and some women are lesbians, others are hetero, others 
are bi-sexual, and the same thing with the men. It [sexuality and gender] has got 
no relationship whatsoever. 
Chelsea, MTF, 1996 
Jack, a FTM 'transgenderist' and Chelsea, a MTF disrupt assumptions about lines of 
continuity between sexed identities, biological sex, social gender and sexuality. For 
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Jack, sexuality is fixed, gender is changeable, this is in contrast to Angie who indicates 
that it is sexuality that is changeable and gender that is fixed: 
I have read an article that suggested that there were 18 sexes going from 
straight macho male to straight feminine female and right down the centre was 
transsexual because that was the cross-over between the two. Basically it went 
straight male macho masculine, straight male feminine, gay male masculine, 
gay male feminine, then there was a couple of things like Klinefelter's syndrome 
and the female side basically mirroring what was on the male side. So you have 
got two genders but you have got varying sexualities. 
Angie, MTF, 1996 
Sexuality occupied a contradictory position among the transgendered people to 
whom I talked. In Chapter Two Nick suggested that gender and sexuality were 
different: 'A lot of people confuse gender and sexuality and the two have nothing to do 
with each other'. Others employed sexuality as a way to shore up their social gender 
identities as male or as female. At the beginning of this chapter, for example, Anita 
suggested that she wanted to have genital surgery so that she could 'function sexually' 
in her 'chosen gender role'. Transsexuals who adopt an either/or approach to gender 
by choosing to have gender reassignment surgery, and who engage in homosexual 
encounters post surgery, disrupt the sex/gender binary and render problematic 
oppositional readings of post-operative transsexual bodies as conformity to 
heterosexual regulatory regimes. 
Hausman (1995: 110) argues that transsexuals' use of sex change surgery is 
illustrative of their "desperation" and "dependence" on medical technologies. 
Hausman's negative analysis of medical technologies could be criticised for being overly 
pessimistic and moralistic. Analyses of patriarchal power, as operating through 
violence, objectification and repression, are unable to explain adequately why many 
transsexuals view medical technologies as beneficial and enabling or why transsexuals 
voluntarily engage in them (Sawicki, 1991; Davis, 1991, 1993). Rather than focusing 
exclusively on the terrain of control in cultural production, analyses of sex change 
surgery should investigate the ways in which forms of conformity, resistance and 
refusal are enacted through surgical alteration of the body. This involves analysing 
discursive texts and the meanings, pleasures and experiences of individuals who use 
sex reassignment technologies (Shultze, 1990: 66-67). 
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Halberstam (1998: 160) also suggests that, in defining transsexual subjectivities, 
Hausman attributes too much power to the medical professionals. Halberstam argues 
for example that: 
There are many bodies that escape and elude medical taxonomies, of bodies that 
never present themselves to the physician's gaze, of subjects who identify within 
categories that emerge as a consequence of sexual communities and not in relation 
to medical or psychosexual research (Halberstam, 1998: 161). 
In Sydney, in 1996/97, medical narratives about transsexualism, decisions to use 
gender reassignment technologies and individual desire for surgery, were embedded 
within critiques of medicalisation and narratives about identity developed by 
transgender activists that circulated within the transgender community. Unlike 
cosmetic surgery, genital reassignment surgery for MTFs, and a hysterectomy for FTMs, 
is associated with a significant and tangible 'institutional reward': in New South Wales 
state legislation allows post-operative transsexuals to change the sex designation on 
their birth certificate. The contradictions and ambiguities surrounding this legislation 
are discussed further in Chapter Eight. It is important to note, however, that despite the 
convenience of a 'paper identity' that is consistent with a transsexual's (post-operative) 
gender identity not all of the people whom I interviewed wanted to change their 
anatomy. In fact I was surprised to learn from one transgendered informant that 
approximately 80 percent of MTFs who identify as transsexual or transgender in 
Australia, and have passed clinical assessments as candidates for vaginoplasty, do not go 
on to have the surgery. The person suggested that most of the reasons that many people 
decide not to continue with surgery are financial, political, medical5 or related to lack 
of access. 6 Fear of a poor outcome was also a contributing factor. Genital surgery was 
seen as problematic by some of the people whom I interviewed. Jack, an FTM, did not 
want to have genital surgery because he considered it to be too experimental. In the 
following narrative he also reflects on some of the problems associated with the more 
established, but still 'risky', MTF surgery: 
5 Most of the people whom I interviewed who were pre-operative wanted to have genital surgery. Some 
remained pre-operative because of their current circumstances rather than because they had changed 
their mind. 
G Transsexuals born in South Australia, for example, are allowed to change the sex designation on their 
birth certificate only if reassignment surgery is performed in South Australia. Limited sex reassignment 
surgery as available at the time that the legislation was passed (in 1988). However, at the time of writing 
sex reassignment surgery was not available in that State - see Chapter Eight for further discussion about 
this. 
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There are quite a few (MTF) tranys out there who are quite happy not to have 
surgery. One of the reasons being that the down side of the surgery is the other 
medical problems associated with it and the possibility of unsuccessful surgery. I 
won't say failure, because that lies with each individual. Medically they could 
say that it is a failure but physically or emotionally to you it is not or vice versa. 
Jack, FTM, 1996 
Individuals who identify as transgendered and refuse to adopt an either or approach 
to gender by resisting sex-change surgery disrupt male/female, mind/body, 
normal! abnormal oppositions and problematise oppositional readings of 
transsexualism as conformity to normative expectations about gender and the 
biological body. Jack provided the following response to my suggestion that gender 
reassignment surgery could be interpreted as conformity to social expectations about 
lines of connection between gender and anatomy: 
The surgical intervention that I've already had, it is really hard work to analyse 
that without going, it does matter, in that I'm so much more comfortable now 
having had my chest done and I don't have to wear strapping underneath my 
shirt. I had to wear another shirt in the middle of bloody summer. The comfort 
and the ease with which I live and then that (binding my chest) was because I 
was attempting to make my chest look masculine in the face of a female body, 
and for society. 
Jack, ITM, 1996 (emphasis Jack's) 
Jack resists genital surgery, but he has had his female breasts reduced so that his 
chest looks more masculine. He is torn between the attractions of political analysis that 
embraces the possibilities of a male identity and a female body and his embodied 
experience of this reality. Jack is aware of the contradiction between his decision to 
have this 'incredibly painful' and 'humiliating' surgery and the non-operative position 
advocated by some transgender activists. Jack's experience makes him resistant to the 
idea that the physicality of his body does not matter. In this narrative Jack's chest 
reflects his male identity making him feel masculine in spite of his female body. The 
convenience of his day to day life since the reduction reinforces the initial decision to 
have the surgery. At the same time, Jack acknowledges that he had the surgery and 
bound his chest in order to conform to the normative expectation that men do not have 
female breasts. 
Hausman's aversion to the surgically crafted sUbjectivities of transsexuals implies 
that the experiences of individuals whose bodies conform to normative expectations 
171 
about the relationship between biology and gender may be the more legitimate subjects 
for feminist analysis and debate. However, one strategy of moving beyond oppositional 
analyses of 'normative' bodies, would be to look at the ways non-normative bodies 
disrupt and render problematic dualistic conceptions of gender and sexuality. 
Transsexuals, for example, who articulate understandings about gender and/or sexual 
identities that are based in essentialism and, at the same time, use surgery to reconstruct 
their bodies in order to fit their desired gender and/or sexual identities, disrupt the 
essentialist! social constructionist nature/culture binaries. Like cosmetic surgery 
clients, transsexuals are not cultural dupes of the sex/gender system or medical 
technologies. Transsexuals are able to recognise the flawed assumption that gender is 
immutable and at the same time often express their gender identity in essentialist terms 
relating their identification with the (biological) other as an expression of a core being 
or inner-self. In the following interview extract Mary attaches essentialist 
understandings of 'male' and 'female' to the biological body. At the same time, she 
suggests her mind is not unitary and neither is her body. She presents herself as 
someone who is satisfied with her decision to have surgery and she constructs herself as 
an agent. 
Well to me gender reassignment surgery was the smallest step, the final tiny 
small little step in a long process. And I can understand why some people 
particularly female-to-male elect not to go through reconstruction, for me I still 
did not feel complete and whole, I mean I wanted to feel like a complete person, 
I mean OK, yes, I would never be biologically completely female, I mean you just 
cannot remake people like that, so again it comes down to a compromise 
between your head and the body that you occupy and to me again it has been a 
good compromise, it is a good compromise. Whether that relates to the same 
thing in terms of cosmetic surgery I guess people do that mostly for self-esteem, 
whether they do it to feel complete and whole I don't know. 
Mary, MTF, 1997 
The messy problem of having and occupying a body is indicated in how Mary's 
experience of her physical body impacts on her sense of self. For Mary identity is 
essentially corporeal in the sense that selfhood becomes problematic when it does not 
map onto the 'body that you occupy'. Surgery is not an ideal solution to this dilemma, 
but is instead represented as a 'good compromise' between the body and mind. The 
description of surgery as a compromise suggests that Mary does not consider that her 
actions involve an absolute privileging of mind over body. Instead surgery is an 
inevitable, but essentially inadequate solution to an identity that is experienced as 
incomplete. In this narrative, the body acts both as a resource and as a constraint on 
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identity. Mary constructs herself as an agent, but one operating in the context of 
constraint: the constraints of a personal history as 'boy' and a woman and the 
constraints of a body that can be reworked but is not complete. Mary takes action that 
is shaped by desires for 'completion', but she sees these desires as potentially unreliable. 
Mary's parents recognised that she was transgendered at an early age and facilitated 
her (medical) transition across binary gender categories. She claims that she was never 
a man, transitioning early meant that she went from being a boy to a woman. Her 
surgery was successful, with few post-operative complications, and she now has very 
little contact with other transgendered people. Mary's personal narrative is embedded 
in local debates about heterogeneity that emerge out of transgender politics. She does 
not present her course of action as one that is suitable for all transsexuals. Mary 
acknowledges that 'some [transsexuals] do not go ahead with the surgery' indicating 
that that she has encountered variations between transsexuals in their relationship to 
medical technologies. 
In this narrative, Mary indicates that her preoperative identity is that of a female. 
Surgery is the 'smallest step in a long process'; it does not represent a rite of passage 
that makes her into a woman. Mary's experience disrupts common sense lines of 
connection between anatomy and social gender. However the hierarchical organisation 
and institutionalisation of the binary oppositions that constitute sex and gender remain 
largely unchallenged. Mary draws on essentialist arguments that locate femaleness in 
biology. She operates with essentialist understandings about her non-unitary self, and 
she uses surgery and hormones to actively craft her gender identity. For Mary, the 
meanings associated with biology are natural and ahistorical, while (her own 
achievement of) gender is cultural, local and historical. Attention to the materiality of 
bodies enables us to look critically at essentialism while recognising its strategic utility 
in narratives and understandings about selves. 
Cosmetic surgery 
The talk of women who engage in the discourses and practices of cosmetic surgery 
may also incorporate resistant or critical discourses about cosmetic surgery that 
challenge understandings of clients as cultural dupes. In this section I argue that taking 
the agency of women seriously involves acknowledging the contradictory and 
ambiguous practices of women who engage in cosmetic surgery. 
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Most feminists who write about women's relationship to, and use of, cosmetic 
surgery tend to explain it in terms of commercial exploitation, patriarchal and racial 
oppression (Spitzack 1988; Young 1990; Wolf 1991; Morgan 1991; Bordo 1993a, 
1993c; Hausman, 1995; Balsamo 1996; Kaw, 1998). They generally stress the negative 
impacts of surgical alteration and caution women against its use. Within these analyses 
women who engage in cosmetic surgery are often constructed as 'cultural dupes', while 
their status as victims of prevailing beauty norms is provided as evidence of their 
oppression (Spitzack, 1988; Young, 1990; Wolf, 1991; Morgan, 1991; Bordo, 1993a, 
1993c; Hausman, 1995; Kaw, 1998). Bernice Hausman (1995: 64-65) for example, 
suggests that women are' victims who are powerless in their relation to social norms of 
beauty, and thus the cosmetic surgery establishment' which developed as a result of 
modern medicine's 'increasing ability to intervene in and on the human body'. 
Feminist analyses which emphasise the exploitative nature of cosmetic surgery tend 
to imply that women who engage in cosmetic surgery are falsely conscious of the social 
construction of beauty and body image in modern Western societies (Young, 1990; 
Wolf, 1991, Morgan, 1991, Bordo, 1993a, 1993c; Kaw, 1998). In Kathryn Pauly 
Morgan's (1991) and Naomi Wolf's (1991) analyses of cosmetic surgery, women's 
actions are explained through particular interests that are assumed to be foundational 
to the construction of female gender identities and gendered bodily practices. Making 
sense of the actions of women who engage in cosmetic surgery becomes a matter of 
placing people in the right social categories, explaining cosmetic surgery in relation to 
patriarchal, professional medical, and/or economic interests and defining which 
categories of women are more or less disadvantaged in relation to those interests. 
Actors in the same social category have shared attributes, interests and practices 
regardless of difference in residence, age, occupation, family composition etc. This form 
of reasoning presupposes that women have particular interests, and are SUbjected to 
similar forms of oppression, because one aspect of their identity fits into one social 
category. In this analysis gender stands in for experience, because it is assumed that the 
gender identities of female cosmetic surgery clients are foundationally constituted in 
relation to patriarchy, medicine and consumer culture (Somers, 1994: 623). Moreover, 
there is apparently no need for researchers to talk to actual cosmetic surgery clients 
because it is taken for granted that their actions could be explained by the interests 
associated with the particular social categories that they happen to occupy. 
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An alternative explanation of women's relationship to cosmetic surgery is one which 
considers complexity by acknowledging the potential pleasures and benefits of cosmetic 
surgery for individual women while also exploring the dilemmas and risks involved in 
women's cosmetic surgery decisions (Davis, 1991, 1993, 1995; Phibbs, 1994; Parker, 
1995). Central to this analysis is an acknowledgement of women who choose to 
engage in cosmetic surgery as active agents rather than as cultural dupes. The 
contradictions and ambiguities associated with agency are a central concern in Kathy 
Davis' (1991, 1993, 1995) approach to cosmetic surgery. She argues that feminist 
analyses of cosmetic surgery need to take seriously women who choose to surgically 
modify their bodies (Davis, 1991: 35; 1993: 35). Davis criticises the lack of attention 
to the contradictions and ambiguities of agency in many feminist accounts of cosmetic 
surgery on three grounds. 
First, the cultural dupe approach does not pay sufficient attention to agency; 
cosmetic surgery may be 'actively chosen and knowledgeably defended' by women 
(Davis, 1991: 29) as simultaneously a problem (a form of oppression) and a solution 
(Davis, 1991: 32; 1993: 30) (a way of temporarily achieving liberation through 
changing their embodied relationship to discourses and practices of femininity). 
Second, Davis argues that feminists tend to focus on the actual processes involved in 
surgically modifying the body, and tend to ignore the way that cosmetic surgery is also 
a way for women to recraft their identities. As such, cosmetic surgery is presented as a 
disembodied phenomenon. Women's active and lived relationship to their bodies tends 
to disappear in feminist accounts of beauty practices (Davis, 1991: 29). For Davis 
(1991: 29) this disembodied approach to cosmetic surgery reproduces the mind/body 
split and reinforces dualistic understandings about the female body. The deficient 
female body is surgically altered so that it is more closely aligned to cultural ideals of 
femininity. The decision to have cosmetic surgery is represented as a cognitive exercise, 
a matter of bringing the body into line with the mind/body image of the woman. This 
analysis privileges the relationship between the mind and cultural expectations about 
femininity and tends to gloss over an individua1's experience of her body. 
Third, a feminist approach to cosmetic surgery that privileges narratives of 
oppression and exploitation restricts feminist interventions in the area of feminine 
beauty practices (Davis, 1991: 29). Rather than an exclusive focus on the way that 
public narratives and representations of femininity and masculinity are reproduced and 
reinforced by women's engagement in cosmetic surgery, Davis argues for an analysis of 
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cosmetic surgery that also considers how individual actions and story-lines may 
undermine and transform those very same structures (Davis, 1993: 28-29). Davis 
argues that many women who choose cosmetic surgery make decisions about their 
surgery in the context of limited structural opportunities for women. She suggests that 
it should be possible to criticise the social relations and processes in which cosmetic 
surgery is embedded without constructing as victims individual women who may 
choose to surgically modify their bodies (Davis, 1991). Davis calls for a more 
sophisticated concept of agency that considers women who engage in femininity work 
as rational and knowledgeable actors, who make informed choices within the context 
of particular structured limitations that are mostly beyond their control. Davis' use of 
agency is based on an understanding of the ways in which actors simultaneously take 
up and are taken up by particular discourses and practices like those associated with 
beauty and cosmetic surgery (Davies, 1997). 
In 1994 I explored how the talk of women who had engaged in different forms of 
'elective' breast surgery could be used to problematise theoretical and cultural 
generalisations about feminine embodiment and its relationship to the discourses and 
practices of cosmetic surgery. Conversations with women clients and plastic surgeons 
suggested that cosmetic surgery was not only about sculpting and changing body 
shapes; it was also about recrafting identities. The women that I interviewed in 1991 
and 1994 often described their cosmetic surgery in terms of personal and physical 
transformation. Sarah, a cosmetic surgery client, described how breast augmentation 
enabled her to be a 'different person' through enhancing her self confidence: 
I have heaps of confidence and I feel a different person. It is a confidence 
booster, you come across more confident, and the way people react makes you 
confident (Sarah, 1994). 
Women who engaged in cosmetic surgery also talked about how recrafting their 
bodies enhanced their psychological well-being. In the following interview extract 
Lucy, a 28 year old librarian, talks about how her breast reduction made her body more 
acceptable to herself: 
The major difference though is how I feel about my body, but also how other 
people see it, so that I can actually feel OK about my breasts (Lucy, 1991). 
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The women I interviewed for my earlier work on cosmetic surgery emphasised the 
way in which breast augmentation increased their self-esteem, gave them confidence, 
enhanced their femininity, and, as a result, their sexuality. Isabel, who at 32 years of 
age had eye surgery and breast implants following the break-up of her marriage, 
indicated that augmenting her breasts meant that she was able to pursue a more sexual 
image 'I had implants because I wanted to look sexy'. Looking sexy was also achieved 
through her choice of clothing 'clothes shopping is much better, I feel more sexual'. 
Discourses about normality, gender and sexuality framed the talk of women who 
engaged in cosmetic surgery. The women interviewed in 1991 and 1994 used cosmetic 
surgery to bring their bodies more into line with an image that they had of themselves. 
This parallels some of the feminist literature on and interview talk about gender 
reassignment surgery. Conversations with people who identified as transsexual or 
transgendered suggested that they also explain their elective surgery decisions in terms 
of sculpting and changing body shapes and recrafting identities. Female cosmetic 
surgery clients were often aware of critical positions on cosmetic surgery. Sarah, a 34 
year old sales representative for a medical company that sells breast implants, said that 
she encountered resistance from her mother and friends over her decision to enhance 
her breasts: 'I told all my friends, the majority thought it was not a really good idea 
because of all the publicity [about the risks]'. Sarah said that her experience of breast 
augmentation meant that she was able to be a more effective sales representative. She 
saw herself as an asset to her company - a tangible demonstration of confidence in 
their product. 
The women I interviewed also reflected critically on the way that appearance 
pressures influenced their decisions to have cosmetic surgery. Isabel suggested that the 
disapproving gaze of other women was a major contributor to her eventual decision to 
enlarge her breasts. She hesitantly confided: 'this is going to sound strange but I did it 
not only for me but for other women'. Isabel's tentativeness suggests that she perceived 
that it was unusual to refer to the female gaze as a reason for enhancing her breasts. 
Sarah and Isabel talked about how breast enlargement conformed to expectations about 
femininity that are defined by men. Isabel suggested that 'men are not subject to the 
variations of women's bodies so it is easier for them'; 'it would be better if men's 
expectations were less'. Sarah considered that breast augmentation catered to the male 
gaze: 'men do find large breasts more attractive and I suppose it [breast augmentation] 
reinforces that'. Maria, a 46 year old former cosmetic surgery client who became a 
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political activist as a result of her experiences of implant failure, claimed that she had 
nose, breast and chin surgery, not because she was a cultural dupe, but because she was 
'acutely aware of the value that is attached to beauty'. The women to whom I spoke 
recognised the ways in which they were constituted in and through discourses about 
beauty, youth, femininity and heterosexuality and they presented themselves as 
strategic actors in relation to those discourses. 
Alternative feminist constructions of 'the natural' body feature in feminist criticisms 
of cosmetic surgery (Wolf, 1991; Morgan, 1991; Hausman, 1995). When feminists are 
resistant or critical of women's decisions to use cosmetic surgery to conform to a 
'traditional' image of femininity or transsexuals' decisions to use sex change surgery to 
conform to normative understandings about the relationship between sex and gender, 
they often attempt to construct alternative feminist discourses about the 'natural' body. 
These discourses neglect to recognise that the 'natural' images being constructed as 
alternatives to surgical modification are in themselves normalising images of 
embodiment. It is important to reflect critically on the construction of feminist 
alternatives and what counts as appropriate ways to rework 'the body' within different 
contexts . 
. Some interesting continuities emerge from a comparison of feminist analyses of 
cosmetic surgery and gender reassignment surgery. Many feminist analyses of gender 
reassignment surgery offer text-based analyses that construct clients of medical 
technologies as cultural dupes (Hausman, 1995; Lienert, 1995, 1998). These analyses 
do not consider the contradictions and ambiguities associated with agency. They focus 
on the actual modification of the body and devalue the way surgery may be used to 
craft identity. They also deploy a problematic notion of the natural body as that 
unaltered by surgery (Wolf, 1991; Morgan, 1991; Hausman, 1995). In many feminist 
analyses of cosmetic surgery women are characterised as helpless victims of medical 
technologies (Morgan, 1991; Hausman, 1995). In contrast, transsexuals are often 
constructed both as dupes of the medical establishment and as active agents who work 
in a collaborative relationship with medical professionals (Raymond, 1980; Hausman, 
1995). An alternative approach is a feminist analysis of sex reassignment surgery and 
the (re)construction of gender which considers complexity, which questions whether 
transsexuals or women who engage in cosmetic surgery are indeed cultural dupes and 
explores the ways in which action on the body is a potential source of empowerment as 
well as control (Davis, 1991, 1993, 1995; Phibbs, 1994). 
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During my research with people who identified as transsexual and/or transgendered 
I noted some interesting similarities between the talk of people who had used, or 
desired, gender reassignment surgery and the talk of women who engaged in elective 
breast surgery. Both groups of people were involved in (re)crafting their identities 
through sculpting and changing the shape of their bodies. Public narratives of 
sexuality, gender and normality were used to justify and explain the surgical desires 
and decisions of the people that I interviewed. I want to return now to an analysis of the 
similarities and differences between cosmetic surgery and sex reassignment surgery 
that focuses on the talk of clients who engage in these technologies. 
Speaking comparatively - using medical technologies to craft gender 
... women are victims who are powerless in their relation to ... the cosmetic 
surgery establishment (Hausman, 1995: 64 italics my emphasis). 
Transsexuals were actively engaged in defining their position within medical 
discourses (Hausman, 1995: 129 italics my emphasis). 
The above extracts from Hausman (1995) are illustrative of the paradox that I 
have noticed within feminist analyses of cosmetic surgery and gender reassignment 
surgery. In Hausman's analysis of cosmetic surgery women accessing cosmetic surgery 
are characterised as helpless victims of medical technologies. 7 For Hausman medical 
objectification is antithetical to SUbjectivity. How women clients may shape the 
application of these technologies is given scant recognition.8 In contrast she constructs 
transsexuals as simultaneously victims of medicalisation and as active agents who work 
in a collaborative relationship with medical professionals. 9 How is it that Hausman 
ascribes so little agency and knowledgeability to women and a degree of agency to 
transsexuals? Furthermore, what do people who transition across binary gender 
categories think about the relationship between cosmetic surgery and gender 
reassignment technologies? 
7 Also see Spitzak, 1988; Morgan, 1991; Wolf, 1991. 
8 See Cussins (1998) for a discussion of the relationship between medical objectification and the 
subjectivity of women who engage in IVF technologies. 
9 Also see Raymond, 1979. 
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When I began this thesis I was interested in looking at similarities and differences 
between cosmetic surgery and gender reassignment surgery. I expected that 
transsexuals would argue quite passionately that gender reassignment was a 
fundamentally different type of surgery to cosmetic surgery because it changed a 
fundamental aspect of their identity. I was prepared for arguments which suggested 
that gender reassignment was a 'rite of passage' that 'made' transsexuals into their 
chosen gender identity whereas cosmetic surgery simply reshaped an aspect of the 
body. I was wrong. Only a minority of the people that I interviewed adopted this 'rite 
of passage' position. In interview after interview respondents agreed that cosmetic 
surgery and gender reassignment were broadly similar. The talk of transsexual and 
transgendered research informants deconstructed the opposition between cosmetic 
surgery and gender reassignment surgery as discrete medical procedures, the 
distinction between the social origins of these surgeries and the distinction between the 
motives of clients who use these procedures. 
Many of the people I interviewed reflected critically on their decisions to engage in 
gender reassignment technologies. In doing so they challenge sets of understandings 
about people who have gender reassignment surgery as cultural dupes of the 
sex/gender system. Differences between cosmetic surgery and gender reassignment 
tended to centre on public perception and the latter's necessity for sexual functioning. 
These ideas are discussed in the following section through reference to interviews with 
Michelle, Nick and Chelsea who talk about similarities and differences between gender 
reassignment surgery and cosmetic surgery in terms of public perception, techniques 
used, motives of clients and desired outcomes. 
Michelle, a male-to-female transsexual interviewed in 1996, argues that gender 
reassignment surgery is cosmetic surgery. She then goes on to say that women and 
people who are transgendered/ transsexual use cosmetic surgery technologies in order 
to feel more comfortable in their bodies: 
Well yes it [gender reassignment surgery] is cosmetic surgery. In a very real 
sense it is quite the same thing. People undergo cosmetic surgery because they 
want to enhance something about themselves, and want to feel better about 
themselves in some way, or for whatever reason. Whether it is a face lift, or 
whether it is breast enhancement, penis enlargement or whatever, it is 
something connected to making their body more acceptable to themselves. That 
is no different, I don't really think, than gender reassignment surgery which is 
attempting to do the same thing, which is attempting to (a) make yourself feel 
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better about your body, and (b) perhaps it is a more significant thing, but then 
in tum make yourself feel better about yourself because of the fact that you are 
more comfortable in your body. The fundamental difference between the two is 
that people probably generally don't really want to hear if you enhance your 
breasts, or have a face lift, or whatever else, but there is this pretty horrific sense 
in a lot people of the notion that people can actually have their genitals altered, 
or cut off, or whatever. It is a much more emotive issue than the simple face lift 
IS. 
Michelle, MTF, 1996 
Michelle suggests that women who surgically alter their bodies are less reflexive 
about their cosmetic surgery decisions. However, transgendered people and women 
cosmetic surgery clients identified the expectations of other people as contributors to 
their eventual decisions to surgically alter their bodies. Both Michelle and Lucy (a 
woman whom I interviewed in 1991 who had a breast reduction so that she could feel 
OK about her breasts), suggest that 'elective' surgery is a way for them to be 'normal' so 
that they could feel more comfortable in their bodies. Michelle considers that, while 
the techniques associated with surgically modifying the body and the outcomes desired 
by clients may be the same, it is the site of the surgery (i.e. the genitals), and the sets of 
understandings which are attached to these forms of surgery, that make them different. 
Michelle indicates that the social stigma surrounding transsexualism, and transsexuals' 
use of sex reassignment surgery, makes cosmetic surgery decisions undertaken by 
women less problematic than those undertaken by people who identify as 
transgendered. Cosmetic surgery is not as emotive as gender reassignment surgery and 
this makes women who have cosmetic surgery less interesting to the general public 
than people who have gender reassignment surgery. 
In the following interview extract Nick also argues that both gender reassignment 
technologies and cosmetic surgery involve 'changing gender'. For Nick, these 
technologies are about 'sculpting your body', he suggests that the difference is socially 
constructed: 
SF: Do you think that people who have) or desire) gender reassignment surgery 
differ from people who have) or desire) cosmetic surgery? 
No. No difference I don't think, either way it is still cosmetic surgery. Which 
ever way you look at it really you are changing gender. It is more socially 
acceptable for people to have face lifts and stuff like that. But to me there is no 
difference. It is no different than me, like I've had my nose done, admittedly for 
medical reasons but that is irrelevant, it is still plastic surgery and it is still 
cosmetic surgery. For me it is no different than going look I've had my chest 
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done. Basically you are sculpting your body, you have fat taken off you are 
sculpting your body, changing gender is sculpting your body. Simple as that 
and I don't think there is a difference. It is society that makes it a difference 
because it is OK to spend thousands of dollars on your face to make yourself 
look beautiful or whatever, but it is not OK to have gender reassignment surgery 
and be happy, I don't see that logic. 
Nick, ITM, 1997 
According to Nick gender reassignment, plastic surgery and cosmetic surgery 
technologies are similar as they all involve sculpting the body. Nick takes male 
hormones, he has had a rhinoplasty and a mammoplasty. He indicates that transitioning 
across binary gender categories is something that he works on daily - his body is an 
ongoing project. Chelsea also suggests that gender reassignment is a form of cosmetic 
surgery. She draws parallels between the motives of clients who engage in these 
technologies: 
Nope, I don't believe that they differ at all from people who desire cosmetic 
surgery, and I consider gender reassignment surgery to be cosmetic surgery. It 
does not mean that it lacks import, that it is not important to me. It has to be 
cosmetic, by definition cosmetic is just changing the body in whatever shape you 
want, whether it is a breast lift, a face lift, or whatever. The ultimate result of 
that is to produce a situation where you can function better in society. And if 
other people think that bigger or smaller breasts help them function then so 
much the better. More power to them if they have got the money to do it so 
long as they know what they are getting into first. 
Chelsea, MTF, 1996 
Cosmetic surgery and gender reassignment technologies enable people to 
function better in their day-to-day lives. By suggesting that cosmetic surgery is not 
superficial and should not therefore be dismissed as 'frivolous' or 'unnecessary' (Young, 
1990) Chelsea pre-empts a negative reading of her construction of both forms of 
surgery as 'cosmetic'. An awareness of the potential negative outcomes associated with 
medical intervention prompts Chelsea to present knowledgeability and informed 
consent as pre-requisites for action. While Chelsea agreed that gender reassignment 
surgery was similar to cosmetic surgery she also noted differences in relation to access 
and to fertility: 
One difference I can think of is essentially that you have to go through a long 
process before you can get the surgery. That is you have to wait, living in the 
role of another gender having hormonal changes in your body. By the time that 
you get to have gender reassignment surgery you are already infertile. You 
cannot have children either way, because if you are going female-to-male then 
you have had a hysterectomy already and if you are going male-to-female you 
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have been on hormones so long you have no sperm count. So the main 
difference between other forms of cosmetic surgery and this is that you cease to 
be part of the reproductive gene pool. I know there are lots of men and women 
that are infertile, but genital reconstruction is sort of like a choice, infertility is a 
by-product of the process. 
Chelsea, FTM, 1996 
According to Chelsea access to privately funded surgery is easier for people who 
engage in forms of cosmetic surgery that are not associated with transitioning across 
binary gender categories. Cosmetic surgery involves negotiation between the surgeon 
and the client. In contrast MTFs who desire genital surgery, and FTMs who desire 
mammoplasty and/or hysterectomy, have to secure consent from a team of people -
including a psychologist, an endocrinologist/physician and the surgeon (Findlay, 1995: 
43). Chelsea characterises sex reassignment as a 'choice' in spite of all these medical 
gate-keepers, consequently the infertility that results from that process is social. 
Differences between sex reassignment surgery and cosmetic surgery are discursively 
produced by the alignment of dualistic understandings about the relationship between 
sex, gender and anatomy with another set of oppositions based on assumptions about 
the normal/abnormal and the natural/artificial. Morgan (1991) and Hausman (1995) 
imply that the surgically modified bodies of women may be read as 'artificial' in 
relation to female bodies that are unaltered by surgery. Similarly, feminists, such as 
Raymond (1979), Lienert (1995) and Hausman (1995) suggest that the post-operative 
bodies of MTF transsexuals are 'less authentic' than the bodies of women. This 
category of 'authentic' women presumably includes those women who engage in 
cosmetic surgery who are defined as 'artificial' by Morgan (1991) and Hausman 
(1995). This suggests that feminist definitions of 'natural' and 'artificial' women may 
change depending on the reference point that is used to construct the 'natural'. 
Generalisations about sex reassignment surgery and cosmetic surgery obscure rather 
than clarify the way that these discourses and practices are created and applied to the 
body. Distinctions between gender reassignment surgery and cosmetic surgery are 
based on assumptions that the boundaries constituting these two categories are fixed 
and unambiguous. 
In New Zealand and Australia private plastic surgeons perform both aesthetic 
cosmetic surgery and sex reassignment surgery procedures. Clients who have or desire 
sex reassignment surgery may also have breast surgery, ribs removed and cheek 
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implants - forms of surgery that more commonly are associated with people who do not 
identify as transsexualltransgendered. This suggests that differences between these two 
forms of surgery are discursively constructed rather than grounded in any obvious 
differences in techniques or desired outcome. The difference between 'legitimate' 
cosmetic surgery and 'illegitimate' sex reassignment surgery is also apparent in 
research informants' talk about these procedures. Jane thought that gender 
reassignment surgery was necessary and not 'cosmetic'. In contrast, she characterises 
breast augmentation, cheek implants, rib removal and chin shaving - surgeries also 
associated with transitioning across binary gender categories - as unnecessary and 
therefore illegitimate. The following interview extract illustrates her position: 
Jane: I don't want the breast implants, dangerous, if my breasts grow to be a C 
cup, I'll be a C cup, if they grow to be a B cup, I'll be a B cup. The hormones are 
fixing up most of the other little body shape problems. The only thing I do really 
want to fix up is my ears, but that is just a normal thing that everybody hates 
something about them, mine are too big, they sit out too much, and I have 
always wanted them to sit back. Apart from that I don't want to go and have 
like some of the things that people talk about having, like a couple of rib bones 
taken out, if you have got a problem with the rib bones, having the jaws redone 
and cheek bone implants, having them shaved and that. The vocal chords in the 
voice box I wouldn't mind getting done because that is one of the main give-
aways, and I want to be fully accepted as a woman, where you just couldn't tell. 
I don't see the desire to have surgery where it is not needed. 
SP: What about women who do not have gender issues and have cosmetic 
surgery? 
Jane: They just want to enhance their natural beauty, or get rid of something 
that is a problem to them, it might be they have got a big nose, they dislike their 
nose, if people stare at their nose they get their nose fixed up. 
SP: Is that true forgender reassignment surgelY that people are getting rid of 
something that is a problem to them? A body image problem or is it something 
more? 
Jane: It goes deeper, because they (transsexuals) identify with the sex, it is not 
cosmetic, (they/women) want to make themselves look prettier. I want to make 
myself look more normal in relation to the person I identify with. Like I don't 
want to get the breast enhancement, if I wanted to make myself look prettier, 
like big tits, and I don't want that, I want myself to look normal. I don't want to 
stand out as a gorgeous luscious super woman, I just want myself to be accepted 
as a woman every day. So I don't agree that they are similar. 
Jane, MTF, 1996 
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Jane considers gender reassignment to be more legitimate and necessary than 
cosmetic surgery because it is associated with an individual's sex. Jane does not agree 
with unnecessary cosmetic surgery. She defines necessary surgery as those procedures 
that will enable her to pass as a woman in her day-to-day life. For Jane, gender 
reassignment is about being 'normal' and 'accepted' every day whereas cosmetic 
surgery is done for reasons of vanity or beauty. Unlike gender reassignment 
technologies cosmetic surgery is not done so that people are able to be ordinary or 
normal (Davis, 1991, 1993). Jane's pre-operative identity is constructed through a 
fractured relationship between her corporeality and self. Gender reassignment is not 
antithetical to subjectivity. Instead it enables Jane to become an embodied subject by 
changing the relationship between her corporeality and her identity (Davis, 1993: 37). 
In the following narrative Angie suggests that cosmetic surgery clients and gender 
reassignment clients might have similar feelings about their bodies. Unlike gender 
reassignment surgery, cosmetic surgery to Angie involves 'butchering' and 'mutilating' 
the body. Cosmetic surgery is chosen freely; gender reassignment is not a choice but is 
essential: 
If society was more accepting trannsexuals like myself would still seek surgery 
because I don't want to be a woman with a penis. I don't think I have to be 
crazy to think that. If society was less rigid and it was acceptable, it was the 
norm for me to exist with a penis, I'd still seek reassignment surgery. I'll always 
be transgendered but I just want to normalise my life a little. Try and 
uncomplicate it because I consider myself to be a straight female and I'm not 
able to experience that. I mean the majority of women who have their breasts 
done do it for a man more than they do it for themselves. They might do it a 
little bit for themselves but there is no way in the world that I would ever 
consider doing that to myself - butchering myself. Sex reassignment I don't 
consider to be mutilation. Gender reassignment is something that I have to do. 
Breast augmentation is not something that I have to do. But then somebody who 
wants breast augmentation that may be something that they have to do to feel 
good about themselves. They may have been flat-chested all their lives and they 
need to feel more of a woman to feel more accepted by society. I mean except 
for the bad press about breast augmentation cosmetic surgery is more acceptable 
than gender reassignment. Society does not have a problem with a woman 
making her breasts bigger, it is a patriarchal society anyway, most men have a 
large breast fantasy. Whereas gender reassignment isn't cosmetic surgery 
because it is fiddling with an area that people have a problem with because it is 
associated with sexuality. 
Angie, MIT, 1996 
Both Jane and Angie consider gender reassignment to be more acceptable than 
cosmetic surgery. Cosmetic surgery involves the unnecessary mutilation of the 'natural' 
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female body. These narratives sit alongside, and in tension with, talk about how 
identities may be engendered through surgical technologies. Jane and Angie suggest 
that authentic social identities depend on having particular types of bodies. Minds are 
disturbed by bodies that do not conform to normative sets of understandings about the 
relationship between sex and gender. As a result, the pre-operative bodies of MTFs are 
'unnatural'. Sex reassignment surgery brings gender identity into line with the physical 
body. Angie suggests that the relationship between gender reassignment and sexuality 
makes the surgical decisions of transgendered people problematic. 
While Jane and Angie distinguish between cosmetic surgery and gender 
reassignment surgery, most of the people I talked to agreed that gender reassignment is 
a form of cosmetic surgery. The narratives of transgender people often utilise 
essentialist understandings of gender while simultaneously breaking down and/or 
challenging these understandings. The field in which transsexualism is embedded 
opens up new spaces for doing gender and presents additional possibilities for looking 
at the ways sUbjectivities are engendered through lines of connection between gender, 
sexuality and embodiment. This suggests that instead of focusing on the medicalisation 
of transsexualism as a regulatory process, through which transsexuals are constituted 
as 'other' and in need of surgical intervention, it may be more productive to consider 
the different contexts in which transsexual surgery is both constraining and enabling as 
a regulatory discourse and as a way of constructing transitional bodies. 
Connections and differences 
In sum, I have outlined some of the key themes within feminist criticisms of the way 
gender is used in medical discourses and practices and I have also located 
transsexualism and sex reassignment surgery technologies inside these debates. Medical 
technologies for crafting gender produce and reproduce theories about the natural 
body and the social environment. Elective surgical technologies are based on the view 
that the body is a plastic and malleable commodity. They are shaped by heterosexual 
interests in ways that inevitably reflect certain gender relations and assumptions about 
sexual difference. I also argued that there are a number of connections between 
feminist analyses of cosmetic surgery and gender reassignment surgery. For example, 
many offer text-based analyses that focus on the actual modification of the body in 
ways that devalue how surgery may be used to craft identity. Both deploy a 
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problematic notion of the 'natural' body as that unaltered by surgery, thereby 
constructing a binary opposition between the natural pre-surgical body and artificial 
post-operative body. They imply, for example, that self engineered subjectivities are 
less authentic because of their essential relation to technology. 
Feminist research into gender reassignment surgery needs to reinstate people who 
identify as transgendered as active and knowledgeable actors within the context of 
structured limitations (Davis, 1991: 33). People who have gender reassignment 
surgery make informed choices within the context of particular structural constraints. 
They are often aware of these constraints and the potential negative consequences of 
their gender reassignment surgery decisions. However, this knowledge is set in the 
context of the pleasures and possibilities that gender reassignment surgery offers. For 
many, gender reassignment will be an ambivalent experience. Therefore 
understanding why individuals opt for gender reassignment surgery necessarily 
involves recognising how those who are clients articulate their personal experiences of 
the constraining and enabling features of this surgical procedure. The people 
interviewed for this research described their gender reassignment surgery in terms of 
personal and physical transformation. Like women who had cosmetic surgery, they 
emphasise the sexual and psychological benefits that were associated with modifying 
their bodies. 
In attempting to make sense of their worlds and experiences, the people interviewed 
bring a variety of analytical skills to the research conversation. In this chapter, and in 
the previous two chapters, research informants used knowledges about diversity to 
challenge stereotypes about transsexuals and to question the idea that genitals and 
social gender have to be consistent. They deconstructed the opposition between 
cosmetic surgery and sex reassignment surgery and opened up the possibility of 
resisting surgery for reasons defined as 'cosmetic'. Some of the people that I 
interviewed drew on feminist theories about male dominance and problematised 
personal history and experience. In short, their talk hints at the contradictions and 
ambiguities associated with constructing gender identities through the use of medical 
technologies. 
The extracts from interviews with a range of different people who participated in 
this research also contained ideas or theories about the relationship between choice, 
action and consequence(s). Rather than suggesting that transsexuals are unreflexive in 
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their pursuit of sex reassignment surgerIes, these narratives illustrate some of the 
dilemmas and difficulties surrounding their surgical decisions articulated by those with 
gender issues. These deliberations suggest that elective gender reassignment surgery is 
not a course of action that is taken lightly. Specifically, people made choices about 
surgery in the context of knowledge about debates over its use. The talk locates 
transsexuals' dependence on medicine in social pressures, questions the ethics of 
surgery and alludes to the risks associated with less successful surgery ('the surgery is 
not great at all', 'inadequate vaginal depth'). Rather than constructing transgendered 
people as cultural dupes of a rigid binary sex-gender system, these narratives suggest 
that the people interviewed are knowledgeable and strategic actors. 
Exploring embodied citizenship 
Registering identities, regulating bodies 
At the very moment when genitals seem to display their full, unambiguous 
extralinguistic reality - when the language of one sex collapses - they also 
assume their fullest civil status, their fullest integration into the world of 
meanmg ... 
Thomas Laqueur (1990: 139). 
At the boundaries of gender categories, it seems, bodies may travel without 
passports granted by society 
Bob Connell (1999: 454) 
This chapter begins with a mundane artifact, a pIece of paper on which the 
perfunctory details of a person's birthlidentity are recorded, and traces the complex 
network of relations that go into its production. The birth certificate is embedded in 
multiple overlapping networks of social relations but for the purposes of this chapter I 
will restrict discussion to three: the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register, the 
legislation governing this register for recording a change of sex in New South Wales, 
and the birth certificate itself. The full birth certificate is the state's original record of a 
person's name, sex, nationality, parentage and date of birth from which subsequent 
documents such as passports are generated. The birth certificate is an artifact 
generated by the Births, Deaths and Marriages register. The register acts as a bridging 
device (Latour, 1995) between the birth certificate, the individual and the state. 
Registers are an important way in which states regulate citizens (Phibbs, 1994; Austrin 
and Phibbs, 1996; Phibbs, 2000). The way in which registers are implemented and 
used, however, has been largely neglected by social theorists working in the area of 
citizenship and body politics. In the area of citizenship theory Rogers Brubaker (1992: 
21), for example, argues that 'the modern state is not simply a territorial organisation 
but a membership organisation, an association of citizens'. Brubaker does not explore 
how modern states attempt to monitor and administer this membership through 
administrative practices. 
188 
189 
Biological sex, like citizenship, is an enduring personal status ascribed at birth. In 
Australia, ascription of state citizenship determines the rules for recording sex at birth 
and for recognising subsequent gender identity. In this chapter I argue that the 
complex sets of relations that enable states to distinguish between unconditional sexed 
identities and conditional sexed identities, are performed in and through the use of the 
Births, Deaths and Marriages register.1 In this view, the register is an attempt to make 
all of the complex elements associated with citizenship and biological sex homogeneous 
in electronic and geographical space.z I argue that variations in policies and practices, 
relating to altering the sex designation on the birth certificate, within and between 
Australian states means that administrative distinctions between male and female 
bodies are complicated by the corporeal diversity and personal histories of 
transgendered individuals. 
Moria Gatens (1996: 8) argues that the imaginary body embedded in state policies 
and practices is not neutral. Instead it reflects and reproduces binary notions of sexual 
difference that are embedded in cultural values, images, symbols and representations. 
Gatens does not explore how these inequitable bodies are reproduced within the 
administrative apparatus of the state. This Chapter connects Gatens' arguments about 
the body politic with contemporary debates in the area of 'sexual' or 'intimate' 
citizenship (Evans, 1993; Plummer, 1995; Bell, 1995; Stychin, 1998; Weeks, 1998; 
Sullivan,2000). According to Gatens the neutral body on which state politics are based 
is in fact a male body. Gatens suggests that women's bodies remain problematic 
whenever they differ from the body politic. 3 I argue that the body politic is represented 
by a particular kind of imaginary male body; or to put it another way, it is not only 
women's bodies that problematise the body politic but any body, male or female, that 
1 Distinctions are made between citizens who are born within the territorial borders of a nation-state and 
those who are not - for example permanent residents. The sex designation on the birth certificate of a 
post-operative transsexual is regulated by the laws governing change of sex in his or her country of 
birth. Citizens who are born in New Zealand, for example, which recognises change of sex for post-
operative transsexuals, are able to change all of their official documents birth certificate, passport etc. 
People who have become New Zealand citizens but who were born in the UK, for example, which does 
not recognise change of sex for post-operative h'anssexuals, are unable to change the sex designation on 
any official documents that rely on the UK birth certificate. New Zealand born citizens, who are post-
operative transsexuals, have an unconditional right to their gender identities. Non New Zealand born 
citizens do not. 
Z Electronic space refers to the uniform organisation of information in a computerised register! statistical 
database. Geographic space refers to the actual physical territory from which the Births, Deaths and 
Marriages register draws its information about the population. 
3 Gatens (1996: 24) argues that 'our legal and political arrangements have man as the model, the 
center-piece, with the occasional surrounding legislation insets concerning abortion, rape, maternity 
allowance, and so on. None of these insets, however, take female embodiment seriously. It is still the 
exception, the deviation, confined literally to the margins of man's representations'. 
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does not mirror it. State legislation relating to the regulation of transgender bodies and 
identities is used by way of example to explore how sexed identities are regulated by a 
modern state. One reading of the New South Wales legislation that allows post-
operative transsexuals to change the sex designation on the birth certificate is that 
surgery and reproductive non-functioning are important to the way that the state 
regulates or authorises transgender bodieslidentities. Debates within citizenship theory 
tend to focus on the territorial or hereditary construction of citizenship (Brubaker, 
199 Z). I explore the national and local construction of citizenship in Australia by 
looking at the way that citizenship is constructed through the territorial/reproductive 
regulation of sexual difference. 
The New South Wales legislation that enabled post-operative transsexuals to change 
the sex designation on their birth certificate came into effect in conjunction with the 
Transgender Anti-vilification Act on October 1, 1996. Both sets of legislation were the 
result of five years of co-operative political lobbying by the gay, lesbian and 
transgender communities. For many people in the Sydney-based transgender 
community the reforms represented long overdue state recognition of transgender and 
transsexual identities.4 Others considered the reforms to be a compromise that 
maintained the status quo. 5 In this case state recognition of transgender bodies and 
identities is incorporated into existing policies and practices through administrative 
strategies that attempt to maintain dualistic understandings of sexual difference. The 
legislation governing the Births Deaths and Marriages register, that allows the sex 
designation on the birth certificate to be changed, is a new instrument of bio-power 
(Foucault, 1978: 140) and potential source of division and differentiation among 
transgendered people. 
Nations have been historically constituted in gendered and sexualised terms 
(Stychin, 1998: 7). In New South Wales "sexual citizenship" for post operative 
transsexuals is constituted through the consumption of gender reassignment surgeries. 
State legislation that allows post-operative transsexuals born in New South Wales to 
change their sex on their birth certificate constructs a local citizenry that is related to 
4 Peter Weekes, 'Victory at last for state's tranys'. Q, 192, 7/07/96. 
5 Rachel Toft argues for example, that the reforms are a hollow victory for the transgender community-
as continuing to exclude post-operative h'anssexuals from marrying enables the New South Wales 
Government to avoid its own Transgender Anti-vilification Laws. She also points out that the disjunction 
between state and federal legislation means that transsexuals are still not able to 'live legally as normal' 
(Letter to the Editor, Polare, 14, 1996, P 4). 
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territorial-based birth-right. Only those individuals born in New South Wales are able 
to take full advantage of this legislation; transsexuals born in other Australian states 
and living in New South Wales are excluded by this legislation. Instead the official 
documentation relating to their sexed identity is governed by state legislation based in 
their territory of birth. In other words, this concept of citizenship is constituted through 
a series of exclusions. I argue that in New South Wales transsexual identities and rights 
are constructed in terms of the legislation, which specifies which categories of people 
may officially change their gender and under what conditions. 
Registering sexed identities 
The law recognises only two sexes - male and female - and requires the decision 
assigning sex to be made when the infant's sex, determined by genital anatomy, is 
entered on the birth certificate. Yet the designation of sex, decided in a split second, 
may have a profound effect on the individual's future development... You cannot 
choose not to be classified sexually as either male or female; the choice made for you 
at birth operates in all areas, for all purposes, for all time ... (Dunderdale, 1992: 23). 
The full birth certificate is the state's archive of an individual's identity. It ties an 
individual, however tenuously, to a particular place/community/nation and does not 
lapse with either temporary or permanent absence (Brubaker, 1992: 21). It is the 
original record of a person's name, sex, nationality, parentage and age from which 
subsequent documents such as passports are generated. The birth certificate records 
date and place of birth and name of parentis in order to establish certain rights to 
citizenship and the inheritance of property.6 The recording of the sex of an infant at 
birth confers a gender identity. The sex, once recorded on the birth certificate, 
determines institutional and social inclusions and exclusions; in this regard biological 
sex is a form of (heterosexual) social closure. 
Rodgers Brubaker (1992: 29-30) argues that all forms of social closure include some 
way of defining and identifying 'outsiders or ineligibles'. Insiders and outsiders may be 
defined informally through tacit, internalised criteria deployed in social interaction or 
formally by specialised administrators. Formal techniques for the definition of insiders 
and outsiders include: 
GIn Aush'alia inheritance rights are regulated by state. In New South Wales definitions of 'descent' and 
'descendants' for the purposes of inheriting property are outlined in the Inheritance Act of 1901 
(www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au). 
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the elaboration of explicit and unambiguous criteria of insider hood and 
outsiderhood; exhaustive enumerations of individual insiders or outsiders (guest 
lists, registers, rosters, membership rolls, blacklists); and formally administered 
identification routines in which a particular person is identified as an insider or 
outsider through the application of general criteria or through matching against 
enumerative lists (Brubaker, 1992: 30 italics myemphasis). 
Socially defined biological sex7 is an 'instrument of closure' (Brubaker, 1992: 31) in 
the sense that the state administered categories of male and female determine life 
choices by enabling individuals to participate in certain social interactions and not 
others. Biological sex is also an 'object of closure' (Brubaker, 1992: 31), a legal status to 
which states restrict access. The construction of male and female as general, abstract 
and enduring concepts enables states to use them as administrative categories. The birth 
certificate and the Births, Deaths and Marriages register are the formal mechanisms for 
recording the sexed identities of particular individuals. 
The single piece of paper on which the details of birth are printed is the outcome of a 
series of translations in which individuals become symbols and codes that are able to be 
conserved both individually and collectively in official records. The sex designation on 
the birth certificate divides people into two mutually exclusive categories, male and 
fernale. s The vast majority of people fall easily into these either/or categories, but some 
people are neither or both. Every state requires that a person's biological sex is entered 
onto their birth certificate. The vast majority of people acquire their biological sex in 
this way. Sex is an ascribed status determined at birth - in the majority of cases biology 
is unambiguous allowing states to maintain relatively clear administrative records. 
Some individuals will be assigned incorrectly, in the sense that their subsequent gender 
identity may not correspond to the sex recorded at birth (see Brubaker, 1992: p31-32). 
This ambiguity between sex at birth and subsequent gender identity allows for variation 
in state's ascription rules. It is the way that states manage this variability that is of 
interest in this chapter. 
7 In cases where the external genitalia of the new born infant are unambiguous the biological sex of an 
infant is often determined through the judgement of the attending medical specialist (Findlay, 1995: 36-
37). In many of these cases it could be argued that the sex of the infant is defined according to cultural, 
as opposed to diagnostic, criteria, the point being that biology/genetic sex (XX, XV, XO, XXV etc) is not 
the basis on which the 'sex determination' at birth is usually made. Rather it is made on the basis of the 
visual judgement of the doctor or midwife. This suggests that biology is socially defined on the basis of 
physical sex. In addition, the genuine hermaphrodite is biologically male and female but the birth 
certificate will state only one or the other. 
S See Chapter Six for a discussion of critiques of the two sex model. 
193 
The Births, Deaths and Marriages register creates identity categories (national, state, 
sexual, sexed identities), establishes citizenship and allocates inheritance rights. The 
register is organised in gendered and sexualised terms - the sex designation on the 
birth certificate, for example, is incorporated into federal marriage law thereby 
establishing which sex an individual is permitted to marry. Such legislative inclusions 
and exclusions rest on the presumption of heterosexuality and its implications vis-a-vis 
marriage, pro-creation and family (Evans, 1993: 203). The register not only functions 
as a centralised mechanism for recording births, deaths and marriages, but it may also 
be used to smooth over competing claims within a contested field. The birth certificate 
generated through the register may be used to determine sex for the purpose of 
marriage or establish proof of parentage/ marriage for inheritance purposes. The Births, 
Deaths and Marriages register confers rights and shows up differences between people 
living in the same state. One of the functions of the Births, Deaths and Marriages 
register is to establish legitimate membership to a local/national community and 
thereby confer rights associated with citizenship. 
Modern citizenship is typically defined as 'a personal status consisting of a body of 
universal rights (i.e., legal claims on the state) and duties held equally by all legal 
members of a nation-state' (Marshall, 1964; Brubaker, 1992 cited in Somers 1993: 
588; Turner, 1994). Citizenship may be thought of as a social or relational network, a 
moral and political category, as a formal legal or civil status, and as an administrative 
category (Mische, 1996; Lister, 1997: 29; Weeks, 1998: 38; Hudson and Kane, 2000: 
5). Citizenship is about rights and obligations (Lister, 1997) - legal recognition; equal 
treatment before the law and equal political participation have been the traditional 
cornerstones of citizenship (Evans, 1993: 100; Weeks, 1998: 37-38; Sullivan, 2000: 
156). Current claims to citizenship by people who identify as transgendered in 
Australia (and elsewhere) follow patterns in the extension of equal political citizenship 
rights over time to un propertied men, women, people of colour and sexual minorities 
(Plummer, 1995: 146; Somers, 1993; Weeks, 1998). Jeffrey Weeks (1998) comments 
on the connections between universal citizenship, sexual citizenship and the state 
regulation of bodies: 
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New stories about the self, about sexuality, and gender, are the context for the 
emergence of the sexual citizen because these stories telling of exclusion, through 
gender, sexuality, race, bodily appearance or function, have as their corollary the 
demand for inclusion: for equal rights under the law, in politics, in economics, in 
social matters and in sexual matters. They pose questions about who should be in 
control of our bodies, the limits of the body, the burden of custom and of the state 
(Weeks, 1998: 47). 
In contemporary Western societies the differential extension of citizenship to people 
on the basis of class (Weeks, 1998), gender (Lister, 1997), ethnicity (Yuval-Davis, 
1997) and sexuality (Richardson, 1998) point to the embodied dimensions of 
citizenship. Many of these categories were/are at one time or in certain national 
contexts ascribed at birth. 9 
Australians are dual citizens as both members of a nation and a state (Irving, 1997: 
159, 162; Hudson and Kane, 2000: 4). Their civil status is determined in their 'state of 
origin'. Birth registers and the issuing of birth certificates, for example, are the 
responsibility of states (Dunderdale, 1992: 22). This dual citizenship status enables 
states to impose regulations on people born within its territories independently of the 
national federal government (Irving, 1997: 159,162). In addition, passports and 
regulations surrounding marriage are the responsibility of the federal government. The 
local organization of the Births, Deaths and Marriages register potentially poses 
problems when the regulation of the register between states and between states and the 
federal government is not consistent. Discontinuities between states that recognise 
'change of sex' and states and federal legislation that currently do not, means that 
liberal states have had to incorporate these differences into their legislation. It is the 
incorporation of these differences into the New South Wales state legislation that makes 
the use of the birth certificate context-bound. 
State citizenship determines the rules for recording sex at birth and for recognising 
subsequent gender identities. From the age of 18 an unmarried person born in New 
South Wales whose gender identity varies from that ascribed at birth may be able to 
acquire legal recognition of their subsequent gender identity. Rules governing the 
change of sex across Australian states can be more or less restrictive. In New South 
Wales, South Australia and Australian Capital Territory the ability to change the sex 
designation on the birth certificate is open to all candidates who meet certain 
9 Class in Elizabethan England (Garber, 1998 [1992]: 178) and ethnicity in apartheid South Africa for 
example. 
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conditions. Local state regulation of transsexual identities and rights has resulted in 
widely varying legislation that specifies which categories of people may officially 
change their gender and under what conditions. South Australia was the first 
Australian state to pass legislation (in 1988) that enabled transsexuals born in South 
Australia, who had undergone sex reassignment surgery in South Australia, to alter the 
sex designation on their birth certificate. It could be argued that this legislation was 
aimed at regulating sex reassignment surgery rather than extending citizenship rights 
to post-operative transsexuals. The legislation stipulates that only sex reassignment 
surgery performed in a South Australian hospital by medical professionals who are 
accepted medical specialists in this field may be recognised for the purposes of altering 
the sex designation on the birth certificate. Io A transgendered person, born in South 
Australia, who has sex reassignment surgery outside of South Australia cannot alter 
their birth certificate.ll This legislation is largely symbolic as no sex reassignment 
operations are currently performed in South Australia (Perkins, et.al., 1994: 15). At the 
time of writing no other Australian state has incorporated these restrictions into law. In 
other Australian states such as Tasmania and Victoria the ability to make the changes to 
the sex designation on the birth certificate currently remains closed. 
The operation of the Births, Deaths and Marriages register in any state is set by state 
government policy that determines the conditions under which births are recorded and 
their details altered. A one page fact sheet for recording a change of sex issued by the 
New South Wales Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages in 1996 outlines the criteria 
under which a transgender person qualifies to 'record their new gender on their birth 
certificate'. For the purposes of the arguments presented in this chapter it is worth 
reproducing this fact sheet at length: 
From the 1 October 1996 people born in NSW who have undergone sexual 
reassignment surgery will be able to apply to the Registrar to record their new gender 
on their birth certificate. 
A person born in NSW who is 18 years or older may apply to the Registrar to have 
the record of their sex altered on their birth certificate if they are not married and have 
undergone sexual reassignment surgery. 
An application to have birth certificate records altered must be accompanied by 
statutory declarations by two (2) doctors verifying that the applicant has undergone 
10 This legislation resulted from doctors' concerns about MTF transsexuals who had sex reassignment 
surgery in third world countries (' good h'anny guide' http/ /host2mbcol11s.net.aultg). 
11 www.gendercenh.e.org.auandthe.goodtranl1yguide.http//host2l11bcol11s.net.au/tg. 
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sexual reassignment surgery, as well as other documentation certifying the identity of 
the applicant. .. 
Birth certificates will not be marked in any way as to indicate that the person has 
changed sex, although to enable your old birth certificate to be issued as necessary, the 
birth will be re-registered in the current year. 
The new certificate can be used in NSW and other places which recognise change 
of sex (such as South Australia). Where change of sex is not recognised s 32G 
requires that you tell the person relying on your new birth certificate of the 
circumstances it has been reissued, or to use your old birth certificate instead ... 
The child of a person whose sex has been altered can apply for their parent's 
original birth certificate to establish inheritance and citizenship rights. 
(NSW Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages - undated)12 
In New South Wales state legislation allows post-operative male-to-female 
transsexuals born in New South Wales to change their sex on their birth certificate. 
Female-to-male transsexuals are required to have a hysterectomy in order to qualify 
under the same legislation. The regulations position medical professionals as key actors 
in securing the right to change the sex designation on the birth certificate. In order to 
conform to the regulations regarding a change of sex the body needs to go through a 
series of translations. For male-to-female transsexuals the construction of female 
genitals, which induces reproductive non-functioning qualifies them as female. For 
female-to-male transsexuals reproductive non-functioning in the form of a 
hysterectomy qualifies them as male. One reading of this legislation is that both surgery 
and reproductive non-functioning are important to the ,way that the state regulates 
, 
transgender bodies. Another interpretation of these surgical requirements suggests that 
the state legislation leaves post-operative transsexuals with ~o biological sex - only 
gender. 
The New South Wales regulations attempt to ensure consistency in the recording of 
sex on the birth certificate. It should not be possible for a woman with a penis to father 
a child or a man with a vagina to give birth. Individual histories, however, may thwart 
attempts to construct consistency. In New South Wales an individual with their 
original birth sex recorded as male may potentially appear on the register as a 
male/ son, a married man, a father, a divorcee and a female. The restriction of marriage 
to people of opposite sex, whereby biological sex at birth is prioritised over subsequent 
12 I acquired this fact sheet in 1996/97 while in Sydney. The fact sheet was probably produced 
sometime between the passing of the Transgender Anti -Discrimination legislation on June 19, 1996 and 
the day of commencement on October 1, 1996. A revised version of this fact sheet is also reproduced on 
the New South Wales Government website (www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au). 
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gender identity (Dunderdale, 1992: 24 & 25), means that a MTF transsexual cannot be 
entered on the register as a married woman. 13 
In principle the sexed identity of a post-operative transgender person endorsed on 
the changed birth certificate is meant to apply relatively independently of local context. 
But at the inter-state and national level the birth certificate is context bound. Tensions 
between public narratives of biological sex as general, abstract, and enduring and the 
way in which transgender identities are local, specific and changing is demonstrated in 
the way in which both birth certificates are used both within New South Wales and 
between New South Wales and other Australian states. Heterosexual male and female 
citizens enjoy the unconditional right to their sexed identity and they may organise 
their lives accordingly. The gender identities of transsexual people are never 
unconditional. In New South Wales pre-operative and non-operative transsexuals are 
excluded from formal legal recognition of their chosen gender identity by the state. But 
even those who are post-operative, and have had the designation on their birth 
certificate changed, are subject to their old identities under certain circumstances. With 
respect to sports competitions, superannuation,14 private education and marriage, an 
individual's original birth certificate applies. 15 
. A person who secures a change of sex has two birth certificates: their original birth 
certificate and the new birth certificate registering the change of sex. In order to 
distinguish between the two birth certificates the birth is re-registered in the year in 
which application to change the sex designation on the birth certificate is successful. 
This means a person who alters the sex on their birth certificate at age 40 will have a 
registration date on their new birth certificate, and a catalogue number, that does not 
approximate the date of birth that is recorded on the new certificate. This disjuncture 
between the (original) date of birth registered on the new birth certificate and the re-
issued certificate's registration date and catalogue number means that an observant 
person may question the authenticity of the birth certificate requiring an explanation 
13 www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au. Dan Hogan of the Department of Births Deaths and Marriages is quoted in 
a newspaper article as saying "Under Commonwealth law, this sort of marriage (between a h'any and a 
person of opposite gender) does not exist, so this form of marriage would be immediately null and void". 
Catt, Julie (20.06.96) 'Surprise reactions to trany victory' in SSO, no. 308. 
14 In Australia the legal age of retirement from paid work for women is 60 and for men 65. In 1999 a 
legal decision (in the case of the Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services vs SRA) was 
made that the sex at birth determines retirement age for the purpose of receiving social security benefits 
(www.austlii.edu.au). 
15 Not all private educational institutions or sporting bodies exclude transgendered people, however, if 
they wish to do so this form of discrimination is not illegal. 
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for this discrepancy that would 'out' a transgendered person. Transsexuals who travel 
across the state border are required to inform the person relying on their new birth 
certificate of the circumstances surrounding its alteration. The legislation within that 
state may require them to reproduce their old birth certificate. The federal government 
does not currently recognise change of sex for post-operative transsexuals. Australian 
passports are an international record of national citizenship and personal identity that 
are administered by the federal government. As a result, the sex designation on the 
passport of a post-operative transsexual, born in New South Wales records the person's 
original sex at birth. A child of a person whose sex has been altered may also acquire 
their parent's original birth certificate in order to establish inheritance and citizenship 
rights. In this example, the birth certificates act as an archive for the conservation of 
traces of a previous identity that establishes a reversible route (Latour, 1995) which 
enables movement backwards and forwards through space and time from differently 
sexed bodies to paper. 
Management tools and surveillance mechanisms 
The New South Wales legislation is based on an assumption of consent; in the first 
instance consent to radical surgery and in the second consent to changing the sex 
designation on the birth certificate. In practice, although discourses of consent are used 
to regulate change of sex on the Births, Deaths and Marriages register, issues of consent 
become secondary to the way that the register is actually implemented and used as a 
management tool and as a surveillance mechanism (Austrin and Phibbs, 1996). This 
contrast between discursive claims and actual practice raises questions about how 
registers are managed and used and in whose interests. The deployment of the 
regulatory functions for the change of sex on the birth certificate may be seen as an 
example of bio-power in action (Foucault, 1978: 40). In this view the Births, Deaths 
and Marriages register is the apparatus for the administration of bodies and regulation 
of the sexed identities of the population in general and transgendered people in 
particular. The altering of an individual's biological sex on the birth certificate is 
regulated by formally articulated norms and enforced by state actors employing formal 
administrative regulations and identification routines. The surgical requirements are 
formal, as the surgery/genitals are invisible in ordinary public interaction and 'visible 
only under the special lens of administrative scrutiny' (Brubaker, 1992: 30). Changes 
to the sex at birth recorded on the register requires 'an administrative apparatus of 
classification and surveillance and a corresponding body of administrative knowledge' 
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(Brubaker, 1992: 30). Sophie, a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual interviewed 
in Sydney describes the process of changing her name on the birth certificate and other 
official papers such as her driver's license and passport: 
When I changed my name I did it down at the Births Deaths and Marriages at 
Westmead. I had no problems there... [Once] I got the birth certificate 
changed, although it still tells them what myoid name was with an 
endorsement thing on the bottom and still got the sex as male, because I have 
not had reassignment surgery. I think if you have the reassignment surgery 
that could change to female. But whether there is still an endorsement on it I 
don't know. But in my case all I have changed is the name, passport still has 
male, driver's license, all I changed was the photo and that is it. I have had a 
few hassles, mostly with Government Departments getting your name changed. 
They tend to be a bit more hassle than private industry. A couple of insurance 
companies I had to get my name changed, no problem at all. Passport office I 
had the biggest hassles with. Although you can't prove it, it was probably some 
smart-arse bloke there giving me the wrong information, I kicked up a bit of a 
fuss in the end and got it resolved. But you still have to kick up a fuss, you can't 
just go "these are the papers, I just want to change it". 
Sophie, MTF, 1997 
Sophie, a pre-operative transsexual, talks about some of the administrative 
differences between pre-operative transsexuals and post-operative transsexuals within 
the New South Wales legislation. Pre-operative transsexuals cannot alter the sex 
designation on the birth certificate and they have the original name recorded on the 
birth certificate and the change of name entered as an endorsement. Post-operative 
transsexuals, who change their name and sex designation on their birth certificate, do 
not have their original name recorded on the reissued birth certificate. The birth 
certificate does have an endorsement indicating that the birth certificate was previously 
issued under a different name but the name is not stated. This statement, combined 
with the absence of a former name, and the date of re-issue was described to me by one 
inter-sex person as a 'give-away to people who know what to look for'.16 In this 
example, a person's name has both personal significance and legal standing. 
Transsexuals, such as Sophie, change the name on the birth certificate so that it reflects 
their gender identity and it is the state's formal record of an individual citizen. 
A register establishes specific kinds of relational-networks that facilitate the 
organisation of actors vis-it-vis each other in ways that provide the means for certain 
16 Personal conversation with an inter-sex person who was born in New South Wales and had changed 
their birth certificate within 4 months of the legislation being passed (June 2001). 
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things, such as biological sex, to become knowable. This information is not given; it has 
to be worked out through forms of inscription collected and represented in a register. 
The register is central to the organisational and regulatory functions of states - it is one 
of the key mechanisms through which citizenship is established and whereby 
populations achieve durability. In this view the Births, Deaths and Marriages register 
operates as a management tool for the organisation of citizenship, identities and their 
associated rights. It is a centralised register administered and funded by the New South 
Wales government. The register is used conventionally as a means of classifying 
information and constructing identity categories. In this regard the register is 
implemented and used as a management tool and as a surveillance mechanism. 
Elizabeth Grosz (1994) also argues that bodies and identities are fashioned through and 
by regulations and techniques of surveillance that are culturally embedded: 
The body is involuntarily marked, but it is also incised through "voluntary" 
procedures, lifestyles, habits and behaviours. There is nothing natural or ahistorical 
about these modes of corporeal inscription. Through them bodies are made 
amenable to prevailing exigencies of power. They make flesh into a particular type 
of body. Culturally specific grids of power, regulation and force, condition and 
provide techniques for the formation of particular types of bodies (Grosz, 1994: 
142). 
State legislation surrounding changing sex on the birth certificate is a 'culturally 
specific grid of power' that condones the construction of flesh into particular types of 
bodies. In New South Wales sexed citizenship for post-operative transsexuals is 
constituted through the consumption of gender reassignment technologies. Female-to-
male transsexuals need to prove that they have undergone a hysterectomy. Male-to-
female transsexuals have to prove that they have had sex reassignment surgery. Within 
this legislation, transgender people are identified with the body in so far as the body is 
understood as the site of these inscriptions. Transgendered people, homosexuals (Rubin, 
1998 [1984]; Evans, 1993; Moran, 1999) and (intellectually) disabled people 
(Meekosha and Dowse, 1997: 56; Munford 1995) as 'other' within the body politic, 
attract state interventions that would not be tolerated in other areas of social life. 
201 
Modern citizenship as uneven and exclusive 
The Births, Deaths and Marriages register makes possible new forms of visualisation 
based around the organisation and transfer of information through time and space. 
The register not only functions as a centralised mechanism for the recording of sexed 
identities, but may also be used to regulate and organise populations, spaces and times. 
The organisation of the population through forms of inscription collected and 
represented in a register hinges around the territorial regulation of citizenship. 
Margaret Somers (1993: 587) argues that 'varying patterns of institutional 
relationships among law [sic], communities, and political cultures were central factors 
in shaping modern citizenship rights'. Somers explores citizenship as an instituted 
process rather than as a status. She argues that citizenship rights tend to be extended 
unevenly, depending on particular configurations of legal infrastructure, varying 
degrees of community capacities for participatory association, and patterns of political 
culture. As a result modern citizenship was achieved unevenly. Her focus is on 
differences in the historical emergence of citizenship rights among a heterogeneous 
working class in 17th and 18th century rural and pastoral England. The patterns that 
she identifies also apply to the differential or uneven extension of transgender 
citizenship rights to transsexuals in late 20th century Australia. 
While Margaret Somers (1993: 587) contends that modern citizenship was 
unevenly achieved, Rodgers Brubaker (1992: 21) argues that citizenship is internally 
inclusive. Contradictions in the regulation of transgendered bodies and identities within 
and between Australian states suggest that citizenship is not internally coherent, nor is 
it evenly distributed. To paraphrase Brubaker's argument about differences in 
citizenship status between people born in a particular territory and those who are not, 
'(t)here is a conceptually clear, legally consequential, and ideologically charged 
distinction between' (Brubaker, 1992: 21) male and female born heterosexual citizens 
and those who are not. 'Closure pivots in each of these cases on the legal institution of 
citizenship' (Brubaker, 1992: 23). The uneven distribution of citizenship rights in a 
modern, democratic state may be seen in patterns of difference that are embedded in 
the regulation of transgendered bodies and identities. Differences in citizenship status 
between 'ordinary' citizens and transsexuals within New South Wales are further 
complicated by legal/legislative distinctions between post-op, non-op and pre-op 
transsexuals. Dissimilarities between the regulation of transsexual bodies and identities 
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between New South Wales, other Australian states and territories, and the federal 
government also impact on the rights of transgendered people living in New South 
Wales. In these examples the continuing use of binary gender categories in federal and 
state policies and practices discriminates against transgendered people. 
The legislation reflects differences between the regulation of transsexual bodies 
between New South Wales, other Australian states and territories, and the federal 
government. State legislation relating to the regulation of transgender bodies illustrates 
how sexed identities are managed by a modern state. In New South Wales surgery and 
reproductive non-functioning are important to the way that the state regulates or 
authorises transgender bodieslidentities. The territorial regulation of sexual difference 
is illustrated by the contradictions within the legislation in New South Wales and 
between New South Wales and other Australian states. This concept of citizenship is 
constituted through a series of exclusions. In Australia transsexual identities and rights 
are constructed in terms of widely varying legislation which specifies which categories 
of people may officially change their gender and under what conditions. 
Post-operative transsexuals, born in New South Wales, who have altered the 
biological sex on their birth certificate do not enjoy the unconditional right to their 
chosen sexed identity. Differences between the state and federal legislation mean that in 
marriage and in superannuation the state's original record of an individual's biological 
sex applies. If they travel or move out of New South Wales they are also subject to the 
state's original record of their biological sex if the state in which they are located does 
not recognise 'change of sex'. The Act distinguishes between post-operative 
transsexuals living in New South Wales who were born in other Australian states and 
those who were born within its territory. In this regard, the legislation marks out a 
form of territorial citizenship based on the local recording of sexed identities on the 
Births, Deaths and Marriages Register. 
Differences in the regulation of transsexual identities within and between Australian 
States are also complicated by differences between Australia and other countries. In the 
following narrative Nick, a trany boy, talks about how the female designation on his 
passport, combined with the thought of being body searched, act as barriers to 
international travel: 
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The only reason I have not left Australia is because of my passport. I have not 
got a passport, but if I had a passport before the legislation, let's say I got one 
last year, it would have female on it. Now can you imagine me going through 
customs in America female? Don't think so. I wasn't prepared, look we all put 
ourselves in situations where we are vulnerable, and the key to success with 
transgenderism is you do not put yourself in those situations. Easier said than 
done, I know, but you have got to think before you act, because it can come 
back at you time and time again. When people have a go at you it is tough, real 
tough. It really hits you, you can get worn down to nothing. And it eventually 
does get to you, and the idea is not to put yourself in those situations. That is 
why I got involved with the legislation ... 
Nick, FTM, 1996 
In Australia pre-operative transsexuals are classed on their passport in relation to 
their birth sex; in New Zealand pre-operative transsexuals have the option of not 
having their sex designation recorded on their passport - that is a line is put through 
the male/female category on the passport,17 One reading of the New Zealand 
legislation would suggest that it deconstructs binary sex/gender categories as a person 
may 'opt out' of any sex. Another more conservative reading of this option would 
suggest that 'opting out' maintains the integrity of normative understandings about the 
relationship between anatomical sex and social gender. 
Peter Read (1998: 173) explores contradictions embodied in intersections between 
national and local legislation for Australia's indigenous peoples in ways that are 
relevant for an analysis of legislation relating to officially changing gender. He argues 
that historical variations in distinctions between indigenous and non-indigenous people 
within and between federal legislation and state policies and practices have effectively 
redefined indigenous Australians out of existence. IS His arguments could also be 
applied to variations in national and state polices relating to transsexuals. The 
legislation that allows transsexuals to change their birth sex enables some people who 
were transgendered to no longer identify in this way. The challenges of the category 
17 New Zealand information based on personal conversation with a transgendered friend in New 
Zealand. Australian information see www.gendercentre.org.au and the 'good h'anny guide' 
http/ IhostZmbcoms.net.au/tg. 
18 Read (1998: 169-170) cites the following example: '[tlhe New South Wales Aboriginal Board were 
ordered to remove children from their parents, but then if possible, to persuade the Department of Child 
Welfare to receive the children into its -not the Board's - institutions. That is, a child was to be removed 
because, and only because, she was Aboriginal; but the moment after removal she was to cease to be 
Aboriginal.' Read (1998: 170) refers to this and numerous other legislative examples like it as 'extinction 
by legislation'. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1990: 69-70) also notes that a series of legal rulings in the 
United States in the 1970's and 80's dictated that homosexuality was not a public concern. But findings 
against gay men and lesbians based solely on their sexuality suggested that homosexuality did not exist 
solely in the private sphere either. Sedgwick argues that these legal double binds oppress and 
discriminate against gay men and lesbians by undermining their identities. 
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transgendered are diminished through the (legislative) technique of redefining the 
other out of existence. Transsexuals who desire state authorisation of their sexed 
identity on their birth certificate have to fit themselves back into the mainstream society 
by divesting themselves of old cultural norms and parts of their bodies and acquiring 
new ones. State recognition of transgender identity is conditional and transgender 
people who do not fulfil these criteria are excluded from recognition. Pre-operative and 
non-operative transsexuals as well as hermaphrodites are differentially positioned vis-
a-vis these regulations - in this sense the regulations permitting transgender people to 
alter the sex on their birth certificate are marked by another form of social closure. Or 
to put it another way, the legislation works best in relation to stereotypical heterosexual 
identified post-operative male-to-female transsexuals. Wendy a MTF interviewed for 
this project observes that the distinctions between pre-operative and post-operative 
transsexuals within the legislation, and its failure to fully incorporate transgenders, are 
a potential source of cleavage within the community: 
When the legislation was passed everyone was pleased about its success 
although there was a lot of carping from one sector of the transgender 
community about the fact that the Bill discriminates between transgenders and 
transsexuals. Things like the fact that a transgendered person is not allowed to 
change their birth certificate, these compromises were made to get the 
legislation through, to include transgenders, the New South Wales parliament 
couldn't or wouldn't go that far, and then no one would have benefited. But 
that really is not important anyway because once the Transgender Amendment 
Bill is on the books you can work to get the Bill amended to include 
transgenders. The state recognition of transgender is the important thing, that 
official validation of our existence and our rights. 
Wendy,FTM, 1996 
Wendy indicates that while transgendered and transsexual people are recognized in 
the New South Wales anti-discrimination legislation (an international first), it is only 
post-operative transsexuals that are allowed to change the sex designation on their 
birth certificate. Transgendered people are differentially positioned vis-a-vis the 
surgical technologies that are incorporated into the Act. The draft legislation required 
transsexuals to have under-gone gender reassignment surgery in order to change the 
sex designation on their birth certificate. This prompted Nick, a female-to-male 
transsexual, to 'come out' in order to get the legislation modified to cater for the 
different bodies of female-to-male transsexuals: 
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That is why I got involved with the legislation... I've lost jobs because I'm a 
trany. So I thought fuck this I'm going to do something about it so I came out, 
got involved with the legislation, went and saw this politician, spun him right 
out. Because with this new law it is only if you have had a sex change that you 
can get a change, well we don't have that availability. Well we do, but it is only 
in its experimental stages and it is a hard enough decision to have bottom half 
surgery, regardless for whether it is a boy or a girl. But for the boys they have to 
choose whether they want one they can piss out of or fuck with. Say you choose 
to have the sex, and it won't work. You are going to be thinking for the rest of 
your life I should have taken the other one and vice versa. Why can't they come 
up with something that does both? Because it is harder to work with something 
that you have not got, than to change something you have (as in MTF surgery). 
With the guys it is hard to create something out of nothing, so why should we 
be crucified (politically) for the inadequacies of the medical profession? We got 
the legislation passed with the fact that you have to have had your sexual organs 
done, with trany guys that is a hysterectomy so basically all a guy has to do is 
have a hysterectomy and he should have no problems. If he does not choose to 
have a hysterectomy, or he does not need to have one, like in Andrew's case he 
has already gone through menopause, he doesn't really need one there are 
certain avenues for that. 
Nick, trany guy, 1996 
Differences between the rights of post-op, non-op and pre-op transsexuals are also 
embedded in the New South Wales legislation. In New South Wales pre-operative and 
non -operative transsexuals are excluded from formal recognition of their chosen 
gender identity by the state. The legislation enabling recognised transgender people to 
alter the sex on their birth certificate was passed in conjunction with the transgender 
Anti-Discrimination Act of 1996 which made it 'unlawful for a person to discriminate 
against another person on transgender grounds' .19 In certain contexts this Act 
differentiates between individuals who are pre-operative or non-operative and those 
who are legally recognised as post-operative. In the provision of goods and services, for 
example, legally recognised post-operative male-to-female transgenders may not be 
denied entry to women only spaces, such as gyms, whereas pre-operative and non-
operative transgendered individuals may be actively barred from entry. 
The differential and uneven extension of citizenship rights to transsexuals is 
illustrated by contradictions in the use of the South Wales change of sex legislation 
within and between New South Wales and other Australian states and the federal 
government. The Births, Deaths and Marriages register is embedded in multiple and 
overlapping networks of power - most obviously, forms of local and national legislative 
19 www.austlii.edu.au 
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power and administrative regulatory power, but also powerful cultural narratives of 
sexual difference. Moria Gatens argues that the imaginary body embedded in state 
policies and practices, such as those associated with the Births Deaths, and Marriages 
register, is not neutral. Instead it reflects and reproduces binary notions of sexual 
difference. The following section explores how the body politic is represented through 
dualistic understandings of sexual difference that are embedded in political languages 
and the administrative apparatus of the state. 
Reflections: sex, gender a.nd the body politic 
Biological sex is an historically and culturally specific artifact which is commonly 
understood as a private 'essence' that transcends history and culture. Since biological 
sex is commonly understood as prior to history, how it is regulated through forms of 
legislative and juridical power tends to be accepted uncritically or taken for granted 
(Evans, 1993: 12). For the great majority of people biological sex is an imposed, 
ascribed status. The importance of this ascribed status to the state's administrative 
apparatus is indicated by the exacting regulations that permit people to change their 
biological sex. The surgical criteria, within the New South Wales legislation that 
enables post-operative transsexuals to alter the sex designation on their birth 
certificate, retains the sexed identities of men and women as mutually exclusive 
categories. This interplay between the New South Wales legislation and dialectically 
opposed sexed bodies maintains the integrity of the particular discursive formation, or 
the imagery and knowledge, associated with the body politic. The legislation is an 
example of the way that the subject of political theory cannot be neutral because it is 
always and already a sexed subject. In this view particular public narratives - ways of 
thinking about sex and gender that are embedded in state policies and practices - are 
activated in and through the Births, Deaths and Marriages register. These public 
narratives about sex and gender constitute and reflect pre-existing interests. This 
requires a study of the social production and reproduction of sexed identities through 
the use of political languages. 
In New South Wales the legislation enabling recognised transgender people to alter 
the sex on the birth certificate was passed in conjunction with the transgender Anti-
Discrimination Act of 1996 which made it 'unlawful for a person to discriminate 
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against another person on transgender grounds'. 20 During the course of my field 
research I interviewed one person who had been very strategic in using the New South 
Wales Anti-discrimination legislation. In the following narrative Sophie talks about 
how the legal protection offered by the legislation enabled her to change her gender 
identity at work. Prior to the legislation Sophie had been living as a woman outside of 
work. She came to work dressed in her female civilian clothes and changed into the 
compulsory male officer's uniform required at her place of work: 
Sophie: I have only come out at work or changed over at work late last year, 
came back from holidays late October, it was only late October early 
November really when I went back to work as female. I told them before 
that, I said before I took the holidays last October that when I come back 
I come back as Jane [Doe]. 
SP: How did they react to that? 
Sophie: At first a bit hostile, but that was at the time just after the new laws came 
in so they couldn't do much. I think if the laws hadn't come in I 
wouldn't have a job. I don't think I would be working there now if the 
laws hadn't come in. That is why I really left it to come out till after the 
law. At least that way we have some sort of protection, I think it is more 
in theory than in practice. I think if you tried to put it into practice you 
would have a hell of a job proving it and getting it through the courts ... 
The law didn't get changed to the degree that we had hoped, but it did 
get changed. It meant that you can't just change your birth certificate to 
a female you have to have that endorsement on it. It was probably a 
compromIse. 
Sophie, MTF, 1997 
The Anti-discrimination legislation came into effect on October, 1, 1996. The bill 
amended the Anti-discrimination Act of 1977 to provide separate grounds for 
prosecution against any person (or institution) that discriminates against an individual 
on the basis of their 'gender orientation'. The bill also introduced legislation to provide 
for the legal recognition of post-operative transsexuals (Polare, 1996: 6).21 Sophie took 
her holidays in late October, early November 1996. During her holiday break Sophie 
changed all her personal papers and was fitted at work for the compulsory female 
officer's uniform. After her holidays Sophie returned to work as a woman. Sophie is 
quite certain that if the legislation had not been passed then she would have lost her job 
as her female identity would not have been accepted at work. Sophie also recognises 
20 www.austlii.edu.au 
21 'The NSW Transgender Bill 1996' in Polan:, edition 13 pages 6- 7. 
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the legislation is not inclusive of all transgendered people because compromises had to 
be made in order to get the legislation through parliament. 
One reading of the New South Wales anti-discrimination legislation is that the 
statutory reform provisions within the Act ensure equal treatment before the law for 
transgendered people. The legislation, for example, enables transsexuals to be 
recognised before the law as victims of sexual assault. In other areas, however, the 
New South Wales law and public policy relating to transgender people continues to 
reinforce 'heteronormativity' (Sullivan, 2000: 156). Altering the sex designation on the 
birth certificate does not confer equal citizenship to transgendered people in all cases. 
This may be seen, for example, in the specific exemptions to the Act in the areas of 
marriage and superannuation. The surgical requirements contained within the Act 
reinforce gendered, (hetero)sexual norms and family arrangements. In these examples 
transsexuals have been effectively marked out as 'different' members of the citizenship 
community. 
State solutions to the different bodies and identities of transgendered people embody 
the contractions between the idealised heterosexual male body of political theory and 
the diverse bodies of actual people. Moria Gatens (1996) argues that traditional 
philosophical accounts of what it means to be human are governed by understandings 
of what it means to be male. Within these accounts women are constructed as that 
which is 'not man'. Feminists have documented the ways in which these male accounts 
of the human subject have adversely affected understandings about women and 
femininity (Gatens, 1996: viii). Following on from Michelle LeDoeuff's work (cited in 
Gatens 1996: ix) it is the interplay between dialectically opposed sexed bodies that 
maintains the particular discursive formation, or the imagery and knowledge, 
associated with the body politic. 
For Gatens the sex/gender distinction encourages a neutralisation of sexual 
difference and sexual politics. Transgender bodies and identities may be incorporated 
into the body politic as long as their differences are removed surgically. In this 
example, it is the physical body of the transgender person, and not the social categories 
by which they are identified, that is called into question. According to Gatens, feminist 
theories of sexual equality, like the New South Wales legislation, base their proof of 
gender as a social category in the flawed work of Robert Stoller, who argued that 
biological sex augments but does 'not determine the appropriate gender identity for 
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that sex ... a person's gender identity is primarily a result of postnatal psychological 
influences' (Gatens, 1996: 6). As such transsexualism and transvestism are entirely 
social. 
Gatens argues that gender theory contains an unreasoned argument that both the 
mind and body are neutral, passive blank slates on which are inscribed various 'social 
lessons'. The body is understood as a passive mediator of these inscriptions. Gender 
theory results in a simplistic solution to oppression, one that involves legislative 
sanctions against discrimination and affirmative action programmes for re-education 
and change. Gatens argues that: 
... a programme of re-education which involves the unlearning of patriarchy's 
arbitrary and oppressive codes and a relearning of politically correct and equitable 
traits, which will, in turn, lead to the whole person: the androgyn (Gatens, 1996: 4). 
Moria Gatens is critical of solutions to oppression that involve either legislative 
sanctions against discrimination and/or affirmative action programmes for re-
education and change. She argues that legislative strategies and affirmative action 
programmes do not challenge the non-neutrality of the imaginary body that forms the 
basis for state policies. Instead, Gatens equates the programme of re-education with 
one of de-gendering (through the removal of difference). This is because the project of 
equality implicitly rests on the flawed assumption of a neutral body politic. It does not 
challenge the way in which the neutral body on which state policies are based is in fact 
a male body. Gatens says that women's bodies are always problematic whenever they 
differ from the body politic - the same could be said for transgender bodies. For Gatens 
the sex/gender distinction uncritically / untenably deploys a mind/body distinction 
which results in an either/or argument. Either the human subject is entirely 
determined by biology or determined by social! environmental factors. This posits a 
naive causal relationship between body and mind. A neutral passive mind implies a 
behavioural stimulus-response model of the acquisition of gender. Instead she argues 
that the human subject is actively produced. The notion of a passive neutral body is 
equally problematic, Gatens states: 
Concerning the neutrality of the body, let me be explicit, there is no neutral body, 
there are at least two kinds of bodies: the male body and the female body (Gatens, 
1996: 8). 
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As long as feminists continue to base feminist theories about embodiment, 
subjectivity, politics or ethics on understandings of woman as other to man, then they 
fall into the trap of oppositional thinking. The subject is always a sexed subject and 
therefore it cannot be neutral. The Births, Deaths and Marriages Register attempts to 
ensure consistency in the recording of sexed identities. These records are based on the 
construction of male and female as mutually exclusive categories. Transgendered 
people who want to change their birth certificate are subject to complex rules that 
attempt to maintain the either/or status of the register. The personal histories of 
transgender people, combined with variations in 'change of sex' policies and practices 
within and between Australian states, disrupts these attempts to create consistency 
within the register. Post-operative transsexuals, who have changed their birth 
certificate to reflect their chosen gender, are able to claim an historical identity in one 
sex and a current identity in another - in this sense they are both/and. As a result, they 
may have a multiplicity of identities within a single data base. Transgender bodies and 
identities trouble the body politic precisely because they are both/and. State solutions to 
these anomalous bodies embody the contradictions between the idealized heterosexual 
male body of political theory and the diverse bodies of actual people. The New South 
Wales legislation requires transsexuals to undergo forms of surgery that induce 
reproductive non-functioning before their gender identity is able to be officially 
recorded by state authorities. This requirement may be likened to a form of biological 
'de-gendering' or 'de-sexing' whereby transsexual differences from the binary gender 
categories that underpin the body politic are surgically removed. Within the legislation 
transgender people are identified with the body in so far as the body is understood as 
the site for these inscriptions. 
Feminists have argued that women's bodies have historically been constructed as 
incomplete, and that this incompleteness has been incorporated into state legislation 
and the law (Gatens, 1996: 26). Assuming that normative associations between 
anatomy and sexed identities are unproblematic, the legislation that allows post-
operative transsexuals to change sex on their birth certificate constructs the female 
genitals of male-to-female transsexuals as anatomically correct, and therefore 
complete, and the female genitals of female-to-male transsexuals as anatomically 
incorrect and therefore incomplete. By taking into account anatomical sex of the 
female-to-male transsexual at birth the legislation is consistent with feminist arguments 
that state regulations implicitly construct women as incomplete beings. In this case, 
however, it is also the male identities of male-to-female transsexuals (or the male body 
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of the female-to-male transsexual) that is singled out as different within the legislation 
because it is constructed as incomplete. 
Gatens contends that the object of study should not be the physical or anatomical, 
neutral or dead body or socialisation theory, but the lived body, the situated body. She 
argues that to understand sex and gender (biology and the personal significance of that 
body) then one needs an analysis of the socially constructed imaginary body. Gatens 
defines the imaginary (body) as 'those images, symbols, metaphors and representations 
which help construct various forms of subjectivity' (Gatens, 1996: viii). While I agree 
with Gatens that the imaginary body of ethics and politics is a male body, I also think 
that this body is what Weber would term an 'ideal type'. It is not only women's bodies 
that problematise the body politic it is any body, male or female that does not mirror it. 
Not to acknowledge this is to oversimplify arguments that men are privileged relative to 
women in relation to the imaginary body politic. The body politic is not neutral; it is 
always sexed. The indeterminate bodies of inter-sexed people graphically illustrate this 
point, as in Australia hermaphrodites are currently unable to legally marry a person of 
either sex (Dunderdale, 1992: 24).22 Saffron, an intersexed person interviewed for this 
research project, is in the ironic position of being excluded from the body politic 
precisely because her sex is both/and or neutral: 
Transgender people are in some cases non-citizens. I remember thinking one 
day after a difficult debate (in which the issue of marriage was raised as a 
barrier to the proposed law changes which would allow some transgendered 
people to change the sex on their birth certificate) I'm a non-citizen so to speak. 
You can get a whole lot of other documents, your driver's license things like 
that, in your gendered name, but it falls short of some basic human rights. It 
says it all, marriage is a privilege, not a right. Certainly everyone has the right 
to bear children or to have children, whether or not you can is a different story, 
whether it is physical or social (infertility) but that right should be there, and 
the right to marry should be there for everybody. It is denied to a whole section 
of people, it is denied to transgendered people, it is denied to gay or lesbian 
people ... But it is also about custody, access to kids, wills and probate and a 
whole of lot of things like that, that civil authorities don't seem to want to 
address (for gay, lesbian and transgendered people). 
(Saffron, 1997) 
Saffron's marginal status as neither quite biologically male or female, combined with 
her interest in civil liberties, means that she has an acute sense of the way in which she 
ZZ The uncertain status of people who are born intersexed in Australia has existed since 1979 when a 
Family Court judge held that the marriage of C and D was void because 'a hermaphrodite was in law 
neither male or female' (In the Maniage of C and D (1979) 35 FLC 340 cited in Dunderdale, 1992: 24). 
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is 'othered' by the imaginary neutral citizen who forms the basis for social policy. The 
surgical criteria within the New South Wales legislation that enables post-operative 
transsexuals to alter the sex designation on their birth certificate retains the sexed 
identities of men and women as mutually exclusive categories. This interplay between 
the New South Wales legislation and dialectically opposed sexed bodies continues to 
privilege heterosexuality and its relationship to marriage, pro-creation and family. 
Despite the existence of these more liberal regulations that allow changes to the sex 
designation on the birth certificate in New South Wales, biological sex remains 
relatively closed and self-perpetuating - open only at the margins. 
Registering identities, regulating bodies 
Drawing on Gatens' analysis of the body politic, an argument has been made for the 
way transgender bodies problematise the body politic and dualistic understandings of 
sexual difference. In New South Wales state legislation allows post-operative male-to-
female transsexuals born in New South Wales to change their sex on their birth 
certificate. Female-to-male transsexuals have to have had a hysterectomy in order to 
qualifY under the same legislation. For male-to-female transsexuals the construction of 
female genitals, which induces reproductive non-functioning qualifies them as female. 
Fo.r female-to-male transsexuals reproductive non-functioning in the form of a 
hysterectomy qualifies them as male. One reading of this legislation is that both 
surgery and reproductive non-functioning are important to the way that the state 
regulates transgender bodies. The state legislation that allows post-operative 
transsexuals to change their birth certificate leaves the transsexual with no right to 
bodily integrity. Of course particular transgendered people can and do, refuse to have 
surgery but these bodies are not legally recognised in New South Wales. 
The Births, Deaths and Marriages register acts as a bridging device linking 
individual bodies and the state. The operation of the register is set by state policies 
which determine the conditions under which births are recorded and their details 
altered. The legislation governing change of biological sex on the Births, Deaths and 
Marriages register is an attempt to re-impose either/or sex/gender categories on 
transgendered bodies and identities that are both/and. The legislation responds to the 
desire for formal state recognition of their gender identity by some transgendered 
people, it does not however, disrupt the existing body politic. Transgendered 
individuals who want to change their birth certificate are subject to complex rules that 
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attempt to maintain their either/or status on the register. The corporeal diversity and 
personal histories of transgendered people, combined with variations in 'change of sex' 
policies and practices within and between Australian states, complicates the body 
politic and disrupts these attempts to create consistency within the register. While the 
reforms impose dualistic categories and new ways of regulating bodies, they also 
construct contradictions and anomalies by excluding some bodies and including others. 
These inclusions and exclusions reflect the diversity of the transgender community. 
The next chapter explores some of these connections and differences within the 
Sydney-based transgender community. 
Inventing (Comm)unity 
Space, place and collective identities 
"Community is an abstract concept tied here in Sydney to geography". 
Wendy (MTF, 1996) 
This chapter explores local debates surrounding identity politics within a 
particular transgender community. It incorporates methodological concerns by 
reflecting on the process of doing research in a particular locale. Anderson's (1991) 
concept of imagined communities is used to put forward an argument about the 
centrality of time and place for sociological research and analysis. However, I also 
problematise ideas about communities and common territory by looking at the way 
identities are constructed in relation to broader social configurations that are not 
tied to place. 
Tensions surrounding the politicisation of identities within the inner city Sydney 
transgender community point to the way social bonds, tacit understandings and 
political mechanisms operating within communities are open, contested and 
contradictory. At the same time communities are 'imagined' through spatial 
symbols, public narratives, collective social rituals and shared times and 
experiences. This chapter analyses how communities are actively constructed and 
how the groups established through these actions are simultaneously problematised 
and deconstructed through relational identities that operate at different local and 
national scales. This diversity poses particular challenges for researching 'imagined 
communities' particularly when the information provided by informants 
problematises the social groups with which they identify. 
Crucial to the way in which I negotiate these challenges is my discussion of the 
construction of relational identities in a particular set of physical spaces in Sydney 
in 1996/97. This requires attention to how I conceptualise and use space and place 
in this chapter and in the thesis more generally. Space is relational in the sense that 
it is constituted by and constitutive of social processes (Massey, 1992: 80-81; 
Fincher and Fanelli, 2001: 130). Space is also geographical (McDowell, 1996: 32), 
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political (Massey, 1992: 66) physical (Wendell, 1992: 69; Chouinard and Grant, 
1996: 176), embodied (Grosz, 1994: 79-80) and social (Plummer, 1995). The 
social dynamics of space include its gendered (Massey, 1994: 2; Namaste, 1996a: 
225) and sexualised dimensions (McDowell, 1995; Myslik, 1996; Valentine, 1996; 
Duncan, 1996; Namaste, 1996a; Brickell, 2000). The embodied dimensions of space 
also refer to the social space immediately around the body. The size and form of this 
surrounding space varies according to the situation and the ethnicity, sex and 
culture of the individual (Grosz, 1994: 79-80). Geographic space refers to how the 
spatial is mapped in relation to bounded places from home to national territories. 
(McDowell,1996: 32). Geographic space, as cultural object, includes symbolic and 
material interconnections between economic and political power relations that are 
simultaneously local and global (McDowell, 1996: 39). The political dimensions of 
space are indicated by geographic terms such as 'margin' and 'centre' that are used 
in academic analyses that explore the politics of location (Massey, 1994: 66). 
Place is another significant element in my construction through fieldwork of 
transgendered community practices. The geographic boundaries of spaces and 
places are easier to define than the boundaries of communities, which may 
transcend space and place. Place, however, tends to be viewed as more bounded or 
localised than space (Massey, 1994: 5). Place of birth and place of residence, for 
example, refer to specific locales that are fixed in space and time (past and present 
respectively). The meanings associated with these examples of place are not given 
but are instead constructed in relation to broader social configurations that 
transcend place such as nation, sex, gender and family (Massey, 1994: 5; Jacobs and 
Fincher, 1998: 21). Places are open to the presence of social relations crafted at 
different spatial scales. As a result, the meanings associated with place are never 
fixed but are instead open, porous and contested (Massey, 1994; McDowell, 1996). 
Identities are shaped through individual relationships with places (Jacobs and 
Fincher, 1998: 20). 
There are different possibilities for, and limitations on, claiming transgendered 
identities in different urban locales. These possibilities vary over time and between 
and within cities. Transgendered individuals have particular experiences and 
interests in common but they also have interests that cut across differences in social 
gender, sexuality, surgical status and place of birth and/ or residence. 
Transgendered identity is not homogeneous (see Figure 1) but is multiple and 
contradictory - fragmented by the existence of different relational spaces that are 
both literal and figurative or symbolic. 
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Identities constructed at different spatial scales flow through place (Jacobs and 
Fincher, 1998: 21) In Chapter Eight, for example, I explored the relationship 
between the local and national context in the construction of gendered citizenship 
identities in New South Wales. In this case, localised gender identities, differentiated 
by place of birth, are constructed through non -local state and federal legislation that 
specifies how the sex designation on the Births, Deaths and Marriages register is to 
be regulated and administered in different state and national settings. These 
regulatory mechanisms have an impact on identities presented in international 
contexts as individuals move across national boundaries using passports that are 
simultaneously local, national and global. State recognition of certain transgender 
identities by the New South Wales government is co-extensive with the production 
of difference through formally articulated and administered exclusions. In this 
chapter I argue that place-based identities are tied to the micro-politics of sexed 
bodies constructed within broader patterns of inclusion and exclusion and executed 
in particular times and spaces (Jacobs and Fincher, 1998: 21-22). 
Time is another crucial factor in my analysis of transgendered community 
practices in different localised settings. Time is chronological, cyclical or seasonal 
and embedded in the collective times of individuals and communities. In Chapter 
Six I argued that individual agency is embedded in multiple and inter-related 
dimensions of time. Social agency is both individually and collectively produced and 
embedded in shared understandings about social life. Identities are not only 
individual - for example, professions or communities may have identities. However, 
it is important to note that both group and individual identities are collaborative1y 
produced. That is, collective identities have individual 'faces' while individuals craft 
their identities in relation to larger identity categories such as nation, sex, class, 
gender, occupation etc. Communities are also embedded in mUltiple and 
overlapping dimensions of time. Benedict Anderson (1983, 1991) argues that group 
continuity and shared social meanings are constructed through the interaction 
between the collective time(s) of the individual and the community. Narratives 
about experiences of community and articulations of collective identity can be 
expressed and understood only through the categories available in discourse and 
through the narratives about community that circulate in a particular locale. It is 
the interaction between individual stories, public narratives, local context and 
collective times and identities that is of interest in this chapter. 
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locating communities in narratives and in time 
Benedict Anderson (1983: 15) famously claimed that '[a]11 communities larger 
than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are 
imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, 
but by the style in which they are imagined'. Imagined communities in Anderson's 
account are groups that are large enough for members to have a sense of connection 
with unknown others who share similar circumstances. Anderson (1983) explores 
how collectivities are imagined as homogenous entities in spite of internal 
differences. Nations are imagined political communities, for example, because the 
nation is conceived as a historical and horizontal linking of fraternity, power and 
time (Anderson, 1983: 15-16). Nationalism in this account has an immemorial past 
and limitless future that transforms contingency into meaning, uncertainty into 
continuity, chance into destiny (Anderson, 1983: 18-19). 
Anderson suggests that a sense of common experience is crucial to the way that 
national communities are invented. Sameness is achieved through the construction 
of a standardised common language, its connection to a partiCUlar territorial state, 
and its use in education and in other administrative mechanisms (Hobsbawm, 1990: 
59-62). Private property, the media and markets also facilitate national cohesion 
because they operate as unified fields of exchange and communication. Drawing on 
Anderson, Craig Calhoun (1997: 4-5) identifies the following characteristics as 
typically present in the rhetorics of imagined national communities. Nations are 
constructed as bounded territories, indivisible and sovereign. They have political 
legitimacy, temporal depth, a sense of membership through common descent and a 
historical connection to a particular territory. National communities are imagined 
through a sense of shared culture and popular participation in collective affairs. 
Internal differences, however, make nations ongoing projects (Anderson, 1983: 
105) constituted by and through claims that are made about themselves and their 
distinctiveness. People recognise one another as members of a collective or 
community, and therefore, recognise others as non-members or strangers 
(Hobsbawm, 1990: 46). 
Anderson (1983; 1991: 11-12) suggests that community, like nationalism, is the 
process of constructing continuity and meaning out of shared values, chance and 
contingency. According to Anderson, communities are constructed through 
imagined connections between written symbols, shared times and collective social 
rituals. In Chapter Eight, I argued that registers are embedded in multiple and 
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overlappins dimensions of time. This chapter also incorporates several ways of 
understandins and usinS time. Time, symbolised in mundane artifacts such as the 
clock and calendar, is chronolosical, prosressive or linear. Time, however, is also 
part of the daily lives of individuals and communities (Massey, 1992: 68). The 
calendar is important to the construction of collective times and identities. It 
records in advance the sisnificant annual events in which a community participates 
(Bourdieu, 1977: 97-98). In Sydney the Diva Awards in Ausust, the Sleaze Ball in 
October and the Mardi Gras Parade in late February are examples of shared social 
rituals embedded in the collective time(s) of the say and lesbian community. 
Publicity for the 1997 Sydney Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras, for example, described 
it as the 'bissest event on the slobal say and lesbian social calendar'.1 The local 
Sydney Mardi Gras is marketed as both a national and an international event. Local 
queer events, and the identities that they represent, are not limited to local places 
but are instead constituted throuSh national and international processes (Plummer, 
1995: 149). This process whereby the local is extrapolated to the slobal is also 
illustrated in the followins political messases of support for the 1997 Mardi Gras. 
In these messases the Sydney Mardi Gras is represented as a celebration of local and 
national community, and as an important part of Australia's national and 
international imase: 
Mardi Gras is a truly international festival, hishlishtins the sreat diversity and 
talent of the Sydney lesbian and say community. The 1997 Sydney Gay and 
Lesbian Mardi Gras will be an opportunity for all Australians to show the world 
that we celebrate our cultural diversity - resardless of our individual beliefs and 
orientations - Kim Beazley, Leader of the Federal Opposition2 
Mardi Gras provides an important international demonstration of Sydney's 
tolerance, creativity and sense of community ... Frank Sartor, Lord Mayor of 
Sydney3 
It (Mardi Gras) makes an important contribution to the cultural diversity and the 
economy of the city and the nation - Hon Sir William Dean, Governor General of 
the Commonwealth of Australia4 
The Mardi Gras is one of Australia's key parades, and a major national, and 
international tourist attraction... Dr Michael Wooldridse, Minister for Health 
and Family Services (Federal Parliament) 5 
1 1997 Sydney Gay & Lesbian Mardi Gras Guide p.94 
2 1997 Sydney Gay & Lesbian Mardi Gras Guide p.7 
3 1997 Sydney Gay & Lesbian Mardi Gras Guide p.7 
4 1997 Sydney Gay & Lesbian Mardi Gras Guide p.9 
5 1997 Sydney Gay & Lesbian Mardi Gras Guide p.9 
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In these messages of support the authors are identified through their location in 
different local (Mayor of Sydney, State Parliament) and national (Federal 
Opposition, Governor General) settings. In other words, the meanings associated 
with this place and event operate at both local and national levels. At the same time 
identities, constructed through these messages of support associated with career, 
occupation and/or political status flow through the Mardi Gras event and its spatial 
location. 
The different dimensions of collective and chronological time outlined above 
may be identified in Benedict Anderson's (1983, 1991) arguments about the way in 
which communities are imagined. He suggests that two forms of writing are 
important to the construction of an imagined community: the novel and the 
newspaper (Anderson, 1991: 25). Newspapers link community and time 
meaningfully together. The solitary act of reading the newspaper connects the 
individual to an imagined community of anonymous others who participate in the 
same activity. (Anderson, 1991: 33). The first form of imagined linkage between the 
individual and the community is time. 'The date at the top of the newspaper, the 
single most important emblem on it, provides the central connection - the steady 
onward clocking of homogeneous time' (Anderson, 1991: 33). The second form of 
imagined linkage is the relationship between the newspaper and the market. The 
simultaneous consumption of the newspaper on a particular day connects the 
individual to an imagined community of anonymous others who read the 
newspaper at the same time. (Anderson, 1991: 35). The newspaper provides a sense 
of collective time - in the sense of chronological time and the collective time(s) of 
the individual and community. 
Transgender autobiographies, the queer press and the magazine PolaTe published 
through the Gender Centre6 are forms of writing that are important to the way 
transgender identities and communities are imagined. Transgender autobiographies 
make private stories about changing gender accessible in public contexts. These 
stories are often scanned by 'secretive' or pre-operative transsexuals for information 
about how to relate to the medical profession and for ideas about how to pass in 
your chosen gender. PolaTe, 'a magazine for people with gender issues'7, is 
6 The Gender Cenh'e is a resource cenh'e for people who transgress binary gender categories such as 
h'anssexuals, h'ansgenders and h'ansvestites. The cenh'e is funded by the New South Wales 
government, it operates much like a community house, but also provides gender out-reach services, 
residential drug and alcohol services, information and other counselling and referral services. Prison 
visits and policy advice are also provide through the cenh'e. 
7 'Polan~ a bi-monthly magazine for people with gender issues' is a slogan that is printed either on 
the cover (edition, 1 S, 1996 for example) or the contents page (edition, 34, 2000 for example) of the 
magazine. This term is not unconh'oversial. In a letter to the editor titled 'Whose gender issues?' 
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published bi-monthly. The magazine contains health and legal advice, political 
commentary relevant to people with 'gender issues', safe sex information, a letters to 
the editor column, personal stories, international transgender news, a local, national 
and international directory, a community advertising page and a social scene 
section. Reviews of books and explications of academic theories relevant to gender 
and sexual minorities are also regular features. 
'Print-capitalism'8 (Anderson, 1983: 40) and film are two of the ways that the 
Sydney queer community represents itself to itself and to the outside world. The 
Sydney queer community is large enough to support two weeldy 'tabloid style' 
newspapers - 'Capital Q' (Q) and the 'Sydney Star Observer' (SSO). The queer 
newspapers are prime movers in setting the agenda (Long, 1958: 260) for what gets 
debated and discussed within the community. These newspapers are important to 
the sense of queer community within Sydney in two ways. First, they contribute to 
debates within the queer community via editorials and the letters to the editor 
column. They report events that would not normally be considered 'newsworthy' by 
the mainstream dailies and they contain reviews of queer film and theatre. Second, 
these reports are written from the point of view of, and in the style of language and 
humour used within the queer community. The editorial copy and the majority of 
the advertisements in the papers are specifically targeted to an imagined queer 
readership. The Newtown Gym Advertisement (see Figure 2) 'FAGS DYKES 
STRAIGHTS TRANNIES And that's just the staff... Every Body Feels at Home at 
NEWTOWN GYM',9 for example, uses humour to communicate the diversity of its 
staff and therefore by implication the membership characteristics of the gym. 
Sydney is an iconographic queer space. It claims to be the second largest queer 
city in the world - second only to San Francisco. The Sydney Gay and Lesbian Mardi 
Gras Festival Souvenir Guide (1997: 1) boasts that 'the world looks to Sydney and 
Mardi Gras for inspiration in Gay and Lesbian issues'. Corporate advertising also 
acknowledges Sydney's emerging queer communities. An example of this is the 
Optus Vision Movie Network 'More Drama Queens' advertising postcard (see Figure 
3) that I collected from a cafe in Newtown in the Summer of 96/97. The inscription 
on the reverse of the postcard reads camply ... 
Norrie May Welby (Q, issue 202, 16/08/96) refers to the description of 'anyone who h'anscends 
standard gender roles' as 'people with gender issues' as 'patronising'. 
8 'Print capitalism' refers to the means whereby printed material is produced, dish'ibuted and sold -
and the industries that support this process such as computer manufacturers, printing press 
manufacturers and the pulp and paper industry (see Anderson 1983: 38-40). 
9 Q, 9 August, 1996, issue 201 
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J-fi sweetie, I'm busy watching aCC tfie fabuCous arama queens on tfie Movie fJ'I&tworkt So I 
naven't been out in ages! 'lJarCing, you must come over ana watch tfiem with me. Love ana 
kisses ... 
Corporate sponsors of the 1997 Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras whose 
advertisements played to either the parade or the queer community included: The 
Rocks ('Eat Drink and BE Mary', see Figure 4) Qantas ('Proud to be part of the 
parade'), Hahn Ice Beer ('Enjoy a Hahn Ice during the 1997 Sydney Gay and Lesbian 
Mardi Gras Festival') and Telstra ('We like coming to the Party ... Because at Telstra, 
we're not just here to have a good time, we're here all the time', see Figure 5). 
Following a series of similar television advertisements the lens of the 'Smirnoff' 
vodka bottle turns a weight machine into an instrument of bondage. Other sponsors 
whose advertising also incorporated queer themes included Holeproof ('Underdaks. 
You'll want to get caught with your pants down', see Figure 6) and Absolut Vodka 
('Absolut Party'. Featuring a bottle wearing a feather boa).!O Clever marketing 
acknowledges the power of the 'pink dollar'!! as interstate and international visitors 
descend on Sydney in late February. This marketing, and the hype surrounding the 
Mardi Gras festival and other significant events on the gay and lesbian social 
calendar, provides a sense of collective identity and imagined community - even if 
these advertisements are likely to be seen only in queer spaces such as bookshops, 
gyms and gay bars, clubs and cafes. 
Special events, such as the Mardi Gras Parade, celebrate diversity by challenging 
the invisibility of gendered and sexual minorities in public spaces (Brickell, 2000: 
168). They are, however, a double-edged sword. The lesbian and gay pride parades 
may be viewed as a way of celebrating difference and affirming minority identities, 
but they are also the way that the queer community presents itself to middle 
Australia as exotic other. The Sydney Mardi Gras is an institutionalised event that 
produces its own Ubiquitous homogeneous (queer) identity. The unity of the Mardi 
Gras identity conceals often-bitter divisions within and between the different gay, 
lesbian and transgender communities. Such divisions are rarely articulated or 
acknowledged outside of the minority communities in which they are embedded. It 
is these connections and differences across communities, and the way that groups 
10 All examples taken from the 1997 Sydney Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras Souvenir Guide. 
11 The 'pink economy' refers to the role of the market in the consh'uction of queer 
sUbjectivities/ spaces through linking consumption to (homo)sexuality. The 'pink dollar/pound' 
refers to queer economic power and to the assumption that gay men are affluent consumers - 'gay' 
in this context equals gay white men with large discretionary incomes (Binnie, 1995: 182-187) . 
Notable cenh'es of queer consumerism include Amsterdam, London, San Francisco and Sydney 
(Knopp, 1995: 158). 
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are defined in relation to dualistic understandings of difference, and/or through 
comparison to other places, that is missing from Anderson's (1983, 1991) account 
of the way in which communities are 'imagined'. 
The politics of 'here' and 'there' 
The transgender community is not homogeneous. Divisions within Sydney 
transgender community are broadly geographical, political and anatomical. People 
are also separated along ethnic and class lines (Perkins, et.a!., 1994: 25-27) and in 
relation to social gender and combinations between social gender and sexuality.lZ 
Harrison White (1992: 313) argues that identity categories, such as social gender, 
and biological sex, are not internally coherent because human actions and selves cut 
across these realms. The heterogeneity of the Sydney transgender community is 
explored in the following sections of this chapter. 
While there are geographic differences within the Sydney community between 
the inner city and the suburbs and differences within the inner city between 
Dariinghurst and Newtown. There are also differences between Sydney and other 
urban centres. Few people to whom I spoke during the course of my research had 
experienced living in, or visiting, different parts of Australia. However, one person 
who had moved from Perth to Sydney commented on the differences that she noted 
between the two places: 
The difference between Perth and Sydney, what I find is quite different, Perth 
does not really have a transgender community as such, Perth does not have that 
much of (transgender) community other than the gay and lesbian community 
over in Perth. The gay and lesbian community is not all that popular over there 
or widespread. But it is funny how things work out, I find living in a lot of places 
you have little groups of friendships and family groups there that link up, 
especially in Perth. And what I found in Sydney is dramatically different in that 
all of sudden whereas OK I was a transsexual woman in Perth or someone 
making a gender transition, I was a trany in Sydney. While the word trany was 
used back in Perth, it was not used in the manner of a slogan if you know what I 
mean. Personally, I don't like the term it is misspelt over here with only one n ... 
But it is so politicised over here now it wasn't over in Perth, despite the fact that I 
was at one point a spokesperson and then the co-ordinator of the local lobby 
group in Perth, nonetheless you didn't have a close knit community as such you 
had people who knew people and they then spoke to those people but not overall. 
There was no overall group identification. 
Elaine, (1996) 
12 See Chapter Three in relation to this - including foohlOte number 11. Some of these issues are also 
raised in the interview material that has been included in the latter half of this chapter. 
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Elaine's comments illustrate the way in which places help to shape individual 
identities (Jacobs and Fincher, 1998: 20). In Perth Elaine identified herself, and was 
identified by others, as a 'transsexual woman'. In Sydney she is identified by others 
as a 'trany' but does not claim this label for herself. In Perth 'trany' does not exist as 
an identity category, nor is it used as a political 'slogan'. In Sydney 'trany' is the 
means by which people who transgress gender boundaries claim 'group 
identification' and/or membership of a politically active community. 
Elaine's experience of difference in claims to identity and community between 
Perth and Sydney in 1996/97 is consistent with academic ideas about the way in 
which the meanings associated with place and the construction of local queer 
identities are constituted in relation to non-local processes (Massey, 1994: 5: Jacobs 
and Fincher, 1998: 21). Place introduces heterogeneity and difference into the 
category of 'transsexual woman' - a category that Elaine indicates she had 
previously experienced as a more-or-Iess homogeneous entity. In this narrative 
contests over identity are articulated through the spatial relations of places. Doreen 
Massey (1994: 5) argues that the 'meanings associated with place are always 
articulated in relation to some oppositional relation or some other place that 
transcends the place in question'. As a result the meaning of place is always open 
and porous. Elaine's observations illustrate the way narrative identities have 
different interpretations whereby particular meanings, and struggles over identity, 
become salient in different relational settings. 
Drawing on Massey (1994),Jacobs and Fincher (1998: 21) argue that 'places are 
open to the presence of social relations crafted at all spatial scales'.13 The politics of 
scale also frame Elaine's narrative. Elaine is able to identify differences in the way 
transsexual identities are constructed in Perth and Sydney. In the larger Sydney 
community the possibility of transgender as a distinct category is heightened. In 
this place transgendered people are able to develop their own networks and 
services. In a smaller community such as Perth, political activism is much more 
dependent upon co-operation with other groups. In this narrative complex 
configurations of identity are tied to particular places and reflect the size of the 
13 Identities are constituted through multiple and interpenetrating axes of difference such as gender, 
class, ethnicity, sexuality. Space is also one of these axes of difference. In analyses of spatially located 
differences emphasis is placed on the intersection of differently scaled local, national and global 
processes on the consh'uction of identity. In other words, local identities are constituted in relation to 
non-local processes (Jacobs and Fincher, 1998: 21). Hence, 'spatial scales' refers to the way that 
space contributes to the construction of identities; this analysis also recognises that contests over 
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space. In Sydney transgender people attempt to assert their differences from the 
queer community. In Perth such differences are minimised in the interests of 
solidarity and co-operation. Political differences associated with scale are also 
present in Wendy's comparison between Sydney and the United States in Chapter 
Two. In that chapter Wendy suggests that it is possible to accommodate diversity 
without division within the transgender community in the United States because of 
the size of those communities compared to Sydney. In Elaine's narrative the larger 
numbers of people who identify as transsexual or transgendered in Sydney enables 
them to develop services and networks independently of the gay and lesbian 
community. In North America the larger size of the transgender population 
compared to Sydney enables different interest groups within the transgender 
community to develop. 
Sydney is claimed to be the transgender capital of Australia (Perkins et.al., 1994: 
11). Perkins, Griffin and Jakobsen (1994: 11) suggest that transgender people tend 
to gravitate to large urban centres for the following reasons: 
(i) the relatively low number of transgenders (elsewhere), (ii) their historical 
investment in anonymity, (iii) the possibility of finding work in the sex and 
entertainment industries ... , (iv) the greater degree of acceptance (or possibly 
nonchalance) amongst inner-city folk, (v) and the variety of services available to 
inner-city residents (e.g. choices in medical service providers, beauticians, 
clothing suppliers etc.) ... (Perkins, et.a!., 1994: 11) 
Most of the transgender population in Sydney is concentrated in the inner city 
suburbs (Perkins et.al., 1994: 11). Sydney tends to be the destination of choice in a 
'transgender diaspora' - men and women who gravitate to large urban centres 
because they are unable or unwilling to live in their chosen gender in the place 
where they grew up. One consequence of this is that Sydney's transgender 
population includes a high proportion of migrants, including 'Maoris, [sic] Islanders 
and Asians' (Perkins et.al., 1994: 11). 
Ki Namaste (1996a) identifies transgendered public space with urban areas 
known for their transsexuals and transvestites. S/he suggests that '[t]hough gay 
male public space is defined through the presence of gay businesses and bars, 
transgender public space reflects the areas of the city frequented by transgendered 
sex workers' (Namaste, 1996a: 231). This is not entirely the case in Sydney. Sydney 
identity occur in and through the spatial relations of places (Jacobs and Fincher, 1998: Z 1). Space is 
therefore political. 
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has designated areas where street prostitution is 'legal' (read 'tolerated') .14 As a 
result transgendered sex workers tend to live close to Sydney's notorious red light 
district Kings Cross and to tout for business on Williams Street in the Cross (Perkins, 
et.al.:1994; Lazarus, 1994: 102). Bars and cafes frequented by openly 
transgendered people tend to be in the inner city suburbs of Darlinghurst and 
Newtown. In the summer of 1996/97 transgender-friendly spaces in inner city 
Sydney included: King Street in Newtown, 'the bookshop' with stores in Oxford 
Street, Darlinghurst and in King Street, the trendy Fish Shop coffee house on King 
Street, the Newtown Gym, the 'Taxi Club' night-club in Darlinghurst (see Figure 7), 
Drag Bag in Darlinghurst, the Trany Pride Centre in Surry Hills, the Newtown and 
Imperial Hotels and the Gender Centre in Petersham. In 1996/97 drag acts were 
performed at the Albury Hotel, DMC, the Midnight Shift and The Imperial Hotel. 
These places are scattered over a wide geographic area within the inner city of 
Sydney; none of these sites for transgendered community activity, leisure and 
performance is located in Kings Cross, which is the locale of transgendered sex 
workers. 
If Sydney is an iconic queer city, then, within that city Darlinghurst and 
Newtown are iconic queer spaces. The road trip in the Australian film 'The 
Adventures of Priscilla Queen of the Desert' (Elliott, 1994) begins in Newtown, 
Sydney. The bus leaves from the Imperial HoteP5 located in Eskineville Road, which 
runs off King Street - the main commercial street in Newtown. It is significant that 
Priscilla's Sydney-based location is Newtown and not DarlinghurstiOxford Street -
the more high profile queer commercial area of Sydney (and the location for the 
annual Mardi Gras Parade). This spatial positioning recognises that Newtown, and 
not Darlinghurst, is the preferred urban (social) space for many of Sydney's inner 
city tranys. The film 'Priscilla' enhanced Newtown's reputation as an iconic space 
within Sydney. In the film 'Newtown' is both a local and an international space. 
Local knowledges, however, are coded within the film in ways that have different 
meanings for local audiences. Newtown in particular is a diverse place that makes it 
a safe space for transgender people. This is illustrated in the following conversation 
with Elaine: 
14 The New South Wales Prostitution Act of 1979 legalised street soliciting and sex work in a brothel 
or private flat (Jakobsen and Perkins, 1994: 64). In 1983 this act was amended to make it illegal to 
solicit in a public sh'eet near a dwelling, and near or in a school, church or hospital. The ambiguous 
meaning of the word 'near' in the amendment expanded the powers of the police by increasing the 
scope for selective enforcement of the law (Neave, 1994: 79-80). 
15 In the 1997 Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras Festival Souvenir Guide the Imperial Hotel also advertises 
itself as 'the home of Priscilla'. 
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An observation that I found interesting was when I went down to Newtown 
in Sydney - now that is a place that has got no majority in itT There is no one 
single group that is a majority in Newtown, and I've walked around 
Newtown and not worried about a single thing, because there are so many 
people who look so radically different down there that I was the most 
conservative person on the street. 
Elaine, MTF, (1996) 
Elaine comments on how the heterosexual domination of public space is 
disrupted by the diversity of the Newtown population. Furthermore, Elaine 
experiences Newtown as a place where it is possible to be openly transgendered 
because binary gender categories in this space are more open and fluid than is the 
case in her place of residence. Elaine's narrative is consistent with key arguments 
within feminist geography about the way in which space is normally constituted in 
gendered and sexualised terms (Duncan: 1996: 127). 
Feminists have long recognised that space is used in gendered ways. In the mid-
1980s Shelagh Cox and Bev James (1987: 1) wrote that '(w)e all inhabit two realms, 
the public and the private, and they shape our lives'. More recently Doreen Massey 
(1994: 6) has argued that '[c]onceptualisations of space are tied up with dualistic 
understandings of gender and the bundles of characteristics assigned to each'. 
Within these arguments the public sphere is masculine; it is associated with work, 
strength, rationality, the civic. The private sphere is feminine; it is associated with 
home, dependence, reproduction and emotion (Cox and James, 1987: 2-3; Peak, 
1993: 416-417; Massey, 1994: 2, 9-11,186,1996),16 Space is gendered and many 
spaces, public and private, are male dominated (Brickell, 2000: 163; Myslik, 1996: 
159). The hegemony of binary gender categories remains unproblematic. Ki 
Namaste (1996a: 226) for example argues that everyday locations assume the 
'naturalness' of binary gender categories: 
Gender outlaws pose a fundamental challenge to public space and how it is 
defined and secured through gender ... 
Binary gender categories mean that transgenders need to live as one or the other 
in order to avoid verbal and physical harassment. In transgender communities 
this is known as the need to pass (Namaste, 1996a: 226 and 228 respectively). 
Norrie May Welby also comments that because sexuality is often invisible in 
ordinary public interaction gays and lesbians are discriminated against, not because 
they are queer, but because they breach binary gender categories: 
16 See Sharp (1996: 10 1-102) for an alternative understanding of the meanings associated with 
public and private spaces in Eastern European counh'ies - whereby the private or domestic sphere 
represents transcendence or freedom from the state. 
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Gays and lesbians also breach the gender roles and get discriminated against 
for breaching fixed Western gender roles of behaviour. There we can find 
allies in feminists and any marginalised community... I also think 
homophobia is not so much fear of homosexuality as it actually is a fear of 
people breaching gender roles. And some of them (homosexuals) get called a 
'poofter' in the street and they are walking down the street on their own, how 
can you tell who is a poofter? You have to be looking at someone else or 
holding someone's hand at least before someone can tell what sex you are 
attracted to or make any judgement about the sex you are attracted to. No the 
person is called a poofter because the are breaching gender roles, they are 
maybe walking with a bit of a swish or a limp wrist or a woman gets called a 
dyke because of her short hair and her clothes. It is because she is breaching 
the gender expectations we get called poofters or dykes. 
Norrie May Welby, interview, 1997 
Judith Butler (1990: 5) argues that binary gender categories achieve their 
stability and coherence through lines of connection between bodies, genders and 
(hetero) sexuality; she terms this triad 'the heterosexual matrix'. Historical and 
cultural variation within gender categories is explained through attention to the 
social production of gender in specific contexts. Variable, culturally constructed 
gender is overlaid on the 'invariable' sexed body; establishing and producing the 
duality of biological sex as natural or prior to culture (Butler, 1990: 7) .17 
Transgendered bodies disrupt this assumption of continuity between sexed 
bodies, culturally constructed genders and heterosexuality. Public space in general 
and urban space in particular is dominated by lines of connection between 
naturalised binary gender categories and heterosexually (Brickell, 2000: 163; 
Myslik, 1996: 159; Valentine, 1996, Duncan, 1996: 137-139 Namaste, 1996a: 
230). The heterosexualisation of space occurs through the positioning of 
heterosexuality as natural and universal. Heterosexual practices are omnipresent 
and invisible in public spaces (Phelan, 1993: 97). This dominance is not recognised, 
leading to claims that heterosexuality is not publicly flaunted (Valentine, 1993; 
Myslik, 1996: Brickell 2000). The heterosexual domination of public space 
constructs homosexuality and transsexuality as visible, unnatural, specific and out 
of place (Brickell, 2000: 165; Namaste, 1996: 226-228). 
The construction of space in relation to unproblematic binary gender categories, 
however, is not recognised in the feminist geographical literature leading to a 
domination of theories about, and examples of, the (hetero)sexualisation of public 
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space (see McDowell, 1995, 1996; Valentine, 1996; Duncan, 1996). Instead it may 
be more productive to explore the way in which gender and sexuality intersect to 
exclude minority genders and sexualities from public spaces. Elaine, for example, 
experiences Newtown as a place where it is possible to be openly transgendered 
because the naturalness of heterosexuality and gender in this public space is not 
secured. 
The politics of 'us' and 'them' 
In Chapter Two I argued that narratives, corporeality and spaces make available 
certain subject positions to actors. Stories, contexts and bodies are important to the 
re(presentation) of a gendered self. The political dynamics of the spaces in which 
transgender stories are told and heard are indicated through local debates within 
the Sydney transgender community over who should represent and provide services 
for people with 'gender issues'. These debates illustrate the way that telling stories is 
a political process that is linked to relations of power that are context specific. 
Transgender identities are constructed through binary oppositions, self and other, 
same and different, overlaid on place. Metaphors of the local and the global 
embedded in Elaine, and Wendy's narratives, discussed above, are also crafted in 
relation to the construction of heterosexuality as the dominant mode of identity and 
sexual practice and the construction of queer identities as subordinate or marginal. 
In Sydney, it is the geographical centre of the city - the inner city - that is the centre 
of expression for these marginal sexualities and identities. It is the heterosexual 
mainstream that lives on the margins of the city in suburbia. In the film 'Priscilla 
Queen of the Desert' (Elliott, 1994) mention is made of the inner city as a safe space 
for sexual minorities and people who are differently gendered. After Felicia/ Adam 
(Guy Pearce) has been assaulted in the country town Coober Pedy in an act of 
homophobic violence, Bernadette the 'transsexual' (Terence Stamp) makes the 
following comments about the inner city of Sydney: 
It's funny we all sit around mindlessly slagging off that vile stink hole of a city, 
but in some strange way it takes care of us. I don't know if that ugly wall of 
suburbia's been put there to stop them getting in or us getting out ... 
Bernadette - From 'Priscilla Queen of the Desert' - italics my emphasis 
17 Thomas Laqueur's (I 987, 1990) discussion of the cultural consh'uction of the sexed body is 
discussed in Chapters Two and Seven. 
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In this extract from the film 'them' is the homophobic straight world that lives 
out there in suburban and rural Australia and 'us' are Sydney's inner city queers 
such as queens, gays, lesbians and transsexuals. The comparison is made in the film 
between places (rural Australia/the suburbs and the inner city) and the possibilities, 
or lack of possibilities, for the expression of minority identities in these particular 
locales. 
In the following narrative Nancy describes the way that differences between 
suburban transsexuals and inner city transgenders mirror differences between those 
tranys who are involved in transgender politics and those who are not: 
There is a whole 'them' and 'us' mentality. 'Them' are transsexuals, who 
generally have the surgery, live in the suburbs as women and are invisible as 
transsexuals, don't want to be involved in transgender politics, and 'us' are 
the inner city tranys, that resist surgery, live ambiguously between men and 
women, are visible as transsexuals and are involved in transgender politics. 
Of course, there are other tranys that identify as transgenders who are not 
involved in transgender politics. 
Nancy, MTF, 1996 
According to Nancy, place of residence maps political differences between people 
who have transitioned across binary gender categories. Transsexuals live in the 
suburbs, they follow the medical model and tend to be 'secretive' or 'invisible'. 
Tranys live in the inner city, they reject the medical model, choosing instead to be 
out and proud as transgendered people. But it is not simply that suburban 
transsexuals reject inner city transgender politics. Everyday locations assume the 
naturalness of binary gender categories and heterosexuality (Namaste, 1996a); their 
place of residence is more likely to inhibit the expression of minority gender 
identities. Choosing to be either/or rather than both/and may be simply a sensible 
strategy for surviving in the suburbs. 
Anderson argues (1983: 19) that durable social groups, such as nations or 
communities, are crafted out of and against large scale cultural systems. The 
sex/ gender distinction and the opposition between straight and gay are examples of 
'large cultural systems' that are important to the emergence of transgender as a 
separate identity and as a collective social group. Discontinuities between biological 
sex and social gender often compel people to identify as transgendered and to seek 
out people who have similar experiences to themselves. Transgendered people have 
tended to congregate within urban areas that are identified as gay neighbourhoods 
and/ or gay commercial areas because of a perceived greater tolerance for diversity 
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within these spaces (Perkins, et.a!. 1994; Myslik, 1996; Namaste, 1996a). In Sydney 
the transgender community crafts its identity out of and against the straight and gay 
communities within which it is embedded. But transgender people are neither 
simply straight or gay, nor are they incorporated unproblematic ally into these 
communities. This is illustrated by Saffron's comments: 
I find with the Mardi Gras, or anything, transgendered people are left right 
out. And I mean we should be able to choose to be separate from that 
community or included in it, and we have historically been very much 
included in gay and lesbian communities overseas... But still we have a very 
rigid section, the gay and lesbian and these other people who fit into that 
category somehow because they are show girls or they do that, and then 
there are just the hetros and they fit with their own name sort of. So it is 
coming from both sides, so called mainstream society or community out 
there and the gay and lesbian subculture, community or society, the 
transgender one seems to be even more marginal and copping it from all 
sides. 
Saffron, (1997) 
In Sydney the recent emergence of transgender as a political identity means that 
transgender identities, and their constructions of community, are crafted in relation 
to both of the gay and straight communities. Saffron suggests that transgender 
people occupy a doubly marginal position that is distinct from the straight and gay 
communities. Queer theorists (Seidman, 1994; Butler, 1990; Brickell, 2000) and 
theorists of sexuality (Hawkes, 1996) have noted that homosexuality is defined in 
an oppositional and subordinate relationship to heterosexuality. Homosexuality is 
that which is not heterosexual; heterosexuality as the privileged mode of identity 
and sexual practice remains silent or undefined. This idea is illustrated in Saffron's 
talk where she struggles to describe the heterosexual community - 'then there are 
just the hetros and they fit with their own name sort of'. Transgender identities are 
defined in relation to their difference from stereotypical gay and straight identities. 
These differences are sometimes chosen but more often than not they are imposed 
by others. 
Saffron's comments about the way in which transgendered people have been left 
out of the queer community are set in the context of her observations about how 
Drag Queens were often the poster girls for the month long Mardi Gras festival, and 
their night-club slats are an important part of the entertainment. Yet their colourful 
contribution to this event was often unacknowledged by the powerful Sydney gay 
lobby. Recent attempts by two prominent lesbian groups to exclude 'non female-
born lesbians' from participating in lesbian events and/or frequenting lesbian 
spaces also underpins Saffron's comments. Several of the people that I interviewed 
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cited the controversy over the Lesbian Space Project, a collectively funded meeting 
place and resource and community centre for lesbians, as an example of local 
discrimination against transgendered people. I thought at the time that they were 
describing to me something that had happened in the 1970s and it came as quite a 
surprise to find out that this incident had happened only the year before (1995). 
In 1995 Dikes On Bikes Inc. (DOB) also attempted to prevent 'the admittance of 
non female-born lesbians'18 to membership of the organisation. After passing a 
resolution to that effect, the decision was subsequently overturned at a full meeting 
held to discuss the issue. In this example, lesbian identified male-to-female 
transsexuals are defined by what they are not that is not female-born lesbians. 
Both of these controversies received extensive coverage in the local queer press.19 
This coverage combined with narratives about discrimination linked to the political 
activism surrounding the anti-vilification legislation enabled transgender people to 
reframe their experiences of discrimination in a different way - not as an individual 
problem but as a public issue. 
Attempts by female-born lesbians to exclude non-female-born lesbians from 
lesbian spaces and events occurred alongside attempts by transgender 'activists' to 
have transgender people staff and manage the Gender Centre - a resource and 
community centre for people with 'gender issues'. While transgender people were 
actively involved in criticising their exclusion from gay and lesbian spaces they 
were at the same time, using a feminist inspired rhetoric of providing transgender 
services designed by and for transgendered people, attempting to control their own 
space/ place. These internal debates were made public in the letters to the editor 
column in the gay and lesbian press in the months prior to the election of the 
management committee at the Gender Centre. The debate in the letters to the editor 
column was initiated by Norrie May Welby's letter published simultaneously in the 
Sydney Star Observer (550) and Capital Q (Q). An abridged version of the letter 
that was published in the 550 is reproduced below: 
For too long, trany welfare and health services have been run by non-tranys. 
Despite what the doctors said about us all these years, we are not sick or 
disordered or dysphoric. What we are is mad! Mad that there are still other people 
dictating "what's best" for us! Mad that the Gender Centre is still teaching other 
people that tranys are sick, disordered and dysphoric! Mad that non-tranys are 
18 Kimberly O'Sullivan, 'Green Light For Trany Bikers' SSG, 226:1 27.7.95. 
19 Battle looms for dyke bikers, SSG, 13.7.95. Kimberly O'Sullivan, 'Green Light For Trany Bikers' 
SSG, 226:1 27.7.95. LSP rises from ashes, SSG, 9.2.95. LSP gears up for major fundraising, SSG, 
291:5,22.2.96. Space Project Relaunched, SSG, 278,15.11.98 
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running trany affairs! Mad that they're keeping the trany's who got anti-
discrimination for us out! 
The Gender centre should be managed only by tranys proud to be tranys! ... 
[W]hy should the Gender Centre be run and staffed by people who are not 
tranys, or by tranys who are ashamed to be seen as tranys ... - 'Keeping us out', 
Norrie May Welby, SSO, no. 341, 1/08/96. 
Contradictions between the self identity of transgendered people and the way 
that they are positioned or represented by others as 'sick' or 'dysphoric' were key to 
the political debates circulating in the community in 1996/97. Norrie May Welby's 
letter was interpreted by some people as advocating separatist policies for the 
Gender Centre (Jasper Laybutt, Q, issue 201, 9/8/96). The justification for 
separatism is set against Welby's claim that the Gender Centre is already practising 
separatist policies in relation to transgender 'activists' ('keeping us out'). In this 
narrative the transgender community (represented through reference to 'we' and 
'us' in Welby's letter) is coterminous with a particular place - the Gender Centre. 
Norrie May contests the meanings associated with this space through reference to 
broader issues that transcend place - such as the meanings that may be attached to 
transgender identities and to medicalisation. Norrie May Welby is a post-operative 
'transsexual',zo but s/he is also visible and political as a transgendered individual. 
Welby's stance on the medicalisation of transsexualism disrupts assumptions that 
transsexuals are uncritically accepting of the medical model. His/her words are 
written in anticipation of the AGM of the Gender Centre on September 23, 1996. 
Welby was a nominee for the Gender Centre management committee. Members of 
the Gender Centre were to vote for the management committee at the AGM. In this 
piece of politicking Welby draws on the 'gender card' in much the same way as 
conservative politicians use the 'race card' to garner publicity and votes in 
parliamentary elections. The letter opened a 'Pandora's box' of controversy that was 
fundamental to the way transgender communities are 'imagined' through 
constructed and contested boundaries between 'us' (tranys) and 'them' (non-
h'anys). Debates around issues of separation and inclusion within Sydney in 
1996/97 are tied to the micro-politics ofthe sexed body (Jacobs and Fincher, 1998: 
21-22) and articulated through divisions between non -trany and trany and 
between pre- post- and non-op. But Welby's letter was not simply a clever pUblicity 
stunt; his/her words underscored some personal concerns about the management of 
the Gender Centre. 
20 See Chapter Five. 
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Three incidents were behind the call by 'progressive' trany 'activists' for the 
Gender Centre to be staffed by an 'all trany team'. First, transgender activists 
claimed that educational literature generated by the Gender Centre, and targeted at 
the general public, referred to tranys as 'disordered' or 'dysphoric' (Welby, SSO, 
1/08/96). Second, the barring of selected 'out and politically active' anti-
medicalisation tranys from a public meeting with medical professionals at the 
Gender Centre in May 1996 was seen as setting an unacceptable precedent 
(Weekes, Q, 202 16/8/96). Third, there was concern about the outcome of Gender 
Centre consultation on a draft report into the treatment of trany offenders within 
the criminal justice system. The New South Wales Anti -discrimination Board 
subsequently ruled that the report breached the Anti-Discrimination Act in ten areas 
(Welby, Q, issue 202, 16.8.96; O'Shea, Q, issue 207, 20/9/96). 
Those opposed to a 'trany take-over' at the Gender Centre, rejected separatist 
policies and argued for a Gender Centre staff that reflected diversity - as this 
diversity would cater for the needs of non-trany partners and their families who 
also used the resources of the centre. A sample of the letters to the editor in the 
queer press, reflecting the range of issues discussed, is reproduced below: 
With the issue of employing non-trany staff, the argument against it harkens back 
to the dark days of separatism ... An all trany team, in my opinion, would result in 
an already marginalised and isolated group, having even less contact with the 
general community - Jasper Laybutt, Q, issue 201,9/8/96. 
In 1996 Jasper and his non-transgendered partner worked at the Gender Centre 
(Q, issue 203 23/8/96). George, whose letter appeared in the same issue of Q, was 
a volunteer at the Gender Centre: 
The Gender Centre at Petersham is a resource centre for many different identity 
groups and individuals with gender issues. This encompasses those from cross-
dressers to trans genders of allldnds, pre and post and non-operative transsexuals as 
well as their friends, lovers, both gay and straight. 
The political stance, staff and resources of the centre needs to reflect the broad 
scope of the service. Therefore, it cannot be staffed exclusively by tranys or cater 
exclusively for tranys - "Norrie politics", George Andrews, Q, issue 201,9/8/96. 
It is interesting to note that in this debate 'trany boys' tended to reject the call for 
separatism/positive discrimination and to favour diversity among the Gender 
Centre staff. Jasper's and George's associations with the Gender Centre were used to 
discredit their calls for diversity by implying that they had vested interests in the 
status quo (Q, issue 203, 23/08/96). Letters to the editor also recognised the 
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contribution that non-transgendered people have made, and continue to make, to 
the 'trany' community: 
I in no way support any notion to exclude people on the grounds that non-tranys 
are not in a position to be beneficial to the 'trany' community - Sharon L. 
Stolzenberg, Q, issue 203, 23/8/96. 
Responses that were critical of the call for transgender services designed for and 
delivered by transgender people emphasised integration over the marginalisation 
and isolation implied by separatism. Separatism is an important part of oppositional 
struggles. Linda McDowell (1996: 43) argues that '[s]eparatism is often associated 
with demands for a geographic space, a territory and the maintenance of 
mechanisms of exclusion and boundaries'. The need for services that are 
appropriate for pre-, post- and non-operative transsexuals also had to be balanced 
against co-operation with other relevant groups and organisations that provided 
support services to the general community. This made a separatist strategy difficult. 
Claim and counter-claim suggested impartiality and vested interest on the part of 
those opposed to an 'all trany team' (Q, 23/08/96) while the progressives were 
described as 'self-indulgent, self serving, individual and social anarchists' (Q, 
23/08/96). 
In the following letter, Jenny Taylor replies to Jasper's call for diversity and co-
operation as a solution to isolation and marginalisation. Jenny argues that the 
community should be empowered to manage its own affairs: 
Jasper seemed to be saying that tranys were too "marginalised" (read: oppressed) 
to run our own affairs, and that we need contact with the general community to sort 
ourselves out. So we can't have an "all trany team" at the Gender Centre... If I 
were to use the Gender Centre's services, I would expect to be dealing with a 
trany. Who else can understand what it is like to be a trany? Jenny Taylor, Q, 
issue 203, 23/08/96. 
Jenny's narrative draws on an understanding of the way communities are 
imagined through shared experiences. She suggests that only people who have had 
similar experiences to herself are able to understand what it is like to be a trany. 
Feminist stand-point theory and a form of social essentialism may be identified in 
this narrative. Social essentialism, based on a commonality of identity and 
experience, is underpinned by universal claims to shared structures of oppression 
located in patriarchy, heterosexism and the unspoken normative requirement 
associated with gender and sexual difference (Butler, 1990: 14). For Jenny, these 
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structures of oppression may be understood only from the point of view of the 
oppressed - that is people who are transgendered. 
The Transgender Liberation/Lobby Coalition21 which supported the move to get 
'progressive' transgender people onto the management committee ('Battle for 
Gender Centre looms', Weekes, Q, issue 202:3, 16/8/96 ) attempted to downplay 
claims that TLC did not welcome 'non-tranys': 
We (TLC) welcome non-tranys who respect our right to control our own affairs -
'Au contraire', Nadine Stransen, Co-Convenor, Transgender Lobby Coalition 
(TLC). Q 30/8/96 issue 204. P 6. 
In a letter to the editor published at the end of August Norrie May Welby restated 
his/her position, albeit in a more reconciliatory manner. An extract from this letter 
is reproduced below: 
Let's have all interested tranys who support a trany community centre staffed by 
members of our community and promoting our community unite to find acceptable 
and forward looking solutions for our service provider, the GC - Norrie May 
Welby, Q 30/8/96 issue 204. P 6. 
Norrie May Welby constructs unity among those who support a centre staffed by 
tranys. She calls on tranys who are not interested in a centre with exclusively trany 
staff to find a solution that is acceptable to both groups. These differences among 
tranys were evident at the AGM on September 24, 1996 which was abandoned with 
different groups unable to reach agreement on policy or management committee 
staff (Q, 4/10/96). One correspondent in the letters to the editor column described 
the outcome of the meeting in the following way: 
In such a small community such divisiveness undermines progress and community 
spirit ... I have a message for both factions mellow out... - 'Gender let down', Laura 
Anne Seabrook, Q, issue 209, 4/10/96. 
For Laura, solidarity is a prerequisite for political action. Debate and division 
undermine strategies for change. The process of constructing and communicating 
different ideas about being transgendered threatened the unity of the community. 
Occasional breakages, splinters and fragmentation, however, while divisive and 
painful are a sign of a healthy democratic process in action (Butler, 1990: 14 -15). 
People who send letters to the editor of Polal't~ write to an 'imagined community' of 
21 In a conh'oversial move TLC changed its name from the Transgender Liberation Coalition to the 
less confrontational Transgender Lobby Coalition around about the time that the 1996 Transgender 
Anti-discrimination Act was passed (Q, 203, 23/08/96). TLC was eventually disbanded in 1997. 
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people who share similar experiences. The letters to the editor column in turn sets 
the agenda for what gets discussed in the community (Long, 1958: 260), while also 
creating a sense of simultaneity, and collective time organised in this case around 
political action (Anderson, 1983). The debate played out in the letters to the editor 
column was part of a campaign for the trany vote in the lead-up to the election of 
the Gender Centre management committee. These debates centred around which 
types of people are appropriate to represent, and provide services to, the 
transgender community (Gamson, 1997: 182). 
Debates in the letters to the editor's column centred on the oppositions between 
same/ different, unity / diversity, marginalisationlinclusion, dependence/ 
independence, and emancipation/oppression. Those who advocated for positive 
discrimination and transgender services designed for and by transgender people 
focused on differences between tranys and non-tranys. Diversity within the 
category 'trany' focused on arguments for and against the medicalisation of 
transsexualism. 'Progressives' followed a social model of transsexualism arguing 
against individual pathology and insisting instead that we live in a gender dysphoric 
society (Welby, Q 202, 16/08/1996; Weekes, Q 202, 16/08/96) - a rhetorical 
move that suggests an opposition between (transgender) community and 'society' 
(Agnew, 1989: 13).22 Those who argued against separatism emphasised diversity 
and co-operation. While they acknowledged the usefulness of the social model of 
transsexualism they also called for individual choice and the right for people to 
control their own bodies: 
Transgender Liberation Coalition has removed the existing medical model that 
defined a trans gender person ... Now, those who present for gender reassignment 
are told they no longer have a medical psychological condition, so do not require 
any treatment... TLC's "solution" to the problem of their own making is to 
politically re-educate tranys so that they won't want to have surgery or hormones -
Linda Darling Q, issue 213, 1111196. 
In 1996/97 ontological and public narratives about transitioning across opposed 
gender categories were contested through arguments for and against the 
medicalisation of transsexualism. The debates in the Sydney community at this time 
illustrate the way that subject positions are tied to spaces and to a person's 
corporeality. Transsexuals perceived that the subject positions offered in the 
narratives of the transgender 'activists' blocked access to their desired identities (in 
22 This opposition between community and society is also embedded in meta-narratives about urban 
transformation within sociology. Tonnies' (1887) GemeinschaftiGeseIlschaft and Durkheim's 
mechanique/organique are examples (Agnew, 1989: 11). 
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material and discursive terms) as post-operative transsexuals. Debates over 
medicalisation were more pronounced in the 'street debates' - and it is to these 
debates that I now turn. 
The call for separatist policies at the Gender Centre led to a battle of words 
between the two 'factions' on the streets of Newtown. The street battle was not 
subject to the editorial restrictions placed on letters published in newspapers. As a 
result they contained personal attacks on prominent people on both sides of the 
debate and plagiarism of cartoons such as the Wizard of Id (Figure 8). The street 
debate was carried out via a series of anonymous A4 double-sided flyers produced 
and distributed weeldy under the title 'The Rainbow; The promise? One community 
- Great diversity'.z3 Political divisions tended to coalesce around differences 
between those who were politically involved and those who were not politically 
involved. These political identities were projected onto differences between those 
who identified as transsexual and followed the medical model and those who 
identified as transgender and rejected the medical model. Georgia explains: 
As a clarification, a transsexual is a person who generally follows the medical 
model, lives in the role of the opposite gender to which they were born, takes 
hormones, generally lives as a woman, eventually has a sex change operation 
and often no-longer identifies as transsexual but as a woman. Transgender, is 
someone who lives as a woman, mayor may not take hormones, and generally 
for whatever reason, financial, ideological or otherwise does not seek medical 
intervention. The concept is good to a point, but when one group of people 
try to force others to go along with their ideas of how you should be and act, 
then it becomes a problem, especially when those people are in a position to 
exert power over other transgenders who are not politically identified. People 
with an interest in transgender politics are subsuming transsexuals beneath 
that label, and they add to transsexual men who cross-dress. So transsexuals 
and cross-dressers are subsumed within the category of transgender to create 
a larger group of people in order to make claims on the state. 
Georgia, MTF, 1996 
Georgia assumes MTF when she defines someone who is transgendered. She 
resists pressure to define transgender in particular ways, but also operates with 
ideas which are not always inclusive. When talking to me about transitioning 
across binary gender categories Georgia foregrounds MTF experiences defining 
them in relation to the non-transgendered world. This perhaps reflects the fact that 
the body politic of transsexualism still tends to privilege the MTF experience. 
23 While I was living in Sydney I collected seven of these flyers. 
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One group, the self-appointed spokespeople for the silent 'transsexual' majority, 
perceived that the other's 'narrow sectarian policies'24 were attempting to 'negotiate 
away trany health rights without any mandate to do SO'.25 Separatists were also 
charged with attempting to deny people access to sex reassignment surgery. This 
'fear' was humorously represented by references in 'The Rainbow; The promise?' to 
people who supported the social model of transsexualism (such as members of TLC 
and Norrie May Welby)26 as those who would have you all using stringP 'The 
Rainbow; The premise?' (a double-sided A4 flyer produced in opposition to 'The 
Rainbow; The promise?') sent up the arguments in the 'Rainbow; The promise?' 
stating that transgender activists did indeed have a hidden economic agenda 
indicated by their wholesale investment in string factories - a reference that speaks 
to male-to-female transsexuals only.28 Female-to-male perspectives were 
conspicuously absent in these street debates. 
In an open letter to the transgender community entitled 'W(h)ither Transgender', 
published as a double-sided A4 pamphlet, Lee Brown (8/12/96) outlined his/her 
concerns about the divisive politics within the community at that time. These 
concerns centred around the need to develop new community-approved standards 
of care for transsexualism, to challenge medical power/knowledge, to recognise and 
celebrate diversity within the community and to develop real alternatives to sex 
reassignment surgery. Brown writes: 
The concept of unity in diversity is only a myth. If it is to realise the 
potential of the hype there has to be real dialogue and understanding 
between the pre-ops and post-ops, between passing and not passing, 
between transsexuals and cross-dressers, between self identified 
transgendered people and others who transgress gender norms. While 
there has been some effort in this direction the fact remains that 
what is described as diversity still looks like hierarchical difference. 
(Brown, 1996) 
These public narratives about differences within the transgender community may 
be interpreted as the outcome of tensions between old and new forms of 
(transgender) world-making - such debates are the key to creating communities 
24 The Rainbow No.7, Summer, 96/97. 
25 The Rainbow No.5, Summer, 96/97 
26 TLC, members of TLC, and those who opposed the medical model of h'anssexualism such as Norrie 
May Welby were represented in cartoons that were reproduced in the flyers. 
27 The Rainbow No.6, Summer 96/97 
28 The reference to sh'ing refers to the practice of binding the male genitals with sh'ing and tape 
among pre-operative male-to-female h'anssexuals. 
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(Plummer, 1995: 18). The narrative identity approach discussed in Chapter Two 
located social action in the networks of relationships within which actors are 
located, and in the numerous cross-cutting story-lines with which people identify 
(Somers and Gibson, 1994: 67). Tensions surrounding the politicisation of identities 
within the inner city Sydney transgender community illustrate the way that social 
bonds, tacit understandings and political mechanisms operating within 
communities are never given but are open, contested and contradictory. In these 
debates the artifacts associated with print capitalism - newspapers, computers, the 
photocopier - provided the means for people to make different ideas about 
transsexualism and community accessible in public contexts. These ideas 
enabled/ forced transgendered people who were differently positioned as pre-, post-
and non -operative to reconsider and reassert how they might think about 
themselves (both individually and collectively) and relate to non-transgendered 
'others' (Anderson, 1991: 36; Gamson, 1997: 179). 
Narratives about transgender identity that were publicly available in Sydney 
connect to Anderson's (1983; 1991: 11-12) arguments about how communities are 
imagined through shared symbols, stories, social rituals, times and experiences. 
However, specific attention to the construction of community through difference 
and schism is missing from Anderson's account of the way in which collectivities 
are imagined. Debates in the newspapers and in the street flyers illustrate the way 
that boundaries within transsexual and transgendered communities are actively 
constructed and problematised through relational identities that operate on different 
local and national scales. The incompleteness or unrepresentability of the category 
transgender enabled these contests over meaning and identity to occur. Debates 
among transgendered people over political representation illustrate how differences 
are not additive - they cannot be solved simply by adding in various forms of 
difference to the category transgender. It is to an exploration of some of the 
similarities and differences between drag queens, transvestites, transsexuals and 
hermaphrodites within the inner Sydney transgender community that I now turn. 
The politics of 'crossing' and 'passing' 
Some social theorists (e.g. Kessler and McKenna, 1978; Woodhouse, 1989; 
Devor, 1989, 1993) and psychologists (e.g. Money and Walker, 1977; Bower, 
1986; Bradley et.a!., 1991; DSM VI, 1994; McConaghy, 1993; Green and 
Blanchard, 1996) have attempted to define boundaries between categories of people 
that they identify as drag queens, transvestites, transsexuals and hermaphrodites. 
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Such differences were also a source of cleavage within the Sydney community. 
Diane, for example, suggests that there is a hierarchy of identities within the Sydney 
transgender community: 
They are not significantly important to me but there is a kind of hierarchy of 
positions within the transgender community. Certainly, there is a difference 
between each of those positions. Drag queens I don't personally perceive as 
having a gender issue particularly, or at all. It is perhaps much more likely 
for them that it is a kind of game. It is kind of a performance, it is much 
more likely to be a parody of woman than is the case for the transgender. 
The transgender is trying to make a connection to their womanhood. 
Whereas maybe the drag queen, and again this is going to be far too much of 
a simplification, but maybe the drag queen is sending up that position more 
than trying to adopt it. But, by the same token, drag queens are a lot of fun 
and I don't have any philosophical objection to what they do and what they 
are about. Some of them are quite stunningly beautiful, which is really 
annoying, though they work hard at it, they spend hours putting make-up 
on. 
Diane, MTF, 1996 
In Chapter Two I suggested that definitions create a hierarchy among existing 
meanmgs. Perceived differences between people who challenge binary gender 
categories also create a hierarchy among different cross-gender identities. The 
hierarchy privileges post-operative transsexuals over those who are pre-operative, 
followed by transvestites and drag queens. Diane is critical of this ranking and 
considers that differences between drag queens, transvestites and transgenders are 
unimportant. At the same time, Diane suggests that drag queens are different from 
transgenders because they do not have 'gender issues'. She argues that drag queens 
are men who perform gender and parody women, whereas transgenders have a 
sense that they are women. Jimmy also suggests that drag queens and transvestites 
swap gender for entertainment: 
Drag queens are like entertainers ... And I guess transvestites might be just 
one step further back from drag. To me a drag queen does it for 
entertainment. Like they will get around in jeans and have kids and wives 
maybe. You know they do it professionally, either to satisfy something in 
them artistically or it is their form of self expression. Or if he is gay well he 
might get around in jeans and boots when he is not performing - or maybe a 
frock as well - but he is doing it as creative expression. He is not a girl and 
he lets you know that. That's the commercial ones, I guess a transvestite may 
even do it for entertainment, and they may carry it over into their personal 
lives. But they have got some understanding in their minds - the division to 
them, or if there is a division or there isn't. 
Jimmy, FTM, 1997 
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According to Jimmy, drag queens and transvestites may be differentiated from 
transgenders because unlike transgenders they do not make a distinction between 
their biological sex and social gender. In my own research I encountered people 
who talked about their identities and/or engaging in practices that troubled these 
definitions between transvestites and transgenders. Michelle, for example, considers 
that differences between transvestites and transgenders are minor: 
Transvestites, my theory is that transvestites are not really vastly different to 
transgenders, but this is my viewpoint because others will argue significantly 
against this. Most people will suggest that a transvestite is a man who maybe 
wants to playa role sometimes but does not want to lose the fact that he is a 
man, and remains firmly set within that gender position. Whereas a 
transgender person is cross-dressing over that barrier and wants to be 
female or vice-a-versa in the case of ITMs. I'm more inclined to think that 
transvestites are just transgender people to a degree and that they are not 
prepared perhaps, or they are afraid, or they are unwilling to sacrifice, or 
make the sacrifices that are necessary to go past the point of being a cross-
dresser. A lot of them are married, have children, jobs they want to protect, 
they have worked for, and when you are talking about changing your 
gender identity you are really having a massive impact on all of those things. 
So, I think if you can be comfortable and happy and stop at a certain point it 
is probably great, it is a lot easier. I identified myself as a transvestite for a 
long, long time, and it wasn't because I wasn't transgender, it really was 
because transgender was too hard. A transvestite you can do quietly in the 
closet and then no-body had to know. That in itself is a pretty awful place 
too, but it is not so life consequential. 
Michelle, MTF, 1996 
Michelle suggests that differences between transvestites and transgenders are 
social rather than psychological. Judith Butler (1993: 130) argues that in the 
ethnographic film about male-to-female cross-dressing Paris is Burning becoming a 
'real' woman is constructed as the means of escaping from homophobic violence, 
racism and poverty. Michelle, in contrast, suggests that coming out as transsexual 
and/ or claiming a transgender identity is precisely to expose yourself to poverty and 
discrimination. The marginality of the transvestite identity is indicated by her 
reference to the spatial symbol of the closet. The closet is a gendered space where 
Michelle performed her transvestite identity in secret. The space makes this subject 
position available to Michelle but the closet is also identified as a space that is 
created through fear and exclusion. Identifying as transgendered is equated with 
rejecting the 'safe' closeted world of the transvestite and 'coming out' into the public 
sphere and facing the consequences of that decision. 
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In the following interview extract Sally (a transsexual and drag queen), talks 
about the category 'drag queen': 
I suppose even drag queens would agree that is a pretty open interpretation 
because often show girls are called drag queens, and there is a lot of diversity 
in that [category]. Like last night I did a show, right, and another girl was 
considering having surgery next year so she is on hormones. There was 
another person who was not on hormones and does not believe in those 
things herself. You would not consider her to be a transgender but a drag 
queen, drag artist, female impersonator and they are comfortable with that 
label. The other person [on hormones] identifies as being transgender, a 
trany. There are other people [trany drag queens] as well that have not gone 
and had the surgery. They [tranys] live their lives as women and that is the 
important thing. I think that is the difference there between [tranyand non-
trany] drag queens, a few of them are straight people who do drag, and gay 
people but they don't live their lives as women. 
Sally, MTF, 1997 
Sally suggests that there is a variety of transgender identities among the drag 
queens that she knows. Differences between people who cross binary gender 
categories are identified by their use of, or intention to use, medical technologies 
such as hormones andlor surgery. Distinctions are also temporal; full-time 
commitment to living in the gender that is opposite to their anatomy is considered to 
be one of the main differences between transgendered and non-transgendered drag 
queens. 
In the following narrative, Diane introduces a biological difference between 
hermaphrodites and people who are transsexual or transgendered: 
Hermaphrodites, I only know one or two, I have every empathy with them 
but they are not the same as transsexuals or transgender. In a very real 
physical sense that they are something quite different again. I mean we 
[transgenders] are generally one gender physically, but spiritually another. 
They (hermaphrodites) can lie very much in the physical in-between space 
as well and then searching out from that physical in between space to a 
gender identity space. I think that is a different set of problems that they 
have, and how they deal with that is often much in a similar fashion as a 
transgender. If they have been brought up a boy and perhaps should have 
been a girl then they will travel the same process. But there is a fundamental 
difference to them to start off with and they would be aware of that 
physically. 
Diane, MTF, 1996 
According to Diane, hermaphrodites are not the same as transsexuals because 
they are able to ground their identity ill their bodies. She identifies hermaphrodites 
with an in-between space that is corporeal. Transsexuals or transgender people are 
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associated with an in-between space that is psychological or spiritual. For both 
transsexuals and hermaphrodites who transition across binary gender categories the 
process is the same. In the following narrative Andrew, a hermaphrodite who has 
transitioned from female to male, talks about differences between drag queens and 
transgenders within the transgender community: 
Transgender is the same as transsexuals, just that is the politically correct 
word because you are not saying boy or girl it is just gendered. Drag queens 
give trany girls a bad name, because to me they are really taking the mickey 
out of trany girls. But at the same time for some girls it is just a profession, 
that is a different kettle of fish, they live the normal day as a man, whether 
gay, straight or whatever, and they are just making money. Hermaphrodite is 
what I am, do you know the only time that I remember I'm a trangendered 
person is when I've got to go to the toilet and I'm in a crowd and I then I 
think oh no I can't just stick it out. Other than that I actually forget, I've 
actually lived longer in my chosen gender than in the gender that was 
chosen for me ... 
Andrew, FTM, 1996 
Andrew suggests that because he has lived longer in his chosen gender he is able 
to claim a legitimate identity as a male. Maleness has become part of his embodied 
habitus. The routineness of his masculine bodily practices is indicated through his 
reference to 'forgetting' (Bourdieu, 1990: 56). 
The above extracts from my interviews explain why the Gender Centre has to be 
able to cater for people who transgress binary gender categories but do not identify 
as transsexual or transgendered. All of the people whose words have been used to 
discuss 'crossing' and 'passing' disrupt categorisation. Sally identified as a 
transsexual and she performed as a drag queen. Michelle and Diane had historical 
(cross-gender) identities as transvestites and current identities as transgendered 
women. Andrew claimed an identity as a hermaphrodite and as a trany boy. The 
hierarchy within the transgender community places drag queens at the bottom 
followed respectively by transvestites, transsexuals, transgenders and 
hermaphrodites. This hierarchy is also temporal; drag queens and transvestites are 
thought to be less committed to a transgender lifestyle because their transitions 
across gender are temporary.29 Transsexuals and transgenders have social and 
psychological reasons for living full-time in their chosen gender, while 
hermaphrodites are able to ground their gender identity in biological origins that 
precede the social. 
29 Temporal differences between categories are also noted in the psychological literature - see for 
example the DSM-IV, 1994; Bradley, et.a!. 1991; DSM VI, 1994; McConaghy, 1993; Green and 
Blanchard, 1996. 
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Simplistic understandings about differences between drag queens, transvestites, 
transgenders and hermaphrodites were often problematised by the people that I 
interviewed. People claimed multiple identities - different identities became salient 
over time and as people moved through various relational spaces. The Sydney 
transgender population is also gendered. In the following section I explore some of 
the differences between trany boys and girls30 within the inner Sydney transgender 
community. 
The politics of 'gender' and 'biology' 
The often paradoxical relationship between deconstructing gender and the literal 
example of sex reassignment surgery is illustrated in feminist and sociological 
analyses of transsexualism.31 A number of feminist analyses and political positions 
on transsexualism suggest that sex reassignment surgery represents the embodiment 
of legitimating gender norms and the naturalisation of heterosexuality.32 These 
analyses often sit in tension with postmodern theories that use transsexualism as an 
example of embodied SUbjectivity to deconstruct the oppositional relationship 
between biological sex and social gender.33 Arguments within the feminist, queer 
and transgender literature (Bell, 1993; Bornstein, 1994; Feinberg, 1996) to the 
effect that transgendered people disrupt lines of connection between social gender 
and anatomy need to take account of how gender operates within transgender 
communities. The transgendered community in Sydney is highly gendered. There is 
at times an uneasy alliance between ITMs and MTFs who have different interests 
and experiences particularly in relation to sexuality, surgery and passing. An 
example of the way that gender differences between trany boys (ITMs) and girls 
(MTFs) may be used in a divisive way is provided in the following extract from a 
letter to the editor of PolaTe (14/1996): 
I hayen't included F2M'S34 (perspectives) as they didn't have any brains to 
start with' - Rachel Toft (MTF). 
30 Trany boy/trany guy and h'any girl are terms that were in common usage in the inner city 
h'ansgender community in 1996/97. They were used by many of the people that I interviewed. I 
have reproduced this colloquial terminology in this chapter. 'Trany boy'I'h'any guy' refers to 
female-to-male h'anssexuals/h'ansgenders and 'h'any girl' refers to male-to-female 
h'anssexualsl h'ansgenders. 
31 I refer here to the idea that the origins of h'anssexualism lie within relations of pah'iarchal 
oppression and capitalist exploitation rather than in objective scientific medicine, see King, 1987. 
32 See, Butler, 1990, 1993; Garber, 1993. 
33 See, Hausman, 199Z: Butler, 1990; Epstein, 1990. 
34 In Sydney the use of FZM (female-to-male) and MZF (male-to-female) or FTM and MTF appears to 
be a matter of personal preference. I have chosen to use FTM and MTF throughout the thesis. In this 
chapter I use FZM and MZF when these terms have been used in the primary sources to which I 
refer. 
245 
Toft's letter criticises the Transgender Anti-vilification laws on the basis that the 
Government is excluded from complying with its own legislation. Her comment 
about 'F2Ms' is made at the end of the letter. Differences between trany boys and 
girls reflect the gender dichotomies in non-transgender communities. This is 
discussed in the following extract from an interview with Jimmy: 
There is a real tension between the ITMs and the MTFs that never gets aired 
or talked about. There is a perception among ITMs that they pass better than 
MTFs and perhaps some jealousy there among MTFs in relation to this. I've 
heard MTFs say that ITMs don't really know what it is like to be transsexual 
because they pass [more easily than MTFs]. 
Jimmy, ITM, 1997 
Jimmy suggests that some ITMs see themselves as superior to MTFs because it is 
easier for them to 'pass' in their chosen gender. A perception that ITMs pass more 
easily among MTFs is used to imply that the ITM transgender experience is not 
equivalent the MTF experience - which is more likely to be exposed to the public 
gaze and therefore subject to discrimination and violence. In the following 
narrative, Angie, a MTF, indicates a lack of empathy with transgendered men 
suggesting that a woman with a penis is more acceptable than a man with a vagina: 
If I was a male and I had a vagina I would be horrified. The penis is so 
important to masculinity, I don't think that you can have a male with a 
vagina it does not equate with male. 
Angie, MTF, 1996 
Biological differences between men and women were also used as a way to 
distinguish between ITMs and MTFs: 
I often wonder what currency the menses have - both within the MIT and 
the ITM world. We ITMs are the first to make attempts to say "Oh they 
never really worked properly" ... when the facts point to another reality. 
And yet, it is often amongst the first reasons we give when asked why MTFs 
aren't women. And then there is another thought that occurs to me - about 
how the menses process affects ITMs. I have had conversations with trany 
guys whose period has either kicked back in or never stopped following 
transition. The effects of that process on their mind. One said to me : "I 
can't deal with the thought that there's bits of my body just falling out of 
me". Have you ever accompanied a woman to an abortion clinic? When I 
accompanied a friend to an abortion clinic to have an abortion, that was 
something that I felt distinctly separate from and yet which seemed to me to 
exclude MTFs in a very finite way. When I reflect on this experience [of 
supporting a friend through an abortion] against the rather 'un-real' world 
of the MTF transsexual who at that moment, seemed to me to not have a clue 
about what being a woman or being female meant. 
Adam, ITM, 1997 
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Adam suggests that there is a temptation to craft narratives about dysfunctional 
female bodies among ITM transsexuals. An infrequent or non-existent menstrual 
cycle may been seen as an attempt by some ITMs to ground their male gender 
identity in their biology. I also encountered narratives about dysfunctional male 
bodies among some of the MTFs that I interviewed. 35 Typically comments were 
made about inadequate penis size and/or impotence. Stories about dysfunctional 
bodies among transgendered people may be seen as attempts to construct a 
continuous gender identity that predates, and therefore justifies, their transition 
across binary gender categories. Adam also suggests that women's experience of 
menstruation, pregnancy and abortion demonstrates that there are fundamental 
biological differences between MTFs and female-born women. In this narrative the 
authenticity of MTF claims to female selfhood are questioned because women, as a 
result of their female biology, will have experiences to which MTFs will never have 
access. 
Differences and connections between tranys were also articulated on the basis of 
social gender and time elapsed since the transition. In the following narrative 
Andrew, a trany guy, talks about how he has more in common with Tony a fellow 
ITM and Tina a MTF who has lived as a woman for several years. He compares 
himself and others to another friend Lynne who has only recently started living as a 
woman: 
There is heaps of support [within the community]. I don't know so much 
with the girls although Tina who is here, and Tony and myself, and Lynne I 
suppose, not so much Lynne because she is just starting out but Tina has 
been changed over 8 years now and her and I relate a lot because we are at a 
certain age, a certain level. 
Andrew, ITM, 1996 
In his comments above Andrew identifies himself with others on the basis of how 
long since he 'changed' . MTF or ITM is less important than stage in the process of 
transition. Discontinuities between the sense of community for trany boys and trany 
girls were also expressed in relation to differences between how boys and girls 
interacted with each other. Trany girls (MTFs) were seen as more social, trany boys 
(ITMs) tended to be more independent. Brad explains: 
I notice the girls always seem to come together a lot, and sort of get really 
involved with each other and really going out together all the time, going to 
parties and stuff, and doing the dress thing and the make-up thing and getting 
35 See Melanie's narrative in Chapter Three for example. Robyn also zrounds her female identity in 
her problematic bioloZY - see Chapter Four. 
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really really involved. And the guys just sort of - we find it difficult to see 
each other once every six months. I don't see a real need to kind of get 
involved like the girls do. I can see myself getting along to a point and then 
just not really having anything to do so much with them any more. I said that 
to a group of guys because they were saying why do we all just disappear? I'd 
like to. And I just said well you get to a point you want to disappear, you 
know that is the whole point of doing this, to assimilate and just have a 
normal life, that is why you start this. We tried to get a boy's group get 
together maybe once every now and then, I mean I'll be into that, I'll go to 
that. I know I'll learn something there, or it'll be interesting just to be there 
and meet other guys and stuff. But I'm not too sure what we all have in 
common, that is the difficult thing. 
Brad, ITM, 1996 
Differences between boys and girls are expressed in relation to public narratives 
and stereotypical understandings of masculinity and femininity. Trany girls were 
more social, engaging in practices of femininity as a group. Trany boys were more 
self-reliant - a characteristic typically associated with masculinity. Brad, a gay 
identified female-to-male, is aware of his difference from other trany boys because 
he is not heterosexual. This leads Brad to question what trany boys actually have in 
common. This assumption of heterosexuality is indicated in Corey's narrative 
(below) where he conflates heterosexuality with the 'mainstream' and then corrects 
himself: 
We started up a trany guys group called Jocks, but with the trany guys 
because they are so convincing without too much surgery, I mean facially 
basically there is no surgery required for trany guys, they don't associate. 
Tranys don't associate together socially, that is not what they are about. 
They are about changing gender and getting back into heterosexuality, the 
mainstream, not so much heterosexual, but the mainstream to blend in. And 
with guys they blend in so well you would not know. But we sort of have a 
get together every couple of months you know have a bit of a nag that is 
about it. 
Corey, ITM, 1996 
In this narrative gender differences are articulated in relation to passing and the 
types of surgery used by trany boys and girls. Corey suggests that trany boys are 
more likely to use transsexual or transgender as a transitional identity, returning to 
the mainstream when their gender identity is no-longer ambiguous. Unlike trany 
girls, trany guys do not tend to hang out together. They have to make a conscious 
effort to get together through formally organised meetings. This perhaps 
contributes to the relative invisibility of ITMs in the transgender community more 
generally. 
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The transgender community in Sydney does exist as a social group but it is a 
heterogeneous community. Michelle makes this point in her observations about the 
community: 
The question of a transgender community in Sydney, there certainly is one, 
but it really is quite a disjointed community and also quite diverse. It is 
difficult to say that there is a transgender identity which is relevant to all 
transgenders. It is quite the opposite to that probably. There are not really 
two transgenders that are the same - the same as that would apply to 
'normal' society - to use the word normal. So the sense of community, if 
there is one, is the fact that we are sharing a common experience if you like. 
But even in that we do it in vastly different ways, and that can range from 
some transgenders being quite empowered in the process to others who have 
drug and alcohol problems and all kinds of difficulties in dealing with the 
process. Also, there are all kinds of different ideas about what the outcomes 
might be, and what they are striving for and what they are hoping to find 
perhaps in the process. So a community sense in terms of gathering together 
and that sort of thing does happen to a degree, but there are a lot of people 
who will purposely stay outside that community, who don't want to be 
involved. I think my experience tends to suggest that mostly people who do 
get involved in the community do so in terms of the need for support rather 
than a desire to be a transgender member of a transgender community. 
Michelle, MTF, 1996 
Michelle suggests that every transgender person is different. These differences 
reflect the sort of diversity that is found within the wider non-transgendered 
community. Unlike the gay or lesbian community, the transgendered community is 
not organised around a single all-inclusive identity category. Community is 
articulated through sharing a common experience. However, these experiences 
differ from individual to individual. Michelle emphasises the value of the use of 
community to individuals as a source of information, social contact and support. 
She suggests that people who access services within the community may not 
necessarily identify themselves as transgendered members of a transgendered 
community. 
The 'imagined' transgender community 
The focus of my research was transgender identities - in this regard the thesis 
was set up to acknowledge and explore diversity. Even so, the categories under 
investigation fragmented into a lot of disparate individuals who, on close 
investigation, appeared to have very little in common. In Chapter Four, for example, 
I discovered through my interview with Robyn that she was someone who was 
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biologically transgendered masquerading as a socially transgendered MTF in order 
to connect with people and access services. 
Inner city transgender community politics in Sydney during the sprmg and 
summer of 1996/97 illustrates many of the contradictions associated with the use 
of identity categories. The identity categories typically associated with gender, sex, 
sexual orientation and transsexualism, are simultaneously fixed and fluid, strategic 
and given, forced and chosen. This chapter, and the previous chapter, indicates that 
differences between transgendered people occur on the basis of geography, 
nationality, place of birth, politics, anatomy, class, ethnicity and combinations 
between social gender and sexuality. These differences may be appreciated only 
after careful attention to events and narratives collected through interviews and 
research in the field. The diversity within the transgender community problematises 
the categories with which transgender people identify and the notion of an 
internally coherent community. At the same time, public narratives draw on 
notions of community as if the category itself is self evident, coherent and 
unambiguous. The diversity within the inner city Sydney transgender community in 
1996/97 illustrates the ways in which identity categories are not homogeneous and 
unvarying, but instead are diverse and unstable in ways that make representing 
them analytically complex and challenging. 
I entered the research field in mid-October 1996 at a time when the political 
divisions within the community had migrated from the letters to the editor's column 
to the streets of Newtown. The debates were complicated and confusing to a person 
who at that time had no historical memory, or understanding, of the divisions 
within the community. Feelings in the community were 'raw' leading to the 
problems associated with asking interview participants the questions about 
community that I had prepared before going to Sydney - see Chapter Three. 
Goffman (1989: 128) suggests that in order to find out about internal cleavages you 
have to be strategic about how you manage social relationships. He suggests that 
researchers try to triangulate what people are saying with actual events - not as an 
interviewer but as a witness to how people react to what is going on around them. 
Familiarity with the local knowledges and debates presented in this chapter was 
made possible by actually living in the area of study. The politics and divisions 
within the Sydney transgender community were initially intimidating to an outsider 
such as myself. Evidence of the divisiveness of the politics that I encountered in 
1996/97 was implicitly presented in editions 22, 23 and 24 of PolaTe which were 
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published with the message "diverse and united in 1998" on the front cover. This 
message is interpreted differently by people who actually lived in the community 
and heard the sometimes acrimonious debates, by people who followed the more 
sanitised version of the debates in the press, and by people who read the cover 
without the knowledge of the political basis for the slogan's origins. 
Anderson (1983, 1991) explores how communities are imagined through 
narratives about simultaneous participation and sameness. The Sydney transgender 
community is also 'imagined'. Unity is constructed through words, images and 
shared narratives, times and experiences. This unity is struggled for in moments of 
stark division. Within this community space and place are vital as a sites for activity 
and as a symbols of difference and connection. Divisions within the community in 
1996/97 were aired publicly in the identity politics associated with the Gender 
Centre. The community is also a resource for articulating differences between pre-, 
post- and non-op, between MTF and FTM between those who identify as 
heterosexual and those who are lesbian or gay. The Sydney transgender community 
is not exclusively imagined through narratives about sameness. Attention to how 
community and unity are simultaneously constructed and deconstructed through 
difference and schism highlights the complex social processes through which 
minority communities are imagined. Investigation of the Sydney transgender 
community highlights differences as well as connections between people who 
transition across binary gender categories. These differences and connections are 
simultaneously personal, local, national and global. 
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Figure 1. 'Whether you identify as a Tranny, Sex Change, Drag Queen, Real 
Woman, Sister, Girlfriend, Transgender or Transsexual person HIV affects US ALL'. 
This safe sex pamphlet provides a sense of the range of identities within the Sydney 
transgender community (Produced by Norrie May Welby, 1992, on behalf of SWOP 
[Sex Workers Outreach Project] in association with ACON [AIDS Council of NSW]. 
Funded by the NSW AIDS Bureau). 
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EveryBody 
Feels at Home 'at 
294 KING STREET (FIRST LEVEL) 
(ACROSS FROM MCDONALDS) 
NEWTOWN 2042 
TEL: (02) 9519-6969 
OPEN: MON-FRI 6AM-10PM SAT-SUN 8AM-8PM 
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Figure 2. FAGS DYKES STRAIGHTS TRANNIES. And that's just the staff ... Every Body 
Feels at Home at NEWTOWN GYM'. This advertisement uses humour to 
communicate the diversity of its staff and therefore by implication the membership 
characteristics of the Newtown Gym (Source: CQ, 9/08/1996). 
UMATHURMAN 
DREW BARRYMORE 
BQYS ON THE SID!:: 
ISABELLA ROSSELLINI 
IMMORTAL BELOVED 
MORE DRAMA 
QUEENS. 
THERE ARE SOME THINGS Y;OU CAN ONLY; SEE 
WITH Y;OUR OPTUS MISION. 
Figure 3. Corporate advertising acknowledges Sydney's emerging queer 
communities in this example of the Optus Vision Movie Network 'More Drama 
Queens' advertising postcard (Avant card, Australia, 1996). 
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THE PLACE 
TO EAT, DRINK AND 
BE 
Figure 4. The Rocks. The place to 'Eat Drink and BE MalY~ MTF cross-gendered 
identities are 'imagined' in this advertisement for an up-market shopping and 
restaurant area (Source: Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras Festival Guide, 1997: 80). 
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':formatlon on services and products to suit your needs, Freecall™ 1800052 052,*" 
Advancing Australia 
Figure 5. This 'Te1stra' advertisement is aimed at an imagined queer community 
both within the company and in the public sphere. The text on the second page of 
this advertisement reads 'We Like Coming to the Party. You've probably seen 
friends wearing out t-shirts and baseball caps at Sydney Gay & Lesbian Mardi Gras. 
And you've probably seen our Phonecards™ and you may have even run into some 
of the members of our gay and lesbian staff association, Crossed Lines. (If you have, 
please return them to us in good condition) ... ' (Source: Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras 
Festival Guide, 1997: 2-3). 
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Figure 6. 'Holeproof Underdaks. You'll want to get caught with your pants down'. 
This advertisement appeals to an 'imagined' gay male reader (Source: Gay and 
Lesbian Mardi Gras Festival Guide, 1997: 34). 
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Figure 7. In Sydney bars and cafes frequented by openly transgendered people tend 
to be in the inner city suburbs of Darlinghurst and Newtown. In this advertisement 
the 'Taxi Club' nite-c1ub in Darlinghurst 'the only place where mad cow are just 
darling' celebrates its 40th birthday. (Source: CQ, issue 193, 14/06/96). 
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Figure 8. The Wizard of Id. This cartoon, written over with references to the 
Gender Centre (GC) and anti-medicalisation trany activists, was printed on the back 
of issue number seven of the street flyer 'The Rainbow; The promise? One 
community - greater diversity'. 
1 
Placing narratives in space and time 
Conclusion 
I have sketched two contrasting stories freely circulating at the end of the 
twentieth century: a narrative of polarised gendel~ one which finds 
communities in the past and draws upon them to assert the power of 
dualistic gender in our lives for the future; and a narrative of abolished 
gendel~ one without much of a tradition to draw upon, but which seeks to 
provide new stories of the ways in which lives can be lived without the 
'tyranny of gender'. There are many positions in between and all the stories 
need telling. 
- Ken Plummer (1995: 158) italics in the original 
Stories construct selves but they are also specific to time and place. New ideas 
and possibilities for action are made available in different relational settings. This 
thesis has been about locating shifting gender identities in the micro details of 
individual lives, and in the communities of the people that I interviewed. Chapters 
in the thesis have artificially distinguished between what was occurring 
simultaneously in local and national settings. Sociology entails an analysis of multi-
dimensional networks where all of these things are in play .. This chapter concludes 
the thesis by attending to these networks and outlining how key concepts have been 
used across the thesis. 
The individual stories presented in this thesis connect to debates in transgendered 
communities and to the broader analytic agendas about agency, selves and 
identities. People who transition across binary gender categories consciously locate 
themselves, both metaphorically and bodily, in public narratives of sex, gender and 
sexuality. They have experiences of managing bodies and identities that confound 
conventional discourses associated with sexual difference. The challenges 
associated with keeping a particular narrative of identity going while occupying a 
body that is differently sexed have provided an opportunity for a critical exploration 
of the relationship between sex, gender, sexuality and the narrative construction of 
identities. 
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The analyses presented in the thesis do not apply just to people who have 
transgendered bodies; they contribute to the literature on embodiment more 
generally. Contemporary social theorists of embodiment observe that recent 
attention to the body in mainstream social theory and in post-structuralist feminist 
thought has not tended to result in theories of the body that explore the concrete 
embodied practices of people in specific historical, social and cultural contexts 
(Davis, 1997: 13-15; Williams and Bendelow, 1998: 35, 127; Jackson and Scott 
(2001: 10-11). This thesis has attempted to contribute to a corporeal sociology of 
the body. Critical interrogation of dualistic understandings of sexual difference has 
occurred alongside careful attention to the particularities of embodied experience, 
situated knowledges and local practices. In this regard, the analyses of difference, 
normalisation and subversion presented in the thesis could also be applied to bodies 
that are differentiated in relation to sexuality, ethnicity and disability. My 
investigation of the way that bodies are regulated through state policies and 
practices could be applied to the lives and experiences of refugees/migrants, lesbian 
women, gay men and people who are disabled. Attention to the narratives of people 
who transition across binary gender categories has enabled an investigation of how 
embodied experience is mediated through cultural representations and in social 
interaction. Throughout the thesis I have argued that it is not just discourses but also 
spaces, places, times, stories and bodies that make subject positions available to 
actors. I would like to conclude with some final reflections on how I have used each 
of these concepts across the thesis. 
Place and space 
Narratives are embedded in place by the stories through which people constitute 
their identities. I have argued that place-based identities are tied to the micro-
politics of the sexed body. In Chapter Eight, for example, I explored the relationship 
between the local and national context in the construction of gendered citizenship 
in New South Wales, Australia. In this case, localised gender identities, differentiated 
by place of birth, are constructed through non -local state and federal legislation that 
specifies how the sex designation on the Births, Deaths and Marriages register is to 
be regulated and administered in different state and national settings. 
Transgender identities are not only constituted through national and 
international processes but are also tied to local places (Plummer, 1995: 149). This 
thesis has explored the internal dynamics of spaces through attention to physical 
locations - workplaces, restaurants, hairdressing salons, beauty salons, urban 
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streets, stages, conference venues and the Sydney Gender Centre. These social 
locations facilitate or inhibit stories, embodiment and the practice of narrativity. 
Sets of understandings about sexual difference are also constructed within broader 
patterns of inclusion and exclusion that shift and change according to particular 
times and spaces (Jacobs and Fincher, 1998: Z 1-ZZ). There are different 
possibilities for, and limitations on, claiming transgendered identities in different 
urban locales. These possibilities vary over time and between and within cities. In 
the film 'Priscilla Queen of the Desert' a comparison is made between places (rural 
Australia/the suburbs and the inner city) and the possibilities, or lack of 
possibilities, for the expression of minority identities in these particular locales. 
Place was also a significant element in my construction through fieldwork of 
transgendered community practices. I problematised ideas about communities and 
common territory by looking at the way that individual identities, and communities, 
are constructed in relation to broader social configurations that are not tied to place. 
Place introduces heterogeneity and difference into the categories 'transsexual' and 
'transgendered'. Some of the people whom I interviewed talked about differences in 
the range of possibilities for claiming transgendered identities within Australia and 
between Australia and the United States. In these examples, narrative identities have 
different interpretations whereby particular meanings, and struggles over identity, 
become salient in different relational settings. Drawing on the concepts of time and 
place within Anderson's (1991) arguments about how communities are 'imagined', 
I explored how the inner Sydney transgender community is constructed through 
unity, difference and schism. 
The politics of the spaces in which narratives, events, identities and experiences 
are at play has been a theme that I have considered throughout the thesis. My 
research indicates that stories and identities are constrained by the internal 
dynamics of the spaces in which narratives are told and heard. Through attention to 
the spatial aspects of narratives I explored how stories and identities shift and 
change according to the spaces and times in which they are embedded. Narratives 
are shaped by the spaces in which they are articulated (Plummer, 1995). They are 
also constrained by the politics of the spaces in which stories are expressed and 
received. The construction of space in relation to unproblematic binary gender 
categories is not recognised in much of the feminist geographical literature leading 
to a domination of theories about, and examples of, the (hetero)sexualisation of 
public space (McDowell, 1995, 1996; Valentine, 1996; Duncan, 1996). 
Transgender people illustrate the way that heterosexuality and gender are assumed 
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in public space. I have argued it may be productive to explore the way in which 
gender and sexuality intersect to exclude minority genders and sexualities from 
public spaces. 
locating stories in time 
Narratives, state records and communities are located in multiple and 
overlapping dimensions of time. Time is linear, cyclical and embedded in the flow of 
lived experience. Metaphors of time are embedded in individual stories about action 
and identities. The temporal dimensions associated with agency are indicated in 
references to past, present and future in the talk of some of the people that I 
interviewed. Most of the pre-operative people that I talked to experienced their 
present identities as fragmented and incomplete. A desire for genital surgery, 
and/ or unambiguous post-transitional identities, was often articulated in relation to 
aspirations for a future identity in which their anatomy and social identities were 
consistent. At the same time, they acknowledged that surgery and/or 'passing' 
would not change their identities. This is because identities are historically 
continuous. Past experiences of a life before surgery shape their orientation to the 
future. Life histories also explore how the past influences the present by using the 
present to reflect on the past. In Chapter Four, Robyn told a story about how the 
present enabled her to craft new stories about his/her past. She overtly re-
interpreted his/her history in light of new knowledges about his/her body. Robyn 
claimed a biological and social identity as a woman and he retained a male identity 
as a son and father. Robyn's history ensures that s/he will always be both male and 
female regardless of his/her social gender. 
The personal histories of transgendered individuals also complicated the 
administrative distinctions between male and female bodies on the New South 
Wales Births, Deaths and Marriages register. State recognition of transgender bodies 
and identities is incorporated into existing policies and practices through 
administrative strategies that attempt to maintain dualistic understandings of sexual 
difference. Place of birth refers to a specific locale situated in time. The births 
register is located in conventional linear time (time of birth and time of re-issue for 
change of sex). At the same time it enables the organisation and transfer of 
information through time and space. A post-operative transsexual, who secures a 
change of sex to reflect their chosen gender, has two birth certificates. Their 
personal history and state records reflect the fact that they are able to claim an 
historical identity as one sex and a current identity as another - in this sense they 
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are both/and. As a result they may have a multiplicity of identities within a single 
data base. For post-operative transsexuals the birth certificate acts as an archive for 
the conservation of traces (of a previous identity) that enables movement backwards 
and forwards through space and time. 
Stories and identities emerge from interaction, shifting and changing according 
to the spaces and times in which they occur. The possibilities for claiming 
transgendered identities vary over time. For example, differences and connections 
between trannies were articulated on the basis of time elapsed since their transition. 
Communities are also constructed through imagined connections between collective 
and chronological times. Benedict Anderson argues that group continuity and 
shared social meanings are constructed through the interaction between the daily 
lives of individuals and the collective time(s) of the community. Time, symbolised in 
mundane artifacts such as the daily newspaper, clock and calendar, is 
chronological, progressive or linear. Calendars and newspapers are important to the 
construction of collective times and identities as they record the significant annual 
events in which an individual and community participates. The narratives of the 
people who participated in this research were shaped by their location in a 
particular temporal and spatial field where complex social and political 
redefinitions of sex and gender are in play. 
Narrativity 
I explored the destabilising spatial, temporal and relational aspects of narratives 
by drawing on Somers' ideas about narrativity and narrative identity. Somers pays 
attention to differences in narratives across geographic space, while Plummer's 
work explores the social spaces in which stories are expressed and received. I 
argued that narratives and spaces are also unstable and relational as both are 
constituted by and constitute social processes. Narrative identities are never 
complete; they are always in the process of being formed. In this sense, identities are 
embedded in an ever unfolding flow of social relationships that shift over time and 
space. The social dynamics of space are indicated by its gendered and sexualised 
dimensions. An analysis of sexed identities that includes the specificity of relational 
settings and shared narratives is able to capture the complexity of the lived worlds 
of people who identify as transgendered. 
Somers' focus on reinterpreting historical data means that consideration of the 
dynamic aspects of inter-personal social encounters is largely absent from her 
264 
analysis. Davies and Harre's (1990, 1999) work on positioning was used to explore 
how people orient themselves in relation to their experience of interactions, 
practices and the public narratives embedded in conversational story-lines. People 
construct identities, however multiple and changing, by locating themselves or by 
being located in stories or public narratives that shift over time and space. Some 
stories presented in the thesis, such as Robyn's, illustrate the foundational 
importance of biology to narrative constructions of selves. Others, such as Norrie 
May Welby, have offered stories that highlight identity construction as an overt 
part of the story-telling process. In these narratives stories about selves are never 
complete because they are always in the process of being made (Benson, 2001: 49). 
People who are in the process of transitioning across gender categories are 
acutely aware of their own gendered subject position and the way that they are 
positioned as male and female in conversations with others. The different ways that 
people who are trangendered position themselves, and are positioned by others, 
illustrates the complex ways that identities are negotiated in everyday social 
encounters. Their narratives also indicate that positioning is not just a 
conversational phenomenon; subject positions are also tied to the internal dynamics 
of spaces - hairdressing salons, restaurants, beauty salons, stages, workplaces, and 
bedrooms - and specific bodies. Many of the people whom I interviewed wanted to 
position themselves physically as a gendered person (or as both/and or neither 
gender in Welby's case) rather than just through words or conversations. My 
research suggests that subject positions offered in conversations are not exclusively 
discursive, or performative, but are tied to a person's corporeality. Understanding 
narrative identities as embedded in the politics of spaces, cultural representations, 
public narratives and relationships to others foregrounds the active, fluid, 
contingent and social nature of stories and sUbjectivities. 
Corporeality 
Attention to the situated dimensions of social interaction suggests that it is not 
just spaces but also discourses and corporeality that make certain subject positions 
available to actors. Throughout the thesis I have paid attention to the way that 
corporeality may inform choices and shape action and identity. Conversations with 
transgendered people have provided some insight into the way bodies impact on 
action and identities. Transgender identities are the outcome of a complex 
interaction between corporeality, culture and SUbjectivity. They are managed in the 
context of occupying bodies that confound conventional discourses associated with 
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sexual difference. The liminality of people who identify as transsexual or 
transgendered allowed them to reflect on the relationship between gender identity, 
corporeality and medical technologies. I explored contradictions and ambiguities 
associated with transgender embodiment through research informants' narratives 
about the relationship between identity, corporeality and gender reassignment 
technologies. 
Some of the people that I interviewed used the body as a resource, while others 
experienced it as a form of constraint. Robyn and Nick's decisions to change their 
social gender, for example, are grounded in new knowledges about their physiology 
and 'felt' in their experiences of bodily changes. Norrie May Welby used his/her 
corporeality to demonstrate the interchangeability of sex and gender. Forms of 
embodied corporeality - voice, gestures and movement of the body - were employed 
to trouble public narratives associated with sex and gender and to draw attention to 
the social fields through which gender is inscribed in the body and institutionalised 
as naturalised difference. The 'natural' anatomical bodies of intersexed children 
were used by some transgender activists as a resource for questioning cultural, 
medical and institutional categories of sex and gender and the forms of social 
exclusion that these categories legitimate. In these examples, transgender 
narratives, bodies and identities are problematic because they blur the boundaries of 
sexual difference in ways that lay bare the processes through which inclusion in one 
category is dependent upon exclusion from its opposite. 
Moira Gatens' arguments about the body politic were extended through 
consideration of the way that the gender identities of transgendered people were 
administered by a modern state. In New South Wales sexual citizenship for post-
operative transsexuals is constituted through the consumption of gender 
reassignment technologies. Within this legislation, transgender people are identified 
with the body in so far as the body is understood as the site of these inscriptions. 
Transgendered people, like homosexuals and disabled people as 'other' within the 
body politic, attract state interventions that would not be tolerated in other areas of 
social life. 
Transgendered people also spoke about how inconsistencies between their 
corporeality and their narratives about self impacted on action and identity. Nick, 
Jimmy, and Jack talked about the way that their identities were constrained by a 
perceived lack of surgical options for FTMs. In the bedroom, for example, Jack's 
male identity was disrupted by his lack of a penis. Michelle, Jane, Anita, Mary and 
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Angie talked about the difficulties that were associated with maintaining a feminine 
identity while their anatomical sex and social genders were inconsistent. Being pre-
operative meant that Angie felt that she was also unable to actively take up the 
identity of 'straight female'. In these narratives forms of selfhood were disturbed by 
bodies that did not conform to certain expectations. The solution was that bodies 
should therefore be 'brought into line' by surgery. Medical technologies provided 
the resources for Michelle, Jane, Angie and Anita to become embodied subjects 
through changing the relationship between their bodies, gender and sexual 
identities. 
The narratives of transgender people illustrate that bodies impact on the 
discursive positioning of selves. For many transgender or transsexual people 
identities are simultaneously discursive and corporeal. It would be impossible for 
transgendered people to tell the stories presented in the thesis without having had 
the experience of occupying bodies that are in some ways problematic. This suggests 
that access to the contradictions and ambiguities associated with the agency of 
transgendered people necessitates attention to the messy materialities of bodies. 
Agency 
In Chapter Six, I explored how liberal humanist understandings of agency 
connect with post-structuralist constructions of agency that focus on the way 
agency is produced by (humanist) discourses that constitute subjects as active 
agents. I argued for an understanding of agency that draws on agents as strategic 
and knowledgeable actors and embeds agency in the temporal and personal aspects 
of experience. Exploring the agency of people who engage in medical technologies 
for crafting gender also requires that the relationship between corporeality and 
identity be acknowledged. 
The assumption of embodied continuity in common-sense narratives is 
potentially problematic for many transgendered individuals who experience 
significant discontinuities between their corporeality and their gender identity. A 
lack of attention to the relationship between embodiment, identity and action, as 
well as to the corporeal limits of some bodies, is also evident in some sociological 
debates surrounding agency. In some post-structuralist accounts of agency and 
sUbjectivity the body also tends to be unproblematically presented as a natural 
template on which understandings about sexual difference are inscribed. 
Specifically individual actions become products of discourse in ways that tend to 
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ignore the corporeal limitations of some bodies. In the thesis I have considered how 
embodied experience interacts with discourse, meaning and sUbjectivity to frame 
individual actions. I have argued that bodies are not simply positions in discourse or 
the product of social practices; on the contrary, it is through an individual's 
experience of the interaction between their flesh, forms of inscription and their 
intentions, that bodies come to have personal significance and meaning. 
The medical and academic literature used in critical analyses of sex change 
surgery tends to offer a dominant reading of this practice. Within these analyses 
transsexual desires for, and uses of, gender reassignment technologies are tied to 
hegemonic relations of medicine, gender and sexuality. A lack of attention to the 
diversity of positions among those people who chose to surgically alter their body 
leads to a homogenised account of transsexuals and their location in medical 
discourses. Transsexuals who access medical technologies are granted a degree of 
agency by analysts that is rarely given to women using cosmetic surgery. However, 
rhetorics of medical violence, danger and control tend to construct people who 
engage in elective surgical alteration of the body as passive casualties of larger 
external processes. These analyses position transsexuals who use medical 
technologies as cultural dupes rather than as active negotiators with the medical 
profession over their health care. Transsexuals' accounts of their actions suggest 
that they simultaneously collude with and resist the reconstruction of the body in 
relation to norms of gender that are embedded in their own and in medical 
narratives about the relationship between anatomy and social gender. Transsexuals 
provide a good example of how people can construct themselves as active agents 
through choosing to remake themselves in various ways. Transsexual agency is also 
constrained within the context of a variety of institutional regimes and normalising 
assumptions and practices that are constructed and inscribed within medical 
discourses and reinforced through public narratives about lines of connection 
between sexed bodies and identities. 
Narratives of gender and practiced embodiment 
In the quote that begins this chapter Plummer (1995) contrasts 'a narrative of 
polarised gender' with 'a narrative of abolished gender' and embraces the need for 
stories of lives that escape 'the tyranny of gender'. This thesis suggests that the 
project of 'abolishing gender' was not embraced by the people I spoke to who 
identified as transgendered. Even Norrie May Welby, who embraced gender 
ambiguity, also utilised gender difference. What their stories and analyses illustrate 
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is the strategic crafting of gender in particular contexts usmg skilful practices. 
These practices are both collective, invented and reworked in specific places, spaces 
and moments in time. This thesis has attempted to demonstrate the complex social 
processes associated with the accomplishment of transgender identities and how 
they might be analysed through attention to bodies, spaces and the practices of 
narrativity. 
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Research Appendix 
1. Information Sheet 
2. Consent Form 
3. Interview schedule 
'Transgendered'I'transsexual' identities and gender reassignment surgery 
University of Canterbury 
Department of Sociology 
Information Sheet 
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You are invited to participate in a PhD research project which explores what 
transgendered people have to say about changing one's gender identity and gender 
reassignment surgery. Those participating in the study have been contacted through 
networks in trans gender communities. 
Your participation in the project will involve an initial interview. Some of those 
interviewed will be asked to participate in further discussion of issues surrounding 
transgendered identities and gender reassignment surgery. You can decide at that time 
whether you want to continue to be involved in this research. 
The initial interview(s) will discuss how transgendered people negotiate gender both 
inside and outside the transgendered community. You will also be asked for your views 
on sex reassignment surgery. Magazine articles which attempt to represent the 
experiences of transgendered/transsexual people will be used in these discussions. You 
may want to talk about your own experiences, however, you are not obliged to do so in 
this interview. 
Should you agree to an interview, a copy of the interview questions, as well as 
information about the magazine articles to be discussed, will be made available to you 
prior to the interview. 
You are assured of the complete confidentiality of any information gathered in this 
investigation. The identity of participants will not be made public. You will receive a 
copy of the interview transcript and will have the opportunity to change this record of the 
interview or add anything to clarify your views. No information that could identify 
individual participants will be included in the transcripts or any documents that may be 
published, including the PhD thesis. The transcript of your interview will not be made 
available to a third party without your explicit permission. 
My name, contact address and phone number are as follows: 
Suzanne Phibbs 
Department of Sociology 
Private Bag 4800 
Christchurch 
NEW ZEALAND 
Telephone 3667 001 ext. 8197 (University) 
3528844 (home) 
email: soci062@canterbury.ac.nz 
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From October 14 until December 23 1996 I may be contacted at the following address (e-
mail and telephone number to be advised). 
Women's Hall 
University of Sydney 
Sydney NSW 2006 
AUSTRALIA 
I will be pleased to discuss any comments you may have about participation in the 
project. 
The project has been reviewed by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee. 
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'Transgendered' I'transsexual' identities 
and gender reassignment surgery 
Consent Form 
For the interview participant: 
I have read and understood the description of the above-named project. On this basis I 
agree to participate in the project, and I consent to the publication of infonnation I 
provide in this interview with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved. I 
understand also that I may at any time withdraw from the project, including the 
withdrawal of any infonnation I have provided. 
Signed...................................................... ............ ... Date ............................................. . 
For the researcher: 
I agree to abide by the conditions set out in the infonnation sheet and consent fonn. I 
also agree to respect any additional conditions set down by the interview participant. 
Signed......................................................................... Date ........................................... . 
273 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Section A 
Transgender communities ~ local, national and international 
I'd like to start with some questions about the trans gender community here in (name of 
city) ChristchurchIW ellington/Sydney. 
1. Is there a trans gender community in (name of city)? 
2. If so, have you been involved in the trans gender community in (name of city)? 
3. What sort of support does the (name of community) offer individuals? (formally/ 
informally) 
4. What do you think are some of the major issues facing transgendered people? 
5. Is there agreement about these issues in the trans gender community here in (name of 
city)? 
6. Is the (name of community) involved in political work? (i.e. agitating for anti-
discrimination legislation, supporting people who have issues with employers, local 
government etc). 
7. Do you know if your concerns/solutions to these problems are shared by people in 
other transgendered communities? 
Differences and connections 
8. In what ways do you think people who identify as transsexual/transgendered differ 
from Drag Queens, transvestites and hermaphrodites? Are these differences important to 
people who are involved in the trans gender community? 
Section B 
Magazine articles ~ your responses 
In this extract from a magazine article Sarah suggests that people who have a gender 
identity that is different from their anatomical body at birth have 'an over-developed 
sense of what gender is' . 
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I tend to think that I have an over-developed sense of what gender is, I am acutely 
aware of it all the time, namely because I don't feel comfortable in the one that 
was assigned to me - Sarah (from Canta Issue 10, 22/05/96 p. 15). 
Do people who wish to change their gender from the one they were assigned at birth have 
an 'over-developed' sense of what gender is? 
In another context feminist Simone de Beauvoir wrote 'one is not born, but rather 
becomes a woman ... ' (From 'The Second Sex' 1953,273). 
Do you think that gender is a process, something we learn, or do you think that it is 
inherent or 'inborn'? 
Or to put it another way is it both a matter of who you feel you 'really are' and a process? 
In an article in the New Yorker magazine Michael (who has changed his anatomical 
gender from female to male) says ... 
"I'm not a professional transsexual. I don't think of myself as transsexual 
anymore. I was one, I made that transition, now I'm just a man" - Michael 
interviewed in Bloom (From 'The body lies' in The New Yorker, July 18, 1994 p. 
49). 
Michael no longer identifies as a "transsexual". What would you see as the advantages 
and disadvantages of rejecting a transsexual/transgender identity in these circumstances? 
Some people who have changed from male to female have spoken about the loss of 
privilege and status associated with their transition from male to female identities. 
'If wealth and power are important, and if in this world wealth and power belong 
to men, then why did I cease being a man and give up that wealth and power'? -
Kate Bomstein (from Mondo 2000, issue 13, 1995 p. 116). 
We live in a patriarchal (male dominated) society, a man still has more status than 
a woman does - Sarah (from Canta Issue 10 22/05/96 p.16) 
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Conversely people who change their gender identity from female to male sometimes talk 
about 'stepping into the trappings of power as men' (Bornstein from Mondo 2000, issue 
13 1995 P 116). 
Do people who adopt a different gender from the one they were assigned at birth talk 
about, or notice, these differences in status/power between men and women? 
Can you describe these differences or give some examples? 
According to Sarah ... 
There are nearly as many different views on the condition of trans sexuality as 
there are transsexuals. Some believe that it is isn't a biological condition, but 
rather a construct of the artificial dichotomy of gender in Western society. In one 
way this is correct, in that a two gender system is an artificial creation, that there 
are definitely more than just two sexes. - Sarah(from Canta Issue 10 22/05/96 p. 
17). 
Do you agree with Sarah? Is the two gender system an artificial creation or are there 
inherent differences between people? Are there more than two sexes? 
In 'The Transsexual Empire' Janice Raymond suggests that transsexuals are 
psychologically unstable victims of a society that over-emphasises the roles of 
sexual insignia (gender) and sexual difference (anatomy) .. (From Amy Bloom 
'The body lies' in The New Yorker, July 18, 1994 p. 38) 
Amy Bloom says that. .. 
If the people involved were less nuts and society were less rigid, it seemed, neither 
transsexuals nor the surgery they seek would exist (From Amy Bloom 'The body 
lies' in The New Yorker, July 18, 1994 p. 38). 
How do you respond to these comments? 
Amy Bloom indicates that some of 'the psychological literature suggests that 
transsexualism is a behavioural problem with a surgical solution' (Amy Bloom, The New 
Yorker, July 18, 1994 p. 47). 
How do you respond to the claim that "transsexualism" is a 'behavioural problem'? 
Is "transsexualism" a psychological problem? 
Do you think people who have/desire gender reassignment surgery differ from people 
who have/desire cosmetic surgery? 
Is it more socially acceptable to have cosmetic surgery than it is to have gender 
reassignment surgery? Why? 
In what ways, if any, are these medical procedures similar/different? 
How do you respond to suggestions by some feminists that transsexuals are erotically 
attracted to those of the same gender and change their anatomy in order to be 
heterosexual? 
Kate Bornstein says she feels she was manipulated into having surgery because our 
culture insists that our gender and our anatomies match up ... 
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I resent that I was manipulated into that surgery by every signpost in the culture. I 
was a total subscriber to the Binary and to the genitals by which it stands. I knew 
I wasn't a BOY, I knew I wasn't a MAN. Neither of those categories fit for 
me ... The only other option I saw in the culture was GIRL, or WOMAN. Nowhere 
else did I see that it was okay to be a "real woman" - which I believed in -with a 
penis! So the next step was get rid of the penis. This insistence on the Binary and 
the genital imperative that signals the Binary coerced me into that - Kate 
Bornstein (from Mondo 2000, issue 13, 1995 p. 116). 
Do you agree with Kate Bornstein? Why? Why not? 
If we lived in a society where gender did not matter, or was not so tied to anatomy, would 
this make a difference to transsexuals/transgender people? How? 
Kate Bornstein describes herself as a "gender outlaw" who is 
looking forward to us all living in ... a 'Third Space'. I don't say there is a third 
space that exists between men and women. I say there is a third space outside of 
the Binary which leaves the Binary (understandings about male and female) as 
this construct off to the side, very fragile and apt to fall apart". 
If we lived in this third space and "if I were a man, everything about me 
that brings me grief in the world .... wouldn't even matter. .. " (from Mondo 2000, 
issue 13, 1995 p. 116). 
What do you think about this 'third space' which Kate Bornstein discusses? 
Do you think that some transgendered people live in that third space now? 
Have your ideas about masculinity and femininity and trans gender changed in the last few 
years? How? 
Is it possible to have a 'real' woman with a penis and a 'real' man with a vagina as 
Bornstein suggests? 
What makes it difficult to live in a body which is female but has a penis, or is male but 
has no penis? 
277 
Luis who has changed his anatomical gender from female to male states: 
Gender is slippery. I used to see it as black and white - men, women, that is it. I 
wanted to be perceived as a male, in a male role, with male attributes. I don't 
hold on to that anymore. Male, female - I don't even understand that anymore. 
And I find, after all this (surgical intervention) it doesn't matter much" - Luis 
(From Amy Bloom 'The body lies' in The New Yorker, July 18, 1994 p. 40). 
Do you agree with Luis? Why? Why not? 
Section C 
Gender-reassignment surgery 
I'd like to finish with some questions about the use of hormone replacement therapy and 
the range surgical procedures available to people who want to change their anatomical 
gender. 
1. Have you used hormone replacement therapy or surgical procedures? 
2. Have you tried to find out more about hormone replacement therapy and/or gender 
reassignment surgery? 
3. How did you find out about these procedures? 
4. What do you think about gender reassignment surgeries? 
5. What do you think are the positive and negative aspects of these procedures? 
6. Is there a lot of discussion of them in the community in (name of city)? 
7. Are there different views on hormone replacement therapy and gender reassignment 
surgery in this community? 
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